THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GABRIEL HERNANDEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

After
the appellant had been tried in criminal cases Nos. 839 and 844 of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, for resistance to agents of
persons in authority and arbitrary detention, respectively, he was
convicted and sentenced to three (3) years, six (6) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional with the corresponding accessory
penalties and to pay a fine of five hundred pesos (P500) with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the costs, in the
first case, and to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional
with the corresponding accessory penalties and likewise to pay the
costs of the suit, in the latter. From both judgments he appealed to
this court for a review thereof.

The informations filed by
the provincial fiscal of Camarines Norte against the appellant in the
aforesaid two cases read as follows:

“That
on or about the 27th day of August, 1932, in the municipality of Daet,
Province of Camarines Norte, Philippine Islands, after the complainant,
as the duly appointed provincial sheriff of Camarines Norte, had
informed the said defendant of the existence of a writ of execution
issued by the court against him in connection with civil case No. 775
entitled ‘The Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Gabriel
Hernandez’, and after showing him the writ in question and on the
occasion that said complainant, then acting in the performance of his
duties, proceeded to attach the personal property belonging to him, the
said defendant, taking advantage of his public position as provincial
governor of Camarines Norte and abusing the same, by means of force and
threat, resisted, refused and tenaciously opposed compliance with the
aforesaid order of the court to be enforced by said complainant, and in
order to accomplish such resistance the said defendant ordered the
chief of police of Daet to detain and lock up the complainant, which
was so done in effect.

“Contrary to law, and with the
concurrence of the first aggravating circumstance specified in article
14 of the Penal Code, that is, the taking advantage by the offender of
his public position.” (Case No. 839.)

“That on or about the
27th day of August, 1932, in the municipality of Daet, Province of
Camarines Norte, Philippine Islands, on the occasion that the offended
party, Amador E. Gomez, as provincial sheriff of Camarines Norte,
appeared at the house of the defendant, Gabriel Hernandez, to proceed
with the attachment of the personal property belonging to the latter
and his wife, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the court in
civil case No. 775, entitled ‘The Collector of Internal Revenue vs.
Gabriel Hernandez’, the said defendant Gabriel Hernandez, who was then
governor of Camarines Norte, and Marcos Panotes, who was chief of
police of the municipality of Daet, taking advantage of their
respective public positions and abusing the same, voluntarily,
illegally and criminally, without any legal motive or right whatsoever,
detained, locked up and deprived the said offended party of his liberty
against his will, for a period of time less than three days.

“Contrary
to law, and with the concurrence of the first aggravating circumstance
(specified in article 14 of the Penal Code), that is, the taking
advantage by the offender Hernandez of his public position.” (Case No.
844.)

The appellant bases his appeal on the ground that the trial court committed the following alleged errors:

“1.
That in the statement of facts appearing in the decision appealed from,
only the evidence of the provincial sheriff was taken into
consideration;

“2. In declaring in its findings of fact that the defendant ‘energetically ordered the said chief of police to arrest the provincial sheriff on his responsibility as provincial governor of Camarines Norte‘;

“3. In not holding it as a proven and undisputed fact that the
provincial sheriff and the defendant were and still are political
enemies and that the provincial sheriff harbored a personal grudge
against him;

“4. In not permitting the witnesses for the
defense Marcosa Pimentel and Emilio Zaleta to testify in corroboration
of the defendant’s testimony to the effect that when the provincial
sheriff forced his way into the house for the second time, the door
thereof was locked, and in holding that the door in question was open;

“5. In having given more credit to the testimony of the provincial
sheriff and his deputy Jose Rada, and in discrediting the testimony of
the defendant and his witnesses;

“6. In holding that the defendant resisted by means of force and intimidation;

“7. In holding that the defendant by a single act committed the
offenses of resistance to agents of persons in authority and arbitrary
detention, and in sentencing him to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days for the first, and to one (1) year and one (1) day
for the second;

“8. In not dismissing these cases and absolving the defendant; and

“9. In denying the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and a new trial.”

By agreement of the prosecution and the defense, the two cases in
question, and case No. 840, for usurpation of judicial functions, which
latter case resulted in the acquittal of the defendant therein, who is
the appellant herein, were tried together.

Before
presentation of evidence by the fiscal, the appellant spontaneously
made the following admissions, to wit: That he, his wife Marcosa
Pimentel and Angel Pimentel were defendants in civil case No. 775
instituted by the Collector of Internal Revenue in the justice of the
peace court of Daet, Camarines Norte; that judgment was rendered
therein sentencing the three of them to pay to the then plaintiff the
sum of two hundred twenty-three pesos and twenty-six centavos
(P223.26); that said judgment became final and executory on February
23, 1931; that the corresponding writ of execution was issued by the
justice of the peace court of Daet; that he (the appellant) was and
still is the provincial governor of Camarines Norte since October 16,
1931; that from February 13, 1932, to December 14th of the same year,
Amador E. Gomez was the provincial sheriff thereof without having been
suspended from such office; that Jose Rada was the deputy sheriff of
Camarines Norte during the same period of time; that on August 29,
1932, he (the appellant) filed a complaint for trespass to dwelling
against the said Amador E. Gomez in the justice of the peace court.

Immediately thereafter, the fiscal proceeded to present his evidence without any objection on the part of the appellant.

It appears from a careful examination of the evidence of record that on
August 20, 1932, the provincial treasurer of Camarines Norte, acting
under instructions from the Collector of Internal Revenue, asked for
and obtained from the justice of the peace of Daet the writ of
execution Exhibit B which was delivered to the provincial sheriff
Amador E. Gomez for execution.

As a preliminary step in the
execution of the writ in question, the aforesaid provincial sheriff, on
August 24, 1932, sent his deputy Jose Rada to the office of the
appellant, who was then the governor of Camarines Norte, to demand
payment of the amount specified in the judgment rendered against him,
his wife and Angel Pimentel, and to show him the writ of execution of
the judgment in question. The appellant told the said deputy sheriff
that he had no money with which to pay it at that moment but he
promised to do so within thirty days. He noted this at the foot of the
said writ Exhibit B.

Inasmuch as this proposition of the
appellant was not satisfactory to him, the provincial sheriff Amador E.
Gomez again sent his deputy on August 26, 1932, to inform the appellant
that it was necessary for the latter to satisfy the judgment, otherwise
his personal property would be attached in accordance with the
requirement of the said writ. The appellant then proposed that the
sheriff attach the stripping machine outfit which he had on his
hacienda, a motor-propelled sail boat and a banca belonging
to him, all of which had cost him more than one thousand fifty pesos
but which he appraised at only six hundred forty pesos on that
occasion, which sum was double the amount of the judgment in question.
To that effect, he delivered to the deputy sheriff a list of said
properties, Exhibit 1. Neither did this new proposition of the
appellant satisfy the provincial sheriff. For the third time, he sent
his deputy to the said appellant’s office to tell him that the
attachment of the personal property which he had in his house would
necessarily take place.

In order to avoid the proposed
attachment of his aforesaid personal property, the appellant addressed
the letter Exhibit E to the sheriff entreating him in the meantime to
suspend execution of the judgment in question, at least until he had
received an answer to the telegram which he had sent to the Collector
of Internal Revenue. He in fact sent a telegram to the aforesaid
official requesting suspension of the execution, binding himself to pay
the amount of the judgment with his salary as provincial governor. In
reply thereto, said official, in the telegram Exhibit V, advised the
appellant to file a petition to that effect with the justice of the
peace court, saying that he would agree to the proposed arrangement if
the official concerned granted his petition. Notwithstanding this, the
deputy sheriff, acting under the provincial sheriff’s orders, appeared
at the appellant’s house with several policemen between 2 and 3 o’clock
on the afternoon of August 27, 1932, and again informed the said
appellant of his intention to attach his personal property,
particularly the piano and chairs which he had in his house, if he did
not pay the amount of the afore-mentioned judgment. Believing the
presence of so many policemen in his house as unnecessary, the
appellant ordered those who accompanied the deputy sheriff to go back
and attend to their own duties, addressing the letter Exhibit C to
their chief thereby ordering him not to provide the sheriff with
policemen.

Upon being informed by his deputy of the
appellant’s attitude, the sheriff went to the lieutenant of the
Constabulary at Daet, and later to Captain Legaspi of the said
organization—who happened to be in the barrio of Dogongan at that
time—to ask for soldiers to help him enforce the writ of execution. Not
having obtained any help, either from the former officer who told him
that nothing would happen to the deputy sheriff in view of the fact
that the persons involved were educated, or from the latter who
requested him to put his petition in writing and furthermore to certify
that the police force was unable to provide him with the necessary aid,
he applied to the municipal president for police assistance. He was
given three men with whom the deputy sheriff, under orders from the
said provincial sheriff, again returned to the appellant’s house for
the same purpose. When the deputy sheriff again failed in his attempt
and the appellant ordered the policemen to retire for the second time,
the provincial sheriff himself, accompanied by the chief of police,
went to the former’s house, first passing by and communicating with the
municipal president Francisco Carranceja and Froilan Pimentel, who
filed the complaint and who was at the said house at that time. When he
arrived at the appellant’s house, he again insisted in proceeding with
the attachment. Said appellant once more reiterated his request not to
attach the personal property in his house but those specified in
Exhibit 1, adding that he would be willing to surrender other property
in case the proceeds of the sale thereof were insufficient to satisfy
the judgment. Joining the conversation, the appellant’s wife told the
said provincial sheriff that, if he so desired, he could sell the
shelves under her house, besides the property offered by her husband,
except her piano and chairs. Unable to control her temper under the
impression that her piano and chairs were to be seized by the
provincial sheriff, the said wife of the appellant made more or less
insulting remarks to the sheriff. In order that things might not come
to the worst and to avoid his wife meddling in said affair, the
appellant invited the said sheriff downstairs for the purpose of coming
to an understanding with him out of his wife’s presence. Once there,
the appellant showed the telegram of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
Exhibit V, to the sheriff to convince him that his request for the
suspension of the execution was reasonable. However, the provincial
sheriff said that he did not acknowledge the telegram in question and
that, any way, he considered it his duty to proceed with the execution.
He likewise stated that he did not agree with the proposition to attach
only the appellant’s stripping machine outfit and his boats for the
reason that they were four kilometers away from the town, and,
furthermore, because he believed that in case they were sold at public
auction, he would not obtain a good price for them. Neither did he
agree with the other proposition to the effect that the latter be
allowed to pay his debt with his salary, even if he were given a formal
authority to collect the same. While the two were discussing the
matter, the appellant’s wife or another person, who was upstairs,
barred the door. perhaps to prevent the piano and the chairs from being
carried away.

Instead of quieting down in view of the
reasons given by the appellant, the provincial sheriff curtly asked the
latter whether he could guaranty his personal safety. Having been
answered in the negative, he then went upstairs, in spite of the
appellant’s warning not to do so for the reason that the door was
barred. After forcing open the door by breaking the bar thereof, he
seized one of the chairs, which was within reach of his hand, to begin
what he believed, according to him, was a legitimate exercise of his
functions as sheriff in the enforcement of a writ of execution which
was delivered to him for execution. In view of the provincial sheriff’s
actions, the appellant approached and held him by the arm with one hand
while with the other he wrested the chair which said sheriff wanted to
deliver by force to one of the several laborers who were standing by
for his orders, under the house. While these developments were taking
place, and even prior thereto, that is, from 2 o’clock on the afternoon
of that day, August 27, 1932, many people gathered about the
appellant’s house to see and witness how the governor’s property was to
be attached inasmuch as the news had spread that the sheriff Amador E.
Gomez would go there that afternoon to do so. Many persons, young and
old, on the street near the appellant’s house said that the sheriff
intended to attach the property of the latter and take his piano and
chairs. This spectacle was accentuated by the presence of several
policemen.

When the provincial sheriff went up to the house
to force open the door, as stated, the appellant called the chief of
police, who was on the street, and ordered him to arrest the sheriff on
the alleged ground that the latter was committing an act of trespass to
dwelling. Said officer of the law made the arrest not only because he
was ordered to do so by his superior, but also because he really
believed that the sheriff was committing an abuse in the house in
question by carrying away a chair by force.

The appellant’s
proposition to the effect that he be permitted to pay the amount of the
judgment in question with his salary as governor, was accepted by the
Collector of Internal Revenue, and pursuant to such understanding, he
actually paid it on October 4 and November 1, 1932, there having been
no necessity, therefore, of resorting to the process of execution.

After the provincial sheriff has been placed under arrest by the chief
of police, he was brought to the latter’s office at about 6 o’clock
that afternoon. He was permitted to drop in at the house of the justice
of the peace to find out whether he could be released under bond.
Inasmuch as the said justice of the peace stated that he could not fix
the amount of the bond unless an information was filed against him, it
was not possible for the sheriff to file any bond. When the appellant
was informed thereof in a letter, Exhibit B, addressed to him by the
chief of police, he replied by means of Exhibit C, as follows:

“Sir:
Replying to your query regarding the person in detention, I again
reiterate what I have already stated to the effect that you may
provisionally release him inasmuch as we shall not be able to file an
information against him tonight, nor tomorrow being Sunday. As far as I
am concerned I have no objection to placing him at liberty under
instructions to appear on Monday morning.”

This letter Exhibit C was sent to the chief of police at about 7
o’clock that same evening but, for one reason or another, the sheriff
did not leave the former’s office until 8.45 o’clock that night.

From the foregoing, which is a summary of the pertinent facts connected
with the two cases under consideration, it will be seen that the
alleged offense of resistance to an agent of a person in authority,
with which the defendant is charged, consisted in his having prevented
the provincial sheriff from carrying away his piano and chairs from his
house by holding him by the arm with one hand while with the other he
wrested the chair which the said sheriff was trying to deliver to one
of the several laborers standing by for his orders below or at the foot
of the stairs of the appellant’s house. The alleged offense of
arbitrary detention with which he was likewise charged consisted in his
having ordered the chief of police to arrest said sheriff, depriving
him of his liberty at least from 6 to 8.45 o’clock in the evening.

Under other circumstances, the appellant’s act in trying to prevent the
sheriff from carrying away his piano and chairs, in the manner above
stated, would constitute a slight offense of resistance to an agent of
a person in authority, but under the circumstances which led to the
commission thereof, it cannot be considered as such. There is no
question that a sheriff may attach the property of a judgment or
execution debtor if he is clothed with the necessary authority under a
judicial writ, as provided for in section 453 of Act No. 190. However,
it should not be construed to mean that, having discretion in choosing
the property to be attached, he should necessarily levy upon such
property as is valued by the execution debtor, particularly when the
latter places other property at his disposal, as was done herein, the
value of which is greatly in excess of the amount of the judgment under
execution. The aforesaid provision does not forbid the execution
debtor, in case he has sufficient property to answer for the payment of
the judgment, to point out to the sheriff which of such property should
be attached and sold to satisfy the judgment with the proceeds thereof.
On the contrary, it may be inferred from the provisions of section 457
of the aforesaid Act that there would be no irregularity committed by
such procedure. It should be noted that, after describing the manner in
which the personal property of the execution debtor should be sold at
public auction, the last sentence of the afore-cited section reads as
follows:

“The judgment debtor, if present
at the sale, may direct the order in which property, real or personal,
shall be sold. when such property consists of several known lots or
parcels of articles which can be sold to advantage separately, and the
officer must follow such directions.”

If
this is permissible, and it is being followed in all cases, why may not
the same be done in the case of an attachment when there are several
properties that may be attached and, furthermore, their value is
sufficient to answer for the amount of the judgment?

The
provincial sheriff really acted arbitrarily and with malice, and even
more than that, with unnecessary severity and abuse. The time requested
by the appellant for the suspension of his action was only a little
more than one day, which was the intervening period of time between
Saturday night, when the incidents which gave rise to the two criminal
processes under consideration occurred, and the following Monday, when,
pursuant to the suggestion of the Collector of Internal Revenue, his
judgment creditor of which suggestion said sheriff was fully aware, he
would be able to apply to the justice of the peace court which issued
the writ, for even a temporary suspension of the writ in question,
inasmuch as said judgment creditor was agreeable thereto. The amount
involved therein was only two hundred twenty-three pesos and twenty-six
centavos. Neither was it a case in which an insolvent person was
concerned for the appellant was not insolvent because he had other
property aside from that offered by him under Exhibit 1 and the shelves
which he had under his house, which shelves must be considered valuable
on the ground that the prosecution did not prove the contrary.
Furthermore, he had his salary as governor, which he also offered in
payment of his obligation, even to the extent of expressing his
willingness to execute the necessary power of attorney so that the
sheriff could collect and apply it to satisfy the judgment which he was
endeavoring to execute. The truth is that the sheriff saw an
opportunity to get even with the appellant who defeated him in the
preceding elections and to avenge the affront which the latter offered
him in tenaciously opposing his appointment as provincial sheriff.
These facts place the latter’s testimony in disrepute, making it
entirely unworthy of credit, inasmuch as it had been given the lie by
the appellant himself and by the other witnesses for the defense. It is
true that his testimony was corroborated in some points by that of the
deputy sheriff Jose Rada and of the municipal president of Daet
Francisco Carranceja, but the former is a subordinate of the said
provincial sheriff and it is to be expected that he would side with the
latter; and, with respect to the other witness, according to the
testimony of the sheriff himself, he was manhandled, to avoid quoting
his offensive words, by the appellant years before. Furthermore, both
of them are the appellant’s political rivals.

When an
obligation may be complied with or a right enforced in one way or
another without detriment to the person charged with such compliance or
enforcement, there is no need of so doing to the annoyance and
humiliation of the persons concerned. As much as possible, one should
find some means of harmonizing compliance with such duty and
enforcement of such right with the rights and obligations of others.

In view of the foregoing proven facts, we are of the opinion that the
provincial sheriff exceeded his authority in the performance of his
duties as such, and the rule in such cases is that the victim of the
abuse has a legitimate right to defend himself. (People vs.
Chan Fook, 42 Phil., 230.) The appellant did nothing more than act in
that sense and therefore he cannot be guilty of resistance. His was an
act of legitimate self-defense.

With respect to the alleged
arbitrary detention, the evidence of the prosecution is not convincing.
The preponderance of the evidence shows that the provincial sheriff
really forced open the door of the upper story of the appellant’s house
in spite of having been warned not to go upstairs because said door was
barred. Under such circumstances his arrest by the chief of police,
upon petition of the appellant, was not entirely without justification
on the ground that the latter, as well as the said chief of police,
believed that he was committing an abusive act. The arrest of the said
sheriff should be considered as a mere incident of the defense availed
of by the appellant to protect his rights.

Wherefore, we are
of the opinion and so hold that the appellant is not guilty of the
offenses with which he was charged in the two cases in question.
Therefore, the judgments of the trial court appealed from are hereby
reversed, and the defendant is hereby acquitted of the offenses of
resistance to an agent of a person in authority and arbitrary detention
of which he was convicted under the aforesaid two cases, with the costs
of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur