G.R. No. L-1668. March 29, 1948
PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY WORKERS’ UNION (CLO), PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., RESPONDENT.
HILADO, J.:
vs. Philippine defining Company Workers’ Union (CLO), was scheduled for
hearing before the Court of Industrial relations. Upon that date, said court
renewed its efforts to effect a temporary settlement of the case before going on
the merits of the petition. A series of conferences with both parties was held
by the court, assisted by Atty. Paciano Villavieja of the Division of
Investigation. Thereafter, considering the circumstances and facts of the case
at that stage of the proceedings, the Court of Industrial relations came to the
conclusion that, “for the welfare of everybody concerned, for the interest of
the public”, and because the court might not be able to decide the case
promptly, in view of the issues involved, the striking laborers should be
directed to return and resume their work in the Philippine defining Company on
September 27, 1946, at 7:00 o’clock in the morning, and the management of the
respondent company should accept them beginning that date? and it was so ordered
by the court (Order Annex A, dated Sept. 26, 1946).
The order contained the following injunction:
“The striking laborers, pending the final determination of this case, are
enjoined not to stage any strike or walk out from their employment without
authority from and without first submitting their grievances to the Court. The
Petitioning Company is likewise enjoined not to lay-off, dismiss, discharge, or
admit any new employees or laborers in its employment during the pendency of
this case, without beforehand notifying and obtaining the authority of the
Court. The controversial points involved in the petition will be heard by this
Court at the opportune time.” (P. 2).
In Case Wo. 32-V(7), Philippine refining Co., Inc. vs. Philippine defining
Company workers’ Union (CLO), of the same court, under date of May 2,1947,
pending final determination of the case, the petitioning company filed with the
court an urgent report to the effect that a strike was declared by the union at
the plant of the company in Manila starting at 7:OO o’clock in the morning of
April 30, 1947. In view of this development and of the other facts and
considerations set forth in the lower court’s order of July 24, 1947 (Annex D),
it ruled that the strike staged by the union or by the workers of the company
therein mentioned on April 30, 1947, “is contemptuous and illegal because it is
a violation of the law and the order of the court. Consequently, as prayed for
in the said report submitted by the company, the court authorizes the said
company to hire such of the striking laborers and employees and new labor force,
as in its discretion it may see fit”. And pursuant to section 6 of Commonwealth
Act No. I03, Atty. Juan Maralit of the court was thereby designated to take
charge of the contempt proceedings and to present such action as might be
warranted therein against the party or parties who might be responsible for the
violation of the law and the order of the court dated September 26, 1946. The
court dismissed the answer and counter-petition for contempt filed by the union
against the company.
The court’s resolutions of August 16 and September 15, 1947, denied
petitioner’s motions for reconsideration of the foregoing orders, and these
orders and resolutions are sought to be vacated and reversed by the instant
petition.
The crux of the instant petitioner’s contention is stated in the three
propositions submitted in the petition under the heading “Reasons for the
Allowance of the Writ”, thus:
“I. That the order of the Court of Industrial delations dated September 26,
1946, enjoining the workers not to stage a strike pending the final
determination of the case,was issued without or in excess of its jurisdiction
and powers, for the same had not been issaed in accordance with Section 19,
Commonwealth Act 103, which is the only source of its authority, if it has ever
any such powers, in issuing such kind of orders.“II. That the said order dated September 26, 1946, which is the basis of the
subsequent order dated July 24, 1947, is null, void and invalid for it is an
infringement of the constitutional rights and liberties of the workers and is
moreover repugnant to the constitutional inhibition prohibiting involuntary
servitude in any form.“III. That the order of the Gourt of Industrial relations dated July 24,
1947, as well as the resolutions of the Court denying the motions for
reconsideration, are also invalid and contrary to law for they were issued in
violation of the due process clause of the constitution. There was no legal and
fair hearing made by the Court of Industrial delations on the issues arbitrarily
disposed of and decided in said order of July 24, 1947.” (Page 6.)
The questions thus raised are substantially the same as those raised in G.R.
No. L-1573, Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs.
Gotamco Saw Mill, wherein judgment went against the petitioning union. There the
court’s order for the striking workers to return to their work was made after
hearing. Likewise in the instant case. And as appears from the court’s order of
September 26, 1946 (Annex A), the order enjoining a strike or walk out without
authority from and without first submitting the grievances to the court, was
made after hearing consisting of a series of conferences with both, parties
“held by the court”; and that said injunction was required by the public
interest is categorically stated in the same order.
In our decision in G. R. No. L-1573, supra, we ruled:
” * * * moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for an
order of the court for the return of striking workers’ authorizes such order,
among other, cases, ‘when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly
decided or settled’. The provision says: ‘* * * and if he has already done so,
(struck or walked out), that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the
court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires
or, when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled’
(Italic supplied). In other words, the erder to return, if the dispute can be
promptly decided or settled, may be issued ‘only after hearing when public
interest so requires’, but if in the court’s opinion the ‘dispute can not be
promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized after hearing to issue
the order: we construe the provision to me that the very Impossibility of prompt
decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue
the order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue
stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry * * *”.
In the order of September 26, 1946, the Court of Industrial Relations, among
others, based its decree upon the ground that “the court may able to decide this
case promptly, in view of the issues involved”.
The power conferred upon the Court of Industrial Relations by Section 19 of
its organic law to enjoin, under the circumstances therein required, a strike or
walk out, or to order the return of striking workers and to correspondingly
enjoin the employer to refrain from accepting other employees, unless with the
express authority of the court, and to permit the continuation in the service of
his employees under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute
arose, is one of the most important virtues of this capital-labor legislation.
It seems that in this respect our law has achieved an advance not attained by
the capital-labor legislation of other countries. And considering that this
progressive enactment is evidently aimed at preventing tn the public interest an
undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry, the general welfare
requires that it be upheld and enforced.
As to the contention that Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is
unconstitutional, we held in G. R. No. L-1573, Kaisahan na Mga Manggagawa sa
Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill, supra, that it is
constitutional. We said:
“* * * It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing
involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment after
said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those
prescribed in said section 19, among which is the ‘implied condition that when
any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer
has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or
arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or
decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of
his employment when so enjoined by the Court after hearing and when public
interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith
return to it, upon order of the Court, which shall be issued only after hearing
when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be
promptly decided:or settled. * * *” (Italic supplied). The voluntariness of the
employee’s entering into such a contract of employment—he has a free choice
between entering into it or not—with such an implied condition, negatives the
possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing, * * *”.
Regarding the facts, this Court is not authorized to review them as found by
the Court of Industrial Relations. (Commonwealth Act No. 103, Section 15, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 559, Section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National
Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134,
Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil
Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial delations, 40 0ff. Gaz. 6th
Supp. p. 71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our
opinion on the constitutioniity of the above statutory and reglementary
provisions should it, in the future, become necessary to decide it.
“Wherefore, the orders and resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations
assailed by the instant petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Parás, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon,
Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING AND DISSSENTING
PERPECTO, J.:
We concur in the result of the decision in this case, but we cannot agree
with the pronouncement depriving the Supreme Court the power to revise findings
of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations.
We are of opinion that such curtailment of the powers of the Supreme Court is
violative of the spirit and purposes of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The power of
revision granted by the Supreme Court should not be limited so as to deny relief
to any party that may foundedly feel aggrieved by any substantial finding of
fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations. Many of the labor disputes that
reach the Court of Industrial Relations center on disputed facts, such as
reasonable salaries, reasonable working conditions, periods of rest, reasons for
strikes or lockouts, injustice of the relations between employer and employees,
etc. The aggrieyed party must not be denied his day in court in the highest
tribunal.
Validity of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is impugned on
constitutional grounds, upon the allegation that it is tantamount to authorizing
involuntary Servitude. We cannot agree with the proposition. Under said section,
the question of involuntary work is not involved, but only the workability of
the settlement of a labor dispute contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 103. When
workers on strike appear before the Court of Industrial Relations to seek remedy
under Commonw.ealth Act No. 103, they do so, on the assumption that the work in
their employment were and are agreeable to their conscience and dignity and, as
a matter of fact, they claim the right to continue performing the same work.
Otherwise, they would not have resorted to strike, a means resorted to to compel
the employer and let them continue wording, but on conditions more agreeable to
the workers. If the strikers should feel that their work is in the nature of
involuntary servitude, they would not resort to a strike nor recur to the Court
of Industrial Relations, but will simply resign and seek some other employment.
When the strikers are seeking remedy under the law from the Court of
Industrial Relations, the court may impose such reasonable conditions, one of
them being that provided by Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No, 103, prohibiting
strikes or ordering strikers to return to work. Those reasonable conditions are
considered as voluntarily accepted by the laborers, not only because it is
expressly provided in Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, but because it is
a reasonable implementation of the powers of the court to effectively settle a
labor controversy.
If the laborers should feel that they are compelled against their will to
perform something which is repugnant to their conscience or dignity, they need
not resort to any court action to seek judicial settlement of the controversy,
as they can resign from their work and there is no power that can compel them to
continue therein.
Orders and Resolution affirmed.