G.R. No. L-1573. March 29, 1948
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. GOTAMCO SAW MILLS, REPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
HILADO, J.:
Kahoy sa Pllipinas” prays, for the reasons therein set forth, that we reverse
and vacate the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations dated September 23,
1946 (Annex A) and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its resolution of July 11, 1947
(Annex C).
In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in the
main case (Case No. 31-V of the Court of Industrial Relations, declared a strike
on September 10, 1946, “which suspended all the work in the respondent company”;
that on September 19, 1946 (presumably after the case had been brought to the
Court of Industrial Relations) said court informed the parties that the
continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice both parties, and that a
temporary solution, satisfactory to both parties, must be found to put an end to
it, at the same time, urging both parties to be reasonable in their attitude
towards each other; that ample opportunity was given to both parties to.iron out
their differences until September 21, 1946, when the court continued the
conference at which, among other things, the leader of the laborers informed the
court that, although said laborers were not exactly satisfied with the
arrangement, in order to cooperate with the court and with the parties so that
the laborers could return to work and the company resume its operation, they had
no objection to accepting a temporary settlement of P3.50 without meal, as
against the proposal of the company of P2.00 without meal; that after a series
of conferences held on September 23, 1946, the date of the order now under
consideration, the labor leader decided to accept a temporary arrangement of the
wage problem as proposed by the management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase
without meal to all striking laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the
Union, manifested that he would have a hard time convincing the laborers, but in
view of their desire to preserve the harmony which used to exist between the
parties, they were going to accede to this proposition, provided that the
management would permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available,
small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations
culminated in an agreement by which the laborers would return to their work on
Tuesday, September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o’clock in the morning, and the respondent
company would resume its operation on said date under the following conditions:
“(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an over-all increase
of P2.00 daily, without meal, over the wages received by them before the strike;“(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring with them home, if
available, small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; and“(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect upon the
return of the workingmen to work until the final determination of the present
controversy.”
The same order then proceeds as follows:
“Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable
and advantageous to both, the court approves the same and orders the striking
laborers of the respendent company to return to their work on Tuesday, September
24, 1946, at 7:00 o’clock in the morning, and the respondent company to resume
its operation and admit the striking laborers. The respondent company is
enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss any laborer affiliated with the
petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the temporary agreement, and the
labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-put or strike during the pendency of
the hearing.”
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7, 1947. “the
respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial delations an
urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held for contempt of court
for having staged a strike during the pendency of the main case “in violation of
the order of this court dated September 23, 1946”; that on January 9, 1947,
petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among other things,
that a representative of petitioner conferred with respondent regarding certain
discriminations obtaining in the respondent’s saw mill, but instead of
entertaining their grievances said respondent in a haughty and arbitrary manner
ordered the stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did then and there
stop working; and in the counter-petition said petitioner asked that the
respondent be held for contempt for having employed four new Chinese laborers
during the pendency of the hearing of the main case, without express authority
of the court and in violation of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as
amended. It is also recited in the said order of March 28, 1947, that on that
same date, January 9f 1947, respondent filed with the court another urgent
motion for contempt against the petitioning union for picketing on the premises
of the respondent’s saw mill and for grave threats which prevented the remaining
laborers from working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation of evidence
pertinent to the incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the said order of March 28,
1947, was entered, and the court stated therein the three questions to be
determined as follows: first, if there was violation by the petitioning
union of the order of said court of September 23, 1946, which would warrant the
commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the facts and
circumstances attending the picketing constitute contempt of court;
third, whether there was violation by the respondent of Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, in taking in four Chinese laborers pending
the hearing and without express authority of the court; and fourth,
whether the dismissal of Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
“(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated September 23,
1946, by the petitioning union and thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes,
special agent of the court, to take such action as may be warranted in the
premises against the person or persons responsible therefor for contempt;“(2) That the question of picketing being closely and intimately related to
the strike which had been found illegal, did not need to be passed upon, it
being imbibed by question No. 1;“(3) That there being no strong and clear proof-on the question of respondent
having violated Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent
was thereby exonerated from any liability in connection with the alleged
employment of four Chinamen;“(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and unworthy to work
among his fellow laborers, his petition for reinstatement contained in demand
No. 5 of the main . case was thereby denied. ”
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the Court of
Industrial Relations, fitting in bane, and denied reconsideration of its order
of March 28, 1947, as requested by the petitioning union. In the course of said
resolution, the union’s contention is recited that the provisions of Section 19
of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, upon which the order of September 23,
1946, was based, had not been complied with; in other words, that the said order
was not issued in conformity with the requisites of the said section, because,
it was said, before its issuance there had been no proper hearing and there was
no express finding by the court that public interest required the return of the
striking workers. The further contention is therein recited that, granting that
the order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with said Section 19,
said provision is unconstitutional for being in violation of the organic
proscription of involuntary servitude. Passing upon these contentions, the Court
of Industrial Relations said:
“The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with the
provisions of Section 19. Said order was proposed and issued on the basis of the
agreement entered into by the parties after the preliminary hearings and
conferences. While it is true that the order of the Court now in question did
not make any express finding as to whether public interest required the return
of the striking workers, it is undeniable, however, that until the present the
main case has not been decided or settled in view of the numerous incidents
arising therefrom since the certification of the dispute by the Department of
Labor to the Court on September 14, 1946. The fact that the Court did not decide
nor settle the dispute promptly, need not be stated in the said order because it
is a fact which is borne out by the entire record of the case. If the petitioner
was aggrieved by the terms of the order, it could have objected right then and
there and could have appealed said order within the period prescribed by law,
and not to wait after it had become final, definite, and conclusive. The record
shows that the petitioner in its answer and counter-petition for contempt based
its complaint upon Section 19 (Incidental Case No. 31-V[4]). It is, indeed,
strange that after taking advantage of this order and enjoyed (enjoying) the
benefits thereunder, the petitioner now comes to impugn and challenge the
validity. The second motion for reconsideration is a sad instance where the
petitioner attacks the validity of an order under which it once took
shelter.“The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start with, this
section is presumed to be constitutional. Several laws promulgated which
apparently infringe the human rights of individuals were ‘subjected to
regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police
power’. The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspired by the constitutional
injunction making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all the people. In order to
attain this object, section 19 was promulgated which grants to labor what it
grants to capital and denies to labor what it denies to capital. Section 19
complements the powers of the Court to settle industrial disputes and renders
effective such powers which are conferred upon it by the different provisions of
the Court’s organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and 4, and ‘other plenary
powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all questions, matters,
controversies or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees’, ‘to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial
or agricultural disputes’ (International HardWood and Venser Co. vs. The Pangil
Federation of Laborers, G. R. No. 47178, cited in the case of Mindanao Bus Co.
vs. Mindanao Bus Co. Employees’ Association, 40 Off. Gaz. 115). Section 4 has
been upheld in the case aforecited. It appearing that the power of this Court to
execute its orders under section 19 is also the same power it possesses under
section 4 of the same act, it inferentially follows that Section 19 is likewise
valid. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, G. R. No.
47796).’
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union,
supra, this Court said:
“In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner’s theory is to concede
to the Court of Industrial Relations the power to deoide a case under Section.
19 but deny it, the power to execute its decisions thereon. The absurdity of
this proposition is too evident to require argument. In the second place,
considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under
Section 19 is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previdusly
acquired under section 4 of the law, it follows that the power to execute its
orders under section 19 is also the same power that it possesses under section
4.” (40 Off. Gaz., [14th Supp.] No. 23, p. 178.)
Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an order
such as those now under consideration as for contempt of court.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 is constitutional. It does not offend against the
constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude. An employee
entering into a contract of employment after said law went into effect,
voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said
section 19, among which is the “implied condition that when any dispute between
the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted
to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to
the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee,
tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
enjoined by the Court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if
he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the
Court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires
or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or
settled * * *”. (Italics supplied). The voluntariness of the
employee’s entering into such a contract of employment—he has a free choice
between entering into it or not—with such an implied condition, negatives the
possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. The resolution of July 11, 1947,
states that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued after a series of
preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied that these were
“hearings” within the meaning of the above mentioned section 19 of the
law. The record certainly reveals that what was done during and what resulted
from and preliminary hearings or conferences were reported to the court
at a formal hearing. As to public interest requiring that the court
enjoin the strike or walk out, or the return,of striking laborers, aside from
the legal presumption that the Court of Industrial delations complied with the
provisions of the law in this respect, we think that, considering the
universally known fact, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that as a
result of the destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and social
rehabilitation of this country urgently demands the reconstruction of
industrial, commercial and residential buildings, which in turn necessitates
building materials, in which lumber figures prominently among the most vital,
public interest of a most real and positive character has attached to the lumber
business. It is obvious that any undue stoppage or diminution in the production
of lumber or allied products so sorely needed in reconstruction work will
inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or slow down the countryfs program of
rehabilitation which, for obvious and natural reasons, the government is
striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return to
their work. And thfct order was made after hearing, and, moreover,
section 19 of Commonwealth Act Not 103, in providing for an order of the court
for the return of striking workers, authorizes such order, among oiler cases,
“when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled”. The
provision, says:”* * * and if he has already done so (struck or walked out),
that he shall forthwith return to It, upon order of the Court, which shall be
issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute
cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled” (Italics supplied). In
other words, the order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or
settled, may be issued “only after hearing when public interest so requires”,
but if in the court’s opinion the dispute can not be promptly decided or
settled, then it is also authorized after hearing to issue the order: we contrue
the provision to mean that the very impossiblity of prompt decision or
settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order
for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or
paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as well stated by the court’s
resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement
was a fact which was borne out by the entire record of the case and did not need
express statement in the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by
the Court of Industrial Relations (Commonwealth Act No. 103, Section 15, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 559, section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National
Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134,
Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz, 1032; Pasumil
Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th
Supp. p. 71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our
opinion on the constitutionality of the above statutory and reglementary
provisions should it, in the future, become necessary to decide it.
For all these considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations assailed by the instant petition aye hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras,
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuazon, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
PERPECTO, J.:
We concur in the result of the decision in this case, but we cannot agree
with the pronouncement depriving the Supreme Court the power to revise findings
of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations.
We are of opinion that such curtailment of the powers of the Supreme Court is
violative of the spirit and purposes of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The power of
revision granted by the Supreme Court should not be limited so as to deny relief
to any party that may foundedly feel aggrieved by any substantial finding of
fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations. Many of the labor disputes that
reach the Court of Industrial Relations center on disputed facts, such as
reasonable salaries, reasonable working conditions, periods of rest, reasons for
strikes or lockouts, injustice of the relations between employer and employees,
etc. The aggrieved party must not be denied his day in court in the highest
tribunal.
Validity of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is impugned on
constitutional grounds, upon the allegation that it is tantamount to authorizing
involuntary servitude. We cannot agree with the proposition. Under said section,
the question of involuntary work is not involved, but only the workability of
the settlement of a labor dispute contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 103. When
workers on strike appear before the Court of Industrial Relations to seek remedy
under Commonwealth Act No. 103, they do so, on the assumption that the work in
their employment were and are agreeable to their conscience and dignity and, as
a matter of fact, they claim the right to continue performing the same work.
Otherwise, they would not have resorted to strike, a means resorted t,o to
compel the employer and let them continue working, but on conditions more
agreeable to the workers. If the strikers should feel that their work is in the
nature of involuntary servitude, they would not resort to a strike nor recur to
the Court of Industrial Relations, but will simply resign and seek some other
employment.
When the strikers are seeking remedy under the law from the Court of
Industrial Relations, the court may impose such reasonable conditions, one of
them being that provided by Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prohibiting
strikes or ordering strikers to return to work. Those reasonable conditions are
considered as voluntarily accepted by the laborers, not only because it is
expressly provided in Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, but because it is
a reasonable implementation of the powers of the court to effectively settle a
labor controversy.
If the laborers should feel that they are compelled against their will to
perform something which is repugnant to their conscience or dignity, they need
not resort to any court action to seek judicial settlement of the controversy,
as they can resign from their work and there is no power that can compel them to
continue therein.
Order and resolution affirmed.