LEE SING, ON BEHALF OF HIS SON LEE SHU, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

This
is an appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila granting a writ of habeas corpus to
the appellee, Lee Sing, on behalf of his son Lee Shu.

Lee
Shu, represented by his alleged father, Lee Sing, applied to the
Collector of Customs for admission into the Philippine Islands. Lee Shu
based his right to enter the Philippine Islands on the claim that he is
the legitimate son of Lee Sing who is an American citizen. A board of
special inquiry in the Bureau of Customs, before whom both Lee Sing and
Lee Shu testified, rendered a decision which is as follows:

“This
is the case of Lee Shu, male, 19 years of age, who seeks admission into
this country as minor son of one Lee Sing, an American citizen landed
on appeal as such per C. B. R. No. 4001-2. From the investigation of
this case. the record shows that the herein applicant and his alleged
father committed some discrepancies with regards to the number of rooms
their house in China has. The herein applicant testified that it has
(house) two rooms and a hall, while the alleged father stated that it
has two rooms; a hall and two small additional rooms. It should be made
of note that the alleged father arrived in this country barely a month
ahead of the applicant and if they really belong to the same family as
claimed, such discrepancy would have easily been overcome. The second
ground for rejecting is with regards to the surroundings of their house
in China, in that the applicant testified that what is at the back of
their house is a hill and that a farm is also at the right side, while
the alleged father stated that ground is behind and that a house is at
the right side. The last ground for an adverse decision is the fact
that according to the observation of the board based on its experience
on conducting investigations on similar cases, the herein applicant is
a pure blooded Chinese rather than a person born of an American citizen
as father as claimed. His conduct to the effect that he is really a
full blooded Chinese will bear the board out of its observation and
conclusion.

“In view of the foregoing, he is hereby
rejected and refused landing in this country. He and his broker are
informed of this decision and are given two days within which to appeal
to the Insular Collector of Customs, should they feel dissatisfied with
the decision.”

The applicant appealed from
the decision of the board and the Collector of Customs, the appellant
herein, on February 21, 1933, affirmed the decision of the board and
ordered that Lee Shu be returned to the port of his embarkation in
accordance with law. Thereupon Lee Sing on behalf of his alleged son,
Lee Shu, filed his petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila
praying for a writ of habeas corpus.

The contradictions in
the testimony of Lee Sing and Lee Shu found by the board and the
collector, the court below, examining the same testimony, found not to
exist. We have reviewed the testimony and find that there are
contradictions as found by the board but they relate to minor details
and, standing alone, would probably not be sufficient to warrant the
exclusion of the applicant. The third ground for exclusion is based on
the personal observation of the board which had Lee Sing and Lee Shu
before it. The board also had before it the record of Lee Sing, C. B.
R. No. 4001-2. From its personal observation of these two individuals,
the board concluded that the applicant being a pure blooded Chinese is
not the son of the American citizen who claims to be his father. The
decision of the board on this point is inaptly worded but we think it
is clearly inferable that the board observed racial dissimilarity which
made it impossible for Lee Sing to be the father of a pure blooded
Chinese.

The lower court rested its decision upon a literal
interpretation of the language of the board which it held to be absurd
on its face. We think that justice to the board requires that an effort
be made to get at the true meaning of the board. There is no doubt that
the board came to the conclusion that Lee Shu is not the son of Lee
Sing because they observed a racial difference between the two which
made that relationship impossible.

There being evidence to
sustain the finding of the board and no arbitrary or illegal act on
their part being shown, the judgment of the court below is reversed
with directions to dismiss the petition. Costs against the appellee.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur.