LAUREANO ELEGADO, SIMEON GALERO, AND ARISTON RABDON, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. NICANOR TAVORA, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Buenaventura Ocampo in the
Court of First Instance of La Union, denying the petition for a writ of
mandamus to require the respondent justice of the peace to allow the
appeal presented by the petitioners in the criminal case in which they
were convicted. The present case was submitted for decision in the
Court of First Instance on the following stipulation of facts:

“1.
Que los acusados en la causa criminal No. 2832 del Juzgado de Paz de
San Fernando, La Union, que son los recurrentes en esta causa, han sido
condenados por dicho Juzgado a cuatro meses y un dia de prision cada
uno;

“2. Que inmediatamente despues de haberse dictado la
sentencia por el Juez de Paz de San Fernando, La Union, el abogado de
los acusados, en Corte abierta, manifesto su intencion de apelar el
asunto al Juzgado de Primera Instancia de esta provincia;

“3.
Que el Juez de Paz de San Fernando, en el mismo dia, 17 de octubre de
1932, a peticion del mismo abogado de los acusados, autorizo mediante
carta que es el Exhibit C al Juez de Paz del Municipio de Rosales,
Pangasinan, para recibir la fianza de los acusados en la cantidad de
P200;

“4. Que, en virtud de la carta Exhibit C, el Juez
de Paz de Rosales, Pangasinan, recibio y aprobo la fianza formalizada
por los acusados, los aqui recurrentes, en la cantidad de P200,
adjuntando en el escrito de fianza una carta sin firma que pedimos sea
marcada como Exhibit D y que explica por si misma;

“5. Que
el Exhibit D se recibio por el Juez de Paz de San Fernando, La Union,
el dia 27 de octubre de 1932, juntamente con la fianza, tal como ha
sido aceptada y aprobada por el Juez de Paz de Rosales, Pangasinan;

“6. Que el 2 de noviembre de 1932, el Juez de Paz de San Fernando, La
Union, expidio la orden que, para su identificacion, pedimos sea
marcada como Exhibit E, la cual orden es una copia del original que
obra en el Expediente No. 2832 del Juzgado de Paz de San Fernando, La
Union, ordenando la ejecucion de la sentencia dictada en dicho
expediente;

“7. Que los recurrentes en esta causa, desde
el 17 de octubre de 1932, no han presentado otra apelacion mas que la
formalizada verbalmente en Corte abierta, por el abogado Sr. Basco;

“8. Que el Exhibit A no se ha facilitado copia a la parte contraria.”

The attorney for the appellants alleges that the lower court erred in
declaring that the appellants herein did not present their appeal in
due form in criminal case No. 2832 of the justice of the peace court of
San Fernando, La Union; and in dismissing the complaint in the present
case.

The contention of the petitioners in the lower court
was that their oral statement in the justice of the peace court of
their intention to appeal to the Court of First Instance was a
sufficient compliance with the law. In this court the attorney for the
appellants relies principally upon the fact that the petitioners
presented an appeal bond within fifteen days, which was approved by the
justice of the peace, as set forth in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of
stipulation of facts.

Section 43 of General Orders, No. 58,
as amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 and section 1 of Act No. 3785,
reads as follows:

“From all final judgments
of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and
in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said
courts, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter
prescribed. The convicted party may appeal from any final judgment of a
justice of the peace in a criminal cause to the Court of First Instance
by filing a notice of appeal with such justice within fifteen days
after the entry of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the
justice shall forward to the Court of First Instance all original
papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause, and the
provincial fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of
the prosecution: Provided, however, That the period of
fifteen days within which the accused may file his notice of appeal
either from a judgment of a justice of the peace court or from a
judgment of a Court of First Instance shall be interrupted from the
time a motion for new trial is filed.”

In the case of the United States vs.
Tenorio (37 Phil., 7), referring to appeals from decisions of Courts of
First Instance, this court held that an appeal in a criminal case must
be perfected in the manner and form prescribed bi- section 45 of
General Orders, No. 58; that said section is almost an exact copy of
section 1240 of the Penal Code of California, and was evidently taken
from said Code; that we are justified in following the interpretation
given by the supreme court of the state from the statutes of which the
provisions of our own laws are copied; that in accordance with the
decisions of the Supreme Court of California a recital in the appeal
that a notice of appeal has been served and filed is no evidence that
an appeal has been taken; that the notice of appeal must be served and
filed; that giving notice in open court that an appellant intends
taking an appeal is an essentially different proceeding from filing
such notice with the clerk of the court; that the word “filing” as used
in section 45 can be construed only as requiring a placing or
depositing with the clerk of a written notice of intention of taking an
appeal.

In the case of Ricafia and Glory vs.
Provincial Warden of Tayabas (54 Phil., 821), it was held that if
section 43 of General Orders, No. 58 had been intended to provide a
different manner of giving notice of the intention to appeal from a
decision of the justice of the peace from that given when the appeal is
taken from the Court of First Instance, a verb other than “to file”
would have been employed to indicate that the notice might be given
either verbally or in writing; that as the petitioners gave only a
“verbal notice of their intention to appeal”, they did not comply with
the requirements of the law, and their alleged notice of intention to
appeal did not produce the desired legal effect.

The case
just cited is similar in many respects to the case now under
consideration. In that case the petitioners verbally announced their
intention to appeal to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, and an
appeal bond was filed by the justice of the peace at P600; the bond was
signed by the petitioners and their bondsmen, and the petitioners were
temporarily released. It appears, however, that the bond was not
approved by the proper justice of the peace. About thirty days after
the judgment had been rendered, the petitioners were arrested because
they had not perfected their appeal in accordance with the law.

The attorney for the appellants in the case at bar calls attention to
the fact that the bond sent by the petitioners to the justice of the
peace of San Fernando was accompanied by a letter requesting the
justice of the peace to give effect to their notice of appeal announced
in open court. It appears, however, from the agreed statement of facts
that this letter was not signed by any one.

Appellants’ attorney also calls our attention to the decision of this court in the case of the United States vs.
Sotavento and Sotavento (40 Phil., 176), in which it was held that an
accused does not lose his right to prosecute his appeal to final
judgment merely because he failed to serve a copy of his written notice
of appeal on the provincial fiscal. The decision in that case does not
support the contention of the present petitioners, but emphasizes the
fact that the notice of appeal must be in writing. It states that the
exercise of the right of appeal should be effected in writing within a
period of fifteen days. Furthermore, it appears that there was a
difference of opinion in the court as to the grounds of the decision in
that case. The writer of the opinion expressed the opinion that the
fiscal would be informed of the appeal filed by the accused when
notified of the order issued by the lower court upon for warding the
case to the Supreme Court on account of the appeal. Four justices
concurred. Justices Johnson and Araullo held that the Government being
the adverse party the filing of the written notice with the clerk was
tantamount to service upon the adverse party. Justice Malcolm concurred
in the result for the special reasons existing in that case, but
expressly stated that the exception made in that case should not be
allowed to overturn judicial precedents and to nullify the law.

In our opinion no reason has been adduced that would justify us in
accepting a bond in lieu of the written notice of appeal expressly
required by law.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villa-Real, Hull, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Malcolm, J., dissents.

---

 

DISSENTING

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

I think the judgment should be reversed. The law provides that: “The
convicted party may appeal from any final judgment of a justice of the
peace in a criminal cause to the Court of First Instance by filing a
notice of appeal with such justice within fifteen days after the entry
of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward
to the Court of First Instance all original papers and a transcript of
all docket entries in the cause, and the provincial fiscal shall
thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of the prosecution.” (Code
of Criminal Procedure, section 43.)

The object of the notice
of appeal is merely to advise the justice of the peace of the
defendant’s intention td appeal to the Court of First Instance.
Clearly, that object is attained when the notice is given in open
court. It has been held that statutes giving and regulating the right
of appeal are remedial in their nature, and should receive a liberal
construction in furtherance of the right of appeal. (2 R. C. L., 29,
30.) “Statutes giving the right of appeal are liberally construed in
furtherance of justice; such an interpretation as will work a
forfeiture of that right is not favored.” (2 Lewis’ Sutherland
Statutory Construction, 1304, 1305.)

In the case at bar, it
is admitted that immediately after the rendition of the judgment by the
justice of the peace, counsel for the defendants below, the petitioners
herein, gave notice in open court of the latter’s intention to appeal
to the Court of First Instance; that, at the request of said counsel,
the amount of the bond for the temporary release of; the defendants was
fixed; and that the bond was later filed and approved. Upon these
admitted facts, I am of the opinion that the requirement for the
perfection of an appeal had been fully complied with by the petitioners.

With all due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, I
believe that it takes too narrow a view of the law. It sacrifices
substance to form, and reduces the protection of human rights to a mere
formula.

---

 

DISSENTING

BUTTE, J.:

The case of Ricaña and Glory vs.
Provincial Warden of Tayabas (54 Phil., 821), definitely settled, I
think, the proposition that an oral notice of intention to appeal from
a decision of the justice of the peace is not a sufficient compliance
with the provisions of section 43 of General Orders, No. 58, the Code
of Criminal Procedure. In that case an appeal bond was submitted but it
does not appear to have been accepted or approved by the justice of the
peace. In the present case the appeal bond was accepted and approved by
the justice of the peace. The recitals of the ordinary appeal bond
plainly show that it is the intention of the defendant to appeal from
the decision of the justice of the peace. Section 43 of General Orders,
No. 58 does not prescribe any special form of notice of appeal. The
primary object of filing a notice of intention to appeal is to require
the justice to forward to the Court of First Instance the original
papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause. It seems to
me that, in view of the fact that the bond itself recites the intention
of the accused to appeal, when that bond is examined, accepted and
approved by the justice of the peace, it discloses to the justice the
real intention of the accused to prosecute his appeal as effectively as
if a mere formal notice was filed.

In the present instance
the justice accepted the oral notice of appeal as sufficient and
permitted the accused to go to all the trouble of preparing a bond and
obtaining the signatures of the sureties on the assumption of all the
parties including the court that nothing further needed to be done to
perfect the appeal. I think that the filing, acceptance and approval of
the bond is a very substantial compliance with the requirement that a
written notice of intention to appeal be given and I concur in the
conclusion of Justice Abad Santos that the decision of the majority
sacrifices substance to form.