THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARCIANO MEDINA (ALIAS MARIANO MEDINA, ALIAS ALEJANDRO DOLA), DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The
accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with “the
crime of trespass to dwelling, with frustrated homicide, and physical
injuries”, committed as follows:

“That on
or about the 7th day of August, 1932, in the municipality of Parañaque,
Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the said accused, Marciano Medina alias Mariano Medina alias
Alejandro Dola, being a private individual, at night time, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling of Capt.
J. H. Davidson against the latter’s will, by forcing his way through a
window protected by wire screens, an opening not intended for entrance,
and once inside the house, when his presence therein was detected by
the inmates thereof who tried to put him under arrest, the said
Marciano Medina in resisting arrest and thus be able to escape, with
intent to kill Joseph Davidson, son of Capt. Davidson, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and stab
with an open knife said Joseph Davidson on the upper left chest, thus
inflicting upon him a mortal wound penetrating the lung, which would
have produced his death as a consequence, thus performing all the acts
of execution which would produce the death of said Joseph Davidson by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is,
because of the timely, able and efficacious medical aid given to the
victim by Dr. Alexander Mileau. In his efforts to escape, the accused
Marciano Medina further criminally, unlawfully and feloniously attacked
and assaulted Captain Davidson, Mrs. Davidson and their daughter Mary
Davidson, with an open knife, thus inflicting upon Captain Davidson
several wounds, one on the right hand, one on the right
sterno-clavicular articulation and one on the upper right arm; Mrs.
Davidson sustained a lacerated wound on the palmar surface left ring
finger and on the middle finger severing the tendons; and Mary
Davidson, the daughter, sustained a wound on the left occipito-parietal
region on the scalp. These wounds sustained by Mr. and Mrs. Captain
Davidson and their daughter required medical attendance for a period of
time longer than 10 days but less than 30 days and incapacitated all of
them from performing their customary labor for an equal period of time.

“That
in the commission of the acts herein complained of, the following
aggravating circumstances existed: (1) that the crime was committed at
night time which the accused purposely sought to insure success in the
commission of the offense herein complained of; (2) in disregard of the
sex due to two of the offended, parties, Mrs. Davidson and her daughter
Mary Davidson; (3) through an unlawful entry, that is, by passing
through a window; (4) that as a means to the commission of the offense,
the window was broken and (5) that the accused has previously been
punished four times of the crimes of theft and for other violations of
the law, to which lighter penalties were attached, by virtue of final
judgments handed down by competent courts.”

The accused was represented by an attorney de oficio.
After the information had been read to him, the court asked the accused
if he understood it, and when he answered in the affirmative the court
asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, and the accused answered
“guilty” The accused was then permitted to testify.

Upon the
termination of the hearing, Judge Francisco Zandueta, in view of the
plea of guilty interposed by the defendant, found him guilty of the
crimes of “allanamiento de morada mediante fuerza”, “homicidio
frustrado”, and “lesiones menos graves”, as alleged in the information,
with the presence of four aggravating circumstances, while there was
only one mitigating circumstance consisting of the defendant’s plea of
“guilty”, and sentenced him to suffer the following penalties:

1. For the crime of trespass to dwelling by means of violence, four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision correccional;
2. For the crime of frustrated homicide, ten years and one day of prision mayor;
3. For the crime of less serious physical injuries, four months and one day of arresto mayor.

The defendant was further sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

Defendant’s attorney de oficio
now alleges that the lower court erred in convicting the appellant of
three different crimes on the facts alleged in the information, to wit:
trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide, and less serious physical
injuries; and in imposing upon the appellant the total penalty of
fifteen years, one month, and thirteen days of imprisonment.

Appellant’s attorney de oficio
in this court, Jose M. Casal, has submitted a brief of twenty pages on
behalf of the appellant, and maintains that the appellant was deprived
of a fair trial and that the case should be remanded to the lower court
for a new trial, the fiscal to choose the charge he wishes to rely on
or to file a separate information for each crime with which he desires
to charge the accused; that the only crime of which the defendant can
be convicted in this case is less serious physical injuries.

Although we commend the zeal with which appellant’s attorney de oficio has studied the case, we cannot agree with his conclusions.

The information in question apparently does not comply with section 11
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a complaint or
information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various allied
offenses, but the attorney for the accused did not demur to the
information, and the trial judge was justified in finding the defendant
guilty of the several crimes with which he was charged and in imposing
upon him the corresponding penalties. That is the established doctrine
of this court.

“When the defendant in a
criminal cause goes to trial under a complaint or information which
contains a description of more than one offense, he thereby waives the
objection, and may be found guilty of, and should be sentenced for, as
many offenses as are charged in the complaint and proved during the
trial. A failure to object for multifariousness in a complaint is a
waiver, and that objection cannot be raised for the first time on an
appeal.” (People vs. Miana, 50 Phil., 771.)

As to the nature of the plea of “guilty” and its sufficiency to sustain a conviction, this court in the case of United States vs. Jamad (37 Phil., 305), said:

“The
essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused,
on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full
knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear
understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in
the complaint or information; such a plea of guilty, when formally
entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any
offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the
introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied
the necessary proof.”

Appellant’s attorney
contends that there is no article in the Revised Penal Code
corresponding to article 87 of the Penal Code, and that it is therefore
not proper to impose upon the accused the several penalties
corresponding to the three crimes with which he was charged, but only
that corresponding to the gravest of them in accordance with article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. There is no merit in this contention, as
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the culprit has
to serve two or more penalties, he should serve them simultaneously if
the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, said penalties
shall be executed successively, following the order of their respective
severity. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code relates to complex
crimes, that is, when a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (or when
one of them is a necessary means for committing the other), and has no
application to the case at bar.

Appellant’s present attorney
severely criticizes the conduct of defendant’s attorney in the lower
court, but it does not necessarily follow that the defendant was
prejudiced by the failure of his attorney to demur to the information.

The lower court found that four aggravating circumstances were present
in the commission of the crime and that the accused was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of having pleaded guilty. The lower court did
not specify the four aggravating circumstances taken into account.
Although the unlawful entry, that is, the passing of the accused
through a window, and the breaking of the window could not properly be
regarded as aggravating circumstances in the crime of trespass to
dwelling, nevertheless the other aggravating circumstances were
sufficient to justify the imposition of the maximum degree of the
corresponding penalties.

The decision of the lower court sentencing the defendant to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor for lesiones menos graves is affirmed.

In accordance with articles 280 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code and
Act No. 4103, the appellant is condemned to suffer the following
indeterminate sentences:

1. For the crime of trespass to dwelling by means of violence, not more than four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision correccional, and a fine of P200 or the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and not less than two years of prision correccional;
2. For the crime of frustrated homicide, not more than ten years and one day of prision mayor, and not less than five years of prision correccional.

As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.