IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF SEVERINA GONZALEZ, DECEASED. SINFOROSO ONA, ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLEE, VS. SERAPIA DE GALA, EXECUTRIX AND APPELLANT.

This
is an appeal taken by the executrix-appellant Serapia de Gala from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, which reads as follows:

“The
executrix herein prays that the project of partition submitted by her
on May 4, 1932, be approved. The widower files opposition thereto on
the alleged ground that the project of partition in question is not in
accordance with the order of this court of April 7, 1931, and in turn,
prays that the same be modified so as to conform to the terms proposed
in the project of partition submitted by him on September 2, 1931.

“In
the said order of this court of April 7, 1931, Judge Francisco Enage,
after a careful examination of the pertinent facts of this case, of the
properties and rights left by the deceased, and of the nature thereof,
determines which properties belong to the conjugal partnership formed
by the deceased and Sinforoso Ona, and which constitute the separate
properties of each of them at the time of the wife’s death. Lastly, he
specifies those which should correspond to the widower, Sinforoso Ona,
as his share of the conjugal property and as his inheritance, declaring
that the remainder thereof should belong to the Candelaria Hospital
Foundation provided for in the will of the deceased. In the said order
of April 7, 1931, the court ordered the executrix to submit a ‘project
of partition, liquidation and adjudication of the paraphernal
properties of the deceased Severina Gonzalez and of the conjugal
properties accumulated during her marriage with Sinforoso Ona, in
accordance with the aforesaid conclusions arrived at in this decision.’

“Inasmuch
as the project of partition submitted by the executrix is not in
conformity with the aforesaid order of April 7, 1931, and, it
appearing, on the other hand, that the project of partition submitted
by the widower Sinforoso Ona on September 2, 1931, literally conforms
to the aforesaid order, the project of partition in question submitted
by the executrix is hereby disapproved and, by way of modification
thereof, the one submitted by the widower Sinforoso Ona on September 2,
1931, is hereby approved.

“There being no objection on the
part of Sinforoso Ona, the supplement to the bill of exceptions filed
by the executrix, is hereby approved. So ordered.”

In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns four alleged errors in
the aforesaid order of the trial court, which we shall discuss in the
course of this decision.

The first question to decide in
this appeal, which is raised in the first assignment of error, is
whether or not the area of the land situated in the barrio of Cabay,
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, in excess of the 56 hectares, 48 ares
and 40 centares stated in the composition title, Exhibit A, as the area
of the land belonging to Josefa de Gala, predecessor in interest of
Severina Gonzalez, should be considered conjugal or paraphernal
property of the deceased Severina Gonzalez.

The evidence
presented by the parties on this point is extremely contradictory.
After a careful consideration thereof and the circumstances surrounding
the case, we have not found sufficient grounds to justify any
modification of the conclusions arrived at by the trial court in its
decision appealed from, taking into account the advantages offered by
its knowledge of the customs of the locality in passing upon the
credibility of the witnesses.

With respect to the question
raised in the second assignment of error, whether the improvements made
by the surviving spouse, Sinforoso Ona, upon the paraphernal property
of the deceased Severina Gonzalez, during her lifetime, constitute
conjugal partnership property, or only the expenses incurred therein,
in accordance with article 1404 of the Civil Code, this question had
already been discussed and decided in the cases of Tabotabo vs. Molero (22 Phil., 418); Santos vs. Bartolome (44 Phil., 76); Dominado vs.
Derayunan (49 Phil., 452), to the effect that only the expenses for
improvements, not including buildings, made by one of the spouses upon
the separate property of the other, are considered conjugal property
and that such improvements made thereon are paraphernal property. We do
not see any reason of sufficient weight to justify the reversal of the
said doctrine.

With regard to the question raised in the
third assignment of error, whether or not Sinforoso Ona has already
been credited with the sum of P3,000 included in the accounts submitted
by him as special administrator on September 9, 1931, the records show
that the only items which the court, by its decree of September 20,
1931, ordered eliminated from the aforesaid final account submitted by
Sinforoso Ona on the said date of September 9, 1931, in case No. 1620
of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, G. R. No. 37313^[1]
of this court, are as follows: the expenses for the transportation of
the products; the salary of the man employed to look after the
properties; the fees of attorneys Diokno, Azada and Veluz, and the
expenses of the suit. These items alone were the subject of the appeal
taken in the aforesaid case. The order of the trial court relative to
the aforesaid sum of P3,000 included in the final account submitted by
Sinforoso Ona, as special administrator, has become final and
conclusive. Therefore, the item in question should not be included in
the project of partition as a debt of the conjugal partnership.

With respect to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error,
whether or not Act No. 3176 authorizes the court, taking cognizance of
the testamentary or intestate proceedings of a deceased spouse, to
liquidate the properties belonging to the conjugal partnership formed
by the said deceased and the surviving spouse, although the law in
question does not designate expressly who should liquidate the
properties of a conjugal partnership, in providing that the properties
in question should be administered and liquidated in the same manner
and under the same procedure as in ordinary testamentary cases, the
executor or the testamentary or judicial administrator is the one
called upon to liquidate the properties of the conjugal partnership in
question under the supervision and control of the court taking
cognizance of the special proceeding. Although it is anomalous to order
a person who is neither the duly appointed administrator nor the
executor to draw up and submit the project of partition on the ground
that the court may compel such administrator or executor to do so under
pain of incurring in contempt of court, however, the fact that it did
so as in the present case, does not constitute a reversible error
sufficient to justify the annulment of said proceeding, inasmuch as it
is the court itself which has to finally approve or disapprove the
project of partition submitted.

In view of the foregoing
considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold (1) that the expenses
incurred by the husband in the planting of coconuts and in the
construction of irrigation ditches on land belonging exclusively to his
wife are for the account of the conjugal partnership formed by them,
but not the improvements themselves (Tabotabo vs. Molero, 22 Phil., 418; Santos vs. Bartolome, 44 Phil., 76; Dominado vs.
Derayunan, 49 Phil., 452); and (2) that the court which takes
cognizance of a testamentary proceeding may compel the administrator or
executor thereof, under pain of contempt of court, to submit a project
of partition, and to make use of another person for that purpose,
although anomalous, does not constitute a reversible error sufficient
to justify the annulment of said proceeding.

Wherefore, with
the sole modification that the value of the improvements amounting to
P36,500 on lot No. 2, which is paraphernal property of the deceased
Severina Gonzalez, is hereby declared also paraphernal property; and
that the sum of P3,000, charged to the conjugal partnership, is hereby
eliminated from the project of partition approved by the lower court;
in all other respects the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Ona vs. De Gala, promulgated July 25, 1933, page 923, post.

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DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

January 11, 1934

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This
is a motion filed by the administrator-appellee Sinforoso Ona, to have
the original decision rendered on November 28, 1933, by the second
division of this court, composed of Chief Justice Avanceña and Justices
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, and Imperial, reconsidered; and to have this
court pass upon the legal question of whether or not in the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, the value of the inspection and
supervision by one or both of the spouses of improvements thereon and
in the preservation thereof, constitute useful expenditures, in
accordance with the provisions of article 1404 of the Civil Code, and
is, therefore, partnership property.

The pertinent facts relative to this point, as admitted by the parties, are as follows:

The land, the nature of the improvements of which is under discussion,
was paraphernal property of the deceased Severina Gonzalez. At the time
of contracting marriage with her surviving spouse, Sinforoso Ona, on
July 16, 1888, the assessed value thereof was P1,000. During the
marriage in question, coconuts were planted and irrigation ditches and
dams were constructed thereon. The planting of the coconuts was done by
planters who were paid a certain sum for each tree planted upon its
attaining a certain age, in accordance with the custom of the place.
The irrigation ditches and dams were constructed by masons. At the time
of the dissolution of the marriage through the death of the wife, the
property thus improved was assessed at P37,500.

The
petitioner herein contends that the sum of P36,500, representing the
difference between the original assessed value of the land before the
improvements thereon, which was P1,000, and the assessed value of the
same with the improvements thereon, which was P37,500, at the time of
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, should be considered
partnership property inasmuch as it was the result of his industry and
labor consisting in having directed and inspected such improvements and
the preservation thereof for the period of 38 years. In support of his
contention, he cites the following opinion of Manresa appearing on page
607, vol. 9, 2d edition, of his commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code,
which reads as follows:

“* * * but if the
improvement is due to the labor or industry of the spouses; or partly
to such industry and partly to the partnership funds; or if the sum
invested or expended thereon is not known; how is the amount of the
useful expenditures determined? How is the partnership to be reimbursed?

“In
all of these cases the increase in the value of the property, resulting
from the improvements thereon, shall have to be taken into account,
which increase in value shall be represented by the difference between
the value thereof at the time it was brought to the marriage or it was
acquired, and that which it had at the time the partnership was
dissolved or extinguished, separating or deducting therefrom that part
produced by improvements thereon dependent upon nature or time, as the
case may be.”

In the case at bar, the
planting of the coconuts and the construction of the irrigation ditches
and dams on the paraphernal property of his deceased wife, Severina
Gonzalez, were not done by the petitioner personally, but by planters
and masons who were paid to do that work. Inasmuch as it was not
Sinforoso Ona, surviving spouse of Severina Gonzalez by her third
marriage, who undertook such plantings and constructions, the
improvements in question cannot be said to be due to his industry and
labor. Although inspection and direction constitute work and the value
thereof is considered useful expenditure under the law, nevertheless,
it is but a small part of the total amount of the useful expenditures
thereon. The records show that a watchman was employed to inspect and
supervise the work of those whose duty it was to take care of and clean
the coconut groves and to gather the fruits. The records also show that
the petitioner herein had abandoned his wife, Severina Gonzalez, and
lived almost, all the time with a concubine. If this is true, he can
not claim that the improvements in question have been due, even partly,
to his industry and labor.

Furthermore, the land as well as
the coconut trees are, by nature and time, susceptible to increase in
value: the land, through the development of the town, of commerce and
of industry; the coconut groves; through the growth of the coconut
trees from the time they are planted until they bear, and also through
the development of commerce and of the coconut oil industry. This
increase in value due to nature and time is not considered partnership
property under the law on the ground that it is neither produced with
funds from the conjugal partnership nor with the work or industry of
any of the spouse.

Therefore, the solution proposed by
Manresa is not applicable to this case on the ground that the cost of
planting the coconuts and of constructing the irrigation ditches and
dams can be determined herein, and that none of the spouses has
contributed with either his or her personal work or industry in the
introduction of the improvements in question, except with money
belonging to the conjugal partnership.

In view of the
foregoing considerations, we conclude that although the value of
inspection work made by any of the spouses in the introduction of
improvements upon the separate property of one or of the other forms
part of the useful expenditures and is, therefore, partnership
property, however, the petitioner herein is net entitled to it on the
ground that it has not been proven that he had ever made such
inspection, and even if he had done so, he would be entitled to only
one half of the value of his work and not to the total value of such
improvements, a great part of which is due to nature and time.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.