IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF DONATA MANAHAN. TIBURCIA MANAHAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. ENGRACIA MANAHAN, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal taken by the appellant herein, Engracia Manahan, from
the order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan dated July 1, 1932,
in the matter of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, special
proceedings No. 4162, denying her motion for reconsideration and new
trial filed on May 11, 1932.

The facts in the case are as follows:

On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No.
4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who
died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. The petitioner
herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix in said will.
The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice
required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of
the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence
was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to
probate as prayed for. The will was probated on September 22, 1930. The
trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix with a bond of
P1,000, and likewise appointed the committee on claims and appraisal,
whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual course. One
year and seven months later, that is, on May 11, 1932, to be exact, the
appellant herein filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial,
praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the
authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. The
appellee herein, naturally filed her opposition to the petition and,
after the corresponding hearing thereof, the trial court entered its
order of denial on July 1, 1932. Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of
appealing from this last order, likewise appealed from the judgment
admitting the will to probate.

In this instance, the
appellant assigns seven (7) alleged errors as committed by the trial
court. Instead of discussing them one by one, we believe that,
essentially, her claim narrows down to the following: (1) That she was
an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was
entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will;
(2) that the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really
probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication;
and (3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the
ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.

The appellant’s first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable.
She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and
neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an
interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for
the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir,
being the deceased’s sister, did not confer on her the right to be
notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which
the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a
forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

The
second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the
authentication and probate of the will in question, which is the only
pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the
will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the
law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential
difference between the authentication of a will and the probate
thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this
case. All the law requires is that the competent court declare that in
the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been
complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is
valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

The last
contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once
a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions
relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The
decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceeding (sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure; Castaneda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393; Montanano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil, 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Joe-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil., 119).

But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from
successfully maintaining the present action and it is that inasmuch as
the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem,
the trial court’s decree admitting the will to probate was effective
and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

“SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT.— * * *.

“1.
In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect
to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or
the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; * * *.”

On the other hand, we are at a loss to understand how it was possible
for the herein appellant to appeal from the order of the trial court
denying her motion for reconsideration and a new trial, which is
interlocutory in character. In view of this erroneous interpretation,
she succeeded in appealing indirectly from the order admitting the will
to probate which was entered one year and seven months ago.

Before closing, we wish to state that it is not timely to discuss
herein the validity and sufficiency of the execution of the will in
question. As we have already said, this question can no more be raised
in this case on appeal. After due hearing, the court found that the
will in question was valid and effective and the order admitting it to
probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The
probate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.

Wherefore, the appeal taken herein is hereby dismissed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Hull, JJ., concur.