BRAULIO BALAGTAS ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. CIRIACA ARGUELLES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal taken by the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs from the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna on June 20,
1932, sustaining the defendant’s demurrer and dismissing the complaint,
with costs against the aforesaid plaintiffs.

According to
their complaint, the appellants brought the action to recover from the
appellee the sum of P25,709 representing the value of the houses and
materials belonging to them and constructed on the land of the
appellee, which is registered in her name, pursuant to the decree
issued in case No. 190, G. L. R. O. Record No. 12386, which houses and
materials were ordered destroyed by the aforesaid appellee through the
sheriff and therefore no longer exist on the said land, because the
appellee has appropriated them for her own use. In other words the
action is for damages.

As the counsel for the appellee
states, this is the third action instituted by the same appellants
against the appellee. The first action was decided in the
aforementioned Record No. 190 wherein the appellants opposed the
registration of the land in question in the name of the herein
appellee, who finally succeeded in obtaining the decree of registration
thereof.^[1] The second action was docketed as civil case No. 5396 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, G. R. No. 35029^[2]
of this court, wherein final judgment was rendered declaring that the
appellants were not entitled to claim the value of the improvements
they made on the land in question, on the ground that they did not
enforce or reserve such right during the registration proceedings.

In deciding the last case, however, the court said:

“There
is, nevertheless, a certain detail which merits the consideration of
this court and which demands a favorable finding for the appellees, to
wit, that the appellant repeatedly stated during the trial that she was
willing to return to the appellees the houses constructed thereon and,
consequently, the materials from those destroyed by virtue of the
execution of the writ of possession. The statement appearing in the
decision appealed from to the effect that the appellant bound herself
to pay to the appellees the value of the improvements is incorrect.
(Bill of Exceptions, pp. 12 and 13). On the contrary, she denied having
bound herself to pay to the said appellees the value of the
improvements claimed by them. (T. s. n. pp. 65 and 66.)”

It is for this reason that in the judgment therein rendered, a
concession was granted in favor of the appellants, reading as follows:

“The
judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the complaint filed by
the appellees dismissed, reserving to them, however, the right to
remove from the land in question the houses respectively constructed by
them thereon and the materials from those destroyed by virtue of the
execution of the writ of possession, without special pronouncement as
to costs of both instances.”

Upon the
ground that their houses and the materials from those destroyed by the
sheriff can no longer be found on the land in question because the
appellee had appropriated or disposed of them, the appellants herein
brought the third action, from which this appeal originated, to collect
indemnity for damages, as hereinbefore stated.

We are of the
opinion and so hold that the appellants have no cause of action in this
case. Their alleged right to an indemnity for the improvements they
made on the land has already been decided adversely to them and the
final judgment rendered on that question constitutes res judicata.
They cannot exercise the same right of action over again under the
pretext that the houses and materials in question have disappeared,
inasmuch as it was already stated in the decision rendered in case G.
R. No. 35029 that they were not entitled to an indemnity for the
improvements alleged to have been made on the said land. If they were
given permission to remove their houses and the materials therefrom, it
was merely through a concession of the owner thereof, the herein
appellee. It should be understood that the concession granted to the
herein appellants also ceased to exist from the moment the houses and
materials disappeared. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
prolonging litigations indefinitely thus putting no end to questions
raised by the litigants for the decision of the courts.

Wherefore, we are of the opinion that the court a quo acted correctly in sustaining the demurrer, in view of the fact that the existence of res judicata
may be inferred from the allegations of the complaint, and therefore
the action instituted by the appellants for the third time is untenable
and cannot prosper.

The judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs of both instances,
inasmuch as it positively appears that the appellants are destitute
litigants. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] G. R. Nos. 30267, 30316-30335. Arguelles vs. Natividad, promulgated August 15, 1929, not reported.

^[2] Balagtas vs. Arguelles, 56 Phil., 849.