MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC., AND ACRO TAXICAB CO., INC., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FAUSTO BARREDO (MALATE TAXICAB), RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This
is an appeal taken to review the decision rendered by the Public
Service Commission on July 28, 1932, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:

“Wherefore, finding that
public necessity and convenience demand the conversion of the garage
service in question into a taxicab service as sought by the petitioner
herein, in accordance with section 15, paragraph (i), of Act No. 3108,
as amended, we hereby DENY the oppositions filed against the
application under consideration; GRANT the permission applied for; and
ORDER that, upon payment of the required fees, the corresponding
certificate of public convenience be issued to the herein applicant,
subject to the following conditions:

“1. That the
applicant, Fausto Barredo, shall operate under the firm name ‘Malate
Taxicab’, employing his 45 Chevrolet Touring Cars, 2 Dodge Brothers
Touring Cars and 10 Plymouth Sedans, or a total of 57 cars, under the
denomination, ‘taxicab’, without a fixed route or terminal within the
City of Manila, and between the City of Manila and any other point
within the Island of Luzon accessible by roads or public highways,
whenever the service so demands; * * *.”

Fausto Barredo, the herein applicant-appellee, filed an application
docketed as case No. 30186, praying for authorization to convert into
taxicabs the 57 automobiles he was operating in connection with his
business known as “Malate Garage”, with the right to employ them in
said service within the City of Manila and its suburbs, and in the
provinces of Luzon having suitable roads for such motor traffic. He
likewise prayed that he be authorized to increase his equipment up to
one hundred (100) taxicabs. The herein appellants, Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., Inc., and Aero Taxicab Co., Inc., filed oppositions to the
application in question. In general terms, the grounds for the
aforesaid oppositions consisted in that the opponents were already
taxicab operators; that public necessity and convenience would not be
served by the granting of the new certificate applied for; that the
opponents were rendering an efficient and satisfactory service; and
that they were ready to increase the number of taxicabs they were then
operating to the limit authorized them if such step were necessary and
convenient in order to better serve the public and promote the
interests thereof. After due hearing during which the parties presented
all the necessary evidence including that adduced in the case of Julio
Danon, Record No. 29473, the Public Service Commission rendered its
decision, the dispositive part of which has been quoted at the
beginning of this decision. The municipal board of the City of Manila
also filed its opposition to the application but the same need not be
considered in view of the fact that it did not appeal.

The
Acro Taxicab Co., Inc., has joined the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc.,
in its appeal to this court, relying on the same brief, the assignments
of error, and the arguments of the latter. The Manila Yellow Taxicab
Co., Inc., assigns the following alleged errors in the decision
appealed from:

“(1) The Public Service
Commission erred in granting a certificate of public convenience to
Fausto Barredo to operate a taxicab service in the City of Manila and
surrounding towns where there are already two certificated taxicab
operators in the same field and it was not shown that the service
rendered by them is inadequate, insufficient and unsatisfactory.

“(2) The Public Service Commission erred in permitting Judge Vicente de Vera to take part in the decision of the case.

“(3) The Public Service Commission erred in dictating the decision
prior to the expiration of the 20 days allowed the parties for filing
memoranda.

“(4) The Public Service Commission erred in denying our motion for reopening and rehearing of the case.”

In
its decision, the commission stated, among other things, that from the
evidence presented and from that adduced in the case of Danon, it may
be inferred that there existed in the City of Manila, its suburbs and
the surrounding provinces, sufficient public demand for the taxicab
service sought by the petitioner-appellee, and that in its opinion,
public necessity and convenience would be better served if the 57
garage cars were allowed to be operated as taxicabs. It also added that
if Danon was granted such right under the identical facts, there was
absolutely no good reason to justify the denial of the same right to
the appellee, for to do so would be tantamount to discriminatory
treatment. We have reviewed the evidence presented in this case and are
convinced that the foregoing conclusions are sufficiently supported
thereby. Hence, it is held that the first assignment of error is
unfounded.

But the appellants contend that the decision
appealed from is incomprehensible and illogical for the reason that it
is based entirely on the authorization granted Danon to convert his
garage cars into taxicabs; and insist that from a legal point of view,
the existence of a prior operator in the same territory is precisely a
cause or ground for denying the same kind of service to another
operator. We are of the opinion that the appellant failed to expound
correctly the reasoning set forth by the commission. What it said and
intended to convey was that if Danon was granted permission to convert
his garage cars into taxicabs, there was no just and sane reason for
denying the same privilege to Barredo, inasmuch as both were similarly
situated and the same facts have been established by the same evidence
presented in both cases.

In the second assignment of error,
the intervention of Judge Vicente de Vera in the case and particularly
the circumstance of his having penned the decision appealed from, are
insistently impugned. It is contended that the said judge could not
legally participate in the deliberation of the case in question on the
ground that the first and only time he acted therein was during the
last hearing thereof which scarcely lasted for one hour and a half, and
during which only one or two witnesses testified. It is also insisted
that this procedure is contrary to the provisions of Act No. 3844 which
requires that the questions involved must be heard and decided by at
least two commissioners who should take part in the direction of the
same. Judge De Vera was designated to act in the Public Service
Commission during the absence of one of the members thereof, who was on
vacation leave. Such designation was perfectly valid and we do not
hesitate to hold that his acts were likewise legal and proper. The fact
that he had not heard the majority of the witnesses testify does not
constitute a ground for his disqualification inasmuch as he could have
examined, as it is to be presumed, the testimony of the witnesses,
which has been accurately transcribed.

The third assignment
of error is based on the alleged ground that the commission rendered
its decision before the expiration of the period granted the attorneys
for the filing of their respective memoranda. Granting that this was an
irregularity, we are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the same does
not constitute an error sufficient to justify a modification or
reversal of the decision in question. Undoubtedly, it was due to lack
of time in view of the fact that judicial vacations were nearing an end
and Judge De Vera had to return to his district.

The last assignment of error being merely a matter of form, does not need further consideration.

The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.