G.R. No. 38621. September 15, 1933

EULALIO POSAS, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. TOLEDO TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions September 15, 1933 HULL, J.:


HULL, J.:


This is a petition for review of an order of the Public Service
Commission granting to the applicant-appellee the right to send one
truck from Gral. Trias, Cavite, to Manila, with the hour of departure
at 5 a. m. On this unimportant question the commission has apparently
issued orders dated October 5, 1928, June 5, 1929, the end of June
1929, and February 10, 1931, which order was appealed to this court. On
April 21, 1932, in G. R. No. 35249, the action of the Public Service
Commission in denying Posas the right of having 5 o’clock a. m. as the
departure hour from Gral. Trias to Manila, was affirmed.[1]

Almost before the ink on that decision was dry, an attorney claiming to
represent Posas, filed a petition with the Public Service Commission
asking that Posas be allowed to continue using the hour of 5 a. m. as
the time of departure of his truck.

The Public Service
Commission, on October 14, 1932, denied this application, but
immediately reconsidered its decision, and on October 31, 1932, granted
the petition. The matter was brought here informally, and petition for
review on account of failure of parties was dismissed by this court on
November 23, 1932, in G. R. No. 38553.[1]
It is again brought to our attention with a showing, which is not
denied, that prior to the application which was considered by the
Public Service Commission, the pretended petitioner, Eulalio Posas, had
died.

While section 23, of Act No. 3108 provides that the
commission may make rules for the conduct of their business, our
attention has not been brought to any rule or regulation that would set
at naught the fundamental rule of all proceedings that only parties
having a real interest will be heard. (Sec. 114, Code of Civil
Procedure.)

While the commission by section 28, Act No. 3108, is given wide powers to grant rehearings (Rural Transit Co. vs.
Cruz, 56 Phil., 302), a distinction must be drawn between those orders
that remain entirely within the powers of the commission and those
orders which are brought to this court for review and final decision.
When this court has acted in the premises, no subordinate tribunal or
body has a right to nullify or set aside the orders of this tribunal.
The decision of this court becomes the law of the case and must be
respected (Silang Traffic Co. vs. Karungkong, 56 Phil., 826).
This very case shows the necessity and propriety of having the orders
enforced until there has been a substantial change in conditions.
Without any substantial change in what applicant originally desired or
in the desires of the traveling public, the Insular Government has been
put to the expense of having the Public Service Commission and this
court each twice pass upon the question. A slight change in the minor
details of the application or the fact that in one case there was one
set of oppositors and in the other case a different set does not make
it a new case. Otherwise, we will soon have it contended that a change
of a few minutes in the time of desired departure or if the applicant
had seen fit to apply for the use of green cars instead of an
application calling for red cars, it would justify the Public Service
Commission granting a rehearing and reversing our orders.

The former Public Service Commission might have been willing to waste
its time in such proceedings, but this court will not permit its time
to be frittered away on such trivialities.

The orders
complained of, being founded on a petition filed in the name of a dead
man, are declared null and void and are set aside. Costs in both
instances will be taxed against the attorney who instituted this futile
proceeding. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Imperial, JJ., concur.


[1] Posas vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil., 959.

[1] Toledo Transportation Co. vs. Posas, 57 Phil, 592.