NARIC WORKER’S UNION, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CARMELINO G. ALVENDIA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

In an order dated May 27, 1958, respondent Honorable Carmelino
Alvendia granted a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No.
36353 (for damages) of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Orders of
July 1, 1958 and August 20, 1958 of the respondent Honorable Judge
Bonifacio Ysip, respectively, denied herein petitioners’ motion, to
dismiss the said civil case and motion for reconsideration of the
denial. From said orders, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari with prohibition.

It appears that on May 26, 1958, the respondent National Rice and Corn Corporation filed a complaint versus
the herein petitioners, Naric Worker’s Union and its officers, in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 36353 for Damages
with Ex-parte Petition for Preliminary Injunction) as a result of the
alleged blocking and obstruction of the gates of the respondent
company’s offices by striking picketers who threatened violence and
bodily harm to persons crossing the union’s picket lines. On the same
date that the complaint was filed, respondent Judge Carmelino Alvendia
issued ex parte an order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, directing the petitioners and their agents to
refrain from the commission of the acts complained of until further
orders from the court.

The writ was subsequently signed by Judge Bonifacio Ysip in May 27.
In due time, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
and dissolve the restraining orders, urging that the respondent court
had no jurisdiction over the case since it grows out of a labor dispute
involving an unfair labor practice case (CIR Case No. 1677—ULP), and,
therefore, exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.

Having been unsuccessful in the lower court, petitioners brought
this petition for review, reiterating their contentions in the court
below. We granted due course to the petition, and upon petitioners’
filing a bond of P500.00, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by this Court.

The parties do not contest that courts of first instance have no
jurisdiction in cases that grow out of labor disputes involving unfair
labor practices.^[1]
Respondent National Rice and Corn Corporation, however, argues that, it
(NARIC) has been held, by judicial as well as administrative and
executive pronouncements, to be a body performing governmental functions^[2], and according to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, petitioners are precluded from declaring: a strike against it.

The portion of the law relied upon by the respondent corporation is to this effect—

“SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government.—The
terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law
and it is declared to be the policy of the Act that employees therein
shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modifications
in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong
to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to
strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this
section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental
functions and not to those employed in proprietary functions of the
Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.”
(Rep. Act 875)

Conceding that the respondent National Rice and Corn Corporation is
an instrumentality of the Government, especially since the law creating
it (Republic Act No. 663) expressly declares the same to be so,^[3] yet its activities are not purely or exclusively governmental in nature.

Thus, under the statute, the corporation is empowered, under Section
3 thereof, among other matters, to buy and sell rice and corn or its
by-products; to give loans on reasonable terms and finance activities
in the rice and corn industry; to borrow, raise or secure money; to
mortgage or otherwise encumber its properties; and to enter into, make,
perform and carry out contracts of every class and description
necessary or incidental to its purpose, for which it may derive profits
or incur losses.

Now, under the proviso of Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act
(already quoted), the prohibition to strike is clearly limited to
“employees employed in governmental functions and not to those employed
in proprietary functions of the Government” (Sec. 11, Republic Act
875). Since the work of the members of the petitioning union consists
mainly in hauling goods at the respondent’s warehouses, barges and
piers, the same bears only a very remote relation to the governmental
functions of respondent corporation, and the union members are not
covered by the prohibition against strikes. Restrictions of the
workers’ basic right to collective action to improve their conditions
of work or protect themselves against oppressive practices are to be
strictly construed.

If, as stated by the respondents, the petitioners were committing
acts of violence and bodily harm during the course of their strike, the
remedy to enjoin the same lies not with the ordinary courts but with
the Industrial Court which has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.

Respondents contend that the case of the petitioners does not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. There is
no merit in this assertion. In the leading case of PAFLU, et al. vs.
Tan, et al., 52 Off. Gaz., 5836, we already made it clear that the
Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the following cases:

“(1) When the labor dispute affects an industry
which is indispensable to the National interest and is so certified by
the President to the Industrial Court (Section 10, Republic Act 875);
(2) when the controversy refers to the minimum wage under the Minimum
Wage Law (Republic Act 602); (3) when it involves hours of employment
under the Eight Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444); and when it
involves an unfair labor practice (Section 5 (a), Republic Act 875).”

It appears that even before the filing of respondent corporation’s
complaint in Civil Case No. 36353 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the Naric Workers’ Union had already filed charges for unfair
labor practices against the corporation, leading to the filing of a
complaint before the Industrial Court by a special prosecutor thereat,
dated June 11, 1958, and docketed as Case No. 1677-ULP. The charges
include the refusal of the corporation to deal with the representatives
of the complainant union for collective bargaining and its desire to
discriminate against and discourage membership in the complainant union
in violation of sub-paragraphs 4 and 6 of Republic Act 875. It does not
appear that the unfair labor practice case was filed merely to divest
the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction and it is not, thus,
relevant whether the filing of the complaint before the Industrial
Court was prior to or later than the filing of the complaint in the
civil case for damages (Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Assn. (NATU), 104 Phil., 17). In National Garments and Textile Workers’ Union-Paflu vs. Caluag, etc., et al., G. R. No. L-9104, September 30, 1956, we held:

“It appearing that the issue involved in the main
case is interwoven with the unfair labor practice cases pending before
the Court, of Industrial Relations as to which its jurisdiction is
exclusive, it is evident that it does not fall under the jurisdiction
of the trial court even if it involves acts of violence, intimidation
and coercion as averred in the complaint. This acts come within the
purview of Section. 9 (d) of Republic Act 875 which may be enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations.

The reason for this rule was stated in Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Assn. (NATU), supra.:

“Since the picketing and strikes may be mere
incidents or consequences of the unfair labor practice, it is but
proper that the issuance of injunction be made by the court having
jurisdiction over the main case, in order that the writ be issued upon
cognizance of all relevant facts.’

Since the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction, the fact that
the petitioning union was declared in default does not affect the
merits of the case.

Wherefore, the restraining orders complained of, dated May 19, 1958
and May 27, 1958, are set aside, and the complaint is ordered
dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and Corn
Corporation’s seeking whatever remedy it is entitled to in the Court of
Industrial Relations. Costs against the corporation.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, J., reserves his vote.

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^[1] Consolidated Labor Ass’n of the Philippines, et al. vs. Caluag, et al., G. R. No. L-12330, May 30, 1958; Reyes, et al. vs. Tan, et al., 108 Phil., 1032; Reyes, et al. vs. Tan, 99 Phil., 880; National Garment and Textile Worker’s Union-Paflu vs. Caluag, et al., G. R. No. L-9104, September 10, 1956.

^[2] Citing Tabora vs.
Montelibano, 52 Off. Gaz., 3058; Opinion No. 15, Series of 1958 of the
Government Corporate Counsel; letter of the Executive Secretary, dated
May 26, 1958, to the NARIC Assistant Manager; Opinion No. 212, Series
of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice, reiterating opinion of the
Secretary of Justice No. 319, s. 1954; No. 264, s. 1966; and No. 219 s.
1657.

^[3] The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 663, creating the National Rice and Corn Corporation, provide:

“SEC. 3. For carrying out the foregoing objectives, the Corporation shall have authority—

(a) To act as the agent or instrumentality
of the Government in any of its governmental, social or civic functions
in such a manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law
or by executive order or proclamation; * * *.” (Italics supplied)

Common law courts invariably conceded corporations as
instrumentalities of the State whenever the law creating it so provides
(Huffman vs. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 39 F. Supp. 139; Herman et al., vs. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 200 Atl. 742; see also, Port Angeles Western R. Co. vs. Clallam County, Wash., et al., 20 Fed. 2d. 202; Trinity Farm Const. Co. vs. Alice Gosjean 78 L. Ed. 918; Barnsdall Refineries, Inc., et al. vs. Oklahoma Tax Commission et al., 41 p. 2d 918).