MUNICIPALITY OF HINABAÑGAN AND RUFINA NABUAL, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, EUGENIO NABUAL, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF WRIGHT AND JULIAN ABEGONIA, DEFENDANTS …

Appeal by the municipality of Hinabañgan from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Samar, dated February 28, 1956, dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief.

The complaint alleges substantially, that the plaintiff municipality
exists, under and by virtue of Republic Act No. 263; that he.
co-plaintiff, Rufina Nabual, is the holder of a license issued by the
said municipality to fish within the latter’s territorial waters; that
until the passage of Republic Act No. 263, Hinabañgan and Concord were
municipal districts with their corresponding territorial extents and
boundaries; that with the enactment of the aforesaid law, the two
districts, were fused into one regular municipality of Hinabañgan;
that, the organizing statute does not mention a new territory or does
it specify new boundaries; that beginning the year 1954, the defendant
municipality of Wright began to assert jurisdiction over certain
fishing grounds of the plaintiff municipality, and that, in fact, its
co-defendant, Julian Abegonia, was granted by the defendant
municipality a license to fish within the fishing zones of the
plaintiff municipality; that defendant municipality, furthermore, is
asserting jurisdiction over Barrio Candoyocan, which, it is claimed, is
part of the territory of Hinabañgan and lastly, that the Provincial
Board of Samar has not been able to give the much desired relief,
despite the lapse of more than five years to the date of the filing of
the complaint.

Wherefore, plaintiffs pray that—

“a judgment he entered, declaring the Municipality
of Hinabañgan as having the legal and official jurisdiction over the
Bucalan River and its tributaries, namely, Carawisan, Mogod, Mogdo,
Malligo Cantapajan and Hinabañgan, and over the now called Barrio
Candoyocan, as integral parts of Hinabañgan in pursuance of and by
virtue of Republic Act No. 263, and consequently, enjoining the
defendants from claiming them to be territories of Wright and
exercising corporate jurisdiction over the same, with costs against the
defendants; and extending to the plaintiffs such other remedies fair
and equitable in the premises.”

Defendants were served with summons on July 22, 1955. Instead of
answering the complaint, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July
30, 1955. The motion was not considered for lack of notification to the
plaintiffs. By order of the Court, dated August 5, 1955, the defendants
were required to furnish the plaintiffs a copy of their motion, which
order was sent to the defendants by registered mail. Failing to comply
with this order of the court, the defendants were, on August 31, 1956,
declared in default upon motion of the plaintiffs. Nonetheless, on
October 29, 1956, the court issued an order requiring the plaintiffs
within ten (10) days thereof to file an answer to the motion to
dismiss, to which the latter complied. In an order dated February 28,
1956, the court dismissed the complaint, declaring, in effect; that
since the case involves a boundary dispute between the contending
municipalities, it is not for the courts to determine that issue, which
is, under the law, vested upon the executive department of the
government to resolve. Hence, this appeal.

Appellants contend that the lower court erred in declaring that
declaratory relief is not the proper remedy of the plaintiffs and in
holding that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain the case.

The appeal is not well taken. The right to settle boundary disputes
between municipalities, which is, in fact, the main issue in this
instance, is vested by law on the provincial board of the province
concerned. Outlining the procedure to be taken up in such cases,
Section 2167, of the Revised Administrative Code reads:

“Municipal boundary disputes—How settled.—Disputes
as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios
shall be decided by the provincial boards of the provinces in which
such municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the
municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the
provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to
the Secretary of Interior (now the Office of the Executive Secretary),
whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute
are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the
provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement
if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal
shall be had to the Secretary of Interior (Executive Secretary), whose
decision shall be final.”

On the other hand, the controversy between plaintiff Nabual and
defendant Abegonia arises only on the uncertainty they both entertain
regarding the territorial coverage of their fishing licenses. This
question is interlinked with the existing boundary dispute between the
two municipalities, who are themselves parties to this suit, and which
appears to be awaiting resolution by the Provincial Board of Samar.
Until that matter is resolved in accordance with the above rules it is
plain that a judicial recourse, would be premature.

If it is true, as asserted by the appellants, that, notwithstanding
the appeal taken to the provincial board by the plaintiff municipality,
the board remains unconcerned and has as yet failed to settle the
boundary dispute, then the action, if at all, would be against the said
board.

Appellants urge, however, that the boundary question is not
seriously involved in this case, and that they merely would like to
have a judicial declaration that Republic Act No. 263 maintains the
integrity and territorial extents of the districts of Concord and
Hinabañgan. On the contrary, we find the boundary dispute as the very
issue in controversy; in fact, this is evident from the plaintiffs’
prayer, viz., that “a judgment be entered, declaring the Municipality
of Hinabañgan as having the legal and official jurisdiction over the
Bucalan River and its tributaries, namely, Carawisan, Mogo, Mogdo,
Malligo, Cantapajan and Hinabañgan, and over the now called Barrio
Candoyocan, as integral parts of Hinabañgan in pursuance of and by
virtue of Republic Act No. 263, and consequently, enjoining the
defendant from claiming them to be territories of Wright and exercising
corporate jurisdiction over the same”. Plainly, if the municipality of
Wright issued its fishing licenses knowing that they covered territory
beyond its boundaries, such licenses would be void, and the proper
action would consist in ejecting its licensee, and not a petition for
declaratory judgment.

Finally, it is contended that the lower court erred in not
proceeding to hear the plaintiffs’ evidence on the date set for
hearing, despite the order of default against the defendants. In this
connection, however, appellants themselves concede the ample discretion
of the court to do so. It must be pointed out, furthermore, that the
court below based its order of dismissal upon the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, a question that may be taken up by it motu proprio at anytime, since it affects the cause of action.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.