[WITH RESOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1962]

Sometime in 1917, Bartolome Quines filed with the Bureau of Lands a
homestead application covering a tract of land situated in the
municipality of Abulug, province of Cagayan. Upon the approval of his
application in the following year, he began clearing and cultivating
the land.

In the years 1923 to 1925, cadastral surveys were
made by the Bureau of Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which
the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was
designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys
were completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying
upon the assurance made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that
they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings,
Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein. However, one Maria
Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No.
3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930, rendered
its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by
her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently because neither
the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during
the hearing to inform the court that it was under homestead
application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final
decree of registration and the original certificate of title to Maria
Florentino, a homestead covering lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome
Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on
September 15, 1930, issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his
name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register of
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of
Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her by the cadastral
court including Lot No. 3044.

Sometime in 1952, Maria
Florentino, with the consent of her husband Jose Villanueva, sold all
the lots approved by Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 to Arturo
Nieto, who subsequently secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1402 in his name on January 21, 1953.

On the other
hand, Bartolome Quines executed a deed of sale on December 23, 1953
transferring Lot No. 3044 as covered by Original Certificate of Title
issued in his name to Atty. Miguel P. Pio. Discovering that the land he
purchased was covered by another title in the name of Arturo Nieto,
Atty. Pio, on January 8, 1954, filed an action against the latter in
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan for quieting of title. The lower
court, however, upon defendant’s motion, dismissed the action on the
ground that the plaintiff had not yet acquired a legal title that could
affect third persons, the sale not having been approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the deed not being
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds.

Prior to
the dismissal of the action to quiet title above mentioned, or on
January 16, 1954, Arturo Nieto, the defendant therein, filed a
complaint against Bartolome Quines in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan. The complaint, alleging, among other things, that the
homestead patent and Original Certificate of Title No. 623 were
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, prayed that the patent
and title be cancelled and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1402
issued in plaintiff’s name be declared as the true and valid title over
the lot in dispute. It was likewise alleged that defendant Quines was
not in possession of Lot No. 3044, but of certain portions of other
lots belonging to plaintiff, and should, therefore, be ordered to
vacate the same. Defendant Bartolome Quines, through his counsel Atty.
Miguel P. Pio, answered the complaint denying its material allegations.

During the pendency of the action, the sale of Lot No. 3044 to Miguel
P. Pio was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and was later registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan who issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1984 in
the name of Miguel P. Pio. Accordingly, Miguel P. Pio filed a motion
for his inclusion as party defendant. His motion having been granted,
defendant Miguel P. Pio answered the complaint denying the material
allegations thereof and interposing a counterclaim for damages.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in defendants’ favor
dismissing the complaint, ordering the cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title No. 11982 and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1402 insofar as they cover Lot No. 3044, and sentencing the plaintiff
to pay the defendants P6,000 representing the owner’s share in the
harvest from the years 1954 to 1957. His two motions for
reconsideration having been denied, plaintiff Arturo Nieto appealed
directly to this Court.

The appeal is without merit.

As established during the trial and found by the trial court, Bartolome
Quines had been in the continuous and peaceful possession of Lot No.
3044 from the time his homestead application was approved in 1918 up to
1953 when he was forcibly ejected therefrom by Arturo Nieto. As a
homestead applicant, he religiously complied with all the requirements
of the Public Land Act and, on August 29, 1930, a homestead patent was
issued in his favor. Considering the requirement that the final proof
must be presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead
application (sec. 14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that
Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and
that the Director of Lands approved the same not long thereafter or
before the land became the subject of the cadastral proceedings in
1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the ministerial act of
issuing the patent and the same was actually issued only after the
cadastral court had adjudicated the land to Maria Florentino.
Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms and conditions which
would entitle him to a patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent
actually issued, has unquestionably acquired a vested right on the land
and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. (Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil., 498.) Under these circumstances and applying by
analogy the principles governing sales of immovable property to two
different persons by the same vendor, Bartolome Quines’ title must
prevail over that of Maria Florentino not only because he had always
been in possession of the land but also because he obtained title to
the land prior to that of Maria Florentino.

Having arrived at the above conclusions, we deem it idle to consider the other points raised in this appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. With costs against appellant.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur in the result.

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BARRERA, J.:

In the decision of this Court in the herein case, promulgated on
January 28, 1961, the following facts were considered duly established:

“Sometime
in 1917, Bartolome Quines filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead
application covering a tract of land situated in the municipality of
Abulug, province of Cagayan. Upon the approval of his application in
the following year, he began clearing and cultivating the land.

“In
the years 1923 to 1925, cadastral surveys were made by the Bureau of
Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land
applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot
No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were completed,
cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands
in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the assurances
made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they would take care
of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not
file any answer therein. However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer
claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the
cadastral court, on August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein
Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was
included in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands
nor any of his representatives appeared during the hearing to inform
the court that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930,
pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the
original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent
covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant
thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930,
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six months
thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register of Deeds issued
Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino
covering the lots awarded to her by the cadastral court including Lot
No. 3044.”

Upon the foregoing, it was
declared that Quines, “having complied with all the terms and
conditions which would entitled him to a patent * * * has
unquestionably acquired a vested right on the land and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof.” The title of appellee Quines
to the land, consequently, was held superior to that of Maria
Florentino, predecessor-in-interest of herein appellant Arturo Nieto.
This Resolution is prompted by appellant’s motion for reconsideration
of our above mentioned decision.

For purposes of resolving
the issues raised in the instant motion for reconsideration, attention
must be given to the following significant facts appearing in the
records: After the approval of appellee’s application for homestead of
the tract of land involved herein, but before a patent therefor could
actually be issued, cadastral proceedings were instituted by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, wherein
said land was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre; that
in this cadastral proceeding, only Maria Florentino appeared and filed
a claim of ownership of Lot No. 3044, as a result of which, the
cadastral court, on August 16, 1930, “awarded and decreed said
non-contested Lot No. 3044” in favor of claimant Florentino; and that
there having been no appeal interposed, the award and decree became
final on September 15, 1930; that on August 30, 1930, a
homestead patent over the same lot was issued by the Bureau of Lands to
appellee Quines, and Original Certificate of Title No. 623, based on
said patent was issued by the Register of Deeds in his name on September 15, 1930;
that Original Certificate of Title No. 11982, in the name of Maria
Florentino de Villanueva, on the other hand, was issued on March 12,
1931.

In the case of De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals, et al (L-17757, promulgated on May 30, 1962), it was held:

“Confronted
with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding
is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Abural (39 Phil., 997), said:

‘After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first
adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This
constitutes the decision—the judgment—the decree of the court, and
speaks in a judicial manner. The second action is the declaration by
the Court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of
the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office.
Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a
copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again
is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.

‘The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration
Office. This office has been instituted “for the effectuation and
accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land.”

(Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 174.) * * *.

‘The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the
decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when
final is the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the
decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The date
of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the
adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be performed is
the mere formulation of the technical description. * * *.

‘As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is
final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day
period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a
copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any
step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may
then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the
certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.’

“Under
the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is
vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from
the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an
appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be
necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent
disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be
necessary.

“As we have here a decree issued by the
cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of
the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision
adjudicating ownership to him of said property had already become
final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said
cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicates was
vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The
land, for all intents and purposes, had become, from that time,
registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.”

In line with the foregoing ruling, the land, for all legal intents and
purposes became registered in the name of the adjudicatee Maria
Florentino after the decision of the cadastral court became final,
i.e., 30 days from August 16, 1930 or on September 15, 1930
(Sec. 11, Act 2259). As the certificate of title based on the patent
was also issued to appellee Quines on the same day, it is clear that
Lot No. 3044 was registered in the names of 2 different persons, on the
same day, pursuant to 2 different proceedings. This peculiar situation
gives rise not to the question of who is rightfully entitled to
registration of the property, but which of the two registrations
already effected and secured, should prevail.

It is true, as
claimed by appellee Quines, that in the case of Aquino vs. Director of
Lands (39 Phil., 850), this Court declared a decree of registration
issued under the Public Land Law to be “conclusive and final”, and that
“once registered, a patent becomes irrevocable and enjoys the same
privileges as Torrens titles issued under Act 496” (Manalo vs. Lukban, 48 Phil., 973; El Hogar Filipino vs.
Olviga, 60 Phil., 17). The pronouncement in the Aquino case, however,
was based on the conclusion that “proceedings under the Land
Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public
Land Law (re-confirmation of imperfect titles) are the same in that
both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings”^[1]; while in the Manalo and El Hogar Filipino
cases, the issue involved was the efficacy of duly issued certificates
of title based on patents, as against titles obtained through cadastral
proceedings instituted subsequent to the granting of such
patents. Whatever rulings and pronouncements may have been made in said
cases, therefore, would have no application to the case at bar, because
the title obtained by appellee Quines was not under Chapter VI of Act
926, but pursuant to the provisions of the same law on homestead (Chap.
I, Act 926), and the question herein presented involves the validity
and enforceability of 2 different registrations that took effect on the
same day. An analysis of the 2 proceedings under which they were
obtained is, consequently, imperative and in order.

Under
Act 926 which is the law governing this case, the Director of Lands,
upon receipt of a homestead application, shall summarily determine
whether the land described is prima facie subject to homestead
settlement, and should he find nothing to the contrary, the applicant
shall be permitted to enter the land specified (Sec. 2). In not less
than five nor more than eight years from the date of the filing of the
application, final proof of residence and cultivation may be made by
the applicant (Sec. 2), of which, the public shall be notified, and any
person may contest the same on any of the grounds enumerated in the law
(Sec. 8). Should the applicant successfully prove that he has complied
with all the requirements of the law, a patent, under the name of the
Government, shall be issued to him (the applicant), upon payment of the
necessary fee (Sec. 3). The procedure, initiated by the applicant and
acted upon by the grantor (the Government), is purely administrative.^[2] As this Court observed:

“*
* * while provision is made for notice to the public of the intention
of the homesteader to apply for a patent upon final proof of occupation
and cultivation of the land, and for the hearing of objections to the
application upon various grounds, including the contention that the
land in question was not ‘unoccupied at the time of filing the
application, the statute nowhere undertakes to declare that the
decision of the Director upon such contest shall be conclusive, or that
the failure of the real owner to contest the application shall have the
effect of forfeiting his, title by making the director’s decision as to
the public character of the land final and conclusive.” (De los Reyes vs. Razon, supra.)

Upon the other hand, the proceedings under the Cadastral Act, at the
initiative of the Government (Sec. 1, Act 2259), are judicial. Process
is served by publication upon all persons who may have interest on the
land, including the Government, to appear and prove or oppose the
claims of ownership that may be filed therein (Sees. 8 and 9). The
action is one in rem and any decision rendered therein by the
cadastral court is binding against the whole world, (Sec. 11) including
the Government.

The decision of the cadastral court,
recognizing Maria Florentino’s right of ownership over the land, was
rendered on August 16, 1930. There being no charge, much less proof, of
irregularity of the cadastral proceeding, the Government, on which said
decision of the cadastral court is also binding and which is supposed
to have knowledge thereof, had actually no more right to convey by
homestead grant on August 29, 1930, said parcel of land to appellee
Quines. The fact that the decision of the cadastral court became final
only on September 15, 1930, after the patent was issued, does not alter
the situation that when such patent was obtained, there was already a
court adjudication in favor of Maria Florentino, binding upon the
government itself, predecesor-in-interest of Quines.

Furthermore, a certificate of title based on a patent, even after the
expiration of one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to
certain conditions and restriction^[3].
As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases and after prior
administrative investigations by the Director of Lands, proper actions
may be instituted by said official which may lead to the cancellation
of the patent and the title, and the consequent reversion of the land
to the Government.^[4] On the other hand, a certificate of title issued pursuant to Act 2259, after the lapse of 1 year, becomes incontrovertible.^[5]
The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that, while with the due
registration and issuance of a certificate of title over a land
acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said property becomes
registered in contemplation of Act 496,^[6]
in view of its nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of
title, when in conflict with one obtained on the same date through
judicial proceedings, must give way to the latter.

Wherefore, the Decision of January 28, 1961 is hereby reconsidered; the
judgment of the lower court reversed and set aside, and another one is
entered declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name
of Maria Florentino de Villanueva, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 140 in the name of plaintiff-appellant Arturo Nieto, subsequently
issued upon cancellation of the former, as the true and valid titles
over Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. Appellant’s claim for
damages, however, is denied there being no sufficient justification for
awarding the same. Without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Claims
and applications for registration of imperfect titles are to be filed
in the Court of Land Registration for investigation and hearing. The
parties and the general public, including the Government (represented
by the Attorney General) are notified thereof. In such hearings, the
procedure prescribed for hearings and in the matter of appeal under Act
946 shall be observed. (Secs. 59, 60, Act 926).

^[2] De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil., 480.

^[3] Secs. 118, 119, 121, 122, Com. Act 141; Sec. 35, Act 926; Campanero vs. Coloma, 106 Phil., 993.

^[4] Secs. 123 anti 124, Com. Act 141; Rellin vs. Cabigas, 109 Phil., 1180.

^[5] Sec. 11, Act 926 in connection with Sec. 38, Act 493.

^[6] Sec. 122, Act 496