THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BALBINO VILLAREAL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of the appellant of
the offense of carrying a concealed deadly weapon as defined and penalized in
section 26 of Act No. 1780. The weapon was a sort of dagger or sharp-pointed
knife with a blade about 8 inches long. It was carried in a leather sheath,
attached to a belt which was strapped round the body, and hung down on the left
hip of the accused concealed from public view inside his trousers.

The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is
the claim that the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and
prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a license, is in
violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Bights.

Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States
Constitution against the infringement of the right of the people of the United
States to keep and bear arms”(U.S. Constitution, amendment 2), which is not
included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out
that in no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case
at bar, not only Because it has not been expressly extended to the Philippine
Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar
provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare
(see cases cited in 40 Cyc, 853, note 18); and further, because even in those
jurisdictions wherein the constitutional guaranty of the right to keep and bear
arms is in force, while it is beyond the power of a legislature or municipal
body to prohibit entirely the keeping and use of military arms, it may, in the
exercise of its police powers, for the purpose of suppressing crime and
lawlessness, lawfully regulate the use of such weapons by providing that they
qhall not be carried in a concealed manner, or that they shall not be pointed at
another, or fired within the limits of a city. (See many cases cited in 40 Cyc,
p. 853.)

Counsel’s contention seems to be based on those provisions of the Philippine
Bill of Rights which prohibit the enactment of a law depriving any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying to any person
the equal protection of the laws. He insists that restrictions placed on the
carrying of deadly weapons have the effect of depriving the owner of the free
use and enjoyment of his property, and that the granting of licenses to some
persons to carry firearms and the denial of that right to others is a denial to
the latter of the equal protection of the laws.

Both the statute in question and the provision of the Philippine Bill of
Rights with which it is claimed it is in conflict were enacted under American
sovereignty, and both are to be construed more especially in the light of
American authority and precedent. The earliest English statute (St. 2 Edw. Ill,
c. 3) regulating the bearing of arms, enacted in the year 1328 A. D., was but an
affirmation of the common law offense of going around with unusual and dangerous
weapons to the terror of the people. Many statutes have been enacted since that
time in England and the United States, regulating the carrying and the use of
weapons, and these have, as a rule, been held to be constitutional, especially
when the prohibitions have been directed to the wearing or carrying of deadly
weapons in a concealed manner. (See 48 Cent. Digest, tit. Weapons, and many
cases there cited.)

There can be no real question as to the police power of the state to regulate
the use of deadly weapons for the purpose of suppressing or restraining crime
and lawlessness. Undoubtedly there are many deadly weapons, such as knives,
bolos, krises and the like which every citizen has a right to own and to use in
the various activities of human life. But the right to own and to use such
weapons does not carry with it the right to use them to the injury of his
neighbor or so as to endanger the peace and welfare of the community. “It is a
settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title,
holds it under his implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that
it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right
to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community.” Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.), 53, 84.) Provided the
means adopted are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the end in
view, not unduly oppressive upon individuals, and in the interest of the public
generally rather than of a particular class, the legislature may adopt such
regulations as it deems proper restricting, limiting, and regulating the use of
private property in the exercise of its police power. (U. S. vs.
Toribio, 15 Phil. Rep., 85.)

We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory
regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure
well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments
of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a
regulation would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress
crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the practice of carrying
concealed weapons prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon the
individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its enactment by the
legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state.

The right to regulate the use of firearms, and to prescribe the conditions
under which they may be kept and used by their owners rests upon substantially
similar grounds. The general provisions touching the licensing of the use of
such arms are mere police regulations, intended to limit such use so that
firearms will not fall into the hands of persons whose use of them might
endanger the peace of the state or the safety and security of individuals. While
it may be true that those charged with the .issuing of such licenses willfully
or mistakenly decline to issue or approve licenses in some cases in which the
applicants are equally entitled with others to receive them, nevertheless the
regulations themselves are of general application and in no wise deny the equal
protection of the law to all applicants. The fault in such cases is not with the
law, but with those charged with its administration.

We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the
accused. The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur in the result.