G.R. No. 7867. November 18, 1914
ANTONIO MATUTE Y AMASA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, OBJECTOR AND APPELLANT.
JOHNSON, J.:
Land Registration. The petitioner asked that five parcels of land particularly
described in the first paragraph of his. Complaint, all located within the
jurisdiction of the pueblo of Davao, on the Island of Mindanao, be registered
under the Torrens system. The petitioner alleged that if the court should find
that he was not entitled to have said parcels of land registered by reason of
ownership, that the same should be registered in his name in accordance with the
provisions of chapter 6 of Act No. 926. The petitioner alleged that said parcels
of land contain 1,785 hectares.
On the 3d day of May, 1907; Gregorio Araneta, Attorney-General, appeared on
behalf of the opponent in said cause.
On the 30th of August, 1907, the petitioner presented an amended complaint,
asking for the registration of the said parcels of land. In the amended
complaint; the petitioner alleged that the said five parcels of land contained
1,511 hectares 38 ares and 24 centares.
On the 31st day of January, 1908, the petitioner presented a motion in said
cause, asking for permission to withdraw his action, reserving to himself the
right “to reproduce it later in another suit.”
On the 16th day of October, 1908, Juan Sumulong, associate judge of the Court
of Land Registration, granted said petition in the following words: “On motion
by the petitioner, the petition in this case is dismissed, without prejudice to
his reproducing the same whenever he may deem it advisable so to do.”
About eighteen months later, on the 22d day of March, 1910, the petitioner
appeared in court and asked that his original cause of action be revived. Said
motion contained
the following:
“1. That, on the date of October 16, 1908, the court, on motion by the
petitioner, issued an order dismissing the petition in this case, reserving to
him the right to reproduce it whenever he might deem it advisable so to do.“2. That, by reason of the aforementioned order and it being to the interests
of the petitioner that this case be tried anew for the purpose of its final
decision, he hereby sets forth that he reproduces in all its parts the petition
presented in the said case.“3. That the petitioner further sets forth that the land described in the
petition, Exhibit E, is included in the Civil Reservation No. Ill for the
organization of a pueblo in the municipality of Davao.“The petitioner therefore prays the court to cancel the order of dismissal
issued in this case on October 16, 1908, and to direct that the case be
proceeded with in the ordinary manner until final judgment be rendered.“Manila, March 22, 1910—Ambrosio Santos, attorney for petitioner.—No. 4
Salcedo, Santa Cruz, Manila.”
On the 1st day of April, 1910, the Honorable Higinio Benitez, associate judge
of the Court of Land Registration, granted said motion and ordered that said
cause be included “in the calendar for the next session in the Province of
Davao.”
On the 26th day of September, 1910, the Attorney-General, Ignacio Villamor,
appeared and duly presented an exception to said order of the 1st of April,
1910, and on the same day (26th of September, 1910) presented a motion based
upon the following grounds:
“1. That, on the date of October 16, 1908, this honorable court issued the
following order:” ‘On motion by the petitioner, the petition in this case is dismissed,
without prejudice to his reproducing the same whenever he may deem it advisable
so to do.“‘Manila, P. I., October 18, 1908.—(Sgd.) Juan Sumulong, acting associate
judge.’“2. That, about the 1st of April, 1910, on motion by the petitioner, Judge
Benitez issued an order granting the reopening of this case and assigning a date
for the hearing.“3. That the order granting a reopening of this case is contrary to law: (a)
Because it was issued after the lapse of more than one year from the date of the
order of dismissal; and (b) because in the order of dismissal, dated October 16,
1908, the petitioner was only granted the right to reproduce his
application.“4. That the question here involved and now sought to have decided is of
great importance for the procedure that must in future be followed by this court
in similar cases; and a ruling on the point in discussion is required of this
court, to avoid appeals that might cause unnecessary expense to the litigating
parties.“Therefore the undersigned Attorney-General prays that this point be
considered by the court in bane, and that after due hearing the order of this
court dated April 1, 1910, be set aside, with the declaration that the reopening
of this case was improper.”
Said motion was referred to the consideration of three judges of the Court of
Land Registration, sitting in bane. Upon due consideration, said judges decided
that they, by virtue of the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 1648, had no
jurisdiction to intervene in said cause, for the purpose of modifying or
reversing the said order of Judge Benitez, reinstating said cause, of April
1,1910.
Section 8 of said Act No. 1648, provides: “Upon a decision being rendered by
any judge serving on the Court of Land Registration, either party in interest
may, within thirty days after the decision is rendered by such judge, petition
the court in bane, consisting of all the judges serving on the court, or at
least three of said judges, for a rehearing of the case, and, if it shall appear
to such court in bane that the decision on which a rehearing is asked is in
conflict with any previous decision of the court, or of any judge thereof, or
with any decision of the Supreme Court of these Islands, or of any other
competent appellate tribunal, then the court in bane, may, in its discretion, by
vote of a majority of its members, grant the rehearing petitioned for, annul the
decision of the single judge, and rehear the case sitting in bane; and the
decision of the court in bane shall be the decision of the Court of Land
Registration in the case, and may be regularly appealed from as in other
cases.”
On the 17th day of November, 1910, the Attorney-General presented his formal
opposition to the registration of said parcels of land in question.
On the 15th day of March, 1911, the petitioner again asked permission to
amend his complaint and to change the description of the land contained in
parcel E.
The cause was duly set down for trial and after hearing the evidence, the
Honorable James A. Ostrand, associate judge, on the 23d day of January, 1912,
rendered his decision, in which he denied the right of the plaintiff to have
registered in his name parcels A and B, described in the first paragraph of the
complaint, for the reason that the evidence did not show that he was the owner
of said land.
The judge found that the evidence did show that the petitioner was entitled
to have parcels C, D, and E, described in the first paragraph of the complaint,
registered. He granted the registration of said parcels C and D, under the
provisions of subsection 5 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The court granted the
registration of parcel E, because, as he found, the petitioner had been, by
himself and through his predecessors, in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of said parcel, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for thirty years.
On the 1st day of February, 1912, the Attorney-General duly excepted to the
order of the judge granting the registration of said parcels C, D, and E, and on
the same day presented a motion for a new trial. Said motion for a new trial was
denied on the 2d day of February, 1912, to which order denying the motion for a
new trial, the Attorney- General duly excepted and presented his bill of
exceptions and appeal to this court.
In this court the Attorney-General presents two assignments of error, as
follows:
“I. The court incurred an error of law in declaring the case reopened by its
order of April 1, 1910; and“II. It likewise erred in decreeing the registration of the land, the subject
matter of the application, in favor of the petitioner, because it lacked
jurisdiction over the matter in litigation and over the person of the
petitioner.”
With reference to the first assignment of error, it will be remembered that
the petitioner, on the 31st day of January, 1908, asked that he be permitted to
retire his petition presented in said cause, “reserving, however, the right to
reproduce it afterwards in other proceedings;” that said motion was granted on
the 16th day of October, 1908, with the condition: “without prejudice to the
said petitioner’s reproducing it whenever he might deem it advisable so to do;”
that more than seventeen months later (the 22d day of March, 1910), the
petitioner asked that said cause be reinstated; that said cause was reinstated,
by order of the court, and again placed upon the calendar on the 1st of April,
1910.
The Attorney-General, in support of his first assignment of error, contends
that the order of the court of the 1st of April, 1910, reinstating said cause
without the presentation of a new petition and the citation of the parties
again, was illegal and done without authority of law and was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. In support of his contention, the Attorney-General
cites numerous decisions. He argues that the order of the court dismissing said
cause, even conditionally (the 16th of October, 1908), became a final order,
after the lapse of the time within which an appeal might have been perfected;
that the action was thus terminated; that it could not be revived by
reinstatement; that the only way that the action could be considered again by
the court was by the presentation of a new petition and a new citation of the
parties. The Attorney-General argues that the decisions of the Court of Land
Registration become final after the expiration of the time within which the
defeated party might appeal. Section 14 of Act No. 496, as amended by section 1
of Act No. 1484, provides that parties desiring, to appeal from an order of the
Court of Land Registration must present their bills of exception within thirty
days, and that that time may be extended by the court for another thirty days.
The Attorney-General argues that if the appeal is not perfected within such
time, the judgment is final. It is argued by the Attorney-General that the
general rule is that the judge may alter or amend his decision in matters of
substance, any time during the term within which such judgment is rendered, but
that after the termination of said term, the judge is without jurisdiction to
make any order in a cause terminated by a final decision, and that, inasmuch as
there are no terms, as such, for the Court of Land Registration, the judgment
should be final and cannot be altered or amended after the time has elapsed for
the perfection of the appeal. (Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson, 18
Phil. Rep., 257; Whipley vs. Dewey, 17 Cal., 314; Miller vs.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 30 Mont, 289, 76 Pac. Rep., 691; Cameron vs.
McRoberts, 3 Wheat. (U. S.), 591; Brooks vs. Burlington & S. Ry.
Co., 102 U. S., 107; Bronson vs. Schulten, 104 U. S., 410; Tubman
vs. B. & O. R. Co., 190 U. S., 38.)
In the case of Whipley vs. Dewey (17 Cal., 314) the supreme court of
California, in a case where a plaintiff moved that his cause be dismissed, with
the right to have the dismissal set aside, said:
“The order permitting a plaintiff to move to set aside the nonsuit preserved
all his rights in the proceedings, but in legal effect it amounted to nothing
more than a right to move for a new trial, and it was necessary that the
provisions of the statute in relation to new trials should be complied with.
This was not done, and upon the expiration of the term, the court lost all
jurisdiction of the matter.”
(Lurvey vs. Wells, 4 Cal., 106; Natoma Water & Mining Co.
vs. Clarkin, 14 Cal., 544; Brown vs. Aspden, 14 How. (U. S.),
25; U. S. vs. Knight’s Admr., 1 Black (U. S.), 488; Public Schools
vs. WaJker, 9 Wall. (U. S.), 603; Hudson & Smith vs.
Guestier, 7 Cranch (U. S.), 1.)
In the case of Bronson vs. Schulten (104 U. S., 410), Mr. Justice Miller,
speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said: “During the term when
it is rendered or entered of record, a judgment or order, however conclusive in
its character, is under the control of the court pronouncing it, and may then be
set aside, vacated, or modified, after that term, unless steps be taken during
its continuance, by motion or otherwise, errors in final judgments can only be
corrected by an appellate court.”
The record shows that the land, or at least some parcels, was occupied by
others than the petitioner at the time of the commencement of the action. Nearly
eighteen months had expired from the time the petitioner made a motion that his
petition be dismissed, before he asked that the same be reinstated. So far as
the record shows no new notices or citations were issued to any of the parties
interested. Many other persons, during the eighteen months, might have acquired
an interest in the land in question.
In reply to the argument of the Attorney-General, relating to the finality of
the judgment dismissing the petition at the request of the petitioner, the
attorney for the plaintiff cites section 37 of Act No. 496.
Said section provides: “If in any case the court finds that the applicant has
not proper title for registration, a decree shall be entered dismissing the
application, and such decree may be ordered to be without prejudice. The
applicant may withdraw his application at any time before final decree, upon
terms to be fixed by the court.”
The phrase in said section: “and such decree (dismissing the application) may
be ordered to be without prejudice/ simply means that the petitioner may again
institute the same action for the same purpose, and nothing more. The provision
of said section that “the applicant may withdraw his application at any time
before final decree, upon terms to be fixed by the court,” does not contemplate
that the Court of Land Registration is authorized to dismiss an action with the
right to reinstate it after the expiration of seventeen or eighteen months,
without new notices and new citations to the parties interested. If a petitioner
in the Court of Land Registration may be permitted to have his cause of action
dismissed and have it reinstated again after the lapse of seventeen or eighteen
months, without new citations and new notices to the parties, then he may have
it reinstated after the lapse of any time. We do not believe that such a
procedure was contemplated by the legislature in adopting said section.
The foregoing interpretation may work a hardship upon the petitioner in the
present case. We believe, however, that it is a safer rule to follow, even at
the cost of an occasional hardship, to adhere to the principle which we have
announced, and to refuse to recognize the right of a petitioner in a case like
the present, to have his action reinstated, without new citations and new
notices, after the lapse of the time within which an appeal might be perfected
from the decision of the Court of Land Registration. We do not believe that the
Court of Land Registration, in dismissing a petition upon the application of the
petitioner, with permission to reinstate the same, has a right to do so upon any
terms which do not require that the parties shall be required, when the
application for reinstatement is made, to re-cite all the parties who may be
interested in the land in question.
The attorney for the petitioner argues that the Attorney-General did not
perfect his appeal within the time required by law and that therefore his appeal
should be dismissed. It will be remembered that the order of the lower court
reinstating said cause was dictated on the 1st day of April, 1910. The motion of
the Attorney-General for a rehearing and his exception to said order was not
presented until the 26th day of September, 1910. There is nothing in the record,
however, which shows on what date the Attorney-General received notice of said
order. The time within which he must present his exception or motion for a new
trial does not begin to run until after he has received notice of the order of
the court. Inasmuch as the record does not contain any proof as to the time when
the Attorney-General received notice of said order, we must conclude that his
motion and exception were presented in time.
In view of the foregoing conclusions, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the
second assignment of error.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed,
without prejudice to, the plaintiff, and, without any finding as to costs, it is
so ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur
.
CONCURRING
MORELAND, J.
I base my opinion in this case upon section 37 of Act No. 496, quoted in the
majority opinion. Under that section it is clear to my mind that a decree
dismissing an application for registration is one which finally terminates the
proceeding and leaves matters in the same condition as if the proceeding had
never been brought.
It is not a suspension of the proceeding” but a termination of it.
Therefore, if the petitioner subsequently desires to institute the same
proceeding again, he must do so in precisely the same manner as if the former
proceeding had never been brought. He must file his petition and take all of the
other steps required by law in that regard.
With respect to the time when a judgment or decree becomes final, apart from
the provisions of Act No. 496, the doctrine of this court is laid down in the
leading case of Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (18 Phil. Rep., 257),
which was reaffirmed and followed in the case of De Fiesta vs. Llorente
and Manila Railroad Co. (25 Phil. Rep., 554).