### Facts:
Miguel R. Cornejo, the elected Municipal President of Pasay, Rizal, was suspended by Andres Gabriel, the Provincial Governor of Rizal, based on several complaints regarding Cornejo’s conduct. This suspension was executed without prior notice or opportunity for Cornejo to defend himself. Following his suspension, Cornejo filed a petition for mandamus seeking reinstatement, claiming deprivation of office without due process. The Provincial Board of Rizal, including Governor Gabriel, Pedro Magsalin, and Catalino S. Cruz, based their action on their compliance with the law as outlined in the Administrative Code, particularly article IV of Chapter 57. This procedural posture set the stage for the case’s escalation to the Supreme Court of the Philippines, focusing on whether the governor’s actions, in compliance with the Administrative Code, violated Cornejo’s right to due process by suspending him without a hearing.
### Issues:
1. Whether the suspension of Miguel R. Cornejo without a formal hearing and prior notice violates the due process clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
2. Whether an elected municipal office, such as the Municipal President of Pasay, constitutes “property” under the due process clause.
3. The legality and constitutionality of Section 2188 of the Administrative Code allowing the Provincial Governor to suspend a municipal officer pending investigation by the Provincial Board, without a prior formal hearing.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, denied Cornejo’s petition, upholding the legality of his suspension under Section 2188 of the Administrative Code. The Court differentiated between administrative and judicial proceedings, stating that due process does not necessarily require a hearing in administrative matters involving temporary suspension from public office. It was further held that public office is not property in the constitutional sense but rather a public trust, underscoring that the provision for temporary suspension by a provincial governor, without a formal hearing, does not contravene the due process clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Dissenting opinions argued that the suspension without a hearing violated basic legal protections and due process rights.
### Doctrine:
The doctrine established from this case is that in administrative proceedings, particularly concerning the temporary suspension of a public officer, a prior formal hearing is not a requisite for due process. Public office is deemed a public trust, not property, hence not subject to the same due process requirements applicable to property rights under the Philippine Bill of Rights.
### Class Notes:
– **Administrative vs. Judicial Proceedings:** Administrative actions, such as suspensions pending investigations, do not always necessitate a formal hearing for due process to be observed.
– **Public Office as Public Trust:** Public office is not considered property but a trust from the public, thus not falling under the “property” protection of the due process clause.
– **Section 2188 of the Administrative Code:** Authorizes the Provincial Governor to suspend a municipal officer (excluding the municipal treasurer) pending board action without requiring a prior hearing.
– **Due Process in Administrative Actions:** The case differentiates the requirements for due process in administrative actions from those in judicial proceedings, pointing out that temporary suspensions can proceed without a formal hearing under certain legislated conditions.
### Historical Background:
This case reflects the legal framework established by the Philippine Administrative Code regarding oversight and disciplinary action against municipal officers by provincial authorities. It underscores the balance between administrative efficiency and due process rights within the context of Philippine law and highlights the evolving understanding of due process in administrative versus judicial contexts.
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