SMI FISH INDUSTRIES, INC., AMADO C. SANTERO, JR., VIRGILIO RODAJE AND ARMANDO ESTRELLADO, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FRUCTUOSO T. AURELL…

Petitioners invoke the remedy of the extraordinary writ of certiorari
to set aside the resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) promulgated on August 27, 1990^[1] which
affirmed, with modification, the joint decision of Labor Arbiter Fructuoso T.
Aurellano dated October 28, 1988, as well as its resolution of December 21,
1990 denying petitioners’ motion for
the reconsideration thereof.^[2]

On March 30, 1987, private respondents filed separate but
identical complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, illegal lay-off, underpayment, non-payment of overtime pay, premium
pay for holiday and rest days, night-shift differential, 13th month pay,
(ECOLA), service incentive leave pay, and damages. Petitioners denied all the foregoing charges and claims.

After hearing and submission by the parties of their respective
position papers, a joint
decision was rendered by the aforenamed labor arbiter of the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch No. V, Legazpi City, ordering the payment by petitioners to
private respondents of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month’s pay for
every year of service and full backwages without qualification or deduction for
a period not exceeding three (3) years in the total amount of P153,476.23 in
lieu of reinstatement.^[3]

On December 22, 1988, petitioners appealed the aforestated joint
decision to the NLRC, disputing the findings of the labor arbiter that they
violated the security of tenure of private respondents. As already stated, a resolution was
promulgated by the NLRC affirming that joint decision of the labor arbiter, but
with a modification setting aside the payment of separation pay and ordering
petitioners to reinstate private respondents to their former or equivalent
positions with backwages, including ECOLA, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay, equivalent to three (3) years, without loss of privileges, seniority
rights and other benefits.^[4]

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent
NLRC, petitioners have now come to us, raising the following arguments:

1. The labor arbiter and the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they failed to
consider and thus set aside the compromise agreement; and

2. The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the
individual private respondents despite their acceptance of the decision of the
labor arbiter ordering payment of separation pay.^[5]

The first issue is without merit. We cannot uphold the theory of petitioners that private respondents
are already barred from filing the present complaint by reason of the amicable
settlement which terminated NLRC Cases Nos. 0216-86 and 0338-86 theretofore
filed by herein private respondents De la Trinidad, Arroyo and Parro, together
with Orlando Gratil and Teresita Borromeo, for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, violation of labor standards, and damages.

The alleged compromise agreement, dated January 15, 1987, has
only the effect of putting an end to those previous cases but will not and cannot
bar the signatories therein from filing complaints against petitioners for
subsequent or future violations of the Labor Code. The pertinent provisions of said compromise agreement read as
follows:

x        x          x

“2. That after a series of dialogues with the
management, the herein parties have agreed to put an end to this case and
settle the matter amicably;

“3. That the claims in the complaints stated in
our petition and affidavit are hereby withdrawn, condoned and set aside, the
same having been remedied and fully satisfied and that the continuation of this
case would merely prejudice and strain the relationship with management and the
rank-in-file;

“4. That the parties in this case have mutually
agreed to comply with the provisions of the Labor Standards Laws and Labor
Relations Laws as exemplified in the New Labor Code with the end-in-view (sic)
to uplift the working conditions of the respondent employer.”^[6]

On the other hand, the instant cases for illegal dismissal and
the other causes of action hereinbefore detailed indisputably arose out of the
incident on March 27, 1987, long after the execution of the above-quoted
compromise agreement, wherein petitioners, through their security guard, one
Santiago Bucal, Jr., unjustifiedly prevented private respondents from entering
their regular place of work, after deceitfully confiscating their
identification cards, in clear violation of the Labor Code and of the very
terms of the compromise agreement.

In the first place, as duly found by the labor arbiter, the compromise
agreement was signed by only three (3) of
the herein five (5) respondents, namely, Jesus de la Trinidad, Gertrudes
Arroyo and Dolores Parro, while they were still in the employ of petitioner company. Private respondents Avelina Bendaña and
Jesus Azares were not signatories thereto, hence, they cannot be bound by that
amicable settlement or compromise agreement.

Furthermore, in the earlier two cases, petitioners had contended
that private respondents were “terminated for cause,” whereas in the
present cases, petitioners now maintain that private respondents are guilty of
“abandonment” and allegedly staged an “undeclared sort of
strike.” Public respondent, aside from declaring that there was no
evidence whatsoever of such acts imputed to private respondents, tersely
discredited this ridiculous theory of petitioners, thus: “Strike and abandonment are two
diametrically opposed terminologies. When employees stage a strike, it is precisely to keep their jobs x x x. If one abandons his job, he simply walks away.”^[7]

With respect to the second issue raised by petitioners, however,
we find merit in their submissions thereon. Respondent NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents, thereby modifying the decision of the
labor arbiter awarding separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. As
pointed out by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier in her partial
dissent, since private respondents did not appeal from the decision of the
labor arbiter, they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication
therein. Accordingly, with the finality
of the decision as to private
respondents, the issue of payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement
has been laid to rest.

It is a well-settled procedural rule in this jurisdiction, and we
see no reason why it should not apply in this case, that an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted
in the decision of the court below.^[8] The
appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the
appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed. He can assign errors on appeal if such is
required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned errors,
in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the
appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of modifying the
judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.^[9]

Parenthetically, we note that the Solicitor General also takes
the position that, under the factual ambience of this case and on pragmatic
considerations, the joint decision of the labor arbiter is arguably the correct
disposition that should be taken in this labor dispute and constitutes a just
resolution of the plaints of private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, dated August 27, 1990 and
December 21, 1990, are SET ASIDE and the joint decision of Labor Arbiter Fructuoso
T. Aurellano, dated October 28, 1988, which instead of reinstating private
respondents awarded them separation pay equivalent to one (1) month’s salary
for every year of service and full backwages in the total amount of
P153,476.23, is hereby REINSTATED. This
judgment is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Nocon, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Per Commissioner Irineo B. Bernardo,   with
Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier concurring (in the affirmance) and
dissenting (on the modification), and Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala
concurring; RAB V Cases Nos. 03-0119-87, 03-0120-87, 03-0123-87; 03-0124-87 and
03-0125-87; Rollo, 25-43.

^[2]
Rollo, 45-46.

^[3]
Rollo, 16-24.

^[4]
Ibid., 44.

^[5]
Ibid., 7-8.

^[6]
Ibid., 47-48.

^[7]
Ibid., 39-40.

^[8]
Alba vs. Santander, 160 SCRA 8 (1988); Makati Haberdashery, Inc., et al.
vs. NLRC, et al., 179 SCRA 448 (1989); Dizon, Jr. vs. NLRC, 181
SCRA 472 (1990).

^[9]
Lumibao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 189 SCRA 469 (1990).