🎧 Case Brief Lecture

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, JOSE ERAD, FERNANDO HERNANDO, EDDIE ESTRELLA, CIRILO DAYAG, EDUARDO POQUITA, CARLITO PEPITO, RENE ARAO, JUANITO GAHUM, EMILIANO MAGNO, …

G.R. Nos. 95494-97. September 07, 1995 September 7, 1995

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Lapanday Workers Union versus Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation

The Case

This is a labor case between the Lapanday Workers Union, together with its officers and members, and their employer companies, Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, which are sister companies engaged in banana production in Davao City. The Union and its leaders ask the Supreme Court to reverse the consolidated decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, which declared their strike illegal, dropped the union officers from the payroll, and dismissed their complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the procedural requirements for a lawful strike, particularly the seven day waiting period after the submission of the strike vote result, and on the graduated penalty that distinguishes the leaders of an illegal strike from the rank and file who were merely misled into joining it.

Procedural History

The employer companies filed separate charges for illegal strike, unfair labor practice, and damages before Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva. In a decision dated December 12, 1988, the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal, held that the employees named in the complaint had lost their employment, and ordered the Union to desist from further committing an illegal strike. The Union appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.

Meanwhile, two other complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension, and illegal dismissal were filed and heard by Labor Arbiter Newton Sancho. In a decision dated October 18, 1989, Labor Arbiter Sancho found the companies guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, ordered reinstatement with backwages, and considered the workers' refusal to report for work on September 9, 1988 justified by the killing of the union director the day before. The companies appealed that decision.

Treating the four cases as arising from the same set of facts and substantially the same issues, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a consolidated decision on August 29, 1990. It upheld the Villanueva ruling, declared the strike illegal, declared the union officers to have lost their employment, ordered the reinstatement of the rank and file without backwages, and dismissed the Union's complaint for lack of merit. The Union's motion for reconsideration was denied, so it came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Facts

The Union was the certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees under a collective bargaining agreement covering December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the agreement expired, the companies hired a security agency to guard their premises and protect their officers, employees, and guests. The Union called the guards goons and special forces and accused them of intimidating its members. The companies also conducted Human Development and Industrial Relations seminars, and the Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped its federation with outlawed labor organizations. These grievances were taken up in a labor management meeting on August 2, 1988, where the Union agreed to let its members attend the seminar for the rank and file, yet later directed them not to attend, picketed the security agency, and filed a notice of strike on August 25, 1988 on grounds of coercion, intimidation, and union busting.

A conciliation conference on August 29, 1988 produced an agreement that union officers would attend the seminar and that a committee would set guidelines on the guards. The companies then notified the conciliation board that there was no more basis for the notice of strike. On September 8, 1988, however, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Union's board of directors, was gunned down in his house, and the gunman was later identified as an alleged member of the new security forces. The next day most members refused to report for work, and when they returned they did not comply with the management quota system, allegedly reducing production to thirty per cent on the Union's instruction. The companies charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.

On September 14, 1988, the companies filed the illegal strike and unfair labor practice charges. On September 17, the workers skipped work to bury Danilo Martinez, and on September 23 they staged a mass action at the company office carrying placards, which failed. Dialogues mediated by the city mayor on September 27 and 29 proved fruitless. A strike vote was conducted on October 3, 1988, the result was submitted to the conciliation board on October 10, 1988, and two days later, on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.

Issues

  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in treating the Union's activities from September 9 to October 12, 1988 as strike activities.
  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in declaring the strike staged on October 12, 1988 illegal.
  • Whether or not the penalty of dismissal was correctly limited to the union officers and leaders while the rank and file were reinstated without backwages.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph (c) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order Number 111, provides:

In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

This fixes the notice and cooling off periods that must precede a strike, and the case turns on whether the Union observed the periods required by law.

Paragraph (f) of Article 263 of the same Code provides:

A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

This is the provision the Court applies directly, because the strike was held only two days after the strike vote result was furnished to the Ministry instead of the required seven days.

Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:

No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.

This defines the prohibited activities, and the same Article supplies the penalty rule that the Court applies to the leaders and members.

Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

This is the basis for dismissing the union officers while sparing the rank and file who were merely misled.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found it unnecessary to rule exhaustively on the legality of the work stoppages of September 9 and September 23, 1988, holding that the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission on the matter was supported by substantial evidence.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the strike of October 12, 1988 was plainly illegal because it was held within the seven day waiting period under paragraph (f) of Article 263. The Court stressed that the procedural steps before staging a strike, namely the filing of the notice of strike, the taking of the strike vote, and the reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment, are mandatory in character. The seven day period exists so that the Department may verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. The haste in holding the strike prevented that verification and set to naught an important policy consideration of the law on strike. The Court put it memorably: every war must be lawfully waged.

On the third issue, the Court affirmed the limitation of the penalty of dismissal to the leaders of the illegal strike, especially the union officers who served as its major players. They could not claim good faith because they admitted knowledge of the law on strike and its procedure. The Court likewise agreed that the members who were merely instigated to participate should be treated differently from their leaders, as part of the benign consideration for labor, but held that these reinstated workers are not entitled to backwages because they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.

Doctrine

The requirements for a lawful strike are mandatory: the filing of the notice of strike, the taking of a strike vote by secret ballot approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit, and the furnishing of the strike vote result to the Ministry at least seven days before the intended strike, subject to the cooling off period. A strike held within the seven day waiting period is illegal, because the period gives the Department of Labor and Employment the opportunity to verify that the strike carries the approval of the majority of the union members.

An illegal strike carries a graduated penalty. Union officers who knowingly participate in an illegal strike, and any worker or officer who knowingly participates in illegal acts during a strike, may be declared to have lost their employment status. Rank and file members who were merely misled or instigated into joining an illegal strike may be reinstated, but without backwages, since they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, with costs against the petitioners, so the Union lost and the consolidated decision stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the seven day waiting period is mandatory and that a strike held within it is illegal, for the law requires that the decision to strike rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory procedural requirements of a strike and the distinction in penalty between union leaders, who may be dismissed, and the rank and file, who may be reinstated but without backwages.