SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CANDIDO BALBIN, GUILLERMO BALLESTEROS, NATHANIEL ESCOBAR, BENJAMIN GALAPIA, LEONARDO ROLDAN, FILEMON SISON, ERWIN REYES-ULEP, EVELYN VALDEZ, OCTAVIO VILLAN…

Petitioners assail the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), dated 6 September 1990, affirming the Resolution, dated 23
March 1988, and Decision dated 5 June 1989, rendered by its First and
Second Divisions, respectively. The aforesaid Resolutions and Decision
ruled adversely against petitioners in the pre-proclamation cases
initiated by them before the COMELEC.

Petitioner Salacnib F. Baterina was a candidate for Governor of Ilocos
Sur in the special local elections held on 25 January 1988. The other
petitioners, Octavio Villanueva and Evelyn Valdez, Felimon Sison,
Leonardo Roldan, Gil Ballesteros, Benjamin Galapia, Erwin Reyes-Ulep,
and Nathaniel Escobar, were candidates for Vice Governor and Provincial
Board Members, respectively, in the same local elections. Petitioners
ran under the banner of the Lakas ng Bansa. Private respondent Evaristo
Singson, on the other hand, was also a candidate for Governor of Ilocos
Sur. Private respondent Mariano Tajon was a candidate for Vice Governor.
The rest of the private respondents were candidates for the other
disputed positions.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur (BOARD) has likewise been impleaded in this Petition.

The canvassing of the election returns commenced as the ballot boxes
containing the returns from the various municipalities of Ilocos Sur
were received by the BOARD.

In the course of the canvass proceedings, verbal objections were raised
by petitioners to certain election returns based on the grounds
mentioned in Sections 233 (lost or destroyed election returns), 234
(material defects in the election returns), 235 (tampered or falsified
election returns) and 236 (discrepancies in election returns), in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt and custody of the
election returns. The objections were aimed at excluding the election
returns from the canvass.

Petitioners submitted to the BOARD their objections in written form
within twenty four (24) hours from the time the verbal objections were
made as required in Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code. They also
submitted written protests before the BOARD, which reiterated their
objections to certain election returns.

The BOARD, in several Resolutions dated 29, 30 and 31 January 1988,
denied the objections and protests of petitioners mainly on the ground
that the alleged defects of the election returns were merely formal and
did not affect their authenticity, validity and genuineness as to
warrant their exclusion from the canvass. Petitioners filed with the
BOARD notices of appeal from its rulings.

On 30 January 1988, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a “Petition
Contesting the Legality of the Proceedings of the Board of Canvassers
with Motion to Restrain Canvassing and Proclamation and/or Suspend the
Effects of any Proclamation,” docketed as SPC No. 88-453 and assigned to
the First Division (Suspension of Proclamation Case). The Petition
sought the suspension of the canvassing and proclamation of any winning
candidate.

On 31 January 1988 the BOARD issued the “Certification of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Provincial Offices,
January 18, 1988 Elections,” proclaiming respondents Evaristo C.
Singson as the duly elected Governor of Ilocos Sur, Mariano M. Tajon as
Vice Governor and the others as Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the province.

On 1 February 1988, petitioners filed with the COMELEC an “Appeal,”
docketed as SPC No. 88-490 and assigned to the Second Division, wherein
petitioners prayed that the Resolutions of the BOARD denying their
protests be set aside. On the same date, petitioners also filed an
“Appeal Memorandum,” docketed as SPC No. 88-506, which was assigned
likewise to the Second Division. The “Appeal Memorandum” was an appeal
from the rulings of the BOARD denying petitioners’ written objections to
the inclusion in the canvass of certain election returns. Petitioners
prayed for their exclusion from the canvass. An “Addendum to Appeal
Memorandum” was filed by petitioners on 8 February 1988 appealing the
other rulings of the BOARD denying their objections.

On 9 February 1988, petitioners followed up their Petition in the
Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No. 88-453) and sought the
suspension of the effects of the proclamation of private respondents as
well as the annulment of the proclamation, or in the alternative, the
declaration of a failure of elections in Ilocos Sur.

On 23 March 1988, the First Division of the COMELEC issued a Minute
Resolution dismissing the Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No.
88-453) filed on 30 January 1988, on the ground that the winning
candidates had already been proclaimed on “21 January 1988” (should be
31 January 1988). It advised the petitioners to file instead an election
protest with the COMELEC if desired (p. 104, Rollo).

Petitioners appealed the dismissal of the Petition alleging error in
that the proclamation was made on 31 January 1988, not 21 January, as
stated in the First Division Resolution. Petitioners also alleged that
the First Division failed to consider the other petition filed by them
in the same SPC No. 88-453, dated 9 February 1988, thereby effectively
dismissing said petition without notice and hearing in violation of
Sections 242 and 246 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On 5 June 1989, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a
decision in SPC Nos. 88-490 and 88-506 (Rollo, p. 124) dismissing
petitioners’ “Appeal” and “Appeal Memorandum” on the ground that no
substantial objection had been raised against the election returns in
accordance with Sections 233-236 and Section 245 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

On 10 June 1989, petitioners appealed the Decision of the Second
Division (in SPC No. 88-490 and 88-506) to the COMELEC en banc. On 6
September 1990, that body issued a per curiam Resolution, in SPC Nos.
88-453, 88-490, and 88-506, dismissing petitioners’ appeals from the
rulings rendered by its First and Second Divisions on the ground that no
genuine pre-proclamation controversies had been raised by petitioners.

That dismissal prompted petitioners to avail of these Certiorari proceedings.

Can the COMELEC be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the dismissal of the Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No. 88-453)
and of petitioners’ “Appeals” (SPC Nos. 88-490 and 88-506) ordered by
its First and Second Divisions respectively?

The Court thinks not. The Suspension of Proclamation Case, filed on 30
January 1988 (SPC No. 88-453), was dismissed by the First Division
considering “that the winning candidates have been proclaimed on January
21, 1988” (Rollo, p. 104). Petitioners claim that the petition was
dismissed because it appeared to have been filed after the proclamation
of private respondents on “21 January 1988,” as stated in the Resolution
(Rollo, p. 14), whereas the proclamation was actually made on 31
January 1988 or after they had filed, on 30 January 1988, their
Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No. 88-453).

Petitioners further contend that the proclamation made on 31 January
1988 is void ab initio because it was made by the BOARD without previous
authority from the COMELEC in violation of Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which provides :

xxx xxx xxx

“The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as
winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on
the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party and any
proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab-initio, unless
the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the
election.”

Petitioners’ aforesaid submissions lack substance. The date “21 January
1988” appearing in the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
plainly a typographical error. The correct date is 31 January 1988. But
even if so, the mere filing of the Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC
No. 88-453) on 30 January 1988 seeking to restrain the canvassing and
proclamation of the winning candidates does note automatically divest
the BOARD of the authority to make a proclamation. Neither does it ipso
facto annul a proclamation which may have been already made.

In this regard, petitioners’ reliance on Section 245 to support their
claim of nullity of the proclamation made by the BOARD for lack of
authorization from the COMELEC is misplaced. That provision applies to a
situation where a party, aggrieved by the rulings of the Board of
Canvassers rejecting the objections to election returns raised by him,
appeals the rulings to the COMELEC. In which case, no proclamation can
be made by the Board of Canvassers without authorization of the COMELEC
until after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on
appeal by the losing party.

In the case at bar, when the proclamation was made by the BOARD on 31
January 1988, there was no pending appeal filed by petitioners before
the COMELEC from the rulings made by the BOARD on their objections to
election returns rendered on 29, 30 and 31, 1988 (Annexes B to B-17,
Petition). The “Appeal” and “Appeal Memorandum,” docketed as SPC Nos.
88-490 and 88-506, respectively, which appealed to the COMELEC the
rulings of the BOARD denying petitioners’ objections to election returns
were filed by them only on 1 February 1988, after the proclamation of
private respondents had been made by the BOARD on 31 January 1988. What
was filed by petitioners on 30 January 1988, before the proclamation,
was a petition seeking merely to restrain the canvass and proclamation
or suspend the effects of any proclamation. This petition, however, is
clearly not the appeal referred to in Section 245 that will operate to
bar the BOARD from making any proclamation of the winning candidates
without authority from the COMELEC after the latter has ruled on the
objections elevated to it on appeal. Consequently, there was no legal
impediment to the proclamation of private respondents by the BOARD on 31
January 1988.

In dismissing the Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No. 88-453), the
First Division also disposed of the other petition filed in the same
case by petitioners on 9 February 1988, praying that the proclamation
made by the BOARD be declared null and void ab initio. As
pointed out earlier, however, the proclamation was validly done by the
BOARD since this is not an instance calling for the application of
Section 245. Moreover, it is well settled that after the proclamation of
the winning candidates, a pre-proclamation controversy ceases and is no
longer viable at this point and should be dismissed, the proper remedy
of the aggrieved party being an election protest.

Notably, the proclamation was made after completion of the canvass of
the election returns by the BOARD, which has the legal obligation, after
said canvass, to proclaim the elected candidates, that duty being
ministerial after the mechanical or mathematical act of counting the
votes cast has been accomplished (Casimiro v. Commission on Elections,
L-84462-63, 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468). No grave abuse of discretion
can be attributed to the COMELEC, therefore, in dismissing the petitions
in the Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No. 8-453).

Petitioners also fault the COMELEC for dismissing the “Appeal” and
“Appeal Memorandum” filed by them in SPC Nos. 88-490 and 88-506,
respectively, on 1 February 1988 (or one [1] day after the
proclamation). These pleadings appealed the rulings of the BOARD denying
their objections to election returns. Petitioners anchored their
objections to the election returns on the ground that they were
fraudulent. They allege that there were five hundred fifty two (552)
election returns coming from various precincts of the province, which
did not contain the signatures of their watchers. Petitioners claim that
the absence of these signatures casts doubts on the authenticity and
integrity of the election returns. Thus, petitioners point to instances
where the tallies in the election returns were not closed by thumbmarks
and signatures; lack of or unauthorized signatures in the envelopes;
tampering of paper seals; erasures or tampering of figures, numbers and
letters; irregular receipt of ballot boxes and other alleged
irregularities in the preparation and delivery of election returns
(Rollo, pp. 19-20).

The objections were rejected by the BOARD in several Resolutions dated
29, 30 and 31 January 1988 (Rollo, pp. 57-71) because the grounds raised
for the exclusion of the election returns were merely formal defects
that did not affect the authenticity and genuineness of the election
returns. On appeal to the COMELEC, the rulings of the BOARD were
sustained.

Again, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of
the Appeals (SPC Nos. 88-490 and 88-506). While petitioners assailed the
authenticity of the contested election returns, the records do not
indicate that they presented any proof before the BOARD to support their
allegations that the election returns were tampered with and
fraudulent. Neither was there any indication in the appeals filed by
petitioners before the COMELEC pointing to specific evidence that would
reasonably support their allegations that the election returns objected
to were not authentic. It is not enough that an election return is
objected to. A mere allegation by a party that an election return is
spurious does not automatically operate to exclude the same in the
canvassing.

The grounds raised by petitioners for the exclusion of the election
returns from the canvassing, as stated in their “Appeal Memorandum”
before the COMELEC (Rollo, p. 92), refer to the failure to close the
entries with the signatures of the election inspectors; lack of inner
and outer paper seals; canvassing by the BOARD of copies not intended
for it; lack of time and date of receipt by the BOARD of election
returns; lack of signatures of petitioners’ watchers; and lack of
authority of the person receiving the election returns.

While the aforesaid grounds may, indeed, involve a violation of the
rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for
canvassing, they do not necessarily affect the authenticity and
genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their
exclusion from the canvassing. The grounds for objection to the election
returns made by petitioners are clearly defects in form insufficient to
support a conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or
spurious. “A conclusion that an election return is obviously
manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the
canvass must be approached with extreme caution and only upon the most
convincing proof” (Estrada v. Navarro, L-28340, 29 December 1967, 21
SCRA 1514). It is only when the election returns are palpably irregular
that they may be rejected (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, L-28517, 21
February 1968, 22 SCRA 662). On the basis of formal defects alone, such
palpable irregularity can not be said to have been established herein.

Petitioners, however, suggest that the lack of the signatures of their
watchers in the contested election returns render their authenticity
questionable. Such a lack, however, is not enough to impugn the
genuineness of the returns. Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 6646 (Electoral
Reforms Law of 1988) provides:

xxx xxx xxx

“In addition to their rights and duties under Section 179 of Batas
Pambansa 881, the two principal watchers representing the ruling
coalition and the dominant opposition coalition in a precinct, shall, if
available, affix their signature and thumbmarks on the election returns
for that precinct. If both or either of them is not available,
unwilling or should they refuse to do so, any watcher present,
preferably with political affiliation or alignment compatible with that
of the absent or unwilling watcher, may be required by the board of
election inspectors to do so.” (Underscoring supplied)

The foregoing provision negates the contention that an election return
is spurious owing to the failure of a watcher to affix his signature.
Under this provision, a watcher signs the election returns only if he is
available. If he is not, or is unwilling, or refuses to sign them, any
other watcher present may be required to sign. In this case, the
signature of any watcher present is not even a mandatory requirement as
can be gleaned from the text of the provision. In other words, while the
signing of an election return by a watcher is a measure intended to
discourage the preparation of falsified returns, the absence of said
signature does not give rise to a presumption that the election returns
are manufactured or spurious and should consequently be excluded in the
canvass. Otherwise, a party’s watcher can easily cause the nullification
of election returns reflecting results unfavorable to the candidate he
is representing by simply refusing to sign the returns.

In fine, the BOARD correctly included the contested election returns in
the canvass as they did not suffer from any serious infirmities
affecting their integrity. It is the “ministerial function of a board of
canvassers to count the results as they appear in the returns which on
their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities” (Demafiles v.
Commission on Elections, L-28396, 29 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1462).

Petitioners also assail the dismissal of their petitions by the COMELEC
without hearing. Suffice it to cite the ruling in Ilarde v. Commission
on Elections, L-31446, 23 January 1970, 31 SCRA 72) that “canvass
proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima facie
case backed up by a specific offer of the evidence and indication of
its nature and importance has to be made out to warrant the reception of
evidence aliunde and the presentation of witnesses and the
delays necessarily entailed thereby. Otherwise, the paralyzation of
canvassing and proclamation leading to a vacuum in an important office
could easily be brought about.” In their case before us, the petitions
and appeals filed by petitioners in their pre-proclamation cases before
the COMELEC did not even point prima facie to a tampering of
election returns, nor to returns with patent erasures and
superimpositions, but merely raised objections based on defects that
are, at best, formal in nature. The COMELEC, therefore, did not gravely
abuse its discretion in concluding that in the absence of genuine
pre-proclamation issues a full-blown hearing was rendered unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Writ of Certiorari prayed for is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., no part.