🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GREGORIO SUMAYA Y DALOGDOG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

G.R. Nos. 93281-84. November 17, 1994 November 17, 1994

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People versus Sumaya

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Gregorio Sumaya y Dalogdog for rape and attempted rape, and the accused was convicted at trial. What makes the case a staple of remedial law and criminal procedure is not the evidence but an event after judgment: the accused died while his appeal was pending. The Supreme Court therefore had to decide what happens to a criminal conviction, and to the civil liability arising from the crime, when the accused dies before his appeal is resolved. The answer turns on the settled rule that death extinguishes criminal liability, and on the narrower question of whether civil liability ex delicto — civil liability arising from the offense itself — survives.

Procedural History

The accused was charged on 30 October 1989 in four separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 06-2298, 2304, 2306, and 2305. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Trial on the merits followed and was concluded, and the trial court rendered a decision finding him guilty of rape and attempted rape. From that judgment of conviction, the accused interposed an appeal to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal, on 22 May 1993, the accused died of cardio-pulmonary arrest at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, where he was detained. On 26 July 1993, the Court issued a resolution requiring the plaintiff-appellee to comment on the death of the accused-appellant. The People filed its comment, citing the ruling in People versus Sendaydiego and urging that while the death of the accused extinguished his criminal liability, the civil liability remained. The Court resolved the appeal in the light of its recent ruling in People versus Bayotas.

Facts

On 30 October 1989, four separate informations for rape and attempted rape were filed against Gregorio Sumaya y Dalogdog before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6. He entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment, and the cases proceeded to trial on the merits.

After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the charges. He appealed the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court.

While the appeal was pending, on 22 May 1993, the accused died of cardio-pulmonary arrest at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, where he was detained. The Court directed the People to comment on the death, and the People argued that although the death extinguished criminal liability, civil liability remained. The records disclosed no civil liability of the accused arising from any other source, such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict, or law.

Issues

  • Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes the criminal action against him.
  • Whether or not the civil liability ex delicto, that is, the civil liability arising from the offenses charged, is likewise extinguished by the death of the accused.
  • Whether or not the Court still needs to pass upon the merits of the appeal after the death of the accused.

Applicable Provisions

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, on how criminal liability is totally extinguished, provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

This provision is the statutory anchor of the ruling: the accused died before final judgment, so his criminal liability, including the pecuniary penalties, was totally extinguished.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, on civil liability of a person guilty of felony, provides:

Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

This provision explains why the civil action is tied to the criminal action: the civil liability ex delicto rests on the criminal liability, so when the latter is extinguished, the former falls with it.

Article 1157 of the Civil Code, on the sources of obligations, provides:

Article 1157. Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts.

This provision matters because the Court looked for any civil liability of the accused arising from a source other than the offense, and found none in the records.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes the criminal action, because there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. The Court adopted its recent ruling in People versus Bayotas, quoting it:

Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

On the second issue, the Court held that the civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. The Court noted that the present case deals with civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the offenses charged in the criminal cases, and that the records did not disclose any civil liability of the accused-appellant possibly arising from other sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict, or law.

On the third issue, the Court held that there was no further need to discuss the merits of the appeal, since the criminal and civil actions were both extinguished by the death of the accused.

Doctrine

First, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes the criminal action, because there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. This follows from Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, under which criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict before final judgment, as to both personal and pecuniary penalties.

Second, the civil action instituted in the criminal case for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. This follows from Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which makes every person criminally liable for a felony also civilly liable: when the criminal liability falls, the civil liability arising from it falls as well.

Third, the extinguishment of civil liability ex delicto does not bar civil liability arising from other sources, such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict, or law, as enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. Where the records disclose no such independent source of liability, the Court need not pass upon the merits of the appeal.

Disposition

The appeal of the late Gregorio Sumaya was dismissed, and the case was declared and terminated.

Remember This

Memorize the line: upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished, and the civil action for civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

Examiners use this case to test the effect of the death of the accused before final judgment, and to distinguish civil liability ex delicto, which dies with the accused, from civil liability arising from contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict, or law, which survives.