PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused appeals from the joint decision^[1] of Branch
48 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, Fifth Judicial Region, in
Criminal Case No. 5519 and Criminal Case No. 5521 promulgated on 27 December
1989. The said decision found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in the first
case and sentenced him “to suffer the penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor as Minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months
and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to pay the heirs of
the late Virgie Trangia the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs”; in the second case,
the accused was convicted of rape and was sentenced “to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment and to pay Blessie Marie Veri the amount of
P30,000.00 as damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs.”

These cases originated from the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mandaon-Balud,
Masbate with the filing thereat on 29 June 1988 of a complaint for murder by
the Deputy Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) at
Mandaon, Masbate, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4314-M,^[2]
and of a complaint for rape by the offended party, Blessie Marie Veri, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4315-M.^[3]
Accused was subsequently arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued
by the Judge of the said court after a preliminary examination was conducted.^[4]
Accused failed to file his counter-affidavit as required by the court. Finding that a prima facie case
existed against him on the basis of the prosecution’s evidence, the said court
forwarded the records of both cases to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Masbate.^[5]
The latter in turn filed
with the RTC of Masbate two separate informations for murder and rape against
the accused. The first, filed on 1
September 1988, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5519 and raffled off to
Branch 48 of the said court. Its
accusatory portion reads:

“That on or about April 30, 1987, in the morning thereof, at sitio
Tonog, barangay Nailahan (sic), Municipality of Mandaon, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, attack, assault and stab with a deadly weapon one Virgie
Trangia, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting wounds which directly caused her instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[6]

On the other hand, the second information, filed on 5 September
1988, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5521 and raffled off to Branch 44 of
the said court. Its accusatory portion
reads:

“That on or about April 29, 1987, in the afternoon thereof, at
sitio Tonog, barangay Nailahan (sic), Municipality of Mandaon, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of violence and intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Blessie
Marie T. Veri, against the latter’s consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[7]

Arraigned on 25 October 1988 in Criminal
Case No. 5519, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.^[8]

Subsequently, or on 14 December 1988, Branch 44 of the court a
quo granted the prosecution’s motion to consolidate Criminal Case No. 5521
with Criminal Case No. 5519 in Branch 48 of the said court.^[9]
Thereupon, the accused entered a plea of not guilty^[10]
on 4 January 1989 in Criminal Case No. 5521.

At the joint trial of both cases, the prosecution presented as
its witnesses Blessie Marie Veri, the offended party; Dr. Napoleon Villasis,
the physician who examined her and issued a medical certificate; P/Lt.
Jesustines Villamor, Station Commander of the Mandaon Police Station; P/Cpl.
Renato Sabaldica; and Jose Radan, a photographer. For his part, the accused testified in his behalf and presented
as his sole witness Ledesma Parabas, a neighbor and caretaker of his
(accused’s) employer’s farm.

The evidence for the prosecution, upon which the trial court
based its judgment, is summarized in the Appellee’s Brief as follows:

“The evidence for the Prosecution showed that appellant and Virgie
Trangia were live-in partners residing at Sitio Tonog, Barangay Nailaban,
Mandaon, Masbate. Living with them was
Blessie Marie Veri, a nine (9) year old schoolgirl, who was Virgie Trangia’s
daughter by another man.

On April 29, 1987, at around 1:00 in the afternoon, Virgie Trangia
went to the poblacion of Mandaon, Masbate. Appellant and Blessie Marie were left alone in their house. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of that day,
i.e., April 29, 1987, appellant approached
Blessie Marie while inside their house. He held Blessie Marie’s hands and dragged her to a room. Inside the room, appellant tied Blessie
Marie’s mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting. Thereafter, appellant tied Blessie Marie’s
hands behind her back with a rope while she was on the floor facing it. Blessie Marie was then made to lie with her
back on the floor. Appellant sat on
Blessie Marie’s abdomen and tied Blessie Marie’s feet together.

On second thought, appellant untied Blessie Marie’s feet, spread
them apart, and tied them again with a rope to two (2) separate posts.

After Blessie Marie’s hands and feet were tied by appellant, the
latter tore Blessie Marie’s panty. Appellant then took off his shorts and brief and placed himself on top
of Blessie Marie. He inserted his
sexual organ to that of Blessie Marie, and he succeeded in his sexual
assault. Thereafter, appellant dressed
himself and left the house. Before
leaving, he untied Blessie Marie’s hands.

After appellant had left the house, Virgie Trangia (Blessie Marie’s
mother) arrived from the poblacion of Mandaon, Masbate. At that time, Blessie Marie was still lying
on the floor. Virgie Trangia inquired
from her daughter as to
what had happened while she was away. Blessie Marie informed her that she was raped by appellant. At around 4:00 in the afternoon, Blessie
Marie and Virgie Trangia went to the Mandaon Police Station to report the
incident. At the police station, they
were investigated by P/Cpl. Renato Sabaldica who prepared a police report
thereafter (Exh. B in Criminal Case 5521, Rec., G.R. No. 91865-66, p. 476).

After investigating Blessie Marie, P/Cpl. Sabaldica took a tricycle
to apprehend appellant. The latter was
apprehended on that same day (the place and time of apprehension undisclosed)
and brought to the Mandaon Police Station where he was detained.

At the police station, appellant asked forgiveness from Virgie
Trangia. Having been forgiven by the
latter, appellant was released from prison in the morning of the following day,
i.e., April 30, 1987. From the
police station, appellant and Virgie Trangia went home together.

In the meantime, at around 9:00 in the morning of April 30, 1987,
Blessie Marie went to Landina de la Cruz’s house which is a walking distance
away from appellant’s house. After
several minutes, Blessie Marie and Landina de la Cruz proceeded to appellant’s
house (where Virgie Trangia and Blessie Marie also live). Upon reaching said house, Blessie Marie
noticed a lot of blood on the floor and wall of her room. She asked Landina de la Cruz where her
mother (Virgie Trangia) was, but
Landina de la Cruz could not answer her question.

After one (1) week, Blessie Marie saw appellant in his parent’s
house which is located fifty (50) meters away from Landina dela Cruz’s
residence. At that time, appellant was
carrying with him Virgie Trangia’s clothings. Blessie Marie then inquired from appellant where her mother was. Appellant answered that Virgie Trangia was
in Estancia, Iloilo. Not believing
appellant (sic), Blessie Marie then left.

Sometime in June 1988, Connie Trangia (Virgie Trangia’s mother)
went to the Mandaon Police Station to report that her daughter was
missing. On the basis thereof, Sergio
dela Cruz, appellant’s father, was invited by the police authorities. At the police station, Sergio de la Cruz
told the police authorities that his son, herein appellant, confessed to him
that he killed Virgie Trangia and buried her body at the base of a coconut tree
along the seashore in Nailaban, Mandaon, Masbate.

Based on the information given by Sergio de la Cruz, appellant was apprehended
on June 13, 1988 by the Mandaon police authorities at Barangay Cagmasuso,
Mandaon, Masbate and brought to the police station.

At the police station, appellant volunteered the information that
he buried his wife along the seashore at Nailaban, Mandaon, Masbate. Thereafter, he led the police authorities to
the said place and dug the ground in the presence of residents thereat. They (appellant and police authorities) were
able to recover eight (8) bones of Virgie Trangia. Photographs were taken by Jose Radan of the place excavated by
appellant and the bones recovered therefrom.

On June 30, 1988, Blessie Marie submitted herself to a medical
examination at the Mandaon Medicare Community Hospital to prove that she was indeed
raped by appellant one (1) year ago. Dr. Napoleon Villasis, who conducted the aforesaid medical examination,
issued a certification (Exh. A in Crim. Case No. 5521, G.R. No. 91865-66, p.
46) to the effect that he found an old hymenal tear at ‘8:00 o’clock position’ in Blessie Marie’s sexual organ.

On the basis of the available evidence, appellant was thus
prosecuted for RAPE and MURDER, the herein cases.”^[11]

Finding the foregoing to be a faithful summary of the
prosecution’s evidence, we hereby adopt the same as our own.

On the other hand, the accused, who admitted to be Virgie
Trangia’s live-in partner from 1985 to 1987, raised the defense of alibi. He declared that on 29 April 1987, he
reported for work at Marcial Mesa’s ricefield. He stopped working at 4:00 p.m. and forthwith proceeded home. Not finding Virgie Trangia and her daughter
Blessie Marie Veri to be home, he looked for them and asked his neighbors about their whereabouts. When Virgie and Blessie Marie finally
arrived, he got angry at them and even slapped Blessie Marie. Virgie thus called a policeman to arrest
him. He was arrested and brought to the
Mandaon municipal jail. Upon being
investigated, he denied having raped Blessie Marie. Thereupon, he was released from jail at around 4:00 p.m. the
following day. He reached home at about
6:00 p.m. and discovered that Virgie and Blessie Marie were no longer in their
house. Searching for them in their
neighborhood, he was informed that both had packed their things and left. He continued looking for them for one year
and assumed, after that period, that they had just gone home to their
parents. On 29 June 1988, he came to
know that cases for murder and rape had been filed against him. He was thus apprehended by the police,
maltreated while being detained and made to confess that he had killed Virgie
Trangia. He insisted, however, that he
did not kill the latter. He was then
brought to Nailaban to look for the place where he had supposedly buried Virgie
Trangia’s remains. He was made to dig
for the said remains but they could find nothing. He claims that he did not see the bones which were presented by
the prosecution in the place where he was made to dig. Nor does he know where the bones came from
as they were just brought by Virgie’s mother, Connie Trangia, to the site of
the digging and placed there before the pictures were taken.^[12]

The accused’s alibi was
corroborated by Ledesma Parabas, caretaker of Marcial Mesa’s land, who
testified that on 29 April 1987, the accused reported for work at Marcial Mesa’s
land at 7:00 a.m., returned to work at
1:00 p.m., stopped at 4:00 p.m. and then headed home. She declared that her house is only about seventeen arms’ length
away from the accused’s house and that she did not hear any shouting from his house in the morning or afternoon of
the said date.^[13]

On 27 December 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision,
the adjudicatory portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos dela Cruz, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and hereby sentences said accused to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and to pay
Blessie Marie Veri the amount of P30,000.00 as damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 5519, the Court finds the accused,
Carlos dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and
hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of Eight (8) Years and One
(1) day of Prision Mayor as Minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months
and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to pay the heirs of the
late Virgie Trangia the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.”^[14]

Accused filed on 11 January 1990 separate notices of appeal
signifying his intention to appeal his conviction for homicide in Criminal Case
No. 5519 to the Court of Appeals^[15] and
his conviction for rape in Criminal Case No. 5521 to this Court.^[16]
Thus, on 12 January 1990, the trial court transmitted the records of Criminal
Case No. 5521 (Rape) to this Court which docketed the same as G.R. Nos.
91865-66. Since only one case was
appealed to this Court, a single docket number should have been assigned to it.

On 19 January 1990, the trial court forwarded the records of
Criminal Case No. 5519 (Murder) to the Court of Appeals. However, on 13 February 1990, the Chief of the Judicial Records
Division of the appellate court forwarded the said records to this Court on the
ground that the same were “erroneously forwarded” to the Court of Appeals
“considering that the penalty imposed upon the accused-appellant is RECLUSION PERPETUA.”^[17] This is, of course, incorrect as the penalty imposed by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. 5519
is not reclusion perpetua. Said
official must have been unaware of the appeal to this Court in Criminal Case
No. 5521 and merely took into account Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Court.^[18]
The case was docketed as G.R. Nos.
92439-40. Again, only one docket number should have been assigned to the
case.

Acting on the motion of
the accused’s counsel, this Court, in its Resolution of 16 January 1991,^[19] ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos.
91865-66 and G.R. Nos. 92439-40.

In his Consolidated
Brief,^[20] the accused urges this Court to reverse
his conviction for rape and homicide and acquit him thereof because the trial court erred:

“I

X X X IN RELYING SOLELY IN (sic) THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT
BLESSIE MARIE VERI IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE
MANIFEST UNCERTAINTIES AND INCONSISTENCIES.

II

X X X IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE CRIME BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.

III

X X X IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED?APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE BASED PURELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH WERE (sic) INFERRED ON
(sic) FACTS NEVER PROVEN.”

G.R. Nos. 91865-66 (Rape):

In support of his first and second assigned errors, the accused
contends that the complainant’s testimony that he raped her is not reliable and
credible as the same contains “manifest uncertainties and inconsistencies which
render the charge of rape doubtful and suspicious.” He then cites some discrepancies
between the complainant’s testimony during the trial and the sworn statement
she had prepared during the preliminary examination, as well as contradictions
in her declarations during direct and cross-examinations. He further claims that her story is not supported or corroborated by
other evidence and that the withdrawal by her mother of the complaint for rape,
which led to his release from jail on 30 April 1987, the complainant’s failure
to undergo a medical examination immediately after the rape and the filing of
the case only after more than a year, reflect the dubiousness of the complaint
for rape. The following are the more
important alleged inconsistencies pointed out by the accused: (a) in her sworn statement during the
preliminary examination, Blessie Marie stated that the accused, who was armed
with a knife, “hogtied” her, dragged her to a room and raped her there;
however, in her testimony given in court, she claimed that the accused first
dragged her to a room, tied her hands and feet and raped her without disclosing
that he (accused) was armed with a knife; and (b) while the complainant
testified in court that (1) she was raped by the accused at 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of 29 April 1987; (2) she reported the incident to the Mandaon Police
Station an hour later, i.e., 4:00 p.m. of that same day; (3) the rope
used by the accused for tying her was found in her room; (4) the accused
removed his shorts and brief after he had tied her hands and feet; and (5) the
accused tied her while she was lying, face down, on the floor, the police
report prepared by P/Cpl. Sabaldica states that the rape was committed at 12:00
noon of 29 April 1987 and was reported to the police authorities at 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon of the same day. Moreover, it is averred that during cross-examination, Blessie Marie
declared that the accused, who was then naked, was already holding a rope as he
dragged her to a room, and that she was lying with her back on the floor when
her hands were tied by him.

We are not impressed. As
to the alleged inconsistencies between her testimony given in court and her
sworn statement, we agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the said
sworn statement was not presented or formally offered in evidence by the
defense. Hence, the same cannot be
given any evidentiary value. Section
34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that “[T]he court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” It must likewise be
stressed that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the same Revised Rules of Court,
“[T]he record of the preliminary investigation whether conducted by a judge or
a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial
Court” unless ordered produced by the trial court on its own initiative or on
motion of any party “whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of
the case or any incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by the
party requesting for its production.” Besides, the offended party was never
confronted with the alleged inconsistent statement or accorded the opportunity
to explain it. Section 13 of the
aforesaid Rule 132 provides that:

“Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with
his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be
asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.”

Furthermore, it was not necessary to show
that the accused had a knife for the purpose of proving the existence of force
or intimidation. All that had to be
established by the prosecution in the instant case was the fact that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party who was only nine (9) years
old at that time. Force or intimidation
is not necessary to commit the
crime of rape in this case for, as provided
by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape may also be committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman who is under twelve years of age, “even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the next two preceding paragraphs (one of which is
the fact that force or intimidation was used) shall be present.”

The variance between the entries in the police report and the
testimony of Blessie Marie as to the approximate time of the commission of the
rape and its being reported to the police authorities is quite inconsequential. Besides, the said entry was prepared by the
police investigator without Blessie Marie’s participation. In fact, no evidence was offered to show
that she had actually seen the report. In view thereof, she cannot be accused of taking an inconsistent
stand. In People vs. Santito, Jr.,^[21] we
ruled that the “entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestion
or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain
to the subject.”

The other alleged inconsistencies
between the complainant’s testimony during direct examination and
cross-examination are on minor, if not trivial, matters which only serve to
strengthen her credibility. Thus, in People
vs. Santito, Jr.,^[22] we
declared that:

“x x x the imputed inconsistency in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on minor details reinforces rather than weakens their
credibility for the reaction of persons when confronted with a shocking
incident varies x x x. Testimonial
discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to
strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony. It would have been
more suspicious if complainant had been able to pinpoint with clarity or describe
with precision the exact sequence of events. The most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses
do not necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility.”

The above pronouncement is especially true
in this case where the offended party was only nine (9) years old at the time
she was sexually assaulted and subjected to inhuman treatment. Blessie Marie immediately revealed the rape
to her mother upon the latter’s arrival; both then wasted no time in reporting
the incident to the police authorities who recorded the complaint and arrested
the accused on the same day. The
spontaneity of such acts, as well as the complainant’s subsequent submission to
a medical examination — albeit belated — and the ordeal of a public trial,
manifested her honest desire to seek justice. It is difficult to believe that Blessie Marie, at so tender an age,
would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless
that was the truth.^[23]

Appellant, however, contends that the complainant’s testimony of
the rape is not supported or corroborated by other evidence. It must, therefore, be emphasized that
except where expressly required by law, the testimony of a single witness need
not be corroborated; witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.^[24]
In prosecutions for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the complainant’s testimony
provided, of course, that the same is credible and convincing.^[25]
In the instant case, we find Blessie Marie’s testimony to be both truthful and
credible.

Furthermore, the charge of rape is duly supported by other
evidence on record. Contrary to the
accused’s submission, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Villasis shows that
the complainant suffered an “old hymenal tear at 8:00 o’clock position.” Such a
finding strongly supports the complainant’s claim that she had been raped by
the accused more than a year earlier. While Dr. Villasis did not rule out the possibility of sexual
intercourse as the cause of the hymenal tear, he affirmed that he “would rather
say that there was a possible
sexual penetration” but “could not qualify if it was forcible or not or it was
rather inflicted through force or intimidation.”^[26]

Nor can we appreciate in the accused’s favor his release from
jail on 30 April 1987 and Blessie Marie’s failure to submit to a medical
examination immediately after the rape. The accused was released from jail not because of his innocence but
because he had begged Blessie Marie’s mother for forgiveness. Also, the rule is settled that a medical
examination is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape.^[27]

Of course, the pardon extended by Virgie Trangia to the accused
would not be sufficient to exonerate him. As early as 1902, this
Court, in United States vs. Luna,^[28] had ruled that the grant of pardon by
the parents or guardian of a
minor complainant “alone, in the name or on behalf of the minor, is not
sufficient, because, as the offense essentially and directly affects the
injured party, she alone is entitled to remit the offense and to authorize the
extinction of the penal action.” Elsewise stated, where the offended party in cases of rape, seduction, abduction or
acts of lasciviousness is a minor, the pardon must be given by both the
parents and the offended party.^[29]

The trial court correctly rejected the defense of alibi on the
basis of the accused’s positive identification by Blessie Marie as the
rapist. We have held that alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused.^[30]
Moreover, for such a defense to
succeed, it is not enough that
the accused prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also show that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission.^[31] The
accused failed to show such impossibility in this case.

Thus, this Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused raped Blessie Marie Veri.

Since there were no extenuating circumstances which attended the
commission of the crime, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.^[32]
It erred, however, in equating the said penalty with “life imprisonment.” We
have time and again said that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous or
interchangeable with life imprisonment because they do not have the same
duration and the latter does not carry with it the accessory penalties provided
in the Revised Penal Code.^[33]

G.R. Nos. 92439-40 (Murder):

In convicting the accused of the lesser offense of homicide, the
trial court took into account the following circumstances: (a) the accused and the victim went home
together in the morning of 30 April 1987 after the former was released from
jail; (b) at 9:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, Blessie Marie and
Landina de la Cruz “saw plenty of blood in her (Blessie Marie’s) room, on the
floor, on the wall and on the ground of their house”; (c) Virgie was never seen
again thereafter; (d) the accused had taken flight because he was no longer in
his house at the time Blessie Marie and Landina arrived therein; (e) the
accused went to Estancia, Iloilo for when Blessie Marie asked him a week later
where her mother was, he replied that she “is in Estancia, Iloilo”; (f) he had
in his possession Virgie’s clothes, a fact which reinforced the theory that he
was the last person with her; (g) he admitted to his father, Sergio de la Cruz,
that he killed Virgie and buried her near the seashore; (h) he was thereafter
apprehended in the island of Cagmasoso, Masbate, “preparatory to take (sic)
flight again”; (i) after his arrest, he admitted, when confronted by P/Lt.
Jesustines Villamor, that “he really killed his wife and the remain (sic) of
her body was (sic) buried at the base of the coconut trees along the seashore
of sitio Nailaban, Mandaon, Masbate”; and (j) he was able to dig up, in the
place where he had buried Virgie’s remains, “eight (8) pieces of human bones
which are the bones of his wife.”^[34] The
trial court ruled that although the declaration of Sergio de la Cruz — that
his son (the accused) admitted having killed Virgie — is hearsay since he was
not presented as a witness, he
nevertheless “provided the clue to the killing of the victim by the accused.”^[35]
Anent the accused’s supposed admission before P/Lt. Villamor, the court a quo opined that although it resulted from a “custodial
investigation without [the] assistance of counsel,” and is therefore “inadmissible for violating the provision of the
Constitution,” it nevertheless “reinforces the circumstantial evidence.”^[36]

The accused vainly attempts to rip apart the foregoing
circumstances by contending that they were inferred from unproven facts or mere
conjectures. Hence, he claims that
there is no evidence to show that he and Virgie returned home together on 30 April
1987; on the contrary, it is asserted that Blessie Marie herself testified
during both direct and re-direct examinations that he went home only after five
days from 29 April 1987, the date of his arrest.^[37] And
even then, per his own testimony, he was released from detention only at 4:00
o’clock in the afternoon of 30 April 1987 and arrived home two hours later.^[38]

Accused also avers that Blessie Marie’s testimony concerning the
blood found in her house was not corroborated by her companion Landina de la
Cruz; thus, the latter’s non-presentation constitutes suppression of evidence
which could have been adverse if produced. He further claims that there is no factual basis for the trial court’s
conclusion that he proceeded to Estancia, Iloilo and that he fled from his
house for at the time he was supposed to be out of the said house, he was very
much still in detention. It could not
likewise be logically presumed, as the trial court did, that his possession of
Virgie’s clothes, even if it be true, proves that he was the last person with
her.

Finally, the accused maintains that while the trial court was correct
in ruling that his declarations were inadmissible for having been taken without
the assistance of counsel, it nevertheless erred in admitting in evidence the “re-enactment pictures”
(Exhibits “C,” “C-1” to “C-12,” inclusive) and the bones that were recovered.

Save for the last, the accused’s grievances do not touch on the
more significant aspects of this murder case. And even if we assume that they do, the accused would still not be
entirely correct for P/Cpl. Sabaldica testified that he released the latter in the morning of 30 April 1989
after an “amicable settlement” was reached with Virgie; both then allegedly
proceeded home.^[39]

Anent the
non-presentation of Landina de la Cruz, it appears that she was, at most, a
corroborative witness. Hence, her
testimony can be dispensed with and no unfavorable presumption may be deduced
from the prosecution’s failure to present her.^[40]

After an extensive review of the records and the trial court’s decision,
we find the prosecution’s case for murder fatally flawed because of the absence
of proof to show that (a) Virgie Trangia had in fact died, (b) the bones which
were unearthed were that of a human being, (c) assuming they were, that they
belong to a female human being and (d) assuming further the latter to be so,
that they were the bones of Virgie Trangia.

There is no evidence on record to prove the fact of Virgie
Trangia’s death except for (a) the testimony of P/Cpl. Renato Sabaldica to the
effect that Sergio de la Cruz had admitted that the accused (Sergio’s son)
confessed to the said killing;^[41]
Sergio then executed on 24 June 1988 an affidavit affirming the “confession” of
his son;^[42] this was followed by the latter’s 1
July 1988 sworn declaration before the Judge of the MCTC of Mandaon-Balud,
Masbate;^[43]
and (b) the declaration of P/Lt. Jesustines Villamor that after the accused’s
arrest for the crime of murder, the former interviewed the latter who then
admitted that “he really killed his wife” and buried her remains “in the base
of the coconut trees along the seashore of sitio Nailaban, Mandaon, Masbate.”^[44]

The declaration of Sergio de la Cruz, as correctly ruled by the
trial court, is hearsay since he was not presented by the prosecution as a
witness.^[45]
In any event, even if such declaration may be admitted, the prosecution still
failed to establish the approximate date of Virgie’s “death.” All that may be
gleaned from the affidavit prepared by Sergio de la Cruz is that his son
(accused) revealed to him a week after 25 July 1987 that he had killed his wife
Virgie Trangia. On the other hand, it
is to be observed that the trial court opined that Virgie must have been killed
in the morning of 30 April 1987 because of Blessie Marie’s discovery of blood
in the room, on the floor and on the walls of their house. We find such a conclusion unacceptable as no
evidence was offered to prove that the said blood was human blood. Moreover, the police authorities did not
conduct an ocular inspection to determine if indeed there were tell-tale signs
of blood.

Furthermore, the evidence discloses that Virgie’s mother, Connie
Trangia, did not in fact report to the police authorities that Virgie had been
killed. She merely complained that
Virgie was missing. On direct examination,
P/Lt. Villamor declared:

“Q   How did you happen to
investigate Sergio de la Cruz?

WITNESS testifying

A     I investigated Sergio de
la Cruz when Connie Trangia the mother of Virgie Trangia reported in our office
that her daughter Virgie Trangia the wife of the accused Carlos de la Cruz is
(sic) missing.”^[46]

The accused’s so-called admission, given after his arrest and
during his custodial investigation, was obtained in total disregard of his
rights as guaranteed by paragraph (1), Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Said paragraph reads:

“Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.”

The precursor of this provision is
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provided in part
that: “x x x [A]ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right.” We have ruled that it is not
enough that the subject be merely informed of such rights, asked if he wants
to avail of the services of counsel and told that he could ask for counsel if
he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request.^[47]
If he decides to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, in order to be valid,
must still be made with the assistance of counsel.^[48]

In the instant case, the
accused was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that
if he cannot afford to have the counsel of his choice, he would be provided
with one. There is no evidence at all
to indicate that he decided to waive such right. And even if he did waive it, no written
waiver, executed in the presence of counsel, was identified or offered in
evidence. Thus, the accused’s alleged
admission that he killed Virgie Trangia is inadmissible in evidence pursuant to
paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides as
follows:

“(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.”

Equally inadmissible, for being integral
parts of the uncounselled admission — or fruits of that poisonous tree — are
the photographs of subsequent acts which the accused was made to do in order to
obtain proof to support such admission or confession, such as (a) his digging
in the place where Virgie Trangia was allegedly buried, (b) his retrieving of
the bones discovered therein and (c) his posing before a photographer while
executing such acts. However, we do not
agree with the accused that the photographs are “re-enactment”
photographs. There was no
“re-enactment” for he was not made to perform again the killing or burying of
Virgie.

In Aballe vs. People,^[49] we
declared as inadmissible the fatal knife used by the accused in stabbing the
murder victim despite the fact that the accused himself voluntarily recovered
the said knife after being detained and investigated by the police authorities
to whom he, without the aid of counsel, admitted his guilt. Thus:

“Indeed, equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife (fatal weapon)
recovered from Aballe after his capture and after the police had started to
question him. Together with
the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon
is but a fruit of a constitutionally
infirmed interrogation and must consequently
be disallowed. x x x”
(emphasis supplied).

We find the trial court’s ratiocination
— that although the accused’s admission is inadmissible, it still “reinforces
the circumstantial evidence” — to be self-contradictory, if not strange. We simply fail to see how inadmissible
evidence can reinforce circumstantial evidence.

Worse, it was never even established by the prosecution that the
bones excavated by the accused belong to a female human being or, more
importantly, to Virgie Trangia. On
cross-examination, P/Lt. Villamor simply expressed an opinion that the bones
belong to a human being. Thus:

“Q   And what are those eight
(8) pieces of bones?

A     We believe to (sic) be
the bones of the dead.

Q    And you mean that you
cannot determine whether it (sic) is really
the remains of the human beings (sic)?

A     I believed that it is
(sic) the bones of a human being and that bones was (sic) recovered after
digging the (sic) place where
the victim was buried.”^[50]

We thus conclude that the guilt of the accused for the alleged
death of Virgie Trangia has not been proven with moral certainty.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1)    REVERSING the decision of Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate in Criminal Case No. 5519 and ACQUITTING the
accused of the crime of homicide, with costs de oficio; and

(2)    AFFIRMING the decision of the said court in
Criminal Case No. 5521 convicting the accused of the crime of rape, subject to
the modification with respect to the use of the term life imprisonment, which
is deleted, with costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Original records (OR), Crim. Case No. 5521, 254-261. Per Judge Ricardo B. Butalid. The decision is dated 24 November 1989.

^[2]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5519, 4.

^[3]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 4.

^[4]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5519, op. cit., 8-9, 12; OR, Crim. Case No. 5521,
6-9.

^[5]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 2-3.

^[6]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5519, 1.

^[7]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 1.

^[8]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5519, op. cit., 19; 23.

^[9]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 14.

^[10]
Id., 28.

^[11]
Brief for the Appellee, 6-14; Rollo, G.R. No. 92439-40, 33, et seq. All references to the transcripts of the
stenographic notes are omitted.

^[12]
TSN, 6 July 1989, 2-22; Consolidated Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 7-8.

^[13]
TSN, 29 August 1989, 2-6.

^[14]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 260-61.

^[15]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5519, 279.

^[16]
OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 262.

^[17]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 92439-40, 1.

^[18]
“Sec. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court
in cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment, or where a lesser
penalty is imposed but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense
for which the penalty of death or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by
filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.”

^[19]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 92439-40, unpaginated.

^[20]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 91865-66, 30, et seq.

^[21]
201 SCRA 87, 94-95, [1991].

^[22]
Supra, at page 96.

^[23]
People vs. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354 [1991].

^[24]
People vs. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304, 315 [1992].

^[25]
People vs. Base, 196 SCRA 688 [1991]; People vs. Santiago, 197
SCRA 556 [1991]; People vs. Aquino, 197 SCRA 578 [1991].

^[26]
TSN, 20 April 1989, 6.

^[27]
People vs. Saldivia, 203 SCRA 461 [1991].

^[28]
1 Phil. 360 [1902].

^[29]
AQUINO, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, vol. III,
1988 ed., 484.

^[30]
People vs. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 618 [1991]; People vs. Caraig, 202
SCRA 357 [1991].

^[31]
People vs. Catubig, 195 SCRA 505 [1991]; People vs. Arroyo, 201
SCRA 616 [1991]; People vs. Plaga, 202 SCRA 53 [1991].

^[32]
Second paragraph, Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

^[33]
People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991]; People vs. Ramos, 203 SCRA
237 [1991]; People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992]; People vs.
Carpio, 207 SCRA 569 [1992].

^[34]
Decision of the trial court, 5-6; OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 258-259; Rollo,
15-16.

^[35]
Decision of the trial court, 6; OR, Crim. Case No. 5521, 259; Rollo, 16.

^[36]
Id., 6; Id., 259; Id., 16.

^[37]
TSN, 7 February 1989, 28-29; 32-33.

^[38]
TSN, 6 July 1989, 14.

^[39]
TSN, 20 June 1989, 15.

^[40]
People vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People vs. Vocente, 188
SCRA 100 [1990].

^[41]
TSN, 20 June 1989, 5-6.

^[42]
Exhibits “B” and “B-3” — Translation, Crim. Case No. 5519.

^[43]
Exhibits “A” and “A-1”, Id.

^[44]
TSN, 20 April 1989, 18.

^[45]
Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, no person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or
other direct descendants.

^[46]
TSN, 20 April 1989, 13-14.

^[47]
People vs. Pecardal, 145 SCRA 647 [1986]; People vs. Lasac, 148
SCRA 624 [1987].

^[48]
Morales vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]; People vs. Galit, 135
SCRA 465 [1985]; People vs. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 [1986].

^[49]
183 SCRA 196, 202 [1990].

^[50]
TSN, 20 April 1989, 27.