PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, VS. LI WAI CHEUNG @ PETER LEE, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

Appellant Li Wai Cheung alias Peter Lee was charged, in three (3)
separate informations all dated 17 February 1987, with unlawful possession of
methylamphetamine crystals, in violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425 as amended; with the unlawful possession of marijuana leaves and seeds, in
violation of Section 8, Article II of the same statute; and with the unlawful
possession and sale of heroin powder, in violation of Section 4, Article II of the same law:

“That on or about the 14th day of February 1987, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Li Wai Cheung @ Peter Lee, without authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control one hundred twenty three (123) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, placed in a plastic bag, a regulated drug. [Criminal Case No. 87-11338-P]

xxx    xxx      xxx

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1987, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Li Wai Cheung @ Peter Lee, without authority of law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) small plastic packet of marijuana leaves and seeds
placed in a clay jar, a prohibited drug. [Criminal Case No. 87-11339-P]

x x x  x x
x x x x

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1987, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Li Wai Cheung @ Peter Lee, without authority of law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and possess heroin
powder placed in five small plastic packets, one (1) weighing scale marked
‘Jiangsu China’ of heroin residue and heroin powder placed in forty-one (41)
small plastic packets, a prohibited drug.”^[1]
[Criminal Case No. 87-11340-P].

Upon arraignment on 3 March 1989, appellant Li, assisted by
counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty to all three (3)
charges.^[2]

After trial, he was found guilty of all three (3) offenses
charged in a decision dated 8 May 1989 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City,
the dispositive portion of which states in part:

“In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Li
Wai Cheung alias Peter Lee guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all criminal cases
namely: Criminal Case No. 87-11338-P
for violation of Section 16, Republic Act 6425 as amended, Criminal Case No.
87-11339-P for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and
Criminal Case No. 87-11340-P for violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425 as
amended and accordingly hereby sentences him to imprisonment of six (6) years,
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine of twelve thousand (P12,000.00)
pesos in Criminal Case No. 11338-P; six years, one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and a fine of twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos in Criminal Case No.
87-11339-P and reclusion perpetua and a fine of thirty thousand
(P30,000.00) pesos in Criminal Case No. 87-11340-P.”^[3]

The facts of the case as found by the lower court are as follows:

“That on February 14, 1987 at Sunset View Towers Condominium
more particularly Room No. 1207 located at Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, accused Li
Wai Cheung alias Peter Lee was arrested and/or caught ‘enflagrante delicto’ in
the act of consummating the sale of alleged heroin powder placed in five (5)
small plastic packets by agents of the Narcom in a ‘buy-bust’ operation after a
confidential agent informed the Narcom law enforcers that one Li Wai Cheung
alias Peter Lee was suspected and/or found peddling and/or pushing heroin
powder and marijuana. That pursuant to
said confidential information, a team was formed with specific instructions to
conduct a ‘buy-bust’ operation against the said suspect which operation led to
the aforementioned arrest of the accused. That the ‘buy-bust’ money in the amount of P1,000.00 together with
thirty (30) pieces of flash roll money was recovered from the person of the
said accused. That thereafter, and
pursuant to and as a consequence of the in flagrante arrest of
the accused, a search of the premises of the accused was conducted by the
Narcom Law enforcers which search resulted to the recovery and confiscation of
the following items namely: one (1)
plastic small packet containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds placed
and/or contained in a clay jar, one hundred twenty-three grams of suspected
shabu (Methamphetamine Hydrochloride placed in a plastic bag), forty-one (41)
grams of white suspected heroin powder placed in 41 small packets, one (1)
weighing scale with trademark ‘Jiangsu China’ together with one (1) Echolac
suitcase. That after laboratory
examination of the above-mentioned specimen by forensic chemist Luena Layador,
it was established that all five (5) grams of white suspected heroin powder
(which were sold by the accused to the Narcom agents acting as poseur buyers)
were found positive for the presence of heroin, which is a prohibited
drug. That the forty-one (41) grams of
white suspected heroin powder placed in forty-one (41) small plastic packets
(found inside the blue Echolac suitcase of the accused) were likewise found
positive for the presence of heroin, a prohibited drug. That the one hundred twenty-three grams of
white granular substance placed in a plastic bag (also found inside the Echolac
suitcase) was found positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug and one (1) small plastic packet containing suspected
marijuana leaves and seeds inside a clay jar was found positive for the presence
of marijuana, a prohibited drug. That
the weighing scale was likewise found positive for the presence of residues of
heroin.”^[4]

These facts were based on the testimonies of P/Pfc. Lolita
Bugarin and P/Pfc. Albert San Jose, Philippine Constabulary (“PC”)
Narcotics Command agents who had posed as buyers during the operation, as well
as on the testimony of Luena Layador, the PC Forensic Chemist who had conducted
tests on the materials seized from appellant Li, the results of which were
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-145-87, offered and admitted as Exhibit
“J” for the prosecution.^[5]

Li Wai Cheung presented a different story before the trial court,
which was substantially corroborated by the testimony of his Philippine-born
common-law wife, Ramona Lalo. The trial
court summed up his story in the following terms:

“That on February 14, 1987 at about 8:00 o’clock P.M., he was
in his apartment with his wife Ramona Lalo and two (2) children. That he was lying on his bed listening to
the radio when the door bell rang. That
his wife opened the door and four (4) men and a woman in civilian clothes
rushed inside. That when he inquired
(from) them what he (had) done, he was told they will search his
apartment. That the persons searching
his apartment took his belongings and even drank water and ate the food in his
refrigerator. That they hit him with
the butt of a gun. That they stayed in
his apartment for less than an hour. That it is not true that on February 14, 1987 he sold or he was selling
shabu to the police officers when he was arrested, the truth being that he was
then lying in bed when he was arrested. That he did not have in his possession any of the items presented as
evidence by the prosecution. That
although he admitted the clay jar belongs to him but he denies that he has
placed anything in it. That the
weighing scale also belongs to him for use in weighing gold. That he owns the Echolac bag but denies
ownership and/or selling any marijuana, shabu powder and heroin allegedly kept
in said suitcase. That they brought him
to a small locked room, the place of which he does not know. That he was not informed of his constitu­tional
rights such as the right to have counsel and to remain silent. That they demanded money from him telling
him to call his relatives to ask for money. That when he said he has no money, he was informed a case will be filed
against him. That they were asking him
P200,000.00 but (he) told them he does not have that much money. That they took from his possession US$1,200.00,
(a gold bar), more than
HK$3,000.00 and P3,000.00. That
jewelries belonging to his wife (were) also taken by the police officers. That the gold bar taken from his possession
is used to make gold leaf which is his business, he has a partner with an outlet in Makati.

x x x  x x x   x x x

That he did not file a complaint against the arresting officer who
beat him because he was frightened. That his common-law wife did not file a case with regard to her money
and jewelry. x x x. That he was forced to admit ownership of the
items allegedly found in his place by putting bullets in between his fingers
and pressed them and by placing a plastic hood over his head which was
tightened around his neck. That at the
headquarters no questions were asked of him x x x.”^[6]

In this appeal, Li Wai Cheung assigns the following as errors in
the lower court’s decision:

“1. The trial court erred in admitting the
inventory receipt as evidence which was signed during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel.

2.          
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant for
violation of section 16, of article III, R.A. 6425, (and) sections 4 and 8 (of)
R.A. 6425 as amended, despite the want of evidence sufficient to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

3.          
The trial court erred in giving weight and credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the theory of
the defense.”^[7]

The ultimate issue posed in this case is whether the trial court erred
in believing the testimony of the prosecution witnesses tending to show that
they succeeded in entrapping the appellant inside his condominium unit as a
possessor and peddler of regulated and prohibited drugs on the evening of 14
February 1987, and in disbelieving the claim of the defense witnesses that what
had really taken place on that date was a robbery and an attempt to extort
money perpetrated by rogue policemen against appellant and his family.

The Court, which is not a trier of facts, necessarily accords
great respect to the factual conclusions drawn by trial courts, particularly on
the matter of credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the
opportunity (which this Court does not have) of observing the deportment and
demeanor of witnesses while listening to them speak, enabling the judge to form
at first hand a judgment as to whether witnesses were telling the truth or not.^[8]

Appellant in his present appeal has failed to show why the Court
should depart from this general rule.

Appellant seeks to establish an exception to the above general
rule by impugning the credibility of the arresting officers and by suggesting
an illicit motive behind the mounting of their operation. He asserts that the officers “had known
before hand” that he was a Hong Kong
national (i.e., a British subject). He
argues that in view of his admission before the trial court that he was an
overstaying alien at the time of his arrest, it can be reasonably inferred that the officers
“barged into” his condominium unit in order to extort money from him
as a condition for not reporting him as a deportable “overstaying”
alien to the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Appellant submits that this view is
plausible because (appellant claims) the arresting officers declared themselves
as immigration agents when they broke into his home; that they took his money
and his wife’s jewelry; and they admitted before the trial court that the
entrapment operation was mounted without prior coordination with the Narcotics Section of the
Pasay City Police Department, the agency having jurisdiction over the Sunset
View Tower Condominium, located in Pasay City, where the arrest took place.^[9]

Appellant’s process of inference is marred by serious flaws. First, a
careful review of the record shows that there was no evidence offered
either by the prosecution or by the defense which tended to show that at the
time of appellant’s arrest, the officers were aware that he was an alien, let alone
an “overstaying” one. Bugarin
admitted that appellant was a total stranger to her at the time of the
entrapment.^[10]
Appellant also admitted that he did not personally know the officers prior to
the time of his arrest.^[11]
Second, the claim that the officers announced themselves as immigration
officers or agents does not appear indubitable for it was based solely on
Ramona Lalo’s testimony.^[12] But
this was contradicted by appellant’s declaration that the officers identified
themselves as policemen.^[13]
Third, appellant’s claim that money and jewelry were taken from him and his
wife is based only on their own testimony. But both of them were considered unreliable witnesses by the trial court
when they testified on this matter, for they never filed any formal complaint
against the officers with the proper authorities regarding the claimed taking
of money and jewelry.^[14]

Weighing appellant’s theory of extortion in the light of these
evidentiary defects, it would then appear to be a case of speculative tenuously derived from the single
circumstance that the arresting officers failed to notify the Pasay City police
in a?????ce of the operation. Appellant, in other words, fai????? show by clear and convincing
evidence the claimed ????? motive on the part of the arresting officers or any
oth?????awful objective which could affect their credibility rebut the
presumption of regularity of performance official duty enjoyed by their
official acts in this case.^[15]

Appellant also contends that the trial judge overlooked a fact of
substance and value which would have
probably altered the legal conclusions drawn in this case had it been
considered. He asserts that the
existence of the entrapment operation was doubtful because: 1) the marked money and “flash roll
money” were not even dusted with fluorescent powder, contrary to the
normal procedure in such operations; 2) the prosecution should have presented
the confidential informant as the best eyewitness to the entrapment, pursuant
to its obligation of proving appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and 3)
appellant was not a “lunatic”, as improbably depicted in the
testimony of the arresting officers, who would have permitted them to enter his
condominium unit, even though appellant had just met them for the first time
and one of the plain-clothes officers had a bulging, side-arm laden waistline.^[16]

The arguments do not persuade. The application of fluorescent powder to the marked money as a standard or required procedure in entrapment
operations was not established by the defense in the first place. Such a circumstance was appropriately a
matter for cross examination of prosecution witness Bugarin, the poseur buyer directly involved in the
preparation and handing-over of the marked money to the appellant during the
operation. But the defense counsel did
not try to cross-examine Bugarin on this point, being at the time of the trial
far more interested in bringing out from her (Bugarin) the details of the
police procedure of supplying
the entrapment money, as well as their marking of such money by affixing
thereon the poseur buyer’s initials.^[17] The
defense counsel’s failure to compel Bugarin, by appropriate questioning, to
explain the non-use of fluorescent powder for marking purposes can only mean
that this matter was not really considered by counsel to be important or material in establishing the
defense theory that no entrapment
operation took place here.^[18]

Neither was the non-presentation of the confidential informant
fatal to the prosecution’s cause. It
was established at the trial that the Narcom agents utilized the informant to
perfect a sale of illicit drugs over the telephone with the appellant; that
Bugarin and San Jose then accompanied the informant to appellant’s condominium
unit in order to consummate the transaction; that appellant permitted the entry
of all three individuals into his unit on the informant’s representations that
the other two individuals were the interested buyers he had procured; and that
San Jose was beside Bugarin when the latter consummated the transaction
directly with appellant by receiving the five packets of heroin powder.^[19]
When the two officers went through the motions described in their testimony of
buying prohibited drugs, and their offer to buy was accepted by the appellant,
the crime of selling prohibited drugs was
consummated by mere delivery of the drug purchased.^[20]
Consequently, the informant’s testimony on this matter, being corroborative in
nature, was not essential for the prosecution’s cause and could be dispensed
with by the latter.^[21]

The claimed improbability of appellant’s permitting two (2)
strangers to enter his apartment room overlooks the role played by the
informant as an intermediary, with whom appellant was evidently familiar and
whose assurances he naturally relied upon in treating the two (2) officers as
ordinary buyers of forbidden drugs.^[22]

Appellant contends further that if no entrapment situation had
developed here, then the entry of the officers into his dwelling was illegal
for want of a judicial warrant. Consequently, appellant’s arrest was unlawful and the results of the
attendant search and seizure were inadmissible in evidence to show his guilt of
the offenses charged.^[23]

Once more, the Court is not persuaded. Appellant was arrested in flagranti delicto,
having been entrapped into revealing his possession of a ready supply of
prohibited drugs, available for sale and disposition at his dwelling to anyone
willing to pay the price.^[24] This
case comes under the exception to the rules requiring previous securing of a
warrant of arrest.^[25]
While entry into the dwelling was also effected here without benefit of search
warrant, the Court believes that this is not a fatal infirmity. Such entry was a purely coincidental event,
appellant having chosen
to consummate the illicit transaction inside the condominium unit, leaving the
officers no choice but to permit appellant to play out his actions in the
course of entrapping him.^[26]
Furthermore, the search without a warrant
of appellant’s dwelling, a single room unit with a total area of nine (9)
square meters according to defense witness Ramona Lalo,^[27]
was a valid incident of a lawful warrantless arrest.^[28]
The search was conducted in a confined place within appellant’s (and his
wife’s) immediate control, an area where he might gain possession of a weapon, or, as it turned out in this
case, destroy evidence constituting proceeds or proof of appellant’s commission
of related offenses.^[29]

Appellant also seeks to assail the prosecution’s case and to
exclude other incriminating evidence against him, on constitutional
grounds: 1) although Bugarin informed
him in English of the rights of an accused during a custodial investigation
immediately after his arrest, this did not effectively inform him of such
rights because appellant hardly knew either Pilipino or English at the time;
and 2) he was compelled to affix his signature to the inventory receipts of
seized articles at the condominium unit by the arresting officers without the
presence or assistance of counsel.^[30]

The force of the first contention is more apparent than
real. The Filipina common-law wife of
appellant was present throughout the time of the arrest of appellant and the
consequent search of appellant’s apartment unit. She claimed to have knowledge of appellant’s native Cantonese
dialect; indeed, the trial court allowed her to translate in open court the
charges read against him in English at arraignment.^[31]
If appellant had any doubts as to what officer Bugarin was conveying to him in
English immediately after his arrest, he could have asked his common-law wife
to translate for him and we may reasonably assume he did so.

The second contention is, however, well-taken and the Solicitor
General himself concedes this point.^[32] The
prosecution in this case relied partly on written admissions drawn from
appellant after his arrest in establishing its case, more particularly his
signatures appearing on the inventory receipts offered and admitted by the
trial court as Exhibits “A” and “B” for the prosecution.^[33]
These signatures, to the extent they tended to prove appellant’s guilt, are
inadmissible in evidence against him for having been obtained in violation of his rights as a person
under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense, the evidence of record showing
that he was not assisted by counsel at the time he affixed his
signatures on the inventory receipts.^[34]
However, this circumstance cannot result in overturning appellant’s conviction
because the remaining prosecution evidence on record (the positive testimonies
of the arresting officers) is quite sufficient to sustain such conviction.

Finally, appellant contends that his claim of being a plain
merchandiser of gold ornaments and wristwatches was plausible because the
weighing scale seized by the officers, and admittedly owned by him, was used in
connection with the fabrication of gold leaf and gold plated jewelry.^[35]

A principal difficulty with this contention is that it overlooks
Forensic Chemist Luena Layador’s test results which showed that after washing
the scale with ordinary water, she found heroin residue present in the water
used in washing the scale.^[36]

All things considered, there are only two (2) errors the Court
can ascribe to the decision under appeal and both of them involve appellant’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 87-11340-P.

The first error relates to the trial court’s failure to
appreciate that there were in fact two (2) offenses, one the sale
of five (5) small plastic packets of heroin powder and the other the possession
of forty-one (41) small plastic packets of heroin powder, charged in the
information and proven at the trial of this case.^[37]
The five (5) packets of heroin powder were received from the appellant during
the entrapment while the other forty-one (41) packets of the same substance
were found in appellant’s Echolac suitcase by the Narcom agents in the course
of their subsequent search of the condominium unit. These offenses were distinct and separate from each other, the
physical objects involved in the sale of heroin being different from those
relating to the possession of heroin. Both offenses, being penalized by a special statute, are not subject to
the provisions on complex crimes set out in Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.

When two (2) or more offenses are charged in a single
information, and the accused failed, as
here, to object to the duplicitous information before trial, the settled
rule is that the Court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and may impose on
him the penalty for each and every one of them.^[38]
Here, the information in
Criminal Case No. 87-11340-P charged accused with the sale of five (5) packets of heroin powder and possession
of forty-one (41) packets of the same drug.

Accordingly, the sentence imposed on appellant in Criminal Case No. 87-11340-P should be modified
by the imposition of a second
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve years (12) and one (1) day to
twenty years (20) and a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for the
offense of illegal possession
of heroin powder.

The second error in appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No.
87-11340-P consists of the trial court’s improper reference to “reclusion
perpetua” as the penalty imposable on appellant for the
sale of heroin powder. The proper
technical nomenclature is, of course, life imprisonment.^[39]

It appearing that appellant is liable for serving four (4)
successive sentences corresponding to the four (4) crimes for which he was
found guilty in this appeal,^[40] the
rules on the service of sentences set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code are applicable here by way of supplementation.^[41]
Under those rules, the maximum period of a convict’s imprisonment in the
service of his successive sentences shall not in any case exceed forty (40)
years, life imprisonment being counted as thirty (30) years. Immediately after service of his forty-year
sentence, appellant as an alien shall be deported from the Philippines without
further proceedings.^[42]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial
court dated 8 May 1989 is, in its dispositive part, hereby partially MODIFIED
so as to read as follows:

“In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Li
Wai Cheung alias Peter Lee guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all
criminal cases, namely: Criminal Case No.
87-11338-P for violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425 as amended;
Criminal Case No. 87-11339-P for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended; and Criminal Case No. 87-11340-P for violation of Sections 4 and
8 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended; and accordingly hereby sentences him

(a)         
in Criminal Case No. 87-11338-P, to imprison­ment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years plus a fine of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00);

(b)         
in Criminal Case No. 87-11339-P, to imprison­ment ranging from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, plus a fine
of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00); and

(c)         
in Criminal Case No. 11340-P to (i) imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, plus
a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); and (ii) life imprisonment plus a
fine of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).”

As so modified, the Decision of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 12-14.

^[2]
Record, pp. 4, 8 and 18.

^[3]
Decision, pp. 1 and 24-25; Rollo, pp. 28 and 51-52.

^[4]
Decision, pp. 21-23; Rollo, pp. 48-50.

^[5]
TSN, 24 July 1987, pp. 17 and 31-34; TSN, 26 May 1987, pp. 6 and 20-23; TSN, 28
May 1987, pp. 2 and 53-54; Rollo, p. 10.

^[6]
Decision, pp. 11-13 and 15; Rollo,
pp. 38-40 and 42; TSN, 2 February 1989, pp. 6-11.

^[7]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 16; Rollo, p.
60.

^[8]
People v. Fabian, 204 SCRA 730, 739 (1991); People v. Adap, 189
SCRA 413, 422-423 (1990).

^[9]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 22-25; Rollo, p. 60.

^[10]
TSN, 3 August 1987, p. 20.

^[11]
TSN, 17 October 1989, p. 212.

^[12]
TSN, 2 February 1989, p. 231; TSN, 17 October 1988, p. 212.

^[13]
Id.

^[14]
Decision, p. 24; Rollo, p. 51.

^[15]
People v. Sanchez, 173 SCRA 305, 311-312 (1989).

^[16]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 19-21; Rollo, p. 60.

^[17]
TSN, 3 August 1987, pp. 9-15; TSN, 1 October 1987, pp. 4-5.

^[18]
See People v. Borja 182 SCRA 581, 589-590 (1990).

^[19]
TSN, 26 May 1987, pp. 10-17 and 19-24; TSN, 24 July 1987, pp. 88-94 and 100-105.

^[20]
People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 94472, 3 March 1992, pp. 5-6.

^[21]
People v. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278, 283-284 (1991). See also People v. Lati, 184 SCRA
336, 343-345 (1990).

^[22]
People v. De Guzman, 199 SCRA 35, 38 (1991); People v. Ortiz, 191
SCRA 836, 839 (1990).

^[23]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 21-22; Rollo, p. 60.

^[24]
People v. Borja at p. 587; People v. Sanchez, at p. 312.

^[25]
Rule 113, Section 5[a]; People v. De los Santos, 200 SCRA 431, 438
(1991).

^[26]
See People v. Blas, G.R. No. 97930, 27 May 1992, pp. 11-12.

^[27]
TSN, 2 February 1989, pp. 242 and 245.

^[28]
People v. Ortiz at p. 840.

^[29]
Rule 126, Section 12; People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376, 386 (1990);
Chimel v. State of California 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

^[30]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 17-18 and 22; Rollo, p. 60.

^[31]Record,
p. 9.

^[32]Appellee’s
Brief, p. 10; Rollo, p.
92.

^[33]
TSN, 1 February 1988, p. 159; Record, p. 324.

^[34]People
v. De la Pena; 199 SCRA
28, 34 (1991); People v. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 601, 605 (1991).

^[35]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 24; Rollo, p. 60.

^[36]TSN,
28 May 1987, p. 53.

^[37]
R.A. 6425 as amended provides:

“SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions. If
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of the
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

x x x     x
x x     x x x

SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from twelve years and one day to twenty years and a fine
ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug except Indian hemp in regard to which the next following
paragraph shall apply.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand
to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
“authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.” (Underscoring supplied)

^[38]
Section 3, Rule 120; Sections 3[e] and 8, Rule 117; People v. Catan, 205
SCRA 235, 244-245 (1992). See also
People v. Peralta, 193 SCRA 916 (1991); People v. Bartulay, 192
SCRA 621, 630 (1990); Manuel v. Hon. Paño, 172 SCRA 225, 232-233 (1989).

^[39]
People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 94472, 3 March 1992, p. 8; People v.
Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237, 244 (1991).

^[40]
See People v. Conwi, Jr., 138 SCRA 405, 413 (1985); People v.
Medina, 59 Phil. 134, 138-139 (1933).

^[41]
Article 10, Revised Penal Code.

^[42]
Section 22, Article 4, R.A. 6425.