LORENZO S. MENDIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan in two (2) criminal
cases for violation of Sections 3(j) and 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He was sentenced to two (2) penalties, each of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as
maximum and perpetual disqualification from public office.

Petitioner was charged in two (2) separate informations. The first information, for violation of Section 3(j) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, read as follows:

“That on or about May 20, 1988 in Angono, Rizal, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer being then the Acting Building Official of Angono, Rizal, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully knowingly approve and grant Building
Permits for market stalls in favor of Zenaida Ortillada, Marlon Rosales and
Ruben Blanco who are not legally entitled to such permits, for the place or
location to where these permits were issued is already covered by a valid and
existing building permit previously issued by accused on March 12, 1987 in
favor of the municipality of Angono, Rizal.

Contrary to law.”

Section 3(j) of the statute includes
among the acts of public officers penalized thereunder the following:

“j. Knowingly
approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in
favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit, privilege or advantage, or a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.” (Under­scoring
supplied)

The second information, for violation of Section 3(e) of the same
statute, read:

“That on or about and during the period from June 15, 1988 up
to the present, in Angono, Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Acting Building Officer of Angono, Rizal, through evident bad faith in the
discharge of his official administrative functions, did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully refuse to issue partial occupancy certificates to the awardees
of Phase II of the Angono Public Market despite the readiness of the facilities
of the building for use as constructed, thereby causing undue injury to the
awardees/market vendors who can not engage in their business.

Contrary to law.”

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, renders criminal the act of a public officer of

“e.     Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.” (Underscoring supplied)

The two (2) charges instituted against petitioner may be quickly
described as follows:

a.       issuing
“building permits for market stalls” in favor of three (3) persons
who are allegedly not legally entitled to such permits; and

b.       refusing to issue
certificates of partial occupancy to awardees of market stalls in Phase II of
the Angono Public Market although said Phase II market was allegedly ready for
use.

The basic facts are not disputed.

Sometime in 1983, the old public market of Angono, Rizal was
razed to the ground by fire.

In 1984, the former stallholders of the old public market were issued temporary
business permits and allowed to erect and construct temporary market stalls on
the public grounds where the old market used to stand. These grounds together with the temporary
market stalls are known as Angono Public Market, Phase I (hereinafter
“APM-Phase I”). Among the
stallholders of APM-Phase I granted business permits were Zenaida Ortillada,
Marlon Rosales and Ruben Blanco, Ortillada and Rosales were relatives, while
Blanco was a friend, of petitioner Mendiola.

After the February 1986 change of government, and more
specifically in January 1987, the Angono Municipal Council headed by
Officer-in-Charge (“OIC”) Nemesio Miranda, Sr., enacted Resolution
No. 7-1987, dated 20 January 1987, authorizing the construction of Angono
Public Market Phase II (hereinafter “APM-Phase II”) on a vacant lot
owned by the Municipality of Angono, adjacent to APM-Phase I. The construction of APM-Phase II was to be financed by a novel scheme: a contract was entered into between (a) a
building contractor (Jose Capistrano),
(b) a Construction Committee
representing the stall awardees of APM-Phase II approximately 157 in number
selected by some mode not
revealed in the record, and (c) OIC Miranda, Sr., signing on behalf of the
Municipality of Angono,
stipulating that each awardee would pay the contractor the sum of P20,000.00
for the construction of APM-Phase II,
which sum was to be
considered as advance stall
rentals to the Municipality for a period of twenty (20) years. The market building would belong to the
Municipality upon turnover at completion by contractor. Notably, no public bidding for the
construction of the new market building was contemplated or provided for in the
scheme.

Petitioner Lorenzo S. Mendiola was Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator and Civil Registrar of Angono. Being a
Civil Engineer, he was concurrently designated as Building Official of
Angono as well as other adjacent towns of
Rizal Province. On 12 March
1987, petitioner issued Building Permit No. 2987 to the Municipality of Angono,
relating to the construction of APM-Phase II. At the time of issuing this building permit, petitioner noted on the
construction blue-print of APM-Phase II that the proposed building would
encroach at several points upon existing stalls comprising part of APM-Phase I;
petitioner Mendiola encircled these points on the blue-print and required that
the construction plan be corrected to eliminate the encroachment. The Phase I market stalls encroached upon in
the building plan of APM-Phase II, were the market stalls of Zenaida Ortillada,
Marlon Rosales and Ruben Blanco.

Conflict between the stallholders of APM-Phase I and the
APM-Phase II awardees quickly erupted and escalated. The APM-Phase I stallholders who possibly did not have P20,000.00
each, and who had to make do with temporary stalls, demanded preference in the
award or occupancy of stalls in APM-Phase II. The APM-Phase I stallholders, acting under the name of “Samahang Nagkakaisa sa Pamilihang
Bayan ng Angono” (“Samahan“) brought suit on
13 March 1987 (Civil Case No. 0229-B) against OIC Miranda, Sr., the contractor
and APM-Phase II awardees, before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Rizal, seeking, among other things, a writ of preliminary injunction to stop
the construction of the new building. When the Regional Trial Court Judge denied the application for
preliminary injunction, the Samahan went on petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 12358) assailing the trial
court’s order denying preliminary injunction.

Meantime, on 17 June 1987, the OIC Municipal Council of Angono enacted
Resolution No. 42-1987, cancelling the stallholders’ permits of Zenaida
Ortillada and Marlon Rosales upon the grounds that: 1. Zenaida Ortillada and
Marlon Rosales were “dummies” of their mothers; and 2. the stalls of the two (2) were obstructing
the completion of the new building. On
14 July 1987, OIC Miranda, Sr., instructed the contractor in writing to
demolish the stalls of Zenaida Ortillada and Marlon Rosales. Thus, for reasons not apparent on the
record, the construction plans conditionally approved by petitioner Mendiola
were never corrected to eliminate the encroachments on existing APM-Phase I
stalls.

The February 1988 local elections resulted in the election and
installation of a new set of local officials in Angono, headed by Mayor Vivencio
Villamayor. The newly elected Municipal
Council promptly assailed the legality of Resolution No. 7-1987 before the
Provincial Board of Rizal. On 12 May
1988, the Rizal Provincial Board enacted its Resolution No. 88-71 directing the
Municipal Council of Angono to hold in abeyance the implementation of
Resolution No. 7-1987, pending review of that Resolution pursuant to B.P. Blg.
337, the old Local Government Code, and “until further notice by the
[Provincial Board] of Rizal.”

On 3 May 1988, the contractor of APM-Phase II, with the aid of
the military, demolished the market stalls of Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco,
ostensibly under the authority of Resolution No. 42-1987 of the Angono
Municipal Council and the written instructions of OIC Miranda, Sr. issued ten
(10) months earlier directing demolition of the market stalls of Ortillada and
Rosales. The demolition of all three
(3) stalls was carried out without prior hearing or a court order and without a
demolition permit from petitioner building official. The market stall of Blanco which, like the stalls of Ortillada
and Rosales, was physically in the way of the new building, was demolished without even being
mentioned in Resolution No. 42-1987 and the written instructions of Miranda,
Sr.

After the demolition of their Phase I market stalls, Ortillada,
Rosales and Blanco applied for authority to renovate their demolished market
stalls. On 20 May 1988, petitioner
issued temporary renovation building permits to the three (3), subject to the
condition set forth in an accompanying letter of the petitioner, that should
the courts or proper higher authority stop the applicants from renovating or
reconstructing the temporary market stalls, the renovation building permits so
issued would thereupon become ineffective.

Because of the demolition of the Phase I stalls and because the
APM-Phase II contractor insisted upon continuing with the construction of the
new building, which continuation was opposed by the new set of municipal
officials, the Samahan (Phase I vendors) commenced another
action before the Binangonan Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 0349-B)
against the contractor and APM-Phase II awardees-vendors, seeking to stop them
from proceeding with the construction of APM-Phase II. In a countersuit (Civil Case No. 0351-B)
before the same court, the contractor and the APM-Phase II awardees-vendors
sought to restrain the Samahan from stopping the construction and
completion of APM-Phase II.

On 26 May 1988, the building contractor requested the District
Engineer of Rizal to inspect the new public market building which, it was
claimed, was 80% complete, and to issue certificates of partial occupancy. The written request was forwarded by the
District Engineer to the regional office of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (“DPWH”).

On 31 May 1988, the DPWH Regional Director wrote petitioner
Mendiola that the APM-Phase II awardees may be issued certificates of partial
occupancy, under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National Building
Code, “barring legal impediments” and “unless there
are valid grounds for withholding the [partial occupancy certificates].”^[1]
In another letter dated 9 June 1988, the Regional Director wrote petitioner
that “with the exception maybe of Certificate of Site Inspections which should be undertaken by this
office,” it appeared that, with the supporting documents presented by the
APM-Phase II awardees-vendors, there was sufficient basis for petitioner to
issue the requested certificate of partial occupancy. At the same time, however, the Regional Director was careful to
add that

“In the event, however, that there are still documents which
your Office may require the applicant [to submit], please inform the party
concerned [so] that the same may be submitted, if within their power to do
so.”^[2]

Moved by the Regional Director’s letters, petitioner wrote the
APM-Phase II awardees-vendors (represented by Roberto Villamayor) that the
documents they had submitted were incomplete and set out five (5) requirements,
still to be complied with, for issuance of the requested certificate.^[3]

Petitioner also, on 22 June 1988, wrote to Regional Director
Lagunilla that non-issuance of the certificates of partial occupancy was
grounded on:

(1) violation by the building contractor in
illegally demolishing market stalls in APM-Phase I without any demolition order
from the courts or the administrative authorities;

(2) the pendency of suits and counter-suits
before the courts regarding the construction of APM-Phase II; and

(3) refusal of the incumbent municipal
officials to accept partial turnover, which turnover was said to run
counter to the terms of Resolution No. 7-1987 and of the contract with the
building contractor.^[4]

On the same date, i.e., 22 June 1988, the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan issued a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Cases Nos. 0349-B
and 0351-B, enjoining the contractor and APM-Phase II awardees from continuing
with the construction of the new building and directing the parties to maintain
the status quo until the legality of Resolution No. 7-1987 was
reviewed by the Provincial Board of Rizal.

The Phase II awardees took two (2) courses of action: first, they applied for a certificate of partial occupancy
with the Municipal Council of Angono pursuant to the provisions of Resolution
No. 7-1987. However, on 12 July 1988,
the Municipal Council, by Resolution No. 082-1988, denied the application of
the Phase II awardees for a certificate of partial occupancy, citing in this
connection the terms of the contract of the Municipal Government with the
contractor and the Phase II awardees and the terms of Resolution No. 7-1987.

The second recourse of the Phase II awardees and the contractor
was to institute an administrative charge against petitioner and to appeal to
the Secretary of Public Works and Highways. In a decision dated 31 August 1988, the Secretary, DPWH, upheld the
position of the contractor and Phase II awardees and directed petitioner to
issue “the partial occupancy certificate of the completed portion of
Market Phase II, after their application has been processed and the fees paid
therefor.” The Secretary also held that the administrative complaint
against petitioner would be “treated in a separate decision after the
evidence on record [is] thoroughly evaluated.”^[5]

On 8 September, 1988, the Angono Municipal Council adopted its
Resolution No. 097-1988 warning the Phase II awardees from opening or doing
business at their stalls in the Phase II building, citing the provisions of the
contract with the contractor and the Rizal Provincial Board directive
suspending implementation of Angono Resolution No. 7-1987 Pending review of its
validity.

On 9 September 1988, petitioner Mendiola wrote the Secretary of
DPWH, through Undersecretary Jose F. Mabanta, stating his reasons why he had
been unable to issue a certificate of partial occupancy, viz.:

“1)  No bldg. inspection sheet duly signed &
accomplished by the contractor;

2)   Fire safety inspection certificate issued
without electrical permit;

3)   CEI [Certificate of Electrical Inspection]
not for the electrical permit of the completed portion of the building;

4)   Electrical permit & sanitary permit not
yet issued by our office due to questionable layout or plan.”^[6]

and at the same time citing, and
furnishing copies of, Resolutions Nos. 082-1988 and 097-1988 of the Angono
Municipal Council. Petitioner closed
with the plaintive request: “Will
you please furnish my office a direct written order regarding the matter.”

A few days later, petitioner once more wrote to the Secretary,
DPWH, furnishing a copy of a letter of Angono Mayor Vivencio Villamayor also
dated 12 September 1988, specifying grounds submitted by the Municipal
Government of Angono for reconsideration of the Secretary’s decision of 31
August 1988. Petitioner Mendiola stated
in his letter to the Secretary that he was in effect moving for reconsideration
of the Secretary’s decision of 31 August 1988 upon the grounds spelled out by
Mayor Villamayor.^[7]

Two (2) days later, however, Secretary Ferrer of DPWH issued an
order stating that petitioner Mendiola’s motion for reconsideration could not
be entertained because the Secretary’s order was “final” subject,
however, to review by the Office of the President.”^[8]

Accordingly, by a letter-petition
dated 17 October 1988, petitioner Mendiola asked the President of the
Philippines to review the decision of
the Secretary, DPWH, dated 31 August 1988.^[9]

On 29 November 1988, without the Office of the President having acted
on the petition for review pending before it, the two (2) informations in this
case were filed against petitioner Mendiola.

We turn to the two (2) charges instituted against petitioner
Mendiola and of which he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.

The Solicitor General has recommended in his Brief that the first
charge, i.e., issuing “building permits for market stalls” in favor
of three (3) persons who were allegedly not qualified for and not legally
entitled to such permits, should be dismissed and petitioner Mendiola’s
conviction thereof reversed and petitioner acquitted. The Solicitor General submits that when he issued the renovation
permits to Zenaida Ortillada, Marlon Rosales and Ruben Blanco, petitioner Mendiola
acted in good faith under “a mistake
of judgment.”

We agree with the Solicitor General on this point.

The information for violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, alleged that Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco were not legally
entitled to “building permits
for market stalls” for the reason that “the place or location to
where these permits were issued is already covered by a valid and existing building permit previously issued by
accused on March 12, 1987 in favor of the Municipality of Angono, Rizal.”
The evidence at the trial, however, showed — as noted earlier — that when
petitioner issued the building permit for the new or Phase II building, he
noted the encroachment of the proposed building upon the Phase I market stalls
of Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco and had precisely required that the building
plan be corrected. We understand this
act of the petitioner to mean that he had not approved the encroachments and thus the APM-Phase II building
permit he issued did not cover the space occupied by the Phase I stalls
of Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco. In
fact, the thrust of the prosecution during the trial was that Ortillada,
Rosales and Blanco were not legally entitled to the renovation permits issued
by petitioner Mendiola because their Phase I stallholder’s permits had been cancelled
by Resolution No. 42-1987 of the old or OIC Municipal Council. The basic difficulty with this position is
that the legality of such cancellation by the Municipal Council may be seen to be itself open to substantial
doubt. The Municipal Council’s Resolution
purporting to decree the cancellation of specified stallholders’ permits
without according due process to the identified permittees, partook of the
nature of a legislative or quasi-legislative act imposing a penalty without
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The mothers of Ortillada and Rosales were themselves registered Filipino
stallholders. The real reason for such
imposition of penalty by quasi-legislative fiat was, of course, the fact that
the Phase I stalls of the three (3) were obstructing the completion of the new
building, which building physically encroached upon the said stalls. But the lawfulness of the construction of
the APM-Phase II new building, as well as the validity of the enabling act,
Resolution No. 7-1987, were themselves subject to severe and continuing
controversy both in the courts and the session halls of the Municipal Council
of Angono and the Provincial Board of Rizal.

In respect of the first charge, the factors tending to show good
faith on the part of petitioner Mendiola include the following: Firstly, the permits issued by petitioner to
Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco upon their application were merely temporary
renovation permits that authorized the renovation of the stalls demolished by
the Phase II contractor. As pointed out
earlier, these renovation permits were qualified by the terms of an
accompanying transmittal letter issued by petitioner Mendiola stating that the
renovation permits would become ineffective should the courts or proper higher
authority restrain the three (3) permittees from renovating their makeshift
market stalls. Secondly, the three (3)
permittees were long-time stallholders, having been so at least since the fire
which had destroyed the old Angono Public Market. They were not strangers to the Angono Public Market, since they
were stallholders, with temporary stalls, in APM-Phase I. Thirdly, the three (3) permittees had
outstanding and paid-up municipal business permits when petitioner issued them
their stall renovation permits. Fourthly,
the permittees’ temporary stalls had been demolished without prior hearing or a
court order, or a demolition order from the authorized building official which
was petitioner Mendiola himself.

Thus, whether Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco were legally entitled
to the temporary renovation permits presented a substantial question of law and
it is well to recall that mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law
may be the basis of good faith.^[10]

There are other factors, environmental in nature, tending to show
good faith on the part of petitioner Mendiola which relate to Resolution No.
7-1987 of the Angono Municipal Council, the enabling Resolution which lay at
the heart of the boiling controversy between the Phase I stallholders and the
Phase II awardees. Firstly, as already
pointed out, the validity of Resolution No. 7-1987 was being litigated before
the courts. The record shows that there
were at least three (3) cases before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan
involving the validity or enforceability of Resolution No. 7-1987. What was brought up before the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari was an interlocutory order of the
trial court in one of the cases denying a preliminary writ of injunction
stopping the construction of the new building.

Secondly, the decision dated 31 August 1988 of the Secretary,
DPWH, was not really final since the applicable statute itself provided
for an appeal by way of a petition for review before the Office of the
President:

“Section 307. Appeal.

Within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of advice of the
non-issuance, suspension or revocation of permits, the applicant/permittee may
file an appeal with the Secretary who shall render his decision within fifteen
days from date of receipt of notice of appeal. The decision of the Secretary shall be final subject only to review
by the Office of the President.” (Underscoring Supplied)

As
noted, petitioner filed not only a motion for reconsideration with the
Secretary but also a petition
for review with the Office of the President. In these further proceedings, petitioner brought to the attention of the
Secretary, DPWH, and the Office of the President the position that had been
vigorously taken by the newly-elected Angono Mayor and Municipal Council. The elements of that position were the
following:

1) Resolution No. 082-1988 of the Angono Municipal Council denying
the application of the Phase II awardees for a certificate of partial
occupancy;

2) the terms of the
contract between the Angono Municipal Government, the contractor and the Phase
II awardees relating to the turnover of the new building upon completion
thereof. The newly elected municipal
officials insisted that turnover of the partially completed new building would
be disadvantageous to the Municipal Government and that in any case, the
Municipal Government had not accepted any partial turnover thereof; and

3) the Resolution of the
Provincial Board of Rizal instructing the Angono municipal officials to hold
the implementation of Resolution No. 7-1987 in abeyance until the Provincial
Board could review the validity and enforceability of that Resolution.^[11]

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, we believe
and so hold that all the above factors support the claim of good faith in
respect of both the first and second charges against petitioner Mendiola. The question of validity and enforceability
of Resolution No. 7-1987 was all pervasive and inevitably affected both the
entitlement of the three (3) Phase I stallholders to the temporary renovation
permits issued by petitioner Mendiola and the entitlement of the contractor and
Phase II awardees to a certificate of partial occupancy of the admittedly
incomplete new building. The facts or
events surrounding the first charge are so intertwined with those surrounding
the second charge as to render it very difficult to separate them, even
conceptually.

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, requires proof of
“manifest partiality” or “evident bad faith” or “gross
inexcusable negligence.” The information for violation of Section 3(e)
alleged only “evident bad faith.” We believe that, in the totality of
the circumstances of this case, the prosecution failed to show beyond
reasonable doubt the presence of any of these three (3)
elements. Indeed, it appears that the
prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of good faith to which
every public official, acting in discharge of his official duties, is
entitled. The petitioner, caught
between two (2) contending groups was constantly trying to specify in writing
the reasons for his acts. While one
need not agree with all his acts or stated reasons therefor or the wisdom thereof, one cannot say
that they were so obviously and palpably sham justifications for merely
arbitrary and capricious acts as to warrant a finding of “evident bad
faith.” No one has claimed that petitioner received any money for issuing
the renovation permits or refraining from issuing the demanded certificate(s)
of partial occupancy.

There is also substantial doubt whether the element of
“undue injury to any party” required in Section 3(e) was adequately
shown by the prosecution. The
respondent Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the circumstance that the
Phase II awardees had in fact entered and occupied their respective stalls in
the new building, without waiting for the certificate(s) of partial occupancy
which they demanded from petitioner Mendiola and without paying heed to
Resolution No. 097-1988 of the new Municipal Council warning them not to open up their stalls in the still incomplete new building.

The record strongly suggests that petitioner Mendiola had the
misfortune of getting caught in the middle of a heated controversy between two (2) local interest groups and
between the outgoing OIC municipal officials and the incoming newly elected set
of municipal officials. In the course
of requiring complete compliance with all formal and documentary requirements
for issuance of a certificate of occupancy or partial occupancy, he was charged
with violation of R.A. No. 3019 as amended, doubtless at the behest of the
Phase II awardees, the contractor and the old or OIC set of municipal
officials. Had he in fact issued the
demanded certificate(s) of partial occupancy, he in all probability would have been charged criminally by the Samahan of Phase I stallholders and the newly elected municipal
officials, probably under the same statutory
provisions. The Court of Appeals
decision did not pass upon the merits of the question of validity of Resolution
No. 7-1987; it merely assumed the validity of that Resolution which was
precisely being controverted before the trial court.^[12]
The DPWH Secretary did not pass upon the grounds relating
to Resolution No. 7-1987 urged in the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
Mendiola and the new Mayor.

Under these circumstances, the filing of the two (2) criminal
informations appears quite unfortunate. We note also that, so far as the record would show, petitioner Mendiola
was, curiously, the only person or public official criminally charged in
connection with the whole affair. That
the three (3) Phase I stallholders
on whose stalls the new building encroached happened to be relatives or friends
of petitioner, appears to us as essentially if not completely co-incidental;
the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that petitioner deliberately chose to
protect the interests of his relatives and friend and not the interests of the
general community appears bereft of basis and as speculative. The standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt was not met.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 7 September 1989 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 13172-13173 is hereby REVERSED and petitioner Lorenzo S. Mendiola is
hereby ACQUITTED in both cases. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Exhibit “L,” Folder of Exhibits.

^[2]
Exhibit “N,” id.

^[3]
Exhibit “O,” id. The five (5) requirements were:

“1. Certification
that the building is safe for occupancy duly signed and sealed by engineer who
made the plans and engineer in-charge of the construction.

2.   Building
inspection sheet, for phase by phase construction of building.

3.   As-built
plan and specifications signed and sealed jointly by the designing engineer and
engineer in-charge of construction and confirmed by the owner.

4.   Electrical
and sanitary permit issued by our office.

5.   Also,
will you clear the data on the certificate of completion: who is the owner and signature of the
owner? contractor’s license
certificate; fill-up the blank space?”

^[4]
Exhibit “P,” Folder of
Exhibits.

^[5]
Exhibit “S,” id.

^[6]
Exhibit “15,” id.

^[7]
Exhibit “X,” id.

^[8]
Exhibit “Z,” id.

^[9]
Exhibit “16,” id.

^[10]
Article 526, Civil Code; Kasilag v.
Rodriguez, 69 Phil. 217 (1939); Cosio, et al. v. Palileo, 17 SCRA
196 (1966).

See also Cabungcal v.
Cordova (11 SCRA 584 [1964]), where the Court held
that an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an
ordinance by a city mayor does not amount to bad faith that would entitle an
aggrieved party to damages against that official. See further Mabutol
v. Pascual (124
SCRA 867 [1983]), which stressed that public officials are not liable
for damages in the discharge of their official functions, absent bad faith;
also, San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno (21 SCRA 292 [1967]). In Sanders v.
Veridiano II (162
SCRA 88 [1988]), the Court held that under
the law of public officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are
protected by the presumption of good faith, and that even mistakes committed by
such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they
were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

^[11]
Letter dated 12 September 1988 of Mayor
Vivencio B. Villamayor to petitioner Mendiola, copy furnished Secretary J.N.
Ferrer, DPWH, Exhibit “Y,” Folder of Exhibits.

^[12]
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 9 May 1988 in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
12358, directed “the incumbent public local officials” to
“implement Kapasyahan Blg. 7-1987. The respondent judge may now
proceed with the trial on the merits, if he has not done so.” However,
after promulgation of the Court of Appeals’ Decision, the Regional Trial Court
of Binangonan in a separate case (i.e., Civil Cases Nos. 0349-B and 0351-B) issued on 22 June 1988, as noted supra page 10, a writ of
preliminary injunction stopping the construction of the new building and
directing the parties to maintain the status quo pending review of the
validity of Resolution No. 7-1987 by the Rizal Provincial Board. Petitioner Mendiola was impleaded in Civil
Case No. 0351-B. He was apparently not
impleaded in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 12358.