G.R. Nos. 87266-69. July 30, 1990
ASSOCIATED WORKERS UNION-PTGWO, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (EN BANC), METRO PORT SERVICE, INC., MARINA PORT SERVICES, INC., ADRIANO S. YUMUL AND 10…
FELICIANO, J.:
These cases have been unusually difficult for the Court, not
because the issues posed are in themselves intellectually demanding, but
because of problems generated by the procedure adopted by the parties in coming
before this Court. The incidents subject
of these cases spawned multiple cases and petitions before the National Labor
Relations Commission (“NLRC”).
After the NLRC rendered a consolidated decision, the parties, in turn,
filed multiple separate certiorari petitions to the Court — on a
staggered and piecemeal basis. This
situation resulted in a number of discrete discussions of issues actually
inter-related, since the Court, at any one time, could only see a small part of
the whole picture and decide only on the basis of what it could see. In what follows, we have tried to put the
whole picture together and to render comprehensive and substantial justice to
all the parties.
On 26 October 1984, petitioner Associated Workers Union
(“AWU”) – PTGWO, the then bargaining representative of the
dockworkers at South Harbor, Port Area, Manila, filed a Notice of Strike
against respondent Metro Port Service, Inc. (“Metro”), the then arrastre contractor in the South Harbor, on the issues,
among others, of unfilled vacancies and union busting. This was docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-NS-10-288-84.
On 3 April 1985,
the abovementioned case was certified in an Order by the then Minister of Labor
and Employment to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration; the Order also forbade
the holding of strikes or lockouts.[1]
The case was docketed as Certified NLRC Case No. 0403-85. In the latter case, one of the demands raised
by AWU was that Metro terminate the employment of
respondents Adriano Yumul and ten (10) others
(individual respondents), for having organized, on 26 October 1984, the Associated Workers Union in
Metroport (“AWUM”) among the rank-and-file
employees of Metro, ostensibly as a local or chapter of AWU. AWU had earlier expelled individual
respondents from membership in AWU for disloyalty and, pursuant to the
closed-shop provision of the existing AWU-Metro collective bargaining agreement
(“CHA”), sought the termination of their employment.
Metro initially resisted AWU’s request
to terminate the employment of individual respondents, contending that the
termination would be premature as individual respondents had not been afforded
due process, and that the termination would be violative
of the status quo agreement in NLRC Case No. NCR-NS-10-288-84.[2]
Metro, however, eventually relented and suspended individual respondents after
AWU — despite the express prohibition in the Order dated 3 April 1985 — staged a strike against it. On 18
April 1985, Metro executed a Compromise Agreement
(“Agreement”) with AWU to end the strike, item No. 2 of which
stipulated:
“At the instance of the union, [Metro] agrees to preventively
suspend (individual respondents] effective immediately.”[3]
The Agreement was attested to by then
Deputy Labor Minister Carmelo Noriel.
As a result of Metro’s implementation of the Agreement,
individual respondents on 30 April
1985 filed a complaint against Metro, docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1372-85. Metro
in that case filed in turn a third-party complaint against AWU and its
officers.
Metro in April 1985 also filed a complaint for illegal strike
with damages against AWU and its officers, docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1341-85. On 21 June 1985, Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana in an Order
directed Metro provisionally to reinstate individual respondents pending
resolution of the issues raised therein, with which Order Metro complied.
On 15 July 1985,
AWU filed a petition for injunction against Metro, docketed as NLRC Injunction
Case No. 993, praying for issuance of a temporary restraining order stopping
the implementation of the Order of provisional reinstatement, and for Metro’s
compliance with the Agreement providing for the suspension of individual respondents. On 1
August 1985, the NLRC in an En Banc Resolution
directed Metro to comply with the Agreement, and Metro complied and
re-suspended individual respondents.
Individual respondents’ petition before the NLRC for preliminary
mandatory injunction on 30 August 1985, praying “that pursuant to the
Implementing Rules of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, [Metro] be ordered to pay their salaries and
allowances from and after their initial preventive suspension of thirty (30)
days and until their actual reinstatement,” was not acted upon.
All the above-mentioned cases, to wit: (a) Certified NLRC Case No. 0403-85 (NCR No. NS-10-288-84); (b) NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1341-85;
(c) NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1372-85; and (d) NLRC Injunction Case No. 993, were ordered consolidated before the NLRC en banc.
On 4 September 1986,
the NLRC rendered a consolidated Decision.
In Certified NLRC Case No. 0403-85, the NLRC ruled that: (a) respondent Metro cannot be compelled to
fill up vacancies with AWU’s recommendees;
(b) respondent Metro cannot be held liable for union busting, the issue of the
medically impaired workers having become moot and academic; and (c) the
compulsory retirement of AWU’s members who have
reached the age of 60 years is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
In NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1372-85, the
NLRC, finding that AWU was a national union, and that individual respondents
have the right to organize themselves into a local chapter thereof, the
formation of which was a protected activity and could not be considered as
disloyalty, held the suspension or dismissal of individual respondents as
illegal and, in relation to NLRC Injunction Case No. 993, ordered their
reinstatement with backwages, to be paid solidarily by AWU and respondent Metro.
In NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1341-85, the NLRC
found the strike staged by AWU not illegal, holding that AWU was of the belief,
although erroneously, that it could validly stage a strike during the pendency of its motion for reconsideration of the
Minister’s Order dated 3 April 1985
enjoining a strike or lockout.
Both AWU and Metro filed separate motions for reconsideration of
the consolidated Decision.
Meanwhile, on 21 July
1986, petitioner Marina Port Services, Inc. (“Marina”),
by virtue of a Special Permit issued by the Philippine Ports Authority, started
operations as the arrastre operator at the Manila
South Harbor
vice Metro. On November 1986, individual
respondents in a Motion/Manifestation prayed that Marina
be included as party-respondent.
On 27 July 1987, the NLRC in a Resolution denied AWU’s and Metro’s motions for reconsideration of the
consolidated Decision dated 4 September 1986, but (acting on individual
respondents’ Motion/Manifestation) with the modification limiting Metro’s
liability for backwages to wages accruing up to July
20, 1986 and ordering Marina to reinstate individual respondents
with backwages and allowances starting from 21
July 1986. Marina
complied with the Resolution by reinstating individual respondents through its
payroll retroactive to 21 July 1986.
AWU thereafter in G.R. Nos. 87266-69 filed with the Court a
Petition for Certiorari on 14
March 1989 praying for the reversal of the decision of the NLRC in
NLRC Case No. NCR-NS-10-288-84 and NLRC Injunction Case No. 993 (praying
principally for reversal of the order holding that respondent Metro could not
be compelled to fill up vacancies with AWU’s recommendees) and in NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1372-85 (praying
chiefly for reversal of the order reinstating the eleven [11] private
respondents to their former positions with backwages
payable solidarily by AWU and respondent Metro). These cases (G.R. Nos. 87266-69) were
assigned to the Third Division of the Court.
Marina, meantime, had gone to the Court on certiorari on
14 June 1988 in G.R. Nos. 81256-59 (entitled “Marina Port Services, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, Metro Port Service, Inc, Associated
Workers Union [AWU-PTGWO], and Associated Workers Union in Metro Port
[AWUM]”) protesting, on grounds of alleged denial of due process, its
inclusion by the NLRC as a party in NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1372-85 and its being
required to reinstate individual respondents with backwages. In dismissing these cases (G.R. Nos.
81256-59) on 3 August 1988,
the Court held that:
“x x x
[t]he decision to include Marina in
the questioned [NLRC Resolution dated 17
July 1987] is based on Par. ‘7’ of the Special Permit granted to Marina
which states that ‘Labor and personnel of previous operator, except those
positions of trust and confidence, shall be absorbed by the grantee.’ Besides,
the petitioner was able to file not only a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Questioned Resolution but also a Motion to Set Aside Motion/ Manifestation and
Remarks on the Comment of Metro Port.
The lack of due process at the beginning, if any, was cured by the above
motions that the petitioner was able to file.”[4]
On 13 April 1988,
Metro in G.R. No. 82705 (entitled “Metro Port
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Associated Workers
Union-PTGWO, Marina Port Services, Inc., and Adriano Yumul
[and 10 others]”) went to this Court again and assailed the NLRC ruling in NLRC
Case No. NCR-4-1372-85 and NLRC Injunction Case No. 993, Metro claimed that it
should not have been held solidary liable with AWU
because it had merely suspended individual respondents pursuant to the
Agreement dated 18 April 1985 it had executed with AWU and, later, had merely
obeyed the Resolution of the NLRC dated 1 August 1985 ordering Metro to
re-suspend individual respondents. In
similarly dismissing Metro’s petition, the Court in G.R. No. 82705, held:
“x x x
Considering that the petitioner was a party to the compromise agreement with
AWU which provided that ‘at the instance of the union, the company agrees to
preventively suspend Adriano S. Yumul and eleven
associates effective immediately’ and accordingly suspended the private
respondents despite the suspension being contrary to law, the petitioner should
be made solidarily liable with AWU for the backwages and allowances that the private respondents may
have been entitled to during their suspension. The petitioner’s liability, however, should
not extend to the time that respondent NLRC ordered it to re-suspend the
private respondents.”[5]
(Underscoring supplied)
Judgment was entered in G.R. Nos. 81256-59 and G.R. No. 82705 on 23 September 1988 and 4 July 1989, respectively, and the
cases were remanded to the Labor Arbiter of origin for execution.
On 18 September 1989,
the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution against Marina
to reinstate individual respondents and to pay them the amount of P154,357.00 representing salary adjustments. Marina
moved to quash the writ of execution questioning the award of P154,357.00, but without success. Marina
thereafter appealed to the NLRC assailing the Labor Arbiter’s refusal to quash
the writ of execution.
On 23 November 1989, Marina received an Order from the Executive
Labor Arbiter dated 15 November 1989, requiring the release of any garnished
deposit from its bank, holding that no seasonable appeal from the 7 November
1989 Order denying Marina’s motion to quash had been taken. Marina
filed a Manifestation dated 23
November 1989, arguing that it had filed an appeal with the NLRC
within the 10-day reglementary period.
On 6 December 1989, the Executive Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution requiring Marina: (a) to
reinstate individual respondents and to pay them the amount of P154,357.00
representing salary adjustments; and (b) to implement and honor the legality of
the organization and registration of AWUM as the local chapter of AWU. Marina then once more went to the Court in
G.R. Nos. 91223-26 and filed a Petition for Certiorari to invalidate the
writ of execution, pleading that: (a)
execution had been ordered without due regard for its right of appeal from the
Labor Arbiter’s Order; and (b) execution would result in its being made to pay
more than what is called for by the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 82705,
where the Court affirmed the NLRC ruling that Marina “should be made solidarily liable with AWU for the backwages
and allowances that the private respondents may have been entitled to during
their suspension [although liability] should not extend to the time that
respondent NLRC ordered it to re-suspend the private respondents.”
These cases (G.R. Nos. 91223-26) were assigned to the First Division of the
Court. On 20 December 1989, a temporary restraining order was
issued by the First Division of the Court to enjoin the implementation of the
Executive Labor Arbiter’s Order of 6
December 1989.
On 16 April 1990,
G.R. Nos. 91223-26 were consolidated with G.R. Nos.
87266-69.
I
1. Deliberating on the
instant Petition for Certiorari, the Court in G.R. Nos. 87266-69
considers that petitioner AWU has failed to show grave abuse of discretion or
any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in
Certified NLRC Case No. 0403-85 (NCR No. NS-10-288-84). The NLRC was correct there in holding that
respondent Metro cannot be compelled to fill up vacancies with AWU’s recommendees, as the CBA
between AWU and respondent Metro granted the latter the right to “fill or
not to fill-up vacancies”; that the issue of the medically impaired
employees had already been raised in another Notice of Strike filed by AWU
against respondent Metro on 16 September 1985, and both parties had agreed to
abide by the recommendation and decision of an examining physician selected by
them; and that the existing CBA grants respondent Metro the right to
compulsorily retire any member of AWU who had reached 60 years of age, which
right has been exercised by Metro.
2. The NLRC, however, misappreciated the relevant facts in NLRC Case No.
NCR-4-1372-85 and NLRC Injunction Case No. 993.
While it is true that AWUM as a local union, being an entity separate
and distinct from AWU, is free to serve the interest of all its members and
enjoys the freedom to disaffiliate, such right to disaffiliate may be
exercised, and is thus considered a protected labor activity, only when
warranted by circumstances. Generally,
a labor union may disaffiliate from the mother union to form a local or
independent union only during the 60-day freedom period immediately
preceding the expiration of the CBA.[6]
Even before the onset of the freedom period (and despite the closed-shop
provision in the CBA between the mother union and management) disaffiliation
may still be carried out, but such disaffiliation must be effected by a
majority of the members in the bargaining unit.[7]
This happens when there is a substantial shift in allegiance on the part of the
majority of the members of the union. In
such a case, however, the CBA continues to bind the members of the new or
disaffiliated and independent union up to the CBA’s
expiration date.[8]
The record does not show that individual respondents had
disaffiliated during the freedom period.
The record does, however, show that only eleven (11) members of AWU
(individual respondents) had decided to disaffiliate from AWU and form AWUM. Respondent Metro had about 4,000 employees,
and around 2,000 of these were members of AWU.[9]
It is evident that individual respondents had failed to muster the necessary
majority in order to justify their disaffiliation. (In fact, it was only on 5 December 1985 that individual respondents were
finally able to register an independent union called Metroport
Workers Union [MWU].[10]
Even then, in the absence of allegation by AWUM [MWU] of the exact number of
its members, the Court presumes that only twenty percent [20%] of the employees
of Metro had joined MWU.[11])
Thus, in the referendum held on 7
January 1985 at the PTGWO compound (where representatives of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment were present) to determine whether individual
respondents should be expelled from AWU, 1,229 members (out of 1,695 members
present) voted for expulsion of individual respondents.[12]
The individual respondents here have failed to present proof of
their allegation that the 1,695 members of AWU were not employees of respondent
Metro alone; the Court therefore presumes that those who voted for their
expulsion were bona fide employees of respondent Metro. Moreover, individual respondents failed to
allege that their expulsion for disloyalty violated AWU’s
constitution and by-laws.[13]
In sum, the attempted disaffiliation of the eleven (11) private respondents
from the petitioner mother union and the effort to organize either a new local
of the mother union or an entirely new and separate union, did not, under the
circumstances of this case, constitute protected activities of the eleven (11)
individual respondents.
II
In view of the conclusion reached above in G.R. Nos. 87266-69,
i.e., that AWU was justified in expelling from its membership the eleven (11)
individual respondents, the question now arises: how and to what extent does such conclusion
affect the liability of Metro, and Marina (as successor-employer)? It will be recalled that the Resolutions of
this Court in G.R. Nos. 81256-59 and 82705 dismissing the Petitions for Certiorari
of both Metro and Marina assailing the NLRC consolidated Decision of 4
September 1986 insofar as their (Metro’s and Marina’s) liability for
reinstatement and backwages of the individual
respondents thereunder is concerned, became final and
judgment entered therein, sometime ago.
1. So far as concerns AWU’s liability
under the NLRC consolidated Decision, it should in the first place be pointed
out that the Court did not make any pronouncement either in G.R. Nos. 81256-59
or in G.R. No. 82705 concerning AWU’s
liability. In G.R. No. 82705, the Court
merely acted on the issue raised by petitioner Metro: that Metro should not be liable at all for
reinstatement and backwages considering that Metro
was only pressed into suspending individual respondents because of AWU’s threat to strike.
In dismissing Metro’s Petition, the Court in G.R. No. 82705 in effect
merely held that Metro, whatever the liability of AWU might be in respect of
the expulsion of individual respondents, could not escape liability by throwing
all responsibility upon AWU; and that Metro could not validly plead that it was
under duress when it executed the Agreement with AWU providing for, among other
things, the preventive suspension of individual respondents.
The Court is, of course, aware that AWU was a party-respondent in
both G.R. Nos. 81256-59 and 82705, and that AWU had in fact filed a Comment in
both G.R. Nos. 81256-59 and 82705.
Nonetheless, the Court did not either in G.R. Nos. 82156-59 or in G.R.
No. 82705 in fact make a determination of the
legality of AWU’s expulsion of individual respondents
from its membership. The Court in G.R.
No. 82705 held only that the liability of Metro was solidary
in nature, i.e., solidary with AWU, whatever AWU’s liability might be; and it may be well to recall that
solidary liability is different from secondary
liability. In G.R. Nos. 81256-59, the
Court simply held that Marina was
properly impleaded in the underlying cases and could
not be absolved from responsibility for reinstatement and backwages
upon the ground of denial of due process.
2. Thus, so far as
concerns the liability of Metro and Marina
for reinstatement with backwages of individual
respondents under the consolidated NLRC Decision, the preeminent fact is that
the Court’s Resolutions in G.R. Nos. 81256-59 and 82705 dismissing their
Petitions are already final. The
liabilities of Metro and Marina for
reinstatement and backwages under the consolidated
NLRC Decision have become fixed and definite, with the modification decreed by
the Court in G.R. No. 82705 in so far as backwages
were concerned. Thus, the conclusion we
today have reached in G.R. Nos. 87266-69 cannot benefit Metro and Marina
and will not dissolve their already fixed and definite liabilities.
3. Turning to the question
of the backwages due to the eleven (11) individual
respondents, three (3) different time periods are relevant here and must be
distinguished from one another:
First Period: From 18 April 1985 to 21 June 1985: the Compromise Agreement between Metro and
AWU to end the strike, in which Metro agreed to preventively suspend the eleven
(11) individual respondents, was effected on 18 April 1985 and implemented
immediately. The Labor Arbiter on 21 June 1985 ordered Metro to
reinstate provisionally the eleven (11) individual respondents and Metro
complied.
Second Period: From 1 August 1985 up to 27 July 1987: the NLRC, pursuant to the urging of AWU,
ordered Metro to re-suspend the individual respondents on 1 August 1985 and
Metro again complied with this Order.
Approximately two (2) years later, on 27 July 1987, NLRC ordered Metro/Marina to reinstate the
individual respondents and Marina
complied by reinstating the individual respondents on the payroll, i.e., paying
their salaries although they were not allowed to work on their jobs.
Third Period: From 28 July 1987 to 18 September 1989: on 18
September 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued the questioned writ of
execution ordering, among other things, Marina
to reinstate formally the individual respondents.
Under the consolidated NLRC Decision, Metro/Marina are liable for the backwages
accruing during the First and Third Periods above indicated. In respect of the Second Period, however, the
Court in G.R. No. 82705, as already pointed out earlier, held that Metro/Marina
should not be held liable for backwages accruing
during that period. Strictly speaking,
in view of our conclusion above that AWU was justified in expelling individual
respondents from its membership, neither AWU nor Metro/Marina would be liable
to individual respondents for the backwages accruing
during this Second Period.
4. In the interest of
substantial and expeditious justice, however, we believe that the backwages accruing during the Second Period should be paid
and shared by AWU and by Metro/Marina, on a 50-50 basis. We here establish this equitable allocation
of ultimate responsibility in order to forestall further litigation between AWU
and Metro/Marina and individual respondents in respect of claims and countering
claims for payment or reimbursement or contribution and to put a definite end
to this prolonged and costly confrontation among the several parties.
The equitable considerations which impel us to hold AWU liable
for one-half (1/2) of the backwages during the Second
Period include:
(a)
the fact that Metro had been reluctant to comply
with the demand of AWU to terminate the services of individual respondents and
had wanted to give the latter procedural due process, but gave in to the
demands of AWU;
(b)
that AWU had pressed Metro very hard and indeed
went on strike against Metro when Metro refused simply to terminate the
services of the individual respondents;
(c)
that AWU, instead of
waiting for final judicial determination of the legality of its expulsion of
individual respondents, chose to importune the NLRC to issue the order requiring
the re-suspension of the individual respondents on 1 August 1985, with which order Metro eventually complied.
5. Turning to
Metro/Marina, we note that, apart from the finality of the Court’s Resolutions
in G.R. Nos. 81256-59 and 82705, there is independent basis for holding
Metro/Marina responsible for reinstatement with backwages
accruing throughout the three (3) periods above indicated. The equitable considerations which lead us to
hold Metro/Marina responsible for one-half (1/2) of the backwages
accruing during the above Second Period relate to the failure of Metro to
accord individual respondents procedural due process by giving them reasonable
opportunity to explain their side before suspending or dismissing them. Such dismissal was accordingly in violation
of the Labor Code.13 Notwithstanding AWU’s closed-shop clause in the CBA, Metro was bound to
conduct its own inquiry to determine the existence of substantial basis for
terminating the employment of individual respondents.[14]
That AWU, disregarding the Minister of Labor and Employment’s express order,
had threatened to go on strike, and indeed actually went on strike, if Metro
had continued with the services of individual respondents, did not
relieve Metro from the duty to accord procedural due process to individual respondents.[15]
6. The portion of the Writ
of Execution issued by the Executive Labor Arbiter requiring Marina to pay
salary differentials in the total amount of P154,357.00
accruing during the period from 20 July 1986 up to October 1989, should be
modified to conform with the above legal and equitable allocation of liability
for the backwages which had accrued during the three
(3) Periods above mentioned during which the individual respondents were
suspended. The salary differentials, as
we understand it, refer to increases in the prevailing wages accruing partly
during the Second Period and partly during the Third Period as above
indicated. In other words, the salary
differentials accruing from 20 July 1986 up to 27 July 1987 should be borne on
a 50-50 basis by AWU on the one hand and Metro/Marina on the other. The salary differentials accruing from 28 July 1987 up to 18 September 1989 shall be borne
exclusively by Marina.
7. The portion of the Writ
of Execution issued by the Executive Labor Arbiter which requires Marina
to recognize the legality of the organization and registration of AWUM (now
MWU) as a local chapter of AWU, is inconsistent with
the conclusions we have set forth in Part I above, and must be deleted. What was in fact eventually established by
individual respondents was a separate, independent union called Metro Port
Workers Union (MWU) which was not entitled, during the time periods here
relevant, to recognition as the bargaining unit in CBA negotiations.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved:
In G.R. Nos. 87266-69:
(a) to DISMISS the Petition
for Certiorari in respect of Certified NLRC Case No. 0403-855
(NCR-NS-10-288-84) for lack of merit; and
(b) to
GRANT partially the Petition for Certiorari in respect of NLRC Case No.
NCR-4-1372-85 and NLRC Injunction Case No. 993.
The consolidated Decision of the NLRC dated 4 September 1986 ordering
AWU and Marina to pay solidarily the backwages of individual respondents, as well as the NLRC
Resolution of 27 July 1987 denying AWU’s and Metro’s
Motions for Reconsideration, are hereby MODIFIED so as to require AWU and
Metro/Marina to pay, on a 50-50 basis, to individual respondents the backwages which accrued during the Second Period, i.e.,
from 1 August 1985 up to 27 July 1987.
In G.R. Nos. 91223-26:
to GRANT
partially the Petition. The Order of the
Executive Labor Arbiter dated 6 December 1989 is hereby MODIFIED so as (a) to
require AWU and Metro/Marina on a 50-50 basis to pay the salary differentials
accruing during the period from 20 July 1986 up to 27 July 1987, and Marina
alone to pay the salary differentials accruing from 28 July 1987 up to 31
October 1989, and so as (b) to delete the portion requiring Marina to recognize
AWUM (MWU) as the local chapter of AWU.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 20 December 1989 is hereby LIFTED so
as to permit enforcement of the Order of the Executive Labor Arbiter as herein
modified.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p.
4, in G.R. No. 82705.
[2] Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo,
p. 114, in G.R. No. 82705.
[3] Rollo, p.
5, in G.R. No. 82705.
[4] Rollo, p.
105, in G.R. Nos. 81256-59.
[5] Rollo, p.
198, G.R. No. 82705.
[6] Tanduay
Distillery Labor Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,
149 SCRA 470 (1987).
[7]
People’s Industrial and Commercial Employees’ and Workers’ Organization (FFW) v.
People’s Industrial and Commercial Corporation, 112 SCRA 440 (1982); Volkschel Labor Union v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 42 (1985).
[8] See Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v.
BCI Employees & Workers Union-PAFLU, 23 SCRA 465 (1968); Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Noriel, 80 SCRA 682 (1977).
[9] Record on Appeal, NLRC Case No. NCR-4-1341-85,
p 40.
[10] Rollo, p.
113, in G.R. Nos. 91223-26.
[11] Article 234, Labor Code.
[12] Record on Appeal, NLRC Case No. NCR-NS-10-288-84, p. 64.
[13] Lirag Textile
Mills, Inc. v. Blanco, et al., 109 SCRA 87 (1981).
13 Article 278 of the Labor Code, as amended by B.P. Blg. 130, provides:
“x x
x x x x x x x
x x x the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes
for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself x x x.”
[14] Liberty Cotton
Mills Workers’ Union, et al. v. Liberty Cotton
Mills, et al., 90 SCRA 391 (1979).
[15] Carino v. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 91086, promulgated 8 May
1990.