SALIC B. DUMARPA, MARANAO C. DANGANAN AND SAADUDDIN ALAUYA, PETITIONERS, VS. JAMIL DIMAPORO AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENTS.

By Resolution dated October
28, 1988,^[1] the Commission on Elections en
banc^[2] passed
upon and disposed of -?

(a) “two motions for reconsideration filed by Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom and Monabai Panondiongan Balt, from a decision of the Commission (First Division)
promulgated July 11, 1988, dismissing their petitions and affirming the
proclamation of Jamil Dimaporo
as the duly elected municipal mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur,” and

(b) “a motion for contempt of the Commission (against)
Provincial Fiscal Salic B. Dumarpa,
3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao D. Danganan, and Vice-Governor Saaddudin
Alauya, all of the Province of Lanao
del Sur.”

As regards the motions
for reconsideration, the Resolution declared them to be without merit, and
“sustain(ed) the decision of the First Division on all cases.”

As regards the motion for
contempt, said Resolution found the charge to have been duly substantiated,
pronounced respondents “Provincial Fiscal Salic Dumarpa, 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao Danganan and Vice-Governor Saaddudin
Alauya ** in contempt ** (and) imposed (on them) a
Fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) each **.”1 It is this aspect of the Resolution and the Order subsequently
promulgated on January 12, 1989 denying the respondents’ motion for
reconsideration, that are now challenged in the instant special civil action of
certiorari.

The facts are not
complicated.  They have to be gone into
in some detail, however, so that the issue, albeit simple, may be more
accurately defined.

On February
3, 1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo
was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong.

The annulment of the
proclamation and the canvass on which it was based2 was sought in two (2) separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty
candidates:  one filed on February 15, 1988
by Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom (docketed
as SPC No. 88-646), and the other, on
February 17, 1988, by Monabai Panondiongan
Balt (docketed as SPC Nos. 88-697 and 88-697-A).

While these petitions
were pending adjudgment by the COMELEC First
Division, the Secretary of Local Governments
issued on May 19, 1988 a memorandum addressed to the Regional Director, Region
XII of the Department of Local Governments, designating Maclis
Balt “Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur vice Abdullah Imam.” The memorandum precisely took
account of said petitions.  It stated
that the designation of the OIC was made “(i)n
view of the election controversy that has arisen over the mayoralty race of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, and to ensure
that the democratic process is respected throughout the transition
period.”3

A copy of this memorandum
was furnished Governor Saidamen Pangarungan,
among others.  He, in turn, issued on
May
23, 1988 a
memorandum to “All Concerned,” on the subject, “Lifting of
Suspension Order,” reading as follows:4

“In view of the designation of OIC-Mayors in the
municipalities of Bacolod-Grande and Marogong, Lanao del Sur by the Secretary of Local Governments on different
dates pending final resolution by the Commission on Elections of the mayoralty
poll disputes therein, the order issued by this Office suspending the
processing of vouchers and other financial matters as well as the encashment of
pertinent checks for said towns is hereby lifted.

All concerned are hereby advised to recognize the said designation
of the Secretary of Local Governments.

For compliance.”

Evidently on the strength
of the designation of the Secretary of Local Governments and said memorandum of
Governor Pangarungan, Maclis
Balt assumed the position and discharged the
functions of OIC, Office of the Mayor, Marogong.

The petitions seeking
annulment of Datu Dimaporo’s
proclamation were ultimately dismissed by the First Division of the COMELEC, by
decision rendered on July 11, 1988. 
Motions for reconsideration thereof were seasonably presented by both
petitioners.  These were brought up to
the Commission en banc for resolution.

Datu Dimaporo lost no
time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of Marogong, as confirmed by the First Division’s Decision of July 11,
1988.  Under date of July 18, 1988, his counsel, Mangurun Batuampar, sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen
B. Pangarungan, “transmitting ** the
‘RESOLUTION’ of the Honorable First Division of the Commission on Elections **,”
and praying “that communications and other official matters involving the
affairs of the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur be accorded to DATU
JAMIL DATU MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation was affirmed by the Commission on
Elections as aforestated.” This letter, and
other related documents collated by the Office of the Governor, were later
referred to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur by 3rd Indorsement dated August 1,
1988, of Atty. Sa-Aduden Alauya, “Vice
Governor-OIC Governor.” The 3rd Indorsement
reads as follows:1

“Respectfully forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal, this
province, the herein attached basic communication, dated July 18, 1988, of
Atty. Mangurun Batuampar,
counsel of Datu Jamil ** Dimaporo with a xerox copy of the
Resolution dated July 11, 1988, of the First Division of the Commission on
Elections, and the comment thereto by OIC-Mayor Maclis
Balt with a xerox copy of
the motion for reconsideration filed in behalf of Monorabai
Panondiongan Balt on July
1988, together with the preceding indorsements
thereof, for legal opinion as to who between Datu Jamil ** Dimaporo and Maclis Balt should be recognized
as the Municipal Mayor and/or OIC-Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.

Early action on the matter is desired.”

The Provincial Fiscal acted
promptly on the request.  The opinion
sought was communicated to the Vice Governor by 4th Indorsement
dated August 5, 1988.  It was signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Maranao C. Danganan,
with the conformity (“conforme“) of
Provincial Fiscal Salic B. Dumarpa.  The indorsement
reads as follows:

“Respectfully returned to the Honorable Vice Governor-OIC
Governor, this province, the herein attached 3rd Indorsement
together with its enclosures, with the legal opinion that Datu
Maclis Balt is still the
Mayor of the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, pursuant to Sec.
3, paragraph C, Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for
reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the Commission on Elections
shall be decided En Banc by the Commission. 
Considering that a motion for
reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC2 the
decision of the Division is not final and executory.  The decision of the Commission En Banc is not
yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining order is issued
by the Supreme Court.”

On learning of this legal
opinion, Datu Dimaporo
filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, as well as Vice-Governor Alauya,
in contempt.3 His motion, dated August 22, 1988, inter alia drew attention to the inaccuracy in the 4th Indorsement
— that OIC Maclis Balt had
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the First Division of the
COMELEC1 —
and pointed out that the
respondents should have known “that MACLIS BALT has never been a candidate
for Mayor in Marogong during the February 1, 1988
local elections and therefore, cannot file a motion for reconsideration in the
above-entitled cases not being a party therein.” The motion theorized that
the act of Vice-Governor Alauya in seeking legal
opinion of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, and the formulation and
communication of the requested opinion by Fiscals Dumarpa
and Danganan, constituted “indirect contempt as
it is clearly an improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice (Sec. 3-d, Rule 71,
revised Rules of Court), and is also an unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of this Honorable Commission en banc (Sec. 3-c., Rule
71 **) where the above-entitled cases are now pending for decision * *.”
In exposition of this thesis, the motion made the following assertions:

“10.  That the aforestated improper conduct ** causes chaos and confusion
among the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public on
who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, considering the
conflict of the defendants’ legal opinion and the ‘Resolution’ of the COMELEC
Division, as aforesaid, resulting to damage, injury and prejudice not only upon
the complainant but to public service, particularly the people of Marogong, Lanao del Sur;

11.  That defendants are good
lawyers and know very well that resolutions, orders or decisions of this
Honorable Commission can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court as indicated in
Exhibit ‘2’ (legal opinion), and the issuance of the legal opinion is indeed
with evil motive and tainted with malice;

12.  That the aforesaid
improper conduct of the defendants if not timely corrected by severely
punishing them in contempt of this Honorable Commission will be establishing a
very bad precedence because such improper conduct amounts to a REVIEW by a
Provincial Fiscal of whatever resolution, order or decision of this Honorable
Commission.”

Responses to the motion for contempt were separately filed by the
fiscals and by the Vice-Governor.  In a
pleading entitled “Vigorous Opposition to Motion **” dated September 15, 1988,2
Vice-Governor Alauya declared that –

1) “Datu Maclis
Balt as an OIC Mayor of the Municipality (of Marogong) is religiously performing the prescribed duties,
powers and responsibilities of the mayor of the town until the final
adjudication of the mayoralty election cases, hence, it is not true that
defendants’ act causes chaos and confusion in said Municipality;”

2) in the situation that he had found himself — confronted by
the letter of Datu Dimaporo’s
counsel requesting recognition by the Office of the Governor as Mayor of Marogong pursuant to the Decision of the COMELEC First
Division, the comment of OIC Mayor Balt, and the
motion for reconsideration filed by defeated candidate Monarabai
Balt — “and in his desire to act safely and
correctly and to be in good faith all along, he indorsed ** (the) documents **
to the Provincial Fiscal in his capacity as a legal counsel of the province in
the absence of the Provincial Attorney for legal opinion;”

3) “said legal opinion has not disputed or contradicted the
force and effect of the said resolution (of the First Division) ** ; (o)n the
contrary, the defendants recognize and respect the force and effect of said
resolution and because a motion for reconsideration was timely filed on July
19, 1988, then it has not become final and executory,
hence, it is not true that the defendants’ act resulted to damage, injury and
prejudice upon anybody in said Municipality of Marogong;”

4) “the opinion ** does not constitute a review of the
aforesaid resolution of the ** Comelec First Division
in the sense that the defendant-Fiscals did not affirm or reverse said
resolution.  They did not even say
anything against it.  They merely opined
that because a motion for reconsideration was timely filed, then said
resolution has not become final and executory.  This is known to any student of law.  Actually, these are the offshoots of the
letter of movant’s counsel to the Governor **.  If the herein defendant did not take such an
appropriate action, possibility is not remote that he will be charged of
negligence of duty.  Suffice it to state
that the herein defendant acted honestly, dedicatedly and without any iota of
malice or evil motive in his heart and mind. 
It is hoped with defendant’s prayer to Allah that all his action will
not help throw this province into blood bath.”

For their part, the respondent fiscals asserted the following
pertinent propositions in their Answer dated September 12, 1988 (in addition to substantially the same
arguments set forth in the Vice-Governor’s “Opposition” above
adverted to):1

1) in their written opinion, they had “just humbly stated in
three sentences the provision of law on the subject of the query of the Office
of the Provincial Governor **; that such statements **, briefly stating the
provision of the constitution particularly Sec. 3, paragraph c of Article IX
thereof in relation to Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not directed
against the authority, dignity and majesty of the Commission on Elections so as
to constitute a contumacious attitude and flouting or arrogant belligerence
against it that the act may constitute contempt;”

2) said opinion “has no punitive values that could interfere
with the process or proceedings of the Commission,” and could not be
deemed a contempt thereof; and

3) “the counsel for the complaint has put down the
Commission to the level of the Provincial Fiscal in alluding to a ‘conflict of
the defendants’ opinion and the Resolution of the COMELEC Division, (thus)
displaying his apparent oblivion of the bureaucratic set-up and the
jurisprudence prevailing in this country.”

The fiscals also submitted a Memorandum, bearing the same date as
their answer,2
in which, among other things, they expressed the view that since the First
Division had assumed jurisdiction over the petitions questioning the
proclamation of Datu Dimaporo
— indeed, “it took the Honorable First Division ** considerable time and
effort to resolve the controversy” — the presumption was that the
proclamation must have appeared invalid to the First Division, otherwise it
“could not have acquired (assumed) jurisdiction over the ** cases because
the remedy of the petitioners-appellants was a regular protest before the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur.”
They “were forced to assume that the proclamation of Jamil
Dimaporo was irregular because the First Division
heard the petition to annul the said proclamation,” and this left them
“no other option than affirm the jurisdiction of the First Division over
the cases by stating the law sanctioning its authority and that is article IX
of the Constitution.”

In its Resolution of October
28, 1988 anent the contempt incident, the Commission en banc condemned
the fiscal’s conception of “the First Division’s
jurisdiction of the pre-proclamation controversy” as a “distortion of
the law and jurisprudence.” It said: 
“The propriety and legality of proclamations already made or about to be made are precisely the
issues in pre-proclamation controversies over which the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction.  It is a rule so
consistent and well established in this jurisdiction that even the Commission
itself cannot disturb a proclamation made by a Board of Canvassers
without notice and hearing.  This rule we
hold respondents bound by judicial notice.” Stressing that under the law
“it is solely the Commission that can suspend or annul any
proclamation made,” the Resolution
pointed out that “What respondents
Alauya, Dumarpa and Danganan in effect did was to suspend the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo made by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marogong, to prevent
him from discharging the duties of
his office, and pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to
office by an Officer-in-Charge, who is the wife of one of the parties to the
instant petitions” — which are acts constituting “unauthorized and illegal assumption of powers that pertain
exclusively to the Commission, an unlawful interference with its processes and
proceedings, and improper conduct that tends directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice in this case.” Brushing aside, too, the
respondents’ argument “that they were merely seeking and rendering an
opinion * * and therefore the
same was not directed against the authority and dignity of the Commission”
as being “devoid of merit,” the Resolution declared the respondents guilty of contempt
and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P500.00.

The fiscals and the Vice-Governor filed a motion for
reconsideration dated November 9, 1988,
depositing at the same time
“the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) with the Provincial
Election Supervisor in Marawi
City as and by way of penalty if
finally adjudged guilty without prejudice to ventilate their rights in the
appropriate forum.”1 They stated among other things that ?

1)  Acting Gov. Alauya was faced with a case needing “urgent action
because both parties are claiming the fund releases of Marogong
and the tension between the protagonists in SPC Nos. 88-646, 88-697 and
88-697-A has reached its boiling point so volatile that without settling the
legal issue the mayorship of Marogong
could have been contested by the sound of guns and thus a resultant
bloodshed.” Thus, “his act of referring the legal controversy to the
legal adviser of the province” was, to him, “the most appropriate
under the circumstances;” * * (and the) act of not implementing the
decision of the Commission, if at all such decision is due for implementation,
is at most unintentional mistake and, which act did not constitute contempt
(citing Asociacion de Agricultores
de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay
Mining Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294);”

2) no suspension of the effects of Dimaporo’s
proclamation was or could have been effected by them since Dimaporo
had never “enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of
the mayor,” had never been paid his salary as mayor, and had not as yet
“been accorded recognition as elected mayor ** by the provincial and
national government;” indeed, “long before the query for legal
opinion was lodged, Balt was already designated as
Officer-in-Charge;”

3) the fiscals had merely performed “a legal duty reposed
upon them when they rendered the questioned legal opinion,” a duty they
could not have refused without incurring liability “for dereliction of a
defined duty;” and

4) with or without the fiscal’s
opinion, “Maclis Balt
would still (have) continue(d) discharging the duties of the mayor, at least,
until October 28, 1988
(when the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc was promulgated).”

By Resolution dated January
12, 1989 the COMELEC en banc not only denied the motion for
reconsideration, but also “rebuked”
the movants “for insisting upon an erroneous legal
position.” According
to the COMELEC –

“Normally, there is nothing objectionable in seeking a legal
opinion and in rendering it.  But what
transpired in connection with these cases were not innocent acts that were
intended to guide official action. 
Rather, they were a deliberate contrivance that were meant to undermine
the efficacy of official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of
canvassers to the First Division of the Commission and even the Commission en
banc which had not in any way issued any restraining order to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate. 
If clarification had to be made in connection with the proclamation and
the decision of the First Division, it should have been sought in the
Commission itself, for movants knew, or should have
known, that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies.  That they attempted to
settle the matter among themselves demonstrates the intention to effect
disobedience to and defiance of the lawful acts and orders of the
Commission.”

The convicted contemners have instituted the instant special civil action
of certiorari in this Court to bring about the nullification of the Resolution of October
28, 1988 “as
regards the findings for contempt.”

Required to comment in
behalf of the public respondent,1 the Office of the Solicitor General begged to “be discharged from
the duty to *** (do so as it) maintains a position different from that taken by
respondent COMELEC.”2 This Court granted the request and accorded to “the respondent
COMELEC itself a period of ten (10) days from notice within which to file the
required comment, if it so desires.”3 Respondent Datu Dimaporo
has not done so, despite notice.  The
COMELEC filed its own comment on July 25, 1989.

The COMELEC counsel
submits that the facts “manifest the firm resolve (on petitioners’) part
to delay, if not totally prevent, the assumption of office by private
respondent Dimaporo * *, a scheme to shroud with
doubt the validity and force of a proclamation while trifling with public
respondent’s discretion on when to annul a proclamation or suspend its
effects;” that the only perceived purpose of the request for opinion was “to
provide an aura of legality to the continuity in office of the designated
officer-in-charge, to the exclusion of the proclaimed winner in the
election;” that “from an overview of the acts of petitioners and the
situation in which all parties found themselves thereafter, petitioners’
pretensions to good faith recede to a wantonly subtle interference with matters
within the exclusive competence of public respondent,” and that
petitioners’ acts were in fact “a deliberate interference with the process
or proceedings before respondent Commission **.”

Upon the facts above
narrated at some length, the Court is constrained to nullify and set aside the
conviction by the COMELEC en banc of the petitioners for contempt.

The essential accusation
against the petitioners was that the rendition by the petitioner fiscals of a
legal opinion upon request of petitioner Vice Governor had caused “chaos
and confusion among the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the
general public on who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong,
Lanao del Sur, considering
the conflict of the defendants’ legal opinion and the ‘Resolution’ of the
COMELEC Division, as aforesaid, resulting to damage, injury and prejudice not
only upon the complainant but to public service, particularly the people of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.”4 This was implicitly sustained by the COMELEC
when it ruled that –5

“What respondents Alauya, Dumarpa and Danganan in effect
did was to suspend the effects of the proclamation of intervenor
Dimaporo made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Marogong, to prevent him from discharging the duties
of his office, and pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office
by an Officer-in­-Charge, who is the wife of one of the parties to the instant
petitions.”

The trouble is, there is
nothing in the challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, or anywhere else in the record, for that
matter, to demonstrate the actuality of the alleged (1) “chaos and
confusion among the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general
public,” or (2) “suspension of the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo * * (in order
to) pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by an
Officer-in-Charge,” or (3) that the latter “is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions;” or (4)
that the legal opinion was “a deliberate contrivance ** meant to undermine
the efficacy of official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of
canvassers to the First Division of the Commission and even the Commission en banc which had not in any way issued any restraining order to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate.”

On the other hand, there are the facts asserted by the
petitioners — never denied or disputed by respondents — that as of the time
that the fiscal’s opinion was solicited and even
thereafter, Datu Dimaporo had
never yet “enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of
the mayor,“ had never been
paid his salary as mayor, and had not as yet “been accorded recognition as
elected mayor ** by the provincial and
national government;” and that indeed, “long before the query for legal
opinion was lodged, (Maclis) Balt
** (had been) already designated as Officer-in-Charge”
and since then and during all the time material to the inquiry, had been
discharging the functions of mayor of Marogong.

It thus appears that the
Resolution in question not only lacks factual foundation of any sort but is
contradicted by such of the relevant facts as may be discerned from the record.

It appears furthermore
that the Fiscals are being sanctioned for rendering an opinion that in
the view of the COMELEC en banc was “a distortion of
law and jurisprudence.” But what is it in that legal opinion that the COMELEC deemed so offensive to its
authority and dignity as to move it to punish its authors?  That opinion was rendered in answer to the
inquiry of the Acting Governor as to whether or not, in view of the judgment by
the First Division of the COMELEC upholding the proclamation by the Board of
Canvassers of Datu Dimaporo
as Mayor-Elect of Marogong, the duly designated OIC
Mayor, theretofore acting as such, Datu Maclis Balt, could still be
recognized as the Mayor of the Municipality. 
The inquiry had been made necessary in view of the conflict in claims to
the mayoralty then being asserted by both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt, which conflict had to be swiftly and legally resolved
to prevent its resolution by arms and bloodshed.  The fiscals’ opinion was based on “Sec.
3, paragraph C, Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for
reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the Commission on Elections
shall be decided En Banc by the Commission.” They declared that since
“a motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC, the decision of the Division is not final and
executory.  The
decision of the Commission En Banc is
not yet even final until and after
5 days whenever no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.” The
Court, quite frankly, sees in the text of the opinion nothing even remotely
resembling an affront to the COMELEC, or a criticism of the First Division’s
judgment.  On the contrary, the opinion
simply paraphrases — correctly, it would appear — the COMELEC’s
own Rules of Procedure1 on the subject it addresses. 
But even if, as the questioned
Resolution declares, the views therein expressed are clearly wrong, it cannot
for that reason alone be considered contumacious; otherwise, liability for contempt would
invariably attach to every declared instance of orders or judgments rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or
otherwise attended by
serious error of one kind or another. 
The absurdity of such a rule or policy need not be belabored.

Nor may the Acting
Governor be faulted for consulting the lawyers of the province as to the
effects of a judgment on the authority and actuations of municipal or
provincial officials, or the fiscals for advising him on such matters.  The law implicitly authorizes the former to
seek such advice and expressly imposes upon the latter the duty to give it on
request.  Section 1682, first paragraph,
of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

“SEC. 1682.  Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province
and provincial subdivisions.  – The provincial fiscal shall be the
legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers, including district
health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and
municipal districts of the province.  As
such he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal
question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties
thereof.”

Thus,
all that the respondent fiscals did was perform a duty specifically enjoined by
law, for the failure or refusal to do which they could appropriately have been
called to account.  It may be that the
opinion they submitted was erroneous, though this is by no means certain and is
not here fully inquired into, there being no need to do so.  As already observed, it cannot, on the ground
of error alone and absent any indication in the record that it was prompted by
a deliberate intent to affront the Commission or ignore or belittle its
judgments and orders, be considered contumacious.

The Court is somewhat
intrigued by the statement in the challenged Resolution which “*** hold(s)
respondents bound by judicial notice” to the rule “*** that even the
Commission itself cannot disturb a proclamation made by a Board of Canvassers
without notice and hearing.” Interpreted in consonance with its context,
the statement would appear to charge the respondents with judicial notice of
the cited rule.  But surely it could not
have been meant to be taken in that sense because the rule of judicial notice
binds only courts acting as such and, moreover, it is doubtful if the precept
referred to is a proper subject of judicial notice.  One would, however, be hard put to give the
statement any other meaning that would not in one way or another contradict the
ordinary intendment of its language.

The respondent Commission
would have it that if need was felt for any clarification in connection with
the proclamation and the Resolution in question, it should have been sought
with said Commission itself since the petitioners knew, or should have known,
that it has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies.  It fails to explain, however, how the Acting
Governor could have done this, not being a party to that particular
controversy.  And even had that step been
feasible, it does not appear that said respondent has jurisdiction to render an
advisory opinion or declaratory judgment.

The power to hold in
contempt, it has time and again been held, must be exercised, not on the
vindictive, but on the preservative principle.1 It is not to be meted out of pique, or from
an imperial sense of the nature and functions of judicial office.  What appears to be an honest
difference of opinion has been blown
up into something that it is not — a direct and confrontational challenge to
the puissance and prerogatives of the Commission.  In a word, petitioners have been found
in contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well with the
Commission and failed to conform to its own views.  Judicial sensibilities should not become too
tender or self-protective.  All things
considered, the contempt ruling here cannot be justified on the preservative
principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of the allegedly
contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of any
intent to denigrate the authority of the respondent Commission or erode the
faith and respect due its decisions, orders or other actuations.  Said ruling is, therefore, REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and petitioners are absolved of the contempt charge.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1] SPC No. 88-646 (Datu
Maruhom, petitioner) and SPC Nos. 88-697 and 88-697-B
(Monabai P. Balt,
petitioner)

^[2] The resolution was written by Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac, and concurred in
by Chairman Davide and Commissioners Abueg, Jr., Africa, Flores, Rama and Dimaampao

1
Rollo, pp. 79, 81, 82

2
On the ground of failure of elections,
fraud, lack of authority of the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers, rollo, pp. 42-43

3
Id., p. 39

4
Id., p. 40

1
Id., p. 19

2
This italicized statement is clearly a mistake,
since, as clearly appears from the 3rd indorsement, it was not OIC Maclis
Balt, but Monorabai Panondiongan Balt who filed a motion for reconsideration. 
The mistake was acknowledged and rectified by the fiscals in their
answer to the motion for contempt (Rollo, pp.
26 et seq., SEE footnote 1, infra)

3
Rollo, pp. 16 et seq.

1 SEE preceding
footnote

2 Rollo, pp.
31-37

1 Id., pp.
26-30

2 Id., pp.
21-25

1 Id., pp. 51, 60

1 Id.,
p. 66

2 Id.,
p. 88

3 Id.,
p. 90

4 SEE footnote 3 and related text at pp. 3 – 4

5 SEE pp. 5 – 6

1 Sec. 2 of Rule 19, to the effect that a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division filed within
five (5) days from promulgation thereof, if not pro-forma, suspends
the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, etc.; and Sec. 3
of Rule 39, providing that decisions in pre-proclamation cases, among others,
become final and executory five (5) days after their
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court

1 Victorino vs. Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653; Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241;
Austria vs. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247, citing Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, Villavicencio vs. Lukban,
39 Phil. 778, In re:  Quirino,
76 Phil. 630 and People vs. Rivera, 91 Phil. 354; Rivera vs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643, citing Villavicencio
vs. Lukban, supra, Gamboa vs. Teodoro,
et al., 91 Phil. 274, Sulit vs. Tiangco, 115 SCRA 207, and Lipata
vs. Tutaan, 124 SCRA 880; Romero vs.
Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197