GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, PETITIONER, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, RES…

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside
the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated February 10, 1989 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 9200 to 9204 which preventively suspended petitioner Amor
D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) pendente lite from
his position as provincial governor of Zambales and
from any office that he may be holding.

The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan,
Zambales in the local elections of November 1971.  While he occupied the position of mayor, a
certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter
complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having
committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019)
in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal
waters of Botolan, Zambales
during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the
municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the
payment of rentals.

The complaint with
respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed.  As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, all dated May 30,
1984 accusing the
petitioner of violation of Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan.  The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9200-9204.  Except for the names of the individuals who
were allegedly favored by the
petitioner and the dates when these favors were made, the informations uniformly alleged:

“That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused AMOR D. DELOSO, a
public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, taking
advantage of his public and official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted
benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality
and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to
him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan
thru a loan financed by the Land
Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without
any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of said tractor by
Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the
Municipality of Botolan.” (Rollo,
p. 30)

A motion to quash the informations was
denied by the Sandiganbayan.  A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.

The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R. NOS.
69963-67) to annul the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions denying
the petitioner’s motion to quash and motion for reconsideration.

In a resolution dated July
28, 1988, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit.  The resolution became final and executory on October
17, 1988.

The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan.  He pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against
him.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to
suspend the petitioner pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019.

On February 10, 1989,
the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution,
the dispositive portion
of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor
D. Deloso is suspended pendente
lite from his position as Provincial Governor
of Zambales and from any other office that he may now
be holding.

“Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary
of the Department of Local Government for implementation and for him to inform
this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.” (Rollo, p. 94)

The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, the petitioner
filed the instant petition.

On February 17, 1989,
the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan
requesting that the execution and implementation of the February 10, 1989 suspension order be held in
abeyance pending determination of the merits of the petition.  The motion was denied prompting the
petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases
which was denied in an order dated February
22, 1989.

In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the
cases, the Sandiganbayan said:

“The Court notes that these cases have already been set for
May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and 7, 1989 at 8:00 o’clock in the morning and 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.  While the accused claims that this period is ordinately far, the Court must also be contend with its
own calendar.  It will be easy enough for
this Court to give the accused an earlier setting.  However, such a setting will be best a
pretence since other cases have already been set between now and May 15 where
in many instances the accused themselves are also under suspension by reason of
the same provision of law.  Under the
above circumstances, no other earlier setting can be granted to the accused
without making that setting merely a sham since other cases which have been set
earlier will naturally have a right to expect priority.” (Rollo, p. 135)

In view of this development, the petitioner filed an urgent supplemental
application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan, the Secretary
of Local Government and Community Development, and all those acting in their
behalf from executing and implementing the February 10, 1989 resolution of the Sandigabayan.

We treat the respondent’s Comment as an answer and decide this
petition on its merits.

The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension
provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act. No.
3019).

This same issue was raised in the case of Layno
v. Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536
(1985).  After considering the facts as
well as the merits of the case, the Court ruled that the petition need not be
resolved through a ruling on the validity of the provision on mandatory
suspension.  We instead, decided the case
in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection of the law.

Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition,
we apply anew the ruling in the Layno case and
decide the instant petition in relation to the principles of due process and
equal protection without having to declare categorically whether or not the
suspension provision of Republic Act 3019 should be struck down as invalid.  We limit ourselves to ascertaining whether or
not, under the circumstances of this case, an indefinite suspension becomes
unreasonable.

As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a
separate opinion the mischief which would result if the Court allows the indefinite
suspension of elective local officials charged with violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:

“The central point of Senator Padilla’s position is ‘that the
penalty of suspension is definitely much lower than that of removal and it would be incongruous
if we give to the penalty of suspension more serious consequences than are
attached to the penalty of removal.’ 
Senator Padilla opted for the immediate restoration of the respondent to
his position once the favorable result of the election is known.

“Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there was an
exchange of views between Senator Ganzon and Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law, the exchange was limited
to the matter of the commencement of the investigation of the charges, which,
according to Senator Ganzon, cannot be made within
one year prior to an election.

“And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion above, I
bewail the apathy of the majority of the Court toward efforts to seek enlightenment
on legal issues of grave importance from the deliberations of Congress upon the
said issues.  It is not quite becoming of
judicial magistrates to shunt aside a suggestion that the interplay of legal
provisions be carefully studied and analyzed.

“In the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I suggested that we examine the
possible delimiting effects of the provisions of the first sentence of section
5 of the Decentralization Act on the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act insofar as the suspension from office of an elective local
official is concerned.  In no uncertain
words did I focus the attention of the Court on the serious ever-present
possibility of harassment of an elective local official taking the form of the
filing of a valid information against him under the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after his exoneration in
an administrative case involving the same offense.

“I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious
delay in the courts of justice which could effectively frustrate an elected or
re-elected local official from discharging the duties of his office for the
entire term of his office, and thus nullify the will of the people who elected
him.  I likewise asked the Court to consider the situation where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly and is elected despite the fact that he is under
suspension under the authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sought a
definitive answer to the question.  ‘What then would happen to the suspension
meted out to him since it is the National Assembly that determines whether he
should assume and continue in office?’

“All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by
the majority of the Court with the sweeping statement that the provisions of
the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative cases.  It is the ex cathedra attitude,
this kind of slothful thinking, that I find abhorrent
and therefore deplore.” (Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163, 197-198 [1974])

Petitioner Deloso was elected governor
of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local
elections.  The regular term of a
governor is only 3 years although he shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992 by special provision of the Constitution.  (Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article
XVIII, Constitution).  He was, however,
ordered suspended from performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 by virtue of the criminal charges filed against him.  The order of suspension does not have a
definite period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his
term of office unless his case is terminated sooner.  An extended suspension is a distinct
possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied
the petitioner’s plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground
that there are other cases set
earlier which have a right to expect priority.

Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially
may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising a due process question.  As we ruled in Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, (supra):

“Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.  His term of office does not expire until 1986.  Were it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in
the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor.  He was elected precisely to do so.  As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to.  It is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the
services of elective officials of their choice. 
For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be
proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally.  In either case, his culpability must be
established.  Moreover, if there be a
criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence.  A preventive suspension may
be justified.  Its continuance, however,
for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question.  For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.  Clearly, there would be in such a case an
injustice suffered by him.  Nor is he the
only victim.  There is injustice
inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga.  They were deprived of the services of the man
they had elected to serve as mayor.  In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and
resulted in sheer oppression.  A denial
of due process is thus quite manifest. 
It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of
suspension should be lifted.”

Moreover, in the earlier case of Garcia v. The Executive Secretary,
(6 SCRA 1 [1962]) we
ruled on the issue as to whether the preventive suspension beyond the maximum
period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
(Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. 
Paulino Garcia, the petitioner in the cited
case was the Chairman of the National Science Development Board appointed by
the President of the Philippines.  He was charged with electioneering and
dishonesty in office.  Pending
investigation of the administrative charges against him, he was suspended by
the Executive Secretary by
authority of the President.  In view of
his indefinite suspension, he filed a petition praying in effect that the
60-day period prescribed in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension
having already expired, he be reinstated in the service pursuant to Section 35
of the said Act.  The respondents opposed
the petition on the ground that the petitioner was a presidential appointee and
therefore not covered by the 60-day preventive suspension limit under Section
35 of the then Civil Service Act.  The
respondents maintained that the petitioner could be indefinitely suspended. 
In ruling in favor of the petitioner, the Court stated:

“To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed
by the President, facing administrative charges can be preventively suspended
indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive
suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt
after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution (No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law.  [Art. XII,
Sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process).  x
x x In
the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and
he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established
after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.  x x
x.” (at pp. 8-9)

The question that now arises is whether
or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was ordered by no
less than the President of the Philippines
is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the
Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13 thereof.

The guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the
application of the ruling in the Garcia v. Executive Secretary.  Thus, we explained in the Layno
case, to wit:

“x x x If the case against petitioner Layno
were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be
applicable.  It is therein clearly
provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein
enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof:  ‘In all cases, preventive suspension shall
not extend beyond sixty days after
the start of said suspension.’ (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last sentence.  The first
sentence reads as follows:  ‘Preventive suspension may be imposed
at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when
the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so
warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence’).  It may be recalled that the
principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government
officials.  So it was held in the leading
case of Garcia v. Hon. Secretary (116 Phil. 348 [1962]).  According to the opinion of Justice
Barrera:  ‘To adopt the theory of
respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative
charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after
due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.’  (Ibid. 351-352) Further:  ‘In the guise of a preventive suspension, his
term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a
finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the
Constitution.’ (Ibid. 352) Clearly then, the policy of the
law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration.  In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing
a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a
different rule of law.  To do so
would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.” (at p. 542)

The application of the Garcia injunction against
preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time applies with greater
force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a
relatively short one.  The interests of the sovereign electorate and the province
of Zambales
cannot be subordinated to the heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan
and of this Court.

It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales
who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if
they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination
of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big
number of sequestration, ill-gotten, wealth, murder, malversation
of public funds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions
that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination
of his innocence or guilt.

The order dated February
10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can
not be sanctioned.  We rule that
henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section
13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section
42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also
appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of
Republic Act 3019 as amended by Batasan Pambansa Blg. 192 to him.  He opines
that the suspension provision as amended which qualifies the public
officer as incumbent does not apply to him since he is now
occupying the position of governor and not mayor, the
position wherein he was charged under the Anti-Graft Law.

This argument is untenable. 
The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383 (1984), in this wise:

“x x x
Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is
presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is
untenable.  The amendatory provision
clearly states that any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage or execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. 
Thus, by the use of the word ‘office’ the same applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only
the particular office under which he was charged.”

One last point.  Should the purposes behind preventive
suspensions such as preventing the abuse of the prerogatives of the office,
intimidation of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the respondent court is not
bereft of remedies or sanctions.  The
petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and
not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.  The preventive suspension imposed on
petitioner Amor D. Deloso
by virtue of the February 10, 1989
resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be limited to
only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume
once again the functions of governor of Zambales,
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial of the pending cases against
him in the Sandiganbayan.  This decision is immediately executory.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., on leave.