THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEOPOLDO MONTANTE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The appellant Leopoldo Montante, 66 years old and widower, was charged by his
daughter Lea Montante, 14 years old and single, with
three counts of rape purportedly committed on three different occasions, to
wit:  on September 29, 1978 (Criminal Case No. 36584), on December 24, 1978 (Criminal Case No.
36585), and on September 12, 1978 (Criminal Case No. 36583) all allegedly
committed in the evening at the dwelling of the appellant and the private
complainant.^[1]

The said three complaints all dated May 5, 1980 were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 158.^[2]

After trial, the Court a quo rendered a joint decision on
all three cases on May 16, 1988,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court, finding the accused Leopoldo
Montante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape on three (3) counts as charged under Criminal Cases Nos. 36583, 36584
and 36585, imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in Criminal Case No. 36583, reclusion perpetua
in Criminal Case No. 36584 and reclusion perpetua
in Criminal Case No. 36585, and to pay the costs.  He is likewise ordered to indemnify the
victim Lea Montante in the amount of P12,000.00.  The accused shall be credited in full of his
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Republic Act 6127.

SO ORDERED.^[3]

The facts as presented by the prosecution are as follows:

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

On September 29, 1978, two days after Lea Montante’s
mother was buried, she and her three brothers, Leopoldo
Montante, Jr., (16 years old), Leonardo Montante (15 years old), and Cesar Montante
(9 years old) were sleeping in their house in Sta. Rosa, Pasig
(TSN, December 16, 1981, pp. 3-4; TSN January 30, 1982, p. 6).  Lea’s grandmother and her half brother Billy,
who were there for the wake and burial of Lea’s mother, were sleeping in another
room (TSN, February 16, 1982, p. 3).  Lea
was then only eleven (11) years old having been born on December 22, 1968 (TSN, January 20, 1982, p.
2).  At around midnight, appellant Leopoldo Montante, Lea’s father, undressed her and laid on top of
her (TSN, December 16, 1981, p. 4).  Lea
struggled and tried to stop him but appellant succeeded in placing his private
parts into Lea’s private parts.  The rape
lasted for ten minutes.

On December 24, 1978,
also around midnight the appellant
again raped her.  The incident was
witnessed by Lea’s younger brother, Cesar Montante,
then only nine (9) years old, who was sleeping a little further from the
victim.  But Lea did not talk to him as she was ashamed (Id.
p. 6). 
Lea’s attempt to run away from home was thwarted by the appellant
who threatened to kill her if she ran away (Id.
p. 13).

Lea was raped by the appellant for the third time on September 12, 1979 (Id.,
p.13).  Lea (then 13 years old) was
sleeping together with her three brothers, (Id., p. 13).  At around 11:00
in the evening, appellant covered Lea’s mouth and proceeded to rape her for
about fifteen (15) minutes (Id., pp. 13-14). 
Her brothers were asleep throughout the incident (Id., pp. 14-15).  The following day Lea could no longer keep
the matter to herself and told her brothers about how their father raped her
and to tell their neighbors about it (Id., p. 15).  Lea and her brothers were able to tell their
neighbors including one Lydia Labosta and one Felicing, the latter being a friend of their mother (Id.,
p. 15).  They all advised Lea to run away
(Id., pp. 15-16).

Lea was able to run away to Marikina to work as a maid for a
certain Josie (Id., pp. 17).  After two
days, she left to stay with her cousins in San Joaquin (Id.).  On November
10, 1979, Benjamin Asis and Ernesto Supsupin, husbands of her cousins, accompanied her in
filing a case against the appellant with the municipal court of Pasig giving a sworn statement before Pfc. Ruben Leano of the Pasig Police Force
(Id., p. 18 TSN, June 16, 1983, pp. 4-5; TSN, September 30, 1987, p. 3).

On November 12, 1979, Lea submitted
herself for medical examination by [sic] Dr. Dario L. Gajardo
of the PC Crime Laboratory of
Camp Crame, Quezon
City (TSN, September 22, 1982, p. 3).  Dr. Gajardo found a healed laceration on Lea’s hymen at 4 to 7 o’clock position and of the type produced by sexual intercourse
(Id., p. 17).^[4]

On the other hand, the defense’s version of facts as summarized
in its brief for the appellant
reads, thus:

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

Accused denies having ever raped his daughter.  He theorizes that his daughter is falsely
charging him with the offense because of his having repeatedly berated her for
constant (sic) going out with her gang which would at times have her spend the
night outside the family abode.  He
particularly remembers that the last time she returned home after an
unauthorized absence, he meted out a corporal punishment to her.  He spanked her while she was lying vertically
on the floor with her head on it and her feet up on air.  The girl almost died (TSN, 27 July 1987, pp.
2-6; TSN, 29 July 1987, p. 10).

Leopoldo Montante
could not have raped Lea on 29
September 1978 because it was only two days after the interment of
his wife.  At that time, his
mother-in-law and the twenty-seven­-year-old son of his wife from a former
marriage were staying in their house where the alleged rape was supposed to
have been committed.  On that date, he
slept at the ground floor of the house while their two aforementioned guests
slept in the same place with all his four older children, under a single
mosquito net.  It was the third night of
the nine nights of prayer for his departed wife (TSN, 27 July 1987, pp. 3-6).

At midnight of 24 December 1978, the accused was in
the house of his neighbor with his fourth child Cesar, waiting for his three
older children (Leopoldo Jr., Leonardo, and Lea) who
heard mass at the Pasig Catholic Church.  When the former went home at 1:10 o’clock at dawn of 25 December 1978, his three children were
already asleep.  At 8:00 o’clock in the morning on that Christmas Day, all his
four children went visiting with relatives. 
The accused was left alone at home (TSN, 29 July 1987, pp. 2-5).

On 12 September 1979 at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, Leopoldo Montante was
asleep.  When he woke up at dawn, as was
his wont as a fisherman, his daughter Lea was still sleeping beside her
youngest brother Cesar.  The accused then
went out to fish with his two older sons as usual.  (Id., p. 6).

The accused’s sister-in-law, Alice Doyola, Lea’s maternal aunt, is supporting the private
complainant in her case against him.  Alice,
thru her son-in-law Benjamin Asis, even visited him
in jail and demanded P5,000.00 in exchange for the withdrawal of the case (TSN,
05 August 1989, pp. 9-10).^[5]

In this appeal, the appellant interposes the lone assignment of
error,^[6]
to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED ON THE SOLE BASIS OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS’ INCONGRUOUS TESTIMONY
WHICH FALLS SHORT OF THE QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES.

We must point out at the very outset that in our appreciation of
the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense, we are always
guided by the principle that “rape is an accusation easy to make, hard to
prove, but more difficult for the party accused, though innocent, to
defend.”^[7]
Thus, the caveat that the testimony of the injured female should not be
received with precipitate credulity. 
More so when the conviction depends at any vital point upon her
uncorroborated testimony.^[8]

The Court therefore takes on the painstaking task of scrutinizing
in great detail the record of the case in order to ascertain whether or not the
quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of innocence and
establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt has been clearly
demonstrated.

 After a careful
review of the entire record, we find sufficient evidence pointing to the guilt
of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 
We therefore see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court.

Well-settled is the rule, which is applicable in this case, that
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses, unless certain facts of substance and value have
clearly and plainly been overlooked or neglected and that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case.^[9]
Thus, conviction by the trial court of the accused in rape cases based on the
sole testimony of the offended party has, in quite a number of instances, been
sustained by us on appeal.^[10]

The appellant, however, argues that the foregoing rule is not
applicable in this case on the ground that another judge, other than Judge Zenaida S. Baltazar, the one who
penned the decision, presided when the complaining witness gave her testimony, citing
People v. Escalante, 131 SCRA 237,
and that therefore the latter judge was not in a position to decide on the
credibility of the private
complainant’s testimony.  But as
correctly pointed out in the brief for the appellee,
“the appellant conveniently
fails to state that, unlike the
Escalante case where the trial judge did not try any part of the case at all and relied solely on the records, in
the case at bar, Judge Zenaida Baltazar
was the presiding judge during the latter half of the trial of the case.  She started presiding when it was the defense’s turn to present
evidence and during the prosecution’s rebuttal.”^[11]

Moreover, athough another judge other
than Judge Zenaida S. Baltazar
was present at the hearing of the complaining witness, there are however
attendant circumstances other than the demeanor of the said witness in court
which convincingly establish the “believability” of her
testimony.  The said chain of
circumstances as succinctly put by the Solicitor
General, reads thus:

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

First, the complaining witness, Lea Montante,
was barely fourteen (14) years old when she testified on December 16, 1981.  Such a tender age of the victim lends
credibility to her testimony (People vs. Egot, 130
SCRA 134).  It is difficult to believe
that she could deliberately perjure herself and fabricate such a detailed
testimony.

Second, it can be immediately gleaned from the transcript of
stenographic notes (tsn) that Lea Montante’s
testimony is replete with details including that of the sexual act (such as the
sucking and fondling of the female breast, secretion from the male organ, and
the significance of menstruation subsequent to sexual intercourse) not normally
within the knowledge and imagination of a girl who is barely fourteen years old.  The detailed narration of the victim, a young
girl, of how she was repeatedly raped by her father is worthy of credence
(People vs. Muñoz, 101 SCRA 704; People vs. Baao, 142 SCRA 476).

Third, the appellant is the complainant’s own flesh and blood.  The appellant correctly points out that only
a father of warped moral values can engage
in carnal relations with his own child. 
But by the same token, it is unimaginable that a 14–year old daughter
would charge her own father with rape unless the same is true.  It requires guile and craft to charge one’s
father with rape (People vs. Muñoz, 101 SCRA
704).  The defense never adduced evidence
to show that Lea Montante, at her age, was possessed
of guile and craft characteristic of scheming adult women of loose morals.

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

Fourth, the charge of rape is inherently, socially and emotionally
destructive of the complainant.  It is
difficult to believe that a chaste woman, much less a young girl, would go
through the troubles and humiliation of a medical examination and a rape
trial unless the rape charge is true (People vs. Campesino,
143 SCRA 56), more so if it is
one against her own father.  The
attendant publicity, humiliation, and personal anguish that a rape trial
necessarily entails deter most rape victims from seeking legal redress.

Appellant alleges that in charging him with rape, the complainant
was merely seeking revenge for the corporeal punishment he inflicted on her as
a disciplinary measure.  Judge Zenaida Baltazar correctly held
that this is “flimsy and untenable”. 
The complainant could have charged her father with any other crime which
would have been just as effective in putting him away to prison but surely not
rape.  A rape charge would also destroy
her with a stigma that will haunt her. 
There can only be one rational explanation why she had to charge her
father with rape.  It really did
happen.  And for three times.

Fifth, the complaining witness submitted herself willingly to a
medical examination where she was undressed and her private parts scrutinized
by a male doctor.  The wilingness of a rape victim to submit to medical
examination is eloquent testimony of the truth of the charge (People vs. Clarin, 108 SCRA 680).^[12]

Besides the simple denial, the appellant asserts that the charges against him were fabricated at
the instance of the aunt of the private complainant who, purportedly though her nephew, visited the appellant in jail and
demanded P5,000.00 in exchange for the dropping of the case.^[13] But upon cross-examination of the said aunt
and nephew who were both presented as the prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses, the
defense counsel nowhere succeeded in obtaining an admission or suggestion of
any visit by either to the appellant in jail.

xxx                xxx                   xxx

Q    According
to you, you never visited the accused at the jail here in the capitol compound
and you also said that neither did Benjamin Asis or
Ernesto Supsupin visited him, are you sure that these
two sons-in-law of yours never visited the accused?

A     It
is true sir that none of us visited Leopoldo Montante in jail not even one of us.  I am sure of that sir.^[14]

xxx   
           xxx                   xxx

Finally, the appellant alleges inconsistencies in the evidence
for the prosecution.  In particular, the
appellant assails the testimony of the private complainant where she indicated
that she and her father were alone in the house during the first alleged rape
on September 29, 1978.  The appellant contends that the said
allegation was highly improbable inasmuch as the said date was the second day
of the nine-day novena for her deceased mother and that aside from her
brothers, her grandmother and a half brother were in their house as guests.^[15]

The said alleged
inconsistency is however belied by the evidence on record which shows that the
private complainant positively stated that on the first alleged rape, her
grandmother and half brother were sleeping in another room inside their house
six meters from the room where she and her brothers were sleeping.^[16]
The appellant likewise assumes without any supporting evidence that the novena
stretched until midnight when the
first alleged rape took place.

On another aspect, the appellant makes much of the
“stoicism” shown by the private complainant when the following day
after the alleged incidents of rape, she refused to tell anybody, not even her
grandmother or her brothers when she had the opportunity to do so,^[17]
but that she merely cleaned the house immediately thereafter and went to
school.^[18]

But the trial court, in correctly interpreting the said acts of
the private complainant, stated, thus:

xxx                               xxx                   xxx

In fact, Lea even testified that she kept to herself what happened
to her on the first and second occasions because she was ashamed for others to
know it.  It was only on the third
occasion that she had the courage to reveal to her brothers, who were also
minors like her, as to what their father did to her.  It was thru the advice of a neighbor and a
friend of her mother that she was able to collect herself and finally run away
from home which she failed to do before because of the threat on her life by
her father.

Lea preferred to keep to herself her sad and embarrassing
experience as she could not even face her brother, Cesar, who saw what her
father did to her on December 24,
1978 when he was awakened from his sleep (page 11, TSN of December 16, 1981).  These acts of the complainant convincingly
show that she is a typical Filipina girl who is ashamed to let the public know
that she was molested and sexually abused, more so by her own father.^[19]

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

In any case, whatever inconsistencies there are refer only to
minor details and “do not, in actuality, touch upon the basic aspects of
the who, the how, and the when, of the crimes committed.”^[20]
On the contrary, minor discrepancies in the testimonies of two or more witnesses
are but natural and would even enhance their credibility as witnesses, because these indicate that
the responses given were honest and unrehearsed.^[21]

The bottomline is that the simple
denial and flimsy defense of the father uncorroborated by any other witness can
not prevail over the straightforward and unequivocal testimony of his teen-age
daughter.  It is most ironic that at the
very moment when the young girl needed greater love and care upon the loss of her
mother, her father instead inflicted upon her this tragic fate that is often
times worse than death itself.  She must
have wished rather that she had joined her departed mother.

“When beasts prey on the flesh of their own kind, they must
be slain.  If they cannot be slain, they must be caged–for
good.”^[22]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity is increased to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00).  With costs against the
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Hererra, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 41-42.

^[2]
Hon. Zenaida S. Baltazar,
Presiding Judge.

^[3]
Rollo, 29.

^[4]
Id., 61 (3-5).

^[5]
Id., 43-44.

^[6]
Id., 41.

^[7]
People vs. Manuel Cui, Jr. y Caballes, G.R.
No. L-48084, June 20, 1988.

^[8]
Id.

^[9]
People v. Bartolome Galang,
G.R. No. 70713, June 29, 1989.

^[10]
People v. Vicente Managbanag, G.R. No. 66550, November 27, 1987.

^[11]
Rollo, 61 (6).

^[12]
Id., 61 (7-10)

^[13]
TSN, August 5, 1987, 98-100.

^[14]
TSN, September 30, 1987,
113.

^[15]
Rollo, 46.

^[16]
TSN, 28-29, February 16, 1982.

^[17]
TSN, 38, March 7, 1982.

^[18]
TSN, 5, 8, December 16, 1978.

^[19]
Rollo,, 28-29.

^[20]
People v. Pableo Cabeltes,
G.R. Nos. L-38145-48, June 29, 1979
(91 SCRA 208).

^[21]
Peole v. Antonio Agudo,
et al., G.R. No. L-23796, July 15,
1985 (137 SCRA 516).

^[22]
Rollo, 61 (13).