PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL MATRIMONIO Y PADILLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Rowena Matrimonio, a girl of fourteen (14) years in
December of 1985, was unlike
many of the youths of her age in our country. She was the first to be born into a common-law relationship between a
man and a woman who did not think of legalizing their
union despite the succeeding births of four (4) more children. She was no stranger to poverty; both her
father and mother were itinerant vendors — he of sweepstakes tickets and she
of children’s toys. As if these adverse
circumstances were not enough, she underwent, at such a tender and innocent
age, a most painful, terrifying and horrifying experience the memory of which
will forever haunt her. She was
sexually molested — not once but twice — by her own natural father, the
herein appellant, in their own home in Sampaloc, Manila. The first assault occurred on 27 December
1985. As a consequence of this
most unnatural and revolting act, she became pregnant. The second took place on 5 April 1986. On both occasions, she had no choice but
yield her body and honor because he had threatened to kill her, her mother and her
siblings. It was only after the second
incident that she decided to reveal his bestial deeds.

On 25 June 1986,
Rowena, accompanied by her maternal uncle, proceeded to the General Assignment Section (GAS) of the Western Police
District (WPD) of Manila to report her painful ordeal. She was investigated and thereafter made to
execute a sworn statement.^[1] On that date, upon the advice of P/Capt. Harrison Tolosa of the GAS, she
submitted to a physical and genital examination which was conducted by Dr.
Marcial Ceñido, Medico-Legal Officer of the WPD Medico-Legal
Section; the latter issued a written report indicating therein the
following findings and opinion:

x x x

“1.  Breasts are hemispherical in shape, engorged,
and with dark brown prominent nipples and areolae;

2.     
Abdomen is enlarged, with fundus of the uterus two (2) fingers
breadth above the umbilicus, fetal head at hypogastrium and positive for fetal
heart beats;

3.     
Hymen is circular in shape, thin and with a deep old
healed laceration at 6 o’clock position and gaping;

4.     
Introitus vagina admits two (2) examining fingers with
moderate resistance;

5.     
External cervical os is round and normal in consistency; and

6.     
Last menstrual period — November 26, 1985 for one (1) week.

OPINION:

The above findings is (sic)
consistent with uterine pregnancy on or
about the 7th month of
gestation.”^[2]

Also
on that date, on the basis of Rowena’s sworn statement and Dr. Ceñido’s
findings, the police arrested and booked the appellant.^[3]

On 26 June 1986, after an
ex-parte investigation, Rowena signed two (2) complaints for rape. Duly subscribed and sworn to by her before
Assistant Fiscal Macairog L. De Vega who appropriately certified the same, the
complaints were filed on that date with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-46285 and
Criminal Case No. 86-46286. The first
complaint reads:

“The undersigned complainant accuses MANUEL MATRIMONIO y
PADILLA of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about December 27,1985, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being the
father of the undersigned complainant, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
abuse of confidence, by means of threats and intimidation, and taking advantage
of undersigned’s youth and weakness, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned,
a minor, 14 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[4]

while
the second provides as follows:

“The undersigned complainant accuses MANUEL MATRIMONIO y
PADILLA of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about April 5, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being the father of the undersigned complainant, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with abuse of confidence, by means of threats and intimidation, and taking
advantage of undersigned’s youth and weakness, have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned, a minor, 14 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[5]

Both cases were
originally raffled off to Branches 45 and 47, respectively, of the court a
quo.

Appellant entered a plea
of not guilty at his arraignment on 17 July 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-46286
(Branch 47).^[6] He entered the same plea at his arraignment on
4 August 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-46285 (Branch 45).^[7] Trial in the latter commenced on 25 August
1986.^[8]

Appellant moved for a
consolidation of Criminal Case No. 86-46286 in Branch 47 with Criminal Case No.
86-46285 in Branch 45, which was granted, subject to the conformity of the Presiding Judge of Branch 45, in the
Order of 9 September 1986.^[9] The latter did not object to the
consolidation. As a result, the two (2)
cases were jointly tried in Branch 45.

The prosecution presented
as its witnesses the victim, Rowena Matrimonio, policeman Cresencio S. Martin
and Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Marcial Ceñido for its evidence in chief, and
recalled Rowena and Yolanda Infante, her mother, as its witnesses on
rebuttal. The defense presented the
accused as its sole witness.

In a Decision dated 5
October 1987^[10] but promulgated on 28 October 1987, the
trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in both criminal cases, and
sentenced him:

“x x x to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the
first rape on December 27, 1985 and the same penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the second rape on April 5,
1986.”^[11]

A day after the
promulgation, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal wherein he manifested
his intention to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals.^[12] Nevertheless, in view of the penalty
imposed, the trial court forwarded to this Court the records of both
cases. This Court accepted the appeal
in the Resolution of 13 April 1987.^[13]

The version of the
prosecution, as developed by its evidence and upon which the judgment of
conviction is based, is as
follows:

Rowena, the eldest in a
brood of five (5) siblings — four (4) brothers and a sister — born out of the
common-law relationship between the appellant and Yolanda Infante, lived with
her family in the second storey of a house in Gerardo St., Balic-balic,
Sampaloc, Manila on and prior to 27 December 1985. In that month, she was a mere fourteen (14) year old first year
high school student.

At 11:00 o’clock in the
evening of that date, while sleeping beside her brother Eduardo and their “ampon”
Marites Garcia in their sala, she
suddenly noticed her father, the appellant herein, sitting beside her. When she asked him why he was there, he told
her not to shout or else he would
kill her.^[14] She believed this because “x
x x kung gumulpi po siya sa nakababata kong
kapatid ay parang papatayin
niya.”^[15]
He then held her left arm, pressed his knee on her right arm and covered
her mouth with his left hand; thereupon, he removed her panty. At that time, he was only wearing his
briefs. He then positioned himself on top of her. She attempted to
resist but “tinatakot po niya ako na papatayin niya ang apat (4)
kong kapatid at aking nanay kung
hindi ko ibibigay.” So, “[P]inagbigyan ko na po dahil sa maliliit pa po ang aking mga kapatid at
ang nanay ko rin po na siyang naghahanapbuhay sa amin.”^[16]
He then forced his private organ into
her private organ. He succeeded in
raping her — “Ginahasa po ako ng tatay ko.” Asked to explain what that means, she
answered: “Hinalay po
niya ako.”^[17] Notwithstanding the fact that she suffered
pain in her private organ until the following morning, she did not reveal her
ordeal to anyone because the appellant warned her not to; he said that if she
did, he would kill her four (4) brothers, her sister and her mother.^[18] It was this assault which caused her
pregnancy.^[19]

On 5 April 1986, at about
8:00 o’clock in the morning, while alone in the sala of their house after
having served breakfast to her two (2)
brothers and a sister at the
kitchen located in the ground floor, Rowena was sexually assaulted again by the
appellant. As in the first assault, she
gave in because of fear; he told her that if she would say anything to anybody,
he would kill her brothers, sister and mother. He placed himself on top
of her, inserted his private organ into hers, kissed her and fondled her breasts. At that time, her mother
had already left to sell her wares. Eduardo had gone to school while the brothers and sister she had fed
were playing downstairs.^[20] Afraid that the appellant would sexually
molest her again, she left on 6 April 1986 for her grandfather’s residence
in Sapang Palay, Bulacan where she stayed until 1 June 1986.^[21] On 2 June 1986, the appellant, Rowena and
her mother, Yolanda, met at a restaurant in Quiapo, Manila. The appellant then suggested, and Yolanda agreed, that Rowena be taken to
the house of a friend in Dasmariñas, Cavite to “hide” her there
because she was already seven (7) months into her pregnancy.^[22]
On their way to Dasmariñas, Cavite, she
confided everything to her mother. The
latter then told her brother, Manuel Infante, and Rowena’s uncle about what
happened. Both convinced Rowena to file
the case against the appellant. Consequently, on 25 June 1986, Rowena, accompanied by her uncle Manuel,
went to the General Assignment Section (GAS) of the Western Police District of
Manila to report the sexual assaults.^[23]

On 11 September 1986,
Rowena gave birth to a male child at the Jose Fabella Hospital; this child was
given by Rowena’s mother, Yolanda, to a person who brought him to Canada.^[24]

Upon the other hand,
appellant admitted having had sexual intercourse with Rowena but denied that he
forced or coerced her into giving in to his advances for the truth of the
matter is that without Yolanda’s knowledge, he and Rowena lived as husband and
wife for about one (1) year and fifteen (15) days. The relationship started in 27 December 1985 when he and Yolanda quarreled, because the
latter came home drunk, and Rowena offered herself to him. Yolanda discovered the relationship when
Rowena was in the seventh month
of her pregnancy; both parents thus agreed
to take Rowena to Cavite to hide such pregnancy. However, Rowena first stayed in Sapang Palay for about four (4)
months during which time she and the appellant allegedly met every Saturday in
Pateros Street in Quiapo to watch movies. The
appellant claims that he continued having sexual intercourse with Rowena after
the 27 December 1985 incident. These
alleged trysts would usually take place in a motel at the corner of Avenida and
Bangbang streets in Manila; there were times that they would sleep over
in the said motel.^[25]

On cross-examination,
appellant admitted that Yolanda is only his common-law wife and revealed for
the first time that he is legally married to a certain Leticia
Soriano who is still alive. He thus
considers Yolanda as “my second wife.” He also claimed for the first
time that the complainant, Rowena, is not really his daughter because when he
started living with Yolanda, the latter was already seven (7) months
pregnant with Rowena.^[26]

On rebuttal, Rowena
vigorously denied the appellant’s assertions and declared that she had never
lived as the latter’s wife; he is her father; she did not offer herself to him
because of such fact; she yielded to him only because of the threats he
employed; she did not meet him on Saturdays; and she has not gone to any motel
and does not even know how one looks like.^[27]

Yolanda also took the
witness stand to refute the claim of the appellant that Rowena is not his
daughter.^[28]

Confronted with the
foregoing diametrically opposed versions, the trial court found no difficulty in
giving full faith and credit to the story of Rowena and in discrediting that of
the appellant. The following is its
exposition:

“The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
raped his own daughter, Rowena, on December 27, 1985 and April 5, 1986,
intimidating her in both instances to submit to his evil desire — the circumstances of the second rape, being
almost identical to those of the first rape.

Rowena was fourteen (14) years old and a first year high school
student when she was deflowered on December 27, 1985 x x x. She was (sic) the eldest of the five (5)
children of the accused and Yolanda Infante x x x. When she saw her
father seated beside her at about ’11:00 o’clock in the evening’ of December
27, 1985 x x x she ‘did not think about anything bad’ but when he threatened to
kill her if she will shout, she believed that he will do what he threatened,
‘kasi kung gumulpi po siya sa nakababata kong kapatid ay parang papatayin niya’
x x x. Rowena’s awareness of his
cruelty shocked her more when he told her that he will kill her mother and her
brothers and sisters (sic) ‘kung hindi ko ibibigay’
x x x.

It is thus, without hesitation that the Court finds that there was
intimidation sufficient to overcome the will of Rowena to resist the assault
upon her honor. Assuredly, the force
and intimidation employed should be appreciated in relation to her youth and
her fear of her assailant, her own father. So it has been held that ‘the force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age,
size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other’.

Manuel Matrimonio is her own father — ­and since birth had
exercised strong moral and physical influence and control over her. A young daughter’s regard for her father naturally intervened in such a revolting
and dastardly occurrence.

In the words of the Supreme Court in PEOPLE vs. OYDOC, 125 SCRA 250, 256:

‘One should not expect a fourteen-year old girl to act like an
adult or mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under such
difficult circumstances and who would have the courage and intelligence to
disregard a threat on her life and the members of her family and complain
immediately that she had been forcibly deflowered. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their virtue
because of the rapists’ threat on their lives, more so when the rapist is the child’s own stepfather, living with her’.

The Court is, therefore, persuaded to view Rowena’s failure to
promptly disclose to her mother ‘the details of her defoliation’ (sic) in the
‘light of the mental shock and trauma that must have overwhelmed her’ as
stressed by the Supreme Court in PEOPLE vs. SANTOS, 94 SCRA 277, cited in
People vs. Oydoc, supra., p. 257.

The Court finds the testimony of the accused that ‘Rowena offered
herself’ to him when he and Rowena’s mother quarreled on December 27, 1985, a
blatant lie and the irrefutable proof of the beast in him, of his shameless
lust for the human flesh, be it of his own flesh and blood.

Rowena belied the same in this wise: ‘that is not true, sir. Why should I offer myself to him when I know that he is my father?’ (August
7, 1987, t.s.n., p. 3).

In those few and simple words, Rowena proved her regard for her
father — and her contempt of (sic) what he did to her.

Rowena appeared to the Court as one who has not overcome the trauma
of her misfortune — and would rather keep to herself the ignominy of her sad
experience. In fact, the records will
show that she (sic) first took the witness stand, the Court had to reset the
reception of her testimony as she was too reluctant
to talk and that, when she decided to testify, she cried in open Court — ­obviously
‘still possessed of the traditional and proverbial modesty of the Filipina’ who
would not have filed this complaint against her own father and ‘suffered the
torment, if not ignominy, of having to testify in a court of justice about the
wrong done to her’ by her own father, if in truth she was not
really raped.

Rowena gave her story to the Court and ‘she gave it under the
solemnity of an oath under the gaze of a public trial.’ She submitted her
private organ to medical examination. She unraveled the sordid details of her own perdition. Certainly, nothing could be more humiliating
and painful to a young girl as Rowena. ‘It was the truth of her story that gave her the courage and boldness
fearlessly to face interrogation, and medical examination, both effective means
of verifying the truth of her serious accusation’ (People vs. Clarin,
108 SCRA, 680, 692).”^[29]

In his Appellant’s Brief filed on 23 August 1988, appellant
contends that in convicting him, the court a quo erred:

“I

X X X IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE DEFENSE.

II

X X X IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED UNDER CRIM.
CASE NO. 86-46225 (sic) AND CRIM. CASE NO. 86-46486 (sic), DESPITE THE APPARENT
CONSENT GIVEN BY THE COMPLAINANT IN BOTH INSTANCES.

III

X X X IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”^[30]

In support thereof,
appellant insists that the sexual
intercourse that occurred on
27 December 1985 was with the consent
of Rowena who was rather passive, if not submissive to his sexual
advances. Considering that she shared
the same room with her brother, adopted sister and mother who were all asleep,
it was highly improbable that her brother and sister, who were lying beside
her, were not awakened by her supposed struggle when the accused stayed on top
of her for thirty (30) minutes. Moreover, her permissiveness provided the appellant with enough
confidence to consummate the act despite the fact that the room was well-lit;
what he was doing could have been easily seen by the other occupants therein
had any one of them awakened.

He also alleges that if
there was any threat employed by him, the same was not sufficient to prevent
the complainant from resisting since he was unarmed. He contends that based on the complainant’s own testimony
regarding her attitude towards her father immediately after the 27 December
1985 incident, the threat, if any, had already ceased to exist. When she left home on 10 April 1986 to stay
with her grandparents in Sapang Palay, she had all the chances to reveal the
matter to them but she opted to remain silent. That it took the complainant five (5) months from the 27th of December
before lodging the complaints against the appellant casts much doubt on the
veracity of her story.

Appellant further claims that the testimony of the complainant as
to when the alleged rapes were revealed to her mother is inconsistent with the
testimony given by the mother herself. He faults the victim’s mother for not taking any steps to protect her
daughter despite knowledge of the victim’s pregnancy three (3) weeks before 5
April 1986.

As to the second rape committed on 5 April 1986, appellant claims
that there was no sufficient resistance put up by the complainant. He maintains that “there must be
physical struggle taking her
power to the utmost.”^[31]
Hence, he claims that the prosecution
miserably failed to establish the element of force and intimidation.

In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects all the contentions of the
appellant and prays for the affirmance in toto of the appealed
decision. It maintains that the
decisive fact in this case is the appellant’s admission of having had sexual
intercourse with Rowena, and considers his story in support thereof as
“seemingly ridiculous, comical and humorous.”^[32]
It avers that at the time of the commission of the offense, the appellant,
being the complainant’s father, still had moral ascendancy and influence over
her; hence, it was not necessary for her to have put up a determined resistance
against his molestations. A teenage
unmarried lass would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it
were not true. Besides, the records are
bereft of any evil motive which would
have moved Rowena to charge her father with rape.

In evaluating the
evidence in cases of rape this Court has consistently adhered to the following principles: a) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape where only two (2)
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.^[33]

This adherence is
consistent with the constitutional guaranty
enjoyed by an accused that he is
presumed innocent until proven guilty.^[34] A finding of guilt must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind;^[35] it should not be based on a mere accusation
for an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt.^[36]

In most rape cases, however, the culpability of the offender
invariably hinges on the story of the complainant^[37]
since the crime of rape is not normally committed in the presence of witnesses. This Court is therefore duty bound to
carefully scrutinize and closely examine the complainant’s testimony that the
accused indeed committed the crime. Corollarily, conviction of the accused should not be made to rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of the complainant unless the latter’s story is impeccable
and rings true throughout, or bears the stamp of absolute truth and candor.^[38]

Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie
heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court.^[39]
Accordingly, in the appreciation of the evidence, the appellate court accords
due deference to the trial court’s views on who should be given credence^[40]
since the latter is in a better position to decide the question of the
credibility of witnesses, having seen and heard these witnesses and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during trial.^[41] The
trial court’s findings concerning the
credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect^[42] and will be sustained by the appellate court
unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result.^[43]

After carefully examining the records and sifting through the evidence, We find no compelling reason
to disturb the findings of the trial
court.

The assigned errors
present only one crucial issue: whether
appellant committed the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 86-46285 and in
Criminal Case No. 86-46286. He contends
that he did not because Rowena consented to the sexual acts alleged
therein. The trial court found
otherwise and ruled that the latter yielded because of intimidation. It further declared that the acts were
committed against her will.

The pertinent portion of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

“ART. 335. When and
how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or
intimidation.”

x x x

We sustain the trial court for the prosecution’s evidence proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intimidated Rowena into consummating
the sexual acts with him on 27 December 1985 and 5 April 1986. He conveniently availed of two (2) forms of intimidation: threats and his overpowering moral
influence. With respect to the first
incident, he craftily threatened her during the initial stage by telling her
not to shout or else she would be killed; he also threatened the lives of her
mother, sister and brothers to force her to yield her honor and privacy when he
was already on top of her. To an innocent girl who was then barely
fourteen (14) years old, the threat engendered in her a well-grounded fear that
if she dared resist or frustrate the bestial desires of the appellant, she, her
siblings and her mother would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore,
subjective. It must be viewed in the
light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of
the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. We have said before that the workings of the human mind when placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout;
some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may
openly welcome the intrusion.^[44] The test
for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is whether it
produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield
to the bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to do
would happen to her, or those dear to her — in this case, her mother, sister
and brothers. Where such degree of intimidation exists, and the
victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering
resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to
resist with all her might and strength. And even if some degree of resistance would nevertheless be futile,
offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape to exist, it is not
necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so
great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that
the force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.^[45] This is especially true in the case of a
young, innocent and immature girl like Rowena, who could not have been expected
to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel;^[46] or to act like an adult or mature and experienced
woman who would know what to do under the circumstances; or to have the courage
and intelligence to disregard the threat.^[47]

As if these threats were not enough, appellant took full
advantage of his moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter who loves and
respects him as a father. Even after
being belatedly disowned by him during his last few minutes at the witness box
on cross-examination, Rowena remained steadfast in her claim that he is her
father. That sudden, surprising and
shocking disclaimer — which was also vehemently denied by Rowena’s mother, Yolanda — reflected either
the heaviness of his conscience now troubled by the evil he had done to his daughter and which he perhaps felt could be lessened by a rejection
of the father-daughter relationship or the total degeneration of an aberrant mind.

In a rape committed by a
father against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence
over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation.^[48] That ascendancy or influence necessarily
flows from the father’s parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the
children’s duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their
parents. Such reverence and respect are
deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law.^[49] Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughter’s will,
thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.

We have applied the
foregoing principle in the case of a sexual assault of a
stepdaughter by her stepfather,^[50] and of a goddaughter by a godfather in the
sacrament of confirmation.^[51]

Then too, as early as 1901, in United States vs. Ramos,^[52]
this Court already ruled that
“[w]hen a woman testifies that she has been raped she says,
in effect, that all that is necessary to constitute the commission of this
crime has been committed.” If this rule, already deeply embedded in our
jurisprudence, applies to any man committing the crime of rape, then a victim’s
testimony would be entitled to greater weight when the accusing words are said
against a close relative, as in the case of a father by a daughter,^[53] son-in-law by a mother-in-law^[54] or an uncle by a niece.^[55] In the instant case, We could hardly believe
that Rowena would fabricate a story
of defloration and charge her father with two (2) counts of rape unless these
were true. At her tender age, she
needed the company, care and support of a father and mother. She certainly realized that by her
accusations, her father would be deprived of his liberty and thrown into prison
to serve along sentence. She was also
aware that by testifying, she made public a painful and humiliating secret
which others would have simply kept to themselves forever, jeopardized her
chances of marriage or foreclosed the possibility of a blissful married life^[56]
as her husband may not fully understand the excruciatingly painful experience
which would haunt her. She further
realized too well that her denunciations against her own father would only
bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation.^[57]
These considerations are enough
to strengthen Our conviction that Rowena was telling the truth and was not inspired by any other motive than
to obtain justice^[58] for the grievous wrong committed against
her, to have the same punished, to have the full force of the law take its
course against her father and, hopefully, even if it would seem impossible, to
reform the latter. It was not vindictiveness which moved her to file the cases against the appellant. Then again, it is equally settled that no
young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she had been ravished
and abused unless it is the truth.^[59] Appellant has not shown that Rowena,
notwithstanding her illegitimate status, for which she is entirely blameless as
she did not choose who her parents should be, and the social and economic environment in which she was reared, has lost the innate decency and
modesty of a Filipina.

That she reported the sexual
assaults six (6) months after the first intercourse does not weaken her
case. Delay in reporting a rape case committed by a father against his daughter due to threats is justified.^[60]

The version of the
appellant that he and his daughter Rowena were living together as husband and
wife since 27 December 1985 in their own house with her mother, that Rowena
freely gave her consent to the sexual assaults and that they even had Saturday
sessions in a Manila motel to consummate their mutual passions, is simply
incredible and improbable. It is an
affront to Filipino values and an assault on the intelligence; it offends
sensibilities. The story could only be
concocted by a morally corrupt and mentally depraved sex maniac. Such is the appellant who
committed the most dastardly, if not diabolical, act any man could commit: the rape of his awn daughter — his own
flesh and blood. What this Court said, through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in People vs. Ramos,^[61]
is worth repeating:

“Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of
all decent persons who recognize that a woman’s cherished chastity is hers
alone to surrender of her own free will. Whoever violates that will descends to the level of the odious beast. The act becomes doubly repulsive where the
outrage is perpetrated on one’s own flesh and blood for the culprit is reduced
to lower than the lowly animal. The
latter yields only to biological impulses and is unfettered by social
inhibitions when it mates with its own kin, but the man who rapes his own
daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the mores of his
society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal greed on her in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a
human being and is justly spurned by all, not least of all by the fruit of his
own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and shameless
lechery.”

He
has forsaken that which is the highest and noblest in his human nature and thus
deserves no place in society. It is
hoped that others who had suffered the same fate as Rowena would be
inspired by her courage to expose the evil deeds unworthy fathers may have
committed. This world would surely be
different without these beasts.

The affirmance of the appellant’s convictions in the two (2)
cases subject of this appeal is inevitable. He should, however, be condemned to pay
moral and exemplary damages which the trial court failed to impose. Of course, since the appellant was only a vendor of sweepstakes tickets and has
been in prison since 25 June 1986, it would be impossible for him to satisfy
any award for damages. Nevertheless, it
must be imposed for the
circumstances in these cases warrant the award of moral damages under Article
2219(3) in relation to Article 2217 of the Civil Code. We hereby fix the award at P50,000.00 in
each of the two (2) appealed cases. As
for exemplary damages, provided for under Article 2229 of the same Code, We
hereby set the same at P25,000.00 in each of the said cases. Exemplary damages are herein imposed to
deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their own daughters.

Also, We find that the
trial court should have appreciated against the appellant the alternative circumstance
of relationship provided for in Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code considering that the offended party is a descendant of the appellant. Even if not alleged in the informations, it
was duly proven without objection on the part of the appellant. In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is aggravating.^[62]
However, it would not affect the penalty in each of the two (2) cases herein
involved — reclusion perpetua — because it is an indivisible penalty which must,
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the crime.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of Branch 45 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 86-46285 and Criminal Case
No. 86-46286 is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification above
indicated. As modified, moral and
exemplary damages, in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively,
are awarded to the offended party, ROWENA I. MATRIMONIO, in each of the said
cases.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Exhibit “A”, Original
Records, Criminal Case No. 86-46285, 62.

^[2]
Exhibit “F”, Original
Records, Criminal Case No. 86-46285,
65.

^[3]
Exhibit “C”, Id., 64.

^[4]
Id., 1.

^[5]
Original Records, Criminal Case No.
86-46286, 1.

^[6]
Id., 9.

^[7]
Id., Criminal Case No. 86-46285, 3.

^[8]
Id., 11.

^[9]
Id., Criminal Case No. 86-46286, op. cit., 26.

^[10]
Original Records, Criminal Case No.
86-46286, 87-94; Rollo, 14-21; per Judge Andres E. Matias.

^[11]
Id., 93; Id., 20.

^[12]
Id., 98; Id., 22.

^[13]
Id., 25.

^[14]
TSN, 5 January 1987, 2-4.

^[15]
TSN, 2 March 1987, 9.

^[16]
TSN, 23 February 1987, 3-4.

^[17]
TSN, 5 January 1987, 3.

^[18]
TSN, 23 February 1987, 6.

^[19]
Id., 8.

^[20]
Id., 7-8.

^[21]
Id.,10.

^[22]
TSN, 7 August 1987, 15-16; TSN, 2 March
1987, 18.

^[23]
Id., 7 August 1987, 11; TSN, 23 February 1987, 11-12; 21-22.

^[24]
Id., 23 February 1987, 8–9.

^[25]
TSN, 29 July 1987, 2-5.

^[26]
Id., 6.

^[27]
TSN, 7 August 1987, 3-5.

^[28]
TSN, 7 August 1987, 88.

^[29]
Rollo, 18-20.

^[30]
Rollo, 40.

^[31]
Rollo, 59.

^[32]
Id., 81.

^[33]
People vs. Aldana, 175 SCRA 635
[1989]; People vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313 [1990]; People vs.
Alburo, 184 SCRA 655 [1990]; People vs. Leoparte, 187 SCRA 190 [1990];
People vs. Saldivia, 203 SCRA 461 [1991]; People vs. Tismo, 204
SCRA 535 [1991].

^[34]
Section 14(2), Article III, 1987
Constitution.

^[35]
Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

^[36]
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59
[1971]; People vs. Zamora, 54 SCRA 47 [1973].

^[37]
People vs. Pido, 200 SCRA 45
[1991].

^[38]
People vs. Nebres, 58 Phil. 903
[1933]; People vs. Ariarte, 60 Phil. 326 [1934]; People vs. Delfinado, 61 Phil. 694 [1935]; People vs. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259
[1984]; People vs; Permison, 199 SCRA 635 [1991].

^[39]
People vs. Malate, 116 SCRA 487
[1982]; People vs. Veloso, 148 SCRA 60 [1987]; People vs.
Partulan, 156 SCRA 489 [1987]; People vs. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 (1989]; People vs. Tablizo, 182 SCRA 739 [1990]; People vs.
Albarillo, 188 SCRA 113 [1990].

^[40]
People vs. Ordonio, 68 SCRA 397 [1975].

^[41] People vs. Bantac, 167
SCRA 109 [1988]; People vs. De la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416 [1990]; People vs.
Beringuel, 192 SCRA 561 [1990].

^[42]
People vs. De la Victoria, 64
SCRA 400 [1975]; People vs. Moises, 66 SCRA 151 [1975]; People vs.
Advincula, 96 SCRA 875 [1980]; People vs. Aguel, 97 SCRA 795 [1980];
People vs. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141 [1985]; People vs. Salvilla, 184
SCRA 671 [1990].

^[43]
People vs. Pascual, 80 SCRA 1
[1977]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Marzan,
128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985].

^[44]
People vs. Cabradilla, 133 SCRA 413 [1984].

^[45]
People vs. Savellano, 57 SCRA
320 [1974].

^[46]
People vs. Viray, 164 SCRA 135
[1988]; People vs. Fernandez, 165 SCRA 302 [1988]; People vs.
Cariño, 167 SCRA 285 [1988]; People vs. Sarra, 183 SCRA 34 [1990].

^[47]
People vs. Jimenez, 200 SCRA 539
[1991].

^[48]
People vs. Erardo, 127 SCRA 250
[1984]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 [1990]; People vs.
Caballes, 199 SCRA 152 [1991].

^[49]
Article 311, Civil Code; Article 211,
The Family Code of the Philippines.

^[50]
People vs. Robles, 170 SCRA 557
[1989].

^[51]
People vs. Alcid, supra.

^[52]
1 Phil. 81, 82 [1901].

^[53]
People vs. Cariño, supra.

^[54]
People vs. Alvis, 117 SCRA 362 [1982].

^[55]
People vs. Soterol, 140 SCRA 400
[1985].

^[56]
People vs. Vinas, 202 SCRA 720
[1991].

^[57]
People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511
[1978].

^[58]
People vs. Ignacio, 60 SCRA 11
[1974]; People vs. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 [1991]; People vs. Vinas, supra.

^[59]
People vs. Taño, 109 Phil. 912
[1960]; People vs. Bulosan, 160 SCRA 492 [1988]; People vs.
Fernandez, 165 SCRA 302 [1988]; People vs. Pasco, 181 SCRA 233 [1990];
People vs. Santiago, 197 SCRA 556 [1991].

^[60]
People vs. Rosario, 159 SCRA 192
[1988]; People vs. Cariño, supra,; People vs.
Lucas, supra.; People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 208 [1990]; People vs. Vinas,
supra.

^[61]
165 SCRA 400, 408 [1988].

^[62]
People vs. Porras, 58 Phil. 578
[1933]; People vs. Lucas, supra., at 327.