STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. AND STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF AMERICA, NT & SA, HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, AND THE COURT …

The chief question in the appeal at bar is whether or not foreign
banks licensed to do business in the Philippines, may be considered “residents
of the Philippine Islands” within the meaning of Section 20 of the
Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended, eff. May
20, 1909) reading in part as follows:^[1]

“An adjudication of insolvency may be made on the petition of
three or more creditors, residents of the Philippine Islands, whose
credits or demands accrued in the Philippine Islands, and the amount of which
credits or demands are in the aggregate not less than one thousand pesos:  Provided, that none of said creditors has
become a creditor by assignment, however made, within thirty days prior to the
filing of said petition.  Such petition
must be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city in which
the debtor resides or has his principal place of business, and must be verified
by at least three (3) of the petitioners * *.”

The foreign banks involved in the controversy are Bank of America
NT and SA, Citibank N.A. and Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation.  On December 11, 1981, they jointly
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for involuntary insolvency of Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI), which
they amended four days later.^[2]
The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9263 and assigned to Branch 28 of the
Court.

The petition for involuntary insolvency alleged:

1) that CMI had obtained loans front the three petitioning banks,
and that as of November/Decembers, 1981, its outstanding obligations were as
follows:

2) that in November, 1981, State Investment House, Inc., (SIHI)
and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI) had separately instituted actions for
collection of sums of money and damages in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against CMI, docketed respectively as Civil Cases
Numbered 43588 and 43677; and that on application of said plaintiffs, writs of
preliminary attachment had been issued which were executed on “the royalty/profit
sharing payments due CMI from Benguet Consolidated
Mining, Inc;” and

3) that CMI had “committed specific acts of insolvency as
provided in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law, to wit:

* * *

‘5.  that he (CMI) has suffered his (CMI’s) property to remain under attachment or legal process
for three days for the purpose of hindering or delaying or defrauding his (CMI’s) creditors;

***                    ***                    ***

’11.  that being a merchant or tradesman he (CMI)
has generally defaulted in the payment of his (CMI’s)
current obligations for a period of thirty days; * * *.”‘

The petition was opposed by State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI)
and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI).^[3]
It claimed that :

1) the three petitioner banks had come to court with unclean hands
in that they filed the petition for insolvency — alleging the CMI was defauding its creditors, and they wished all creditors to
share in its assets — although a few days earlier, they had “received for
the account of CMI substantial payments aggregating P10,800,000.00;”

2) the Court had no jurisdiction because the alleged acts of
insolvency were false:  the writs of
attachment against CMI had remained in force because there were “just,
valid and lawful grounds for the(ir) issuance,”
and CMI was not a “merchant or tradesman” nor had it “generally
defaulted in the payment of (its) obligations for a period of thirty days * *
;”

3) the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for insolvency because petitioners are not resident
creditors of CMI in contemplation of the Insolvency Law; and

4) the Court has no power to set aside the attachment issued in
favor of intervenors-oppositors SIHI and SFCI.

CMI filed its Answer to the petition for insolvency, asserting in
the main that it was not insoIvent,^[4]
and later filed a “Motion to Dismiss Based on Affirmative Defense of
Petitioner’s Lack of Capacity to Sue,” echoing the theory of SIHI and SFCI
that the petitioner banks are not “Philippine residents.”^[5]
Resolution on the motion was “deferred until after hearing of the case on the
merits” it appearing to the Court that the grounds therefor
did not appear to be indubitable.^[6]

SIHI and SFCI filed their own Answer-in-Intervention,^[7]
and served on the three petitioner banks requests for admission of certain
facts in accordance with Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,^[8]
receiving a response only from Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank.^[9]

SIHI and SFCI then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated May
23, 1983 “on the ground that, based on the pleadings and admissions on record,
the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate CMI insolvent since the
petitioners (respondent foreign banks) are not ‘resident creditors’ of CMI as
required under the Insolvency Law.”^[10]
Oppositions to the motion were filed,^[11]
to which a reply was submitted.^[12]

The Regional Trial Court^[13]
found merit in the motion for summary judgment. 
By Order dated October 10,
1983, it rendered “summary judgment dismissing the ** petition for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, with costs against petitioners.”^[14]
It ruled that on the basis of the “facts on record, as shown in the pleadings,
motions and admissions of the parties, an insolvency court could “not acquire
jurisdiction to adjudicate the debtor as insolvent if the creditors petitioning
for adjudication of insolvency are not ‘residents’ of the Philippines” —
citing a decision of the California Supreme Court which it declared “squarely
applicable especially considering that one of the sources of our Insolvency Law
is the Insolvency Act of California of 1895 **.” And it declared that
since petitioners had been merely licensed to do business in the Philippines,
they could not be deemed residents thereof.

The three foreign banks sought to take an appeal from the Order
of October 10, 1983.  They filed a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal.^[15]
SIHI and SFCI moved to dismiss their appeal claiming it was attempted out of
time.  The Trial Court denied the motion.

SIHI and SFCI filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition (G.R. No. 66449), impugning that denial.  The Court dismissed the petition and instead
required the three banks to file a petition for review in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.^[16]
This the banks did (their petition was docketed as G.R. No.  66804). 
However, by Resolution dated May
16, 1984, the Court referred the petition for review to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, where it was docketed as AC SP-03674.^[17]

In the meantime, the Trial Court approved on May 3, 1985 the banks’ record on appeal and
transmitted it to this Court, where it was recorded as UDK-6866.  As might have been expected, this Court
required the banks to file a petition for review under Rule 45, but they asked
to be excused from doing so since they had already filed such a petition, which
had been referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court and was there pending as
AC-G.R. No. SP 03674, supra.  This
Court then also referred UDK-6866 to the Intermediate Appellate Court where it
was docketed as AC-G.R. No. CV 07830.

Both referred cases, AC-G.R. No. SP 03674 and AC-G.R. No. CV
07830, were consolidated by Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 9, 1986, and Decision thereon
was promulgated on July 14, 1987
by the Fifteenth Division of said Court.^[18]

The Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court’s Order of October 10, 1983 and remanded the
case to it for further proceedings.  It
ruled:

1) that the purpose of the Insolvency Law was “to convert the
assets of the bankrupt in cash for distribution among creditors, and then to
relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start life anew, free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes;”^[19]
and that it was “crystal clear” that the law was “designed not
only for the benefit of the creditors but more importantly for the benefit of
the debtor himself,” the object being “to provide not only for the
suspension of payments and the protection of creditors but also the discharge
of insolvent honest debtors to enable them to have a fresh start;”

2) that the Trial Court had placed “a very strained and
restrictive interpretation of the term ‘resident,’ as to exclude foreign banks
which have been operating in this country since the early part of the
century,” and “the better approach ** would have been to harmonize
the provisions ** (of the Insolvency Law) with similar provisions of other
succeeding laws, like the Corporation Code of the Philippines, the General
Banking Act, the Offshore Banking Law and the National Internal Revenue Code in
connection with or related to their doing business in the Philippines;”

3) that in light of said statutes, the three banks “are in truth
and in fact considered as ‘residents’ of the Philippines
for purposes of doing business in the Philippines
and even for taxation matters;”

4) that the banks had “complied with all the laws, rules and
regulations (for doing business in the country) and have been doing business in
the Philippines for many years now;” that the authority granted to them by the
Securities and Exchange Commission upon orders of the Monetary Board “covers
not only transacting banking business ** but likewise maintaining suits ‘for
recovery of any debt, claims or demand whatsoever;” and that their petition for
involuntary insolvency was “nothing more than a suit aimed at recovering a debt
granted by them to Consolidated Mines, Inc., or at least a portion thereof;”

4) that to deprive the foreign banks of their right to proceed
against their debtors through insolvency proceedings would “contravene the
basic standards of equity and fair play, ** would discourage their operations
in economic development projects that create not only jobs for our people but
also opportunities for advancement as a nation;” and

5) that the terms “residence” and “domicile” do not mean the
same thing, and that as regards a corporation, it is generally deemed an
“inhabitant” of the state under whose law it is incorporated, and has a
“residence” wherever it conducts its ordinary business, and may have its legal
“domicile” in one place and “residence” in another.

SIHI and SFCI moved for reconsideration and then, when rebuffed,
took an appeal to this Court.  Here, they
argue that the Appellate Court’s judgment should be reversed because it failed
to declare that –

1) the failure of the three foreign banks to allege under oath in
their petition for involuntary insolvency that they are Philippine
residents, wishing only to “be considered Philippine residents,” is fatal to
their cause;

2) also fatal to their cause is their failure to prove, much less
allege, that under the domiciliary laws of the foreign banks, a Philippine
corporation is allowed the reciprocal right to petition for a debtor’s
involuntary insolvency;

3) in fact and in law, the three banks are not Philippine
residents because:

a) corporations have
domicile and residence only in the state of their incorporation or in the place
designated by law, although for limited and exclusive purposes, other
states may consider them as residents;;

b) juridical persons may not have residence separate from their
domicile;

4) actually, the non-resident status of the banks within the
context of the Insolvency Law is confirmed by other laws;

5) the license granted to the banks to do business in the Philippines
does not make them residents;

6) no substantive law explicitly grants foreign banks the power to
petition for the adjudication of a Philippine corporation as a bankrupt;

7) the Monetary Board can not appoint a conservator or receiver
for a foreign bank or order its liquidation having only the power to revoke its
license, subject to such proceedings as the Solicitor General may thereafter
deem proper to protect its creditors;

8) the foreign banks are not denied the right to collect their
credits against Philippine debtors, only the right to “petition for the
harsh remedy of involuntary insolvency” not being conceded to them;

9) said banks have come to court with unclean hands, their filing
of the petition for involuntary insolvency being an attempt to defeat validly
acquired rights of domestic corporations.

The concept of a foreign corporation under Section 123 of the
Corporation Code is of “one formed, organized or existing under laws other than
those of the Philippines
and ** (which) laws allow Filipino citizens and corporations to do business
**.” There is no question that the three banks are foreign corporations in
this sense, with principal offices situated outside of the Philippines.  There is no question either that said banks
have been licensed to do business in this country and have in fact been doing
business here for many years, through branch offices or agencies, including
“foreign currency deposit units;” in fact, one of them, Hongkong & Shanghai Bank has been doing business in the
Philippines since as early as 1875.

The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units may be
considered “residents of the Philippine Islands” as that term is used
in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law, supra,^[20]
or residents of the state under the laws of which they were respectively incorporated.  The answer cannot be found in the Insolvency
Law itself, which contains no definition of the term, resident, or any
clear indication of its meaning.  There
are however other statutes, albeit of subsequent enactment and effectivity, from which enlightening notions of the term
may be derived.

The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the term
“‘resident foreign corporation’ applies to a foreign corporation engaged
in trade or business within the Philippines,”
as distinguished from a ”‘non-resident foreign corporation’ ** (which is one)
not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines.”^[21]

 The Offshore Banking Law,
Presidential Decree No. 1034, states “that branches, subsidiaries,
affiliation, extension offices or any other units of corporation or juridical
person organized under the laws of any foreign country operating in the
Philippines shall be considered residents of the Philippines.”^[22]

The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places
“branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks ** (which are)
called Philippine branches,” in the same category as “commercial
banks, savings associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural banks,
stock savings and loan associations” (which have been formed and organized
under Philippine laws), making no distinction between the former and the latter
in so far as the terms “banking institutions” and “bank”
are used in the Act,^[23]
declaring on the contrary that in “all matters not specifically covered by
special provisions applicable only to foreign banks, or their branches and
agencies in the Philippines, said foreign banks or their branches and agencies
lawfully doing business in the Philippines “shall be bound by all laws,
rules, and regulations applicable to domestic banking corporations of the same
class, except such laws, rules and regulations as provided for the creation,
formation, organization, or dissolution of corporations or as fix the relation,
liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of members, stockholders or officers
of corporation.”^[24]

This Court itself has already had occasion to hold^[25]
that a foreign corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is
a defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident within
the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a defendant “not
residing in the Philippine Islands;”^[26]
in other words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied for and granted
solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in the Philippines — and is consequently and
necessarily, “a party who resides out of the Philippines.”
Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party not residing in the Philippines,
or as a party who resides out of the country, then, logically, it must be
considered a party who does reside in the Philippines,
who is a resident of the country.  Be
this as it may, this Court pointed out that:

” * * Our laws and jurisprudence
indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do
business here to the status of domestic corporations.  (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall
Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70,
76; Yu; Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would be entirely
out of line with this policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign
corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of
seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of
law made specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every
requirement of law made of domestic corporations. ** .”

Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to
do business in the Philippines
“to the status of domestic corporations,” subsumes their being
found and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in the country.

The same principle is recognized in American law:  that the “residence of a corporation, if
it can be said to have a residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate
functions **;” that it is considered as dwelling “in the place where
its business is done **,” as being “located where its franchises are
exercised **,” and as being “present where it is engaged in the
prosecution of the corporate enterprise;” that a “foreign corporation
licensed to do business in a state is a resident of any country where it
maintains an office or agent for transaction of its usual and customary
business for venue purposes;” and that the “necessary element in its
signification is locality of existence.”^[27]
Courts have held that “a domestic corporation is regarded as having a
residence within the state at any place where it is engaged in the particulars
of the corporate enterprise, and not only at its chief place or home
office;”^[28]
that “a corporation may be domiciled in one state and resident in another;
its legal domicil in the state of its creation
presents no impediment to its residence in a real and practical sense in the
state of its business activities.”^[29]

The foregoing propositions are in accord with the dictionary
concept of residence as applied to juridical persons, a term which appears to
comprehend permanent as well as temporary residence.

The Court cannot thus accept the petitioners’ theory that
corporations may not have a residence (i.e., the place where they operate and
transact business) separate from their domicile (i.e., the state of their
formation or organization), and that they may be considered by other states as
residents only for limited and exclusive purposes.  Of course, as petitioners correctly aver, it
is not really the grant of a license to a foreign corporation to do business in
this country that makes it a resident; the license merely gives legitimacy to
its doing business here.  What
effectively makes such a foreign corporation a resident corporation in the
Philippines is its actually being in the Philippines and licitly doing business
here, “locality of existence” being, to repeat, the “necessary
element in ** (the) signification” of the term, resident corporation.

Neither can the Court accept the theory that the omission by the
banks in their petition for involuntary insolvency of an explicit and
categorical statement that they are “residents of the Philippine
Islands,” is fatal to their cause. 
In truth, in light of the concept of resident foreign corporations just
expounded, when they alleged in that petition that they are foreign banking
corporations, licensed to do business in the Philippines,
and actually doing business in this country through branch offices or agencies,
they were in effect stating that they are resident foreign corporations in the Philippines.

There is, of course, as petitioners argue, no substantive law
explicitly granting foreign banks the power to petition for the
adjudication of a Philippine corporation as a bankrupt.  This is inconsequential, for neither is there
any legal provision expressly giving domestic banks the same power,
although their capacity to petition for insolvency can scarcely be disputed and
is not in truth disputed by petitioners. 
The law plainly grants to a juridical person, whether it be a bank or
not or it be a foreign or domestic corporation, as to natural persons as well,
such a power to petition for the adjudication of bankruptcy of any person,
natural or juridical, provided that it is a resident corporation and joins at
least two other residents in presenting the petition to the Bankruptcy Court.

The petitioners next argue that “Philippine law is emphatic
that only foreign corporations whose own laws give Philippine nationals
reciprocal rights may do business in the Philippines.”
As basis for the argument they invoke Section 123 of the Corporation Code
which, however, does not formulate the proposition in the same way.  Section 123 does not say, as petitioners
assert, that it is required that the laws under which foreign corporations are
formed “give Philippine nationals reciprocal rights.” What it
does say is that the laws of the country or state under which a foreign
corporation is “formed, organized or existing * * * allow Filipino
citizens and corporations to do business in its own country or state,”
which is not quite the same thing.  Now,
it seems to the Court that there can be no serious debate about the fact that
the laws of the countries under which the three (3) respondent banks were
formed or organized (Hongkong and the United
States) do “allow Filipino citizens and
corporations to do business” in their own territory and jurisdiction.  It also seems to the Court quite apparent
that the Insolvency Law contains no requirement that the laws of the state
under which a foreign corporation has been formed or organized should grant
reciprocal rights to Philippine citizens to apply for involuntary insolvency of
a resident or citizen thereof.  The
petitioners’ point is thus not well taken and need not be belabored.

That the Monetary Board can not appoint a conservator or receiver
for a foreign bank or order its liquidation having only the power to revoke its
license, subject to such proceedings as the Solicitor General may thereafter
deem proper to protect its creditors, which is another point that petitioners
seek to make, is of no moment.  It has no
logical connection to the matter of whether or not the foreign bank may
properly ask for a judicial declaration of the involuntary insolvency of a
domestic corporation, which is the issue at hand.  The fact is, in any event, that the law is
not lacking in sanctions against foreign banks or powerless to protect the
latter’s creditors.

The petitioners contend, too, that the respondent banks have come
to court with unclean hands, their filing of the petition for involuntary
insolvency being an attempt to defeat validly acquired rights of domestic
corporations.  The Court wishes to simply
point out that the effects of the institution of bankruptcy proceedings on all
the creditors of the alleged bankrupt are clearly spelled out by the law, and
will be observed by the Insolvency Court regardless of whatever motives —
apart from the desire to share in the assets of the insolvent in satisfying its
credits — that the party instituting the proceedings might have.

Still another argument put forth by the petitioners is that the
three banks’ failure to incorporate their branches in the Philippines into new banks
in accordance with said Section 68 of the General Banking Act connotes an
intention on their part to continue as residents of their respective states of
incorporation and not to be regarded as residents of the Philippines.  The argument is based on an incomplete and
inaccurate quotation of the cited Section. 
What Section 68 required of a “foreign bank presently having
branches and agencies in the Philippines,
** within one year from the effectivity” of the
General Banking Act, was to comply with any of three (3) options,
not merely with one sole requirement. 
These three (3) options are the following:

1) (that singled
out and quoted by the petitioners, i.e.:) “incorporate its branch
or branches into a new bank in accordance with Philippine laws * * ; or

2) “assign
capital permanently to the local branch with the concurrent maintenance of a
‘net due to’ head office account which shall include all net amounts due to
other branches outside the Philippines, in an amount which when added to the
assigned capital shall at all times be not less than the minimum amount of
capital accounts required for domestic commercial banks under section
twenty-two of this Act;” or

3) “maintain a
‘net due to’ head office account which shall include all net amounts due to
other branches outside the Philippines, in an amount which shall not be less
than the minimum amount of capital accounts required for domestic commercial
banks under section twenty-two of this Act.”

The less said about this argument then, the better.

The petitioners allege that three days before respondent banks
filed their petition for involuntary insolvency against CMI, they received from
the latter substantial payments on account in the aggregate amount of
P6,010,800.00, with the result that they were “preferred in the
distribution of CMI’s assets thereby defrauding other
creditors of CMI.” Non sequitur. 
It is in any case a circumstance that the Bankruptcy Court may well take
into consideration in determining the manner and proportion by which the assets
of the insolvent company shall be distributed among its creditors; but it
should not be considered a ground for giving the petition for insolvency short
shrift.  Moreover, the payment adverted
to does not appear to be all that large. 
The total liabilities of CMI to the three respondent banks as of
December, 1981 was P21,531,336.91, and US $14,485,814.85.  Converted into Philippine currency at the
rate of P7.899 to the dollar, the average rate of exchange during December,
1981,^[30]
the dollar account would be P114,423,451.50. 
Thus, the aggregate liabilities of CMI to the banks, expressed in
Philippine currency, was P135,954,788.41 as of December, 1981, and therefore
the payment to them of P6,010,800.00 constituted only some 4.42% of the total
indebtedness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

 Griño-Aquino
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., no part. Related to
one of the counsel.

^[1]
Italics supplied

^[2] Rollo, pp. 12, 47-61

^[3] Id.,
pp. 13, 62-74

^[4] Id.,
pp. 83-88

^[5] Id.,
pp. 89-94

^[6] Id.,
pp. 14, 113

^[7] Id.,
pp. 14, 114-122

^[8] Id.,
pp. 14, 123-126, 127-134

^[9] Id.,
pp. 14, 135-138

^[10] Id.,
pp. 14, 139-152

^[11] Id.,
pp. 15, 155-158; 159-161

^[12] Id.,
pp. 15, 162-

^[13] Judge
(later Court of Appeals Associate Justice) Rizalina Bonifacio Vera, presiding

^[14] Id.,
pp. 176-200

^[15]
However, at this time the procedure for taking an appeal had been modified by
B.P. Blg. 129 (SEE footnote 16, next following)

^[16]
BP 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, had become effective on August 14, 1981.  Sec. 13 thereof created “Regional Trial
Courts” in place of Courts of First Instance.  Sec. 39 thereof (a) prescribed a uniform
period of appeal of fifteen (15) days from notice of all final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions (except in habeas corpus cases in
which the period of appeal remained at 48 hours from notice of judgment); and
(b) removed the requirement of a record on appeal — except in appeals in
special proceedings and in other cases where multiple appeals are allowed under
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court — providing, in lieu of a record
on appeal, simply for the transmission of the entire original record.  The “Interim or Transitional Rules
and Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1981” (Resolution of the Court En Banc dated
January 11, 1983) also removed the requirement of an appeal bond (par. 18) and
provided that “Appeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court” (par. 25).  Implementation of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act as regards the new courts thereby created
(Intermediate Appellate Court, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts) was
authorized by Executive Order of former President Marcos issued on January 17,
1983 (see also Administrative Orders No. 1, 2 and 3, all dated January 18, 1983
issued by former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando).

^[17] Id.,
p. 15

^[18] Rollo, pp. 262-273. N.B.  The judgment was written for the Division by Lapeña, Jr., J., with whom concurred Ejercito (Chairman) and Chua, JJ.

^[19]
Citing William v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 236 US 549, 35 Ca. Rep.
289; Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 US 234; O’Brien v. Del Rosario
49 Phil. 657; Phil. Trust Co. v. National Bank, 42 Phil. 413; Straton v. New, 283 US
318

^[20]
See opening paragraph of this opinion.

^[21]
SEC. 20, pars. (h) and (i)

^[22]
SEC. 1 (e)

^[23]
SEC. 2

^[24]
SEC. 18

^[25]
Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc. v. Philippine Advertising Corporation, 57
Phil. 607

^[26]
SEC. 424, in relation to SEC. 412 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure;
SEC. 1 (f), Rule 59 of the Rules of 1940; SEC. 1 (f), Rule 57, Rules of 1964

^[27]
Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., Vol. 37, pp. 394, 412, 403

^[28]
18 Am Jur 2d, p. 160

^[29]
23 Am Jur, p. 44, fn 20, citing International Mill
Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511, 78
L ed. 1396, 54 S. Ct. 797

^[30]
Pursuant to the Guiding Rates of the Central Bank of the Philippines