PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, THRU HER PERSONAL GUARDIAN FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, IN HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN…

In this Petition, Pantranco North
Express Inc. (PANTRANCO) asks the Court to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05494-95 which affirmed the decisions of the then
Court of First Instance of Rosales, Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 561-R and Civil Case No. 589-R wherein PANTRANCO was ordered to
pay damages and attorney’s fees to herein private respondents.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

At about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the
spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa
and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico
and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam
River, Ilagan, Isabela, to
celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and
Marilyn Baesa.

The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger jeepney driven by David Ico, who
was also the registered owner thereof. 
From Ilagan, Isabela,
they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some
viands to one Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San
Felipe, taking the highway going to Malalam River.  Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River
at a speed of about 20 kph.  While they were proceeding towards Malalam River,
a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular
route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided wit
it.

As a result of the accident David Ico,
spouses Ceasar Baesa and
Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the
rest of the passengers suffered injuries. 
The jeepney was extensively damaged.  After the accident the driver of the
PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and
proceeded to Santiago, Isabela.  From that
time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently
remained in hiding.

All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein
private respondents settled the case amicably under the “No Fault”
insurance coverage of PANTRANCO.

Maricar Baesa
through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate
actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against
PANTRANCO, respectively docketed as Civil Case No. 561-R and 589-R of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan.

In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico’s alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the
accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.

On July 3, 1984, the CFI of Pangasinan
rendered a decision against PANTRANCO awarding the total amount of Two Million
Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos (P2,304,647.00) as
damages, plus 10% thereof as attorney’s fees and costs to Maricar
Baesa in Civil Case No. 561-R, and the total amount
of Six Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Pesos (P652,672.00)
as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorney’s fees and costs to Fe Ico and her children in Civil Case No. 589-R.  On appeal, the cases were consolidated and
the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by ordering
PANTRANCO to pay the total amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty-Nine
Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Seven Pesos (P1,189,927.00) as damages, plus
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorney’s fees to Maricar
Baesa, and the total amount of Three Hundred
Forty-Four Thousand Pesos (P344,000.00) plus Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
attorney’s fees to Fe Ico and her children, and to
pay the costs in both cases.  The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by
ordering the defendant PANTRANCO North Express, Inc. to pay:

I.  The plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 561-R, Maricar Bascos
Baesa, the following damages:

A)    
As compensatory damages for the death of Ceasar Baesa – P30,000.00;

B)    
As compensatory damages for the death of Marilyn
Baesa – P30,000.00;

C)   
As compensatory damages for the death of Harold
Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa – P30,000.00;

D)   
For the loss of earnings of Ceasar
Baesa – P630,000.00;

E)    
For the loss of earnings of Marilyn Bascos Baesa – P375,000.00;

F)    
For the burial expenses of the deceased Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa – P
41,200.00

G)   
For hospitalization expenses of Maricar Baesa – P3,727.00

H)    
As moral damages – P50,000.00;

I)       
As attorney’s fees – P20,000.00.

II.  The
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 589-R, the following damages:

A)    
As compensatory damages for the death of David Ico – P30,000.00;

B)    
For loss of earning capacity of David Ico – P252,000.00

C)   
As moral damages for the death of David Ico and the injury of Fe Ico –
P30,000.00;

D)   
As payment for the jeepney
– P20,000.00;

E)    
For the hospitalization of Fe Ico – P12,000.00;

F)    
And for attorney’s fees – P10,000.00;

and to pay the
costs in both cases.

The amount of P25,000.00 paid to Maricar Bascos Baesa, plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 561-R, and the medical expenses in the sum of P3,273.55, should be
deducted from the award in her favor.

All the foregoing amounts herein awarded except the costs shall
earn interest at the legal rate from date of this decision until fully
paid.  [CA Decision, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 57-58.]

PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeal’s decision, but on June 26,
1987, it denied the same for lack of merit.  PANTRANCO then filed the instant petition for
review.

I

Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the
doctrine of the “last clear chance” against the jeepney
driver.  Petitioner claims that under the
circumstances of the case, it was the
driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to
avoid the harm.

The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court
in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan
Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding
his negligence.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for
all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of
the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil 809 (1918); Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, et al. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda.
de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989.] The
subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to
avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the
accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence
of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra.]

Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat
claim for damages.

To avoid liability for the negligence of its driver, petitioner
claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause
of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening
negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident.  It is petitioner’s position that even
assuming arguendo, that the bus encroached into the lane of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney towards the spacious dirt shoulder on his right
without danger to himself or his passengers.

The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the doctrine of
“last clear chance” finds no application in this case.  For the doctrine to be applicable, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with
exercise of due care, have been aware of it. 
One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not
know or could not have known the existence of the peril.  In this case, there is nothing to show that
the jeepney driver David Ico
knew of the impending danger.  When he
saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did
not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will
return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite direction. 
As held by this Court in the case of Vda.
De Bonifacio v.
BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a motorist
who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway is generally entitled
to assume that an approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side,
will return to his proper lane of traffic. 
There was nothing to indicate to David Ico
that the bus could not return to its own lane or was prevented from returning
to the proper lane by anything beyond the control of its driver.  Leo Marantan, an
alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated
beside the driver Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez
had no choice but to swerve the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney’s lane because there was a steep precipice on the
right [CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45.] However,
this is belied by the evidence on record which clearly shows that there was
enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger [CA
Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50.]

Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus
was speeding towards Manila [CA
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45.] By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to
its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney
to his right to prevent an accident.  The
speed at which the approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to
the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision.  Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before
the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it.  This Court has held that the last clear
chance doctrine “can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of
all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered” [Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, supra.]

Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico
was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of
Republic Act No. 4136* which provides that the driver of a
vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the right
of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway.

Petitioner’s misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily
apparent in this case.  The cited law
itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or
a stop intersection.  At the time of the
accident, the jeepney had already crossed the
intersection and was on its way to Malalam River.  Petitioner itself cited Fe Ico’s testimony that the accident occurred after the jeepney had travelled a distance
of about two (2) meters from the point of intersection [Petition p. 10; Rollo, p. 27.] In fact, even the witness for the
petitioner, Leo Marantan, testified that both
vehicles were coming from opposite directions [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50], clearly indicating that the jeepney had already crossed the intersection.

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of
petitioner’s driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane
immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the
opposite direction was the sole and proximate cause of the accident without
which the collision would not have occurred. 
There was no supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which would have made the prior negligence
of petitioner’s driver a mere remote cause of the accident.

II

On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner claims
that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage, conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.  Petitioner adduced evidence to
show that in hiring its drivers, the latter are required to have professional
driver’s license and police clearance. 
The drivers must also pass written examinations, interviews and
practical driving tests, and are required to undergo a six-month training
period.  Rodrigo San Pedro, petitioner’s
Training Coordinator, testified on petitioner’s policy of conducting regular
and continuing training programs and safety seminars for its drivers,
conductors, inspectors and supervisors at a frequency rate of at least two (2)
seminars a month.

On this point, the Court quotes with approval the following
findings of the trial court which was adopted by the Court of Appeals in its
challenged decision:

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer has
been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision
over their acts.  Although this
presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof
of diligence of a good father of a family, this Court believes that the
evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the case of ­Ramirez, as a company driver is far
from sufficient.  No support evidence has
been adduced.  The professional driver’s
license of Ramirez has not been produced. 
There is no proof that he is between 25 to 38 years old.  There is also no proof as to his educational
attainment, his age, his weight and the fact that he is married or not.  Neither are the result of the written test,
psychological and physical test, among other tests, have been submitted in
evidence [sic].  His NBI or police
clearances and clearances from previous employment were not marked in
evidence.  No evidence was presented that
Ramirez actually and really attended the seminars.  Vital evidence should have been the
certificate of attendance or certificate of participation      or evidence of such participation like a
logbook signed by the trainees when they attended the seminars.  If such records are not
available, the testimony of the classmates that Ramirez was their classmate in
said seminar (should have been presented) [CA Decision, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 51-52.]

Petitioner contends that the fact that Ambrosio
Ramirez was employed and remained as its driver only means that he underwent
the same rigid selection process and was subjected to the same strict
supervision imposed by petitioner on all applicants and employees.  It is argued by the petitioner that unless
proven otherwise, it is presumed that petitioner observed its usual recruitment
procedure and company policies on safety and efficiency [Petition, p. 20; Rollo, p. 37.]

The Court finds the above contention unmeritorious.

The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the presumption of negligence
on the part of petitioner and the burden of proving that it exercised due
diligence not only in the selection of its employees but also in adequately
supervising their work rests with the petitioner (Lilius
v. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934), Umali
v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623.] Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no
presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and safety standards were
observed.  The mere issuance of rules and
regulations and the formulation of various company policies on safety, without
showing that they are being complied with, are not suffi­cient to exempt
petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its employee.  It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that
in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed.  Petitioner failed to do this.  Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
evidence presented by the petitioner, which consists mainly of the
uncorroborated testimony of its Training Coordinator, is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of negligence against petitioner.

III

On the question of damages, petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals erred in fixing the damages for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased victims. 
Petitioner assails respondent court’s findings because no documentary
evidence in support thereof, such as income tax returns, pay-rolls, pay slips
or invoices obtained in the usual course of business, were presented [Petition,
p. 22; Rollo, p. 39.] Petitioner argues that the
“bare and self?serving testimonies of the wife of the deceased David
Ico and the mother of the deceased Marilyn Baesa … have no probative value to sustain in law the
Court of Appeals’ conclusion on the respective earnings of the deceased
victims.” [Petition, pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp.
38-39.] It is petitioner’s contention that the evidence presented by the
private respondent does not meet the requirements of clear and satisfactory
evidence to prove actual and compensatory damages.

The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased victims.  While it is true that
private respondents should have presented documentary evidence to support their
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the
absence thereof does not necessarily bar the recovery of the damages in
question.  The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to
the earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis
from which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for
the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased victims.  Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of
earning capacity of a deceased victim, the court can consider the nature of his
occupation, his educational attainment and the state of his health at the time
of death.

In the instant case, David Ico was
thirty eight (38) years old at the time of his death in 1981 and was driving
his own passenger jeepney.  The spouses Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty (30) years old at
the time of their death.  Ceasar Baesa was a commerce
degree holder and the proprietor of the Cauayan
Press, printer of the Cauayan Valley Newspaper and
the Valley Times at Cauayan, Isabela.  Marilyn Baesa
graduated as a nurse in 1976 and at the time of her death, was the company nurse,
personnel manager, treasurer and cashier of the Ilagan
Press at Ilagan, Isabela.  Respondent court duly considered these
factors, together with the uncontradicted testimonies
of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos,
in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses Baesa.

However, it should be pointed out that the Court of Appeals
committed error in fixing the compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa.  Respondent
court awarded to plaintiff (private respondent) Maricar
Baesa Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
as “compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa
and Marcelino Baesa.” [CA Decision, p.14; Rollo, 57.] In
other words, the Court of Appeals awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as indemnity for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and another Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for
the death of Marcelino Baesa.  This is clearly erroneous.  In the case of People v. de
la Fuente, G.R. Nos. 63251-52, December
29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518, the indemnity for the death of a person was fixed by
this Court at Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).  Plaintiff Maricar Baesa should therefore be awarded Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as indemnity for the death of her brothers, Harold
Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the death
of each brother.

The other items of damages awarded by respondent court which were
not challenged by the petitioner are hereby affirmed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED,
and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the amount of compensatory damages for the death of Harold
Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa are increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
each.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr.,
Feliciano, and Bidin,
JJ., concur.

*
R.A. 4136 is entitled “An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land
Transportation and Traffic Rules, To Create A Land
Transportation Commission and other Purposes.”