NATALIA REALTY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PROTACIO RANCHU VALLEZ, CEFERINO MARTINEZ, PABLO ESPEMEDA, AUGUSTO ARIZOLA AND CERIACO BANDOC, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

In these appeals in five (5) consolidated cases^[1]
certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court since they involve only a
question of law, We affirm the summary judgment
rendered by the court a quo.

Said appeals originated from five (5) civil cases commenced by
herein appellee Natalia
Realty Corporation against the five (5) appellants, namely, Protacio
Ranchu Vallez,^[2] Ceferino Martinez,^[3]
Pablo Espemeda,^[4] Augusto Arizola,^[5]
and Ceriaco Bandoc,^[6]
which were consolidated and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
at Antipolo, Rizal.^[7]
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants unlawfully occupied portions of the
parcels of land belonging to it and registered in its name under Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 31527 and 31528 (now N-67845) of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal. 
It was prayed that defendants be adjudged without valid right whatsoever
in plaintiff’s land, that they be ordered to vacate the same and to pay the
reasonable compensation and financial reliefs stated
in the respective complaints against them.

After filing their consolidated answer, defendants sought the
dismissal of all the aforesaid complaints for ejectment
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 
Their motion was denied on September
26, 1983 on a holding that the grounds therefor
are not indubitable.

On October 29, 1983,
plaintiff corporation moved for a summary judgment on
the consolidated cases under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court.  Plaintiff claimed that the only issue for
resolution, if any, is strictly legal; and that “the pleadings manifestly
show that there is no genuine issue or issues as to any material fact averred
in the complaint and that defendants in their common answer to complaint have
put up sham defenses and counterclaims all of which are mere pretended denials
and flimsy defenses.” Annexed to said motion is
the affidavit of the company’s executive vice-president, Eugenia Oliveros, attesting to the truth of the averments
therein.  An opposition was filed by
defendants on November 4, 1983
through a “Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”

On December 16, 1983, the trial court rendered a summary judgment
upon finding that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only
“conclusions that because they have been in actual possession for over 30
years of their respective farm lots they are entitled to be respected of (sic)
such occupancy and as such the complaints should be dismissed, (par. 4, p. 7,
Record, Answer, Civil Case No. 117-A) that the titles of plaintiff are null and
void ab initio and should
be cancelled and in lieu thereof issued new certificates of titles (sic) to the
defendants in accordance with the land reform program under P. D. No. 2.”^[8]

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff ordering the
defendants to vacate the portions of land involved, to forthwith remove therefrom all improvements they may have constructed
thereon, and to pay rentals of P50.00 a month from January, 1980 until the
defendant concerned shall have vacated the premises he occupied.^[9]

In a joint notice of appeal, defendants sought appellate review
in the then Intermediate Appellate Court. 
Their brief, dated June 23,
1984, prayed for the reversal of the summary judgment rendered by
the court below and for the confirmation of their alleged just titles
supposedly under Article 541 of the Civil Code. 
It does not appear that appellee corporation
filed a brief therein.

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution of November 27, 1986, certified the
aforesaid consolidated appeals to this Court on its finding that “no
question of fact has been raised by appellants for determination by this
Court.” The only question, according to the Court of Appeals, is whether
or not the court a quo acted correctly in rendering a summary judgment
in the aforesaid cases.

It is settled that a summary judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of any
material fact.^[10]
It is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear
undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits on record.^[11]
This elucidation of its role in procedural law is instructive:

“x x x This Summary Judgment or
Accelerated Judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.  The very object is to separate what is formal
or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so
that only the latter may subject a suitor ‘to the burden of a trial.’ In
conducting the hearing, the purpose of the judge is not to try the issue, but
merely to determine whether there is a meritorious issue to be tried.  Where a motion is made for summary judgment,
such motion is not directed to the pleadings and deals only with the question
of whether there are triable issues of facts and
where such issue exists summary judgment must be denied.  Summary judgment should not be granted where
it fairly appears that there is a triable issue to be
tried.  The Court should not pass on
questions of credibility or weight of evidence, and that the summary judgment
procedure ‘should not be perverted to the trial of disputed questions of fact
upon affidavits’.  The test, therefore,
of a motion for summary judgment is – whether the pleadings, affidavits and
exhibits in support of the motions are sufficient to overcome the opposing
papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to
the action or the claim is clearly meritorious.

“In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to prove the cause of action and to show that the defense is
interposed solely for the purpose of delay. 
After plaintiff’s burden has been discharged, defendant has the burden
to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.”^[12]

The focal point of inquiry is whether or not there is a factual
controversy in these consolidated cases. 
To resolve this query, the pleadings and documents on file and an analysis
thereof are both indispensable and decisive. 
The sine qua non of such an adjudicative recourse
is spelled out thus:  After the hearing,
the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to
the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.^[13]

The mimeographed complaints filed against the defendants are identical
in their substantial allegations, with the plaintiff alleging as follows:

x          x          x

“3.  Plaintiff
is the registered owner and in possession of parcels of land situated at Barrio
Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates Nos. 31527 and 31528 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal;

“4.  That
for more than a year before the filing of this Complaint, defendant/s has/have
(sic) unlawfully occupying and possessing a portion of ______ square meters, more or less, with an assessed value of
P_______ included in_______ Pcs-_______ and within
the aforesaid parcel of land, where his/her/their house and other construction
stand, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, thereby depriving the
plaintiff of the possession of the said portion;

“5.  Notwithstanding the
demands made upon defendant/s to vacate the premises in question and to remove
his/her/their house/s and/or construction therefrom,
he/she/they has/have failed and refused, and still continue/s to fail and
refuse to do so;

“6.  As a consequence of the
acts of usurpation committed by the defendant’s (sic) plaintiff suffered and
will continue to suffer damages at the rate of P50.00 monthly from January 1980
representing the fair rental value of the premises in question;”^[14]

x          x          x

On the other hand, the position of defendants is the same all
throughout the case and is set out in their “joint and common answer to
the complaint,” as follows:

x          x          x

“3.  In answer to
paragraph No. 3 of the plaintiff’s complaint, defendants have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of plaintiff’s claim of
titles and consequently denies (sic) the same in that the alleged judgment or
decision from where it derived said titles are null and void as said title
numbers have the same serial numbers as those in the different municipalities
of the Province of Rizal and those included in Metro Manila that said titles are null and void ab initio and should be cancelled
and in lieu thereof issue new certificates of titles (sic) to the defendants
and their privies pursuant to the contract of legal services with the
undersigned counsel for the defendants and their privies who are members of the
Confederation of Farm and Home Lots Proprietors of the Philippines in
accordance with the land reform program as called for under PD No. 2 dated
September 26, 1972 and the authority of this Honorable Court under
Section 10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

“4.  In answer to
paragraph No. 4 of the plaintiff’s complaint, defendants and their privies
denies (sic) the same, the truth of the matter being that the defendants and
their privies having tacked their respective possessions of their farm and home
lots through their several predecessors in interest without interruption in
open, continuous, public, and adverse
(sic) in the concept of owner since time immemorial by actual possession under
claim of ownership as required by Article 433 of the Civil Code and the
plaintiff has never identified the property of the respective defendants in
paragraph No. 4 of the complaint that Article 434 of the Civil Code provides
that “In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim” and said paragraph No. 4 of the complaint of the
plaintiff shows that it is for an accion reivindicatoria which cannot be had under the
circumstances since many of the defendants and their privies had been in
actual, physical, and material possession of the land in the concept of owner
through their predecessors in interest for more than fifty (50) years beyond
the thirty (30) year limit for an accion reivindicatoria to prosper hence plaintiff (sic)
claim by virtue of a null and void title is untenable because the plaintiff’s
claim of ownership of the land in question cannot be maintained in these class
suit of cases (sic), that is, the plaintiff and their privies versus the
defendants and their privies and predecessors in interest.

“5.  In
answer to paragraph No. 5 of the plaintiff’s complaint, defendants and their
privies deny the same the truth of the matter being that as stated in the
foregoing paragraphs Nos. 3 and 4 above, defendants and their privies exercised
their ownership of the land in question in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code and the land reform
program that the plaintiff should be prosecuted for violation of the law.”^[15]

x          x          x

Additionally, but inexplicably, defendants insist that the filing
of a motion for summary judgment is an admission by plaintiff of the
prescription of their action because said motion is applicable only in the
inferior courts.  They then pontificate
that only three kinds of actions are available to recover possession of real
property, that is, forcible entry or illegal detainer,
accion publiciana,
and accion de reivindicacion,
which actions, according to them, cannot be availed of by the plaintiff because
the only issue in all the three kinds of actions is possession which the plaintiff
allegedly never had from the beginning.^[16]
The incongruity of their said propositions dictate
that they should be disregarded.

We are, consequently, convinced that the rendition of the
questioned summary judgment by the trial court is proper and valid.  Tested against the statutory and
jurisprudential rules above stated, the very allegations of the defendants
prove that no valid issue has ever been tendered by them.  They relied mainly on two points, the alleged
invalidity of the title of the plaintiff and their supposed acquisition of the
properties by adverse possession. 
Defendants’ theses are obviously puerile but they are entitled to the
benefit of clarification.

We note with approval the lower court’s patient explanation that,
inter alia, the certificates of title
issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land Registration
Act (Act No. 496) is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the
entry of the decree of registration. 
Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for review of the decree must be
presented within one year after its entry as described and defined in Section
40 of the same.  After the lapse of one
year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible,^[17]
and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they were
notified of or participated in the registration proceedings.^[18]
The certificates of title of appellee corporation were issued more than thirty years ago:  Title No. 31527 was issued on September 11, 1953, while Title
No.  31528 (now
N-67845) was issued on February 19, 1952.

Even assuming arguendo that said
titles may still be challenged, the present case does not provide the vehicle
for that remedy since the judicial action required is a direct, and not a
collateral, attack.^[19]
In fact, under the existing law, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree^[20]
expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral
attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.

Appellants’ claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise
baseless.  Under Article 1126 of the
Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land
Registration Act shall be governed by special laws.  Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession.^[21]
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and
inconsequential.

There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be
said to justify appellants’ claim that said decree granted the ownership of
said lands to them and their successors by title.^[22]
Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that they acquired the
parcels of land in question when the whole country was declared by the previous
regime as a land reform area.

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed summary judgment rendered by the
trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.  This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., no part.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.

^[1]
CA-G.R. CV Nos. 02584-88, Thirteenth Division; Lorna S. Lombos-de
la Fuente, Gloria C. Paras
and Celso L. Magsino, JJ.

^[2] Civil Case No. 42-A.

^[3] Civil Case No. 93-A.

^[4] Civil Case No. 116-A.

^[5] Civil Case No. 117-A.

^[6] Civil Case No. 157-A.

^[7] Presided over by Judge Antonio V. Benedicto.

^[8] Original Record, Civil Case No. 42-A, 65.

^[9] Ibid., id., 67.

^[10] De Leon vs. Faustino, 110 Phil. 249
(1960); Agcanas vs. Nagum,
32 SCRA 298 (1970); Arradaza, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
50422, Feb. 8, 1989.

^[11] Viajar, et al. vs.
Estenzo, et al., 89 SCRA 684 (1974); Guevarra, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 124
SCRA 297 (1983).

^[12] See Estrada vs. Consolacion,
et al., 71 SCRA 523, 529 (1976).

^[13]
Sec. 3, Rule 34, Rules of Court.

^[14]
Original Record, Civil Case No. 117-A, 1-2.

^[15] Ibid., id., 6-7.

^[16]
Original Record, Civil Case No. 42-A, 62-63.

^[17] De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48
Phil. 227 (1925); Afalla, et al. vs. Rosauro, et al. 60 Phil. 622 (1934); Capio
vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113 (1953).

^[18] Sorongon, et al.
vs. Makalintal, et al., 80 Phil. 259 (1948).

^[19] Legarda, et al. vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Magay,
et al. vs. Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456 (1976); Cimafranca, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
et al., 147 SCRA 611 (1987).

^[20] P.D. No. 1529.

^[21] Sec. 46 (now Sec. 47 of P.D.
No. 1529); see also Corporacion de Padres Agustinos Recoletos vs. Crisostomo, et al. 32 Phil. 427 (1915); Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., 100 Phil. 251
(1956); Umbay vs. Alecha,
135 SCRA 427 (1985).

^[22] Appellants’ Brief, 11.