PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AMBROCIO NABOR AND AMANDO ROSETE, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Nabor

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted two men, Ambrocio Nabor and Amando Rosete, for the shooting deaths of Harry Nicanor and Jean Tandoc on the eve of a town fiesta in Agno, Pangasinan. The trial court convicted both of murder in two cases, and the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the conviction should stand in the face of two conflicting ante-mortem statements and a defense of alibi. The case matters for the Bar because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the requisites of a dying declaration, on how the courts weigh conflicting declarations of a deceased, and on why alibi fails against positive identification.

Procedural History

Two separate informations for murder were filed against the two accused before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 39, sitting at Lingayen, Pangasinan. Both accused entered a plea of not guilty, and the cases were tried jointly. The trial court rendered a joint judgment of conviction, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in each case and sentencing each to reclusion perpetua, with accessories of the law, and ordering them to pay civil indemnity, actual damages, and moral damages to the heirs of both victims. From that judgment the accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's reliance on the dying declarations of the victims, its rejection of their alibi, and the existence of reasonable doubt.

Facts

On the evening of November 22, 1983, five companions went to the municipal plaza of Agno, Pangasinan to watch the games and amusements held on the eve of the town fiesta. They were Janette Tandoc, her sister Jean Tandoc, Emma Español, Mila Viray, and Harry Nicanor. At about eight o'clock that evening the group walked home along Burgos Street. Near an acacia tree, the two accused, Ambrocio Nabor and Amando Rosete, fired upon the group, hitting Jean Tandoc and Harry Nicanor. Jean fell to the ground; Harry, though hit, was able to run to their house.

Janette shouted for help, and with the assistance of neighbors Jean was first brought to a doctor in the town and then to the Nazareth General Hospital in Dagupan City, later transferred to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, where she died on November 23, 1983 while undergoing operation. Harry was also rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital, where he died on November 29, 1983. The medical evidence showed gunshot wounds penetrating vital organs in both victims.

Two ante-mortem statements emerged. Patrolman Marcelo Paragas took Harry's statement on November 28, 1983, in which Harry named Amando Rosete and Ambrocio Nabor as his assailants. Earlier, on November 26, 1983, T/Sgt. Jaime Acerit took a three-page statement from Harry in which the declarant said he had not been able to recognize his assailants and was not sure he could identify them. Jean's own ante-mortem statement, taken on November 23, 1983, said she did not recognize her assailants but described one as smaller than the other and both as wearing jackets. At trial the prosecution relied principally on the positive identification made by Janette Tandoc, who was with the victims before and during the killing and who knew both accused well.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in giving more weight to the dying declaration of Harry Nicanor taken by Patrolman Paragas, corroborated by an eyewitness, than to the conflicting declaration taken by T/Sgt. Acerit and the defense of alibi.
• Whether or not the dying declarations of the victims are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi may prosper against the positive identification of the accused.
• Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation attended the killings.

Applicable Provisions

Section 31 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on dying declarations, provides:

A declaration made by a dying person respecting the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

The Court distilled from this provision the requisites of admissibility and applied them to Harry Nicanor's statement, holding that all were present.

Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, on preventive imprisonment, provides:

Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the whole time during which they have been detained, if they voluntarily agree in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

The trial court applied this provision in crediting the accused with the entire period of their temporary detention.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court affirmed the trial court. Credibility of witnesses is a matter best addressed to the trial court, whose conclusions are generally not disturbed on appeal absent grave abuse of discretion, because the trial judge has the advantage of examining the documentary and testimonial evidence and the demeanor of the witnesses. The Court found the trial court's reasons for preferring the Paragas declaration sound: the declarant under Acerit could hardly talk or hear, yet was said to have signed a three-page statement with only the last page signed, and the defense never presented the witnesses who could have shed light on its taking.

On the second issue, the Court held the dying declarations admissible. It laid down the requisites and added a fourth:

Under Rule 130, section 31 of the Rules of Court, a dying declaration, to be admissible in evidence must have the following requisites: (1) the declarant's statement must be made under the consciousness of an impending death; (2) the declaration must refer to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; and (3) the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry in the case wherein the declarant's statement is sought to be admitted. An additional requisite must be that the declarant was a competent witness.

The Court explained that the declarant need not have categorically stated that he believed his death was inevitable; it is enough that he uttered the statement while suffering from serious wounds which would justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending death. Harry's declaration was further corroborated by the testimonies of his mother and his brother, to whom he named the accused in the hospital.

On the third issue, the Court held the alibi must fail. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that the accused was at some other place at the time of the incident, but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. No such proof existed, and the accused had been positively identified as the killers.

On the fourth issue, the Court found that the accused acted in concert and that both killings were qualified by treachery, the shooting being sudden and thereby insuring the commission of the offense without risk from any defense the victims might make. It found, however, that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of evident premeditation.

Doctrine

A dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when four requisites concur: it was made under the consciousness of an impending death; it refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry in the case; and the declarant was a competent witness. The declarant need not expressly say that he believed death was inevitable; it is enough that he spoke while suffering from serious wounds justifying the conclusion that he was conscious of impending death. Where two conflicting ante-mortem statements exist, the trial court's choice between them rests on credibility, and its assessment is generally upheld on appeal absent grave abuse of discretion. Alibi, to prosper, requires proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime; it cannot overcome positive identification. Treachery qualifies a killing where the attack is sudden, insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction of both accused for murder in the two cases, with the modification that evident premeditation was not proven.

Remember This

Memorize the four requisites of a dying declaration, including the often-forgotten fourth, that the declarant was a competent witness, and remember that consciousness of impending death may be inferred from the gravity of the wounds. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of dying declarations, the resolution of conflicting ante-mortem statements, and the rule that alibi must fail against positive identification absent proof of physical impossibility.