PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PEDRO G. LAGGUI, PRE­SIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XXXIV OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PAMPANGA AND ELISEO SORIANO, RESPONDENTS.

The private respondent Eliseo F. Soriano issued a postdated check that bounced.  He was charged by the Provincial Fiscal in
two separate informations, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Crim. Case No. 2934) and
estafa (Crim. Case No.
3007).  After a joint trial of the two
cases, respondent Judge Pedro Laggui of the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga promulgated a joint decision on
September 24, 1986, (1) dismissing the information in Criminal Case No. 2934
(for violation of B.P. Blg. 22) for being
“fatally defective” (p. 63, Rollo), and (2)
convicting the accused of estafa in Criminal Case No.
3007.

The accused appealed the decision in Criminal Case No. 3007 to
the Court of Appeals, which on July 26, 1988, reversed and set aside the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, thereby acquitting the accused Eliseo Soriano, “without prejudice
to the person entitled to (sic) the civil action for restitution of the thing
and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.” (CA-G.R. No. 04096,
p. 615, Records in Criminal Case No. 2934, Vol. II.)

The State filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the dismissal of the allegedly defective information in Criminal Case
No. 2934 and praying that the trial court be ordered to reinstate the case and
render judgment as the law and the evidence warrant.

Respondent Judge filed his own Comments on the petition, to
defend his order in the case.  The
accused adopted the Judge’s comments as his own.

The only issue raised by the petition is a legal one: whether or
not the information in Criminal Case No. 2934 is indeed “fatally defective.”
The information reads as follows:

“The undersigned Acting Provincial Fiscal and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal accuse ELISEO F. SORIANO of felony of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, committed as
follows:

“That sometime in October 1983, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above?named accused ELISEO F. SORIANO, with intent
to defraud, by means of deceit,
knowing fully well that he had no funds and/or sufficient funds in the
bank, for value received did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Banco
Filipino Check No. 1679962 postdated July 18, 1984, in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P250,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, drawn against his current account with Banco
Filipino, Malolos Branch, Bulacan,
payable to Lolita O. Hizon in payment of an
obligation and when the said check was presented for encashment, said check was
dishonored and returned, with the information that the said check is drawn
against ‘CLOSE ACCOUNT’ and in spite of repeated demands made of the accused to
redeem said check or settle the said amount, accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to comply with said demands, to
the damage and prejudice of Lolita O. Hizon, in the
total amount of P250,000.00, Philippine Currency.

“All
contrary to law.”  (Annex A, p.
21, Rollo.)

Upon arraignment, Soriano pleaded not
guilty to the information.

During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense admitted
the following:

“1.  That at the instance of the private
complainant Lolita O. Hizon, Unity Savings and Loan
Association Inc. Cashier Check No. 0623 dated October
4, 1983 in the amount of P250,000 (Exh. A) was issued
by the said bank drawn against the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, San
Fernando, Pampanga Branch, and the said check was
endorsed by the daughter of Lolita O. Hizon with
authority from the latter in favor of the accused Eliseo
Soriano;

“2.  That the said check (Exh.
A) was thereafter endorsed by the accused in favor of
Dr. Zoilo Pangilinan as
payment of the accused’s indebtedness to the former
and the check was thereafter encashed by the bank;

“3.  That the said check (Exh.
A) after its encashment by the bank, was returned to
the private complainant Lolita O. Hizon;

“4.  That more or less on the date when Cashier
Check No. 0623 (Exh. A) was
issued, the accused issued Banco Filipino Check No.
1679962 (Exh. B) dated July
18, 1984 in the amount of P250,000 in favor of the private complainant Lolita
O. Hizon. According to the accused this Banco Filipino check (Exh. B) was undated, while according to the private
complainant Lolita O. Hizon, the said check (Exh. B), was dated July 18, 1984;

“5.  That when Banco
Filipino Check (Exh. B) was deposited by the
private complainant with the Union Bank of the Philippines, San Fernando, Pampanga on July 18, 1984, check was dishonored by the bank
because the  account of the accused with
the drawee bank was already closed as of July 10, 1984 (Exh.
B-1);

“6.  That because the check (Exh.
B) was dishonored
by the bank, a demand letter dated August 24, 1984 (Exh. C) was
received by the accused from the counsel of the private complainant (Exh. C-1).” (p. 23, Rollo.)

The other facts which were established at the trial are:

The accused (now private respondent) Eliseo
F. Soriano is a minister of the “Church
of God in Jesus Christ, the Pillar
and Ground of the Truth in the Philippines.”
(p. 28, Rollo.) He first met
the offended party Lolita O. Hizon in July or August,
1983, when her godson, Arcadio Mallari,
who is a member of Soriano’s congregation, introduced
the latter to her, Hizon became interested in Soriano’s religious group and became a member thereof on
November 27, 1983.

In the second week of August 1983, Soriano
confided to Hizon his worries about his indebtedness
of P250,000 to Dr. and Mrs. Zoilo
Pangilinan. 
The obligation was secured by a mortgage on the congregation’s property
which would mature on October 4, 1983.  Hizon offered to help. 
She agreed to lend P250,000 in cash to Soriano who would issue a post-dated check to her for the same amount.

To raise the P250,000, Hizon borrowed against her time deposit at the Unity
Savings and Loan Association, Inc, (USLA). 
Since she and her husband were leaving for the United States on a short
trip in August 1983, she signed
the necessary papers for the loan before their departure.  She also
executed a special power of attorney authorizing her daughter, Rose Anne Hizon, to receive from USLA the P250,000-check
representing the proceeds of her loan and to endorse and deliver it to Soriano upon Soriano’s issuing to
her a post-dated check for the
same amount of P250,000.  Accordingly, on
October 4, 1983, Rose Anne got the P250,000 check from
the USLA, endorsed it to Soriano who issued, in exchange therefor,
his Banco Filipino check for the same amount.  His check was undated.

When Lolita Hizon arrived from her trip
on October 16, 1983, she asked Soriano why his check
bore no date.  Soriano
told her to date it “July 18, 1984” (pp. 26-27, Rollo)
so he would have sufficient time to fund it. 
When Hizon deposited the check on that date, the drawee
bank dishonored it because Soriano’s account with it
had been closed as of July 10, 1984, or one
week before the due date of the check.

During the trial on the merits, Soriano
admitted that when he issued the check he did not have enough funds in the bank, and that he failed to
deposit the needed amount to cover it. 
He alleged that he issued the check as “a temporary receipt for
what he had received” (pp. 20-21, t.s.n.,
December 2, 1985; pp. 10 and 35, RTC Decision, p. 30, Rollo).

Despite repeated demands to make good his check, or to replace it
with cash, Soriano did neither.

In its decision dated September 1, 1986, the trial court ruled
that the accused could not be convicted of a violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law, B. P. Blg. 22, because the information failed to
allege that he knew, when he issued the check, that he would not have
sufficient funds for its payment
in full upon its presentment to the drawee bank.  In the opinion of the trial judge, the
information did not charge an
offense, hence, he dismissed it.

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the
State alleges that the information is sufficient,
hence, respondent Judge committed an error of law, and/or gravely abused his
discretion, in dismissing Criminal Case No. 2934.  We agree.

The accused was charged with having violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, which provides:

“Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for he payment of such in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.” (Underscoring supplied.)

The elements of the offense
are:

1.     
the making, drawing and issuance
of any check to apply to account or for value,

2.     
the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, and

3.     
the check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.

The “defect” which respondent Judge perceived in the
information was the failure to allege that the accused, as maker or drawer of the check at the time of
issue, knew of the insufficiency of his funds in the bank for payment of the
check in full “upon its presentment” (p. 56, Rollo).  In the court’s opinion, it was not enough for
the information to have alleged that the accused knew when he issued the check
that he then did not have sufficient funds in the bank; the information
should have alleged that the accused knew that he would not have sufficient
funds in the bank to pay the check in full “upon its presentment.”
It believed that the absence of an allegation that the accused foresaw or had
foreknowledge of the insufficiency of his bank account upon presentment of the
check for payment, was fatal to the information.

The interpretation is erroneous. 
Section 2 of the law provides:

“Section
2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.
– The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency_of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment
in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In other words the presence of the first and third elements of the offense constitutes prima facie
evidence that the second element exists. 
The maker’s knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally
presumed from the dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds.  This Court has ruled that:

“Violation of the bad checks act is committed when one ‘makes
or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds’ or ‘having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon,
for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.'” (People vs. Manzanilla, 156 SCRA 279,
282.)

The gravamen of the offense under B. P.
Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.  The law has made the mere act of
issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by legislature for being
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.  (Lozano vs. Martinez, Lobaton
vs. Cruz, Datuin vs. Pano, Violago vs. Pano, Abad vs. Gerochi, Aguiluz vs. Isnani, Hojas vs. Peñaranda, People vs. Nitafan, G.R. Nos. L-63419, 66839-42,
71654, 74524-25, 75122?49, 75812-13, 75765-67 & 75789, December 18,
1986, 146 SCRA 323).

Since the information in
Criminal Case No. 2934 did allege that the accused, for value received,
unlawfully and feloniously issued the postdated check “knowing fully well that he had no funds and/or insufficient funds in the bank x x x and when the said check was presented for
encashment, said check was dishonored and returned with the information that
the said check is drawn against ‘CLOSE ACCOUNT’ x x x” (pp. 21-22, Rollo)
the information satisfies the legal definition of the offense
under Section 1, B P. Blg. 22.  It is sufficient.  The trial court erred in dismissing it.

However, although its
decision is erroneous, that decision may not be annulled or set aside because it
amounted to a judgment of acquittal.  It
became final and executory upon its
promulgation.  The State may not appeal
that decision for it would place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the offense in violation of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy (Art. III, Sec. 21, 1987 Constitution).

This case is somewhat
similar to the case of US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil.
67, where this Court ruled that the defendant, after having been discharged by
a competent court, cannot again be put on trial for the same
offense “whether his discharge be the result of formal acquittal or of a ruling
of the court upon some question of law arising at the trial; no appeal lies in such case on behalf of the government.” The accused therein was
charged with infringement of literary rights. 
After trial, he moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground
that the evidence of the Government did not establish the commission of the
offense charged.  The Court reserved its
judgment on the motion and required
the defendant to submit his
evidence.  Afterwards, it discharged him
on the ground that no copyright
law existed then in the Philippines.  The
Government appealed.  The Supreme Court
held that the Government had no right to appeal:

“Defendant was regularly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, put
upon his trial by the calling of the government’s witnesses against him, and
thereafter discharged by the trial court. 
It is true that the court made no express finding as to whether the
defendant did or did not commit the specific acts set out in the information,
and that the dismissal of the information was based on the court’s conclusion
of law that there being no copyright law in force in these Islands, the acts
which it is alleged were committed by the defendant do not constitute the crime
with which he was charged, nor any other offense defined and penalized by
law.  But the reasoning and authority of
the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Kepner vs. United States, supra, is conclusively against the right of
appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a
criminal case after he has been brought
to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether defendant’s discharge was based upon
the trial court’s conclusion of law that the trial had failed for some reason
to establish the guilt of the defendant as charged.

“As indicated in the opinion in that case, the protection
afforded by the prohibition against the putting of any person twice in jeopardy
for the same offense, is a protection not merely against the peril of second
punishment, but against being tried a second time for the same offense.  In that case the court expressly held that:

 ‘It follows that Military Order No. 58, as amended
by Act of the Philippine Commission, No. 194, insofar as it undertakes to
permit an appeal by the Government after acquittal, was repealed by the Act of
Congress of July, 1902, providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same
criminal offense.’

“But the reasoning of the opinion goes further and denies the
right to the Government to procure the reversal of erroneous proceedings and
commence anew, save only in those cases in which the first proceeding did not
create legal jeopardy.  So that, without
his own consent, a defendant who has once been brought to trial in a court of
competent jurisdiction cannot be again put on trial for the same offense after the first trial has terminated by a judgment
directing his discharge, whether his discharge be the result of a formal acquittal, or of a ruling
of the court upon some question
of law arising at the trial.” (US vs. Yam Tung
Way, 21 Phil. 67, 70-71.)

Since in the present case the accused Eliseo
Soriano had been arraigned, pleaded “not
guilty,” and was tried upon a
valid and sufficient information (although the lower court erroneously
thought otherwise) and the case against him was dismissed by decision of the
trial court (hence, without his consent and not upon his motion), he has been
placed in jeopardy or danger of punishment for the offense
charged.  For this Court to re-assess the
evidence against him pursuant to the Government’s appeal, would place him twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Although the dismissal of the information against him may
constitute a miscarriage of justice, the erroneous dismissal by the trial court
may not be disturbed for it would violate his basic constitutional right to be exempt from double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review of the trial court’s
decision dismissing the information in Criminal Case No. 2934,
is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.