AGUSTIN V. TALINO, PETITIONER VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

It is settled that is a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more
defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not
admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him.^[1] The issue in this case is whether or not
such testimony was considered by the respondent court against the petitioner,
who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction.

The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
infomations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00,
reoresenting the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually
not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of
the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments.^[2] Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and
6684, these case were tried jointly for all the accused until after the
prosecution had rested, when Gerano Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and
petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed.^[3] They then presented their evidence at such
trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves, in the original
proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat, gave damaging testimony against the
petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned
transactions.^[4] In due time, the
Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino,
Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient
evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that
in violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.

In its decision, the respondent court makes^[*] the following remarks about the separate
trial:

“The prculiarity of the trial of thses cases is the fact that We allowed,
upon thier petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and
Macadangdang. this being the case. We can only consider, in deciding these cases
as against them, the evidence for the prosecution as well as their own evidence.
Evidence offered by the other accused can not be taken up.

“It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because
the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other
accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Talino and
Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they dud not cross examine Ulat
because, as matter of fact, they were not even required to be presented when the
other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter’s testimonies can not
now be considered against said three accused.

“We cannot understand why, it had heard the long and sordid story related by
Ulat on the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and put him on
the stand as part of its rebuttal evidence. Had this been done, there would have
been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat’s testimony against all the
accused.”^[5]

The grant of separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is
not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is
sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution.^[6] While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8,
of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should
be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as
exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall
have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses
of the accused.^[7] In scuh an event, the
evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record against all the
accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial
of the other accused.^[8]

The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost
circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only
after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid
the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and
regretted by the respondemt court, in according the accused the right of
confrontation.

The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guranteed by the
Constitution^[9] to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must
be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is
permitted to be made against his back or in his absence not is any derogatory
information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by
persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secery.
That is also the reason why ex-parte affidavits are not permitted
unless the affiant is presented in court^[10] and hearsay is barred save only in the
cases allowed by the Rules of Courtm like the dying declaration.^[11]

In United States v. Javier,^[12] this
Court emphasized:

“xxx. With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have
quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell vs.
U.S. [1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it intends to secure the accused in the
right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerened, by only
such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give the this testimony
in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It
was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon disposition or ex
parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of
cross-examination.’ In other words, confrontation is essential because
cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a
tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of
accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S. vs.
Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil. 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil. 526;
U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) xxx.”

We have carefully studied the decision under challenged and find that the
respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convincting the
petitioner. The part of the decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of
Ulat at but confined itself to the petitioner’s own acts in approving the
questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the pilot to swindle the
government. Thus:

“If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor participation in
the conspiracy to defraud, he would have questioned this obvious irregularity.
He would have asked whoever as following up the vouchers why two biddings were
conducted, why the awards to ‘D’Alfenor’ were cancelled, when the latter were
cancelled, and when the new bidding was made.

“The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino. While his
duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may have
been ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious irregularity is clear
evidence of his complicity in the conspirary.

“Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers
(including three made out in favor of ‘D’ Alfenor Repair Shop’) were brought to
him for his certificate as regards the availability of funds. He had signed all
the four vouchers. In the afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers were
also presented to him for certification as to funds these three were in
substitution of Exhibits ‘A’,’B’ and ‘C’ which we had earlier signed but which,
according to Talino, were disallowed and cancelled. Talino claims that he had
examined the supporting documents of the last three vouchers — the RIV, the
birds signed by the repair shops and the abstract of bids. If what Talino says
is true, at least the abstract of bids submitted together with vouchers in the
afternoon. This would have raised his suspicions with vouchers in the afternoon.
This would have raised his suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could
be dated as they were (May 18, May 11, respectively) when it was only that
morning that te abstracts containing the name of ‘D’ Alfenor Motor Shop were
submitted. The fact that he readily approved the substitute vouchers with the
substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that he knew he was
facilitating an irregular transaction.

“It is our view that the evidence on record has established betond doubt the
participation of both Agustin Talino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all the fourt
felonies charged in the informations.”^[13]

The petitioners makes much of the statement in the Comment that the
petitioner’s guilt could be deduced “from the evidence for the prosecution and
from the testimony of Pio Ulat,^[14] but
that was not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General’s
analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was
inadmissible against the petitioner because he “did not cross examine Ulat,” and
was not even required to be presented when the latter was testifying. In fact,
the respondent court when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent
court even expressed the wish the Ulat had been presented as rebutal witness in
the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been “no
impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused.” As this was
not done, the trial court not and did not consider Ulat’s testimony in
determinining the petitioner’s part in the offenses.

The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial
evidence other than Ulat’s testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is
futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence
because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond
reasonable doubt, and we agree.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Alampay, J., took part, was on leave during deliberation.

Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on official leave.

^[2] Annexes “A” to “D”, Petitioner,
Rollo, pp. 12-23.

^[3] Annex “F”, Petition:
Ibid., pp. 70-72.

^[4] Decision, pp. 12-16; Id.,
pp. 35-39.

^[*] Third Division: Molina, Quimbo and
Vera Cruz, JJ.

^[5] Ibid., p. 32;
Id., p. 55.

^[6] People v. Cruz (CA), 46
O.G. 1658; People v. Oplado, 12 SCRA 147; U.S. v. Gallegos, 37
Phil. 289 , 88 Phil. 203; Joseph v. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324.

^[7] U.S. v. Morales, 8 Phil,
300; People v. Bermejo, 46 Phil. 252; People v. Romualdez, 57
Phil. 148; People v. Torres, 62 Phil. 942 Joseph v. Villaliz,
supra.

^[8] Joseph v. Villaluz,
supra.

^[9] Sec. 14 (2), Article III, 1987
Constitution.

^[10] People v. Ramos, 122
SCRA 312, citing People v. Rodolfo Sabio, 102 SCRA 232, People v.
Pacala, 58 SCRA 370 and People v, Tan et al., 89 Phil., 337, 341.

^[11] Secs. 30, 31-41, Rule 130,
Revised Rules of Court.

^[12] 37. Phil, 449.

^[13] Decision, pp. 38-39;
Rollo, pp. 61-62.

^[14] Reply, p. 3, quoting, p. 21,
Comment.