PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MIZPAH R. REYES, RESPONDENT.

The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it
an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
P5,000.00 [Art. 172, Revised Penal Code (RPC).] Being punishable by a
correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in ten (10) years [Art. 90, par. 3
(RPC).] The ten (10) year prescriptive period commences to run “from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents . . .” [Art. 91, RPC.] In the instant case, the public document
allegedly falsified was a notarized deed of sale registered on May 26, 1961 with the Register of
Deeds in the name of the accused, private respondent herein, Mizpah R. Reyes.  The
two informations for falsification of a public
document subject matter of the controversy were, however, filed only on October 18, 1984.  The complainants claim that they discovered
the falsified notarized deed of sale in June 1983.  The Court is tasked with determining whether
the crime has prescribed which hinges on whether or not its discovery may be
deemed to have taken place from the time the document was registered with the
Register of Deeds, consistent with the rule on constructive notice.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City
registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. 
Both are now deceased, the husband having died on September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977.        They were survived by the following
children:  the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.

In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the
records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City that
the abovementioned property had already been transferred in the name of “Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and resident
of the City of Lipa,
Philippines”
under TCT No. T-9885.  They further
allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected through a notarized deed
of sale executed and signed on May 19,
1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and
Patricia Pampo. 
The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May
26, 1961.  Upon examination
of the document, they found that the signature of their parents were allegedly
falsified and that accused also made an
untruthful statement that she was single although she was married to one
Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950.  The document was referred by the complainants
to the National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.) for examination of the
signatures of their parents and a report was returned with the finding that the
signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of
Patricia Pampo was forged.  Upon complaint by the sisters of the accused
and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas, Branch XIII, Lipa City
on October 18, 1984 two
(2) informations both for falsification of public
document, the first in Criminal Case No. V-1163, for allegedly making it appear
in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo,
the mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a parcel of land by
falsifying Pampo’s signature, and the second in
Criminal Case No. V-1164, for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact
in the deed of sale, more specifically, by stating that accused was single.

Before arraignment, accused filed a motion to quash both informations on grounds that:  (1) “The criminal action or liability
has been extinguished by prescription of the crime in the light of Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606″; and (2) “The trial court had
no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of accused because of
non-compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement of P.D. No. 1508.” [Rollo, p. 33.]

The trial court granted the motion and quashed the informations in the two (2) cases stating that:

*           *           *

x x x The
title, once registered, is a notice to the world.  All persons must take notice.  No one can plead ignorance of registration.

The essence, therefore, of registration is to serve notice to the
whole world of the legal status and the dealing therewith.

If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration
is in itself a notice and therefore, the prescriptive period of registered
document must start to run from the date the same was annotated in the Register of Deeds.

In these two cases in question, prescriptive period of ten (10)
years should have started from May 26,
1960 (sic).  Considering the
lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the two informations were filed, the
crimes for which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are
charged have already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, Criminal Cases Nos. V-1163 and V-1164
are quashed.  [Rollo,
pp. 33-34.]

From the trial court’s order quashing the two (2) informations, the People, petitioner herein, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals (then designated as the Intermediate Appellate
Court).  In a decision*
promulgated on April 3, 1986,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order.  The Court of Appeals rejected the theory of
petitioner that the prescriptive period should commence on June 1983, when the
complainants actually discovered the fraudulent deed of sale.  The appellate court sustained the trial
court’s ruling that the prescriptive period started on May 26, 1961, when the deed of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City.  Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, filed by the People,
through the Solicitor General.

Among the authorities relied upon by the Court of Appeals in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal is the case of Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 606,
where the Supreme Court made a statement to the effect that in the crime of
falsification of a public document, the prescriptive period commences from the
time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after
the document was registered with the Register of Deeds.  However, petitioner contends that this particular statement is not
doctrine but merely an obiter dictum.

The Cabral case stemmed from the filing on September 24, 1974 of an information
accusing Eugenio Cabral of the crime of falsification
of public document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of the complainant Silvino San Andres in a deed of sale of a parcel of
land.  Before arraignment, petitioner
moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription of the crime, as
the notarized deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.  After hearing the motion, the judge issued a
resolution granting the motion to quash and dismissing the information on the
ground of prescription.  Private
prosecutor filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution.  Acting on said motion, the trial court
ordered the fiscal to make known his position. 
The fiscal filed a comment
stating that the crime has not prescribed as the complainant San
Diego claimed that he only discovered the crime in
October 1970.  Thereafter, the trial
court set aside its resolution granting the accused’s
motion to quash and reinstated the information. 
The accused brought the case to the Supreme Court questioning the trial
court’s authority to set aside its resolution granting his motion to
quash.  The Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the accused by holding that the aforementioned resolution has already become
final and executory for failure of the fiscal to file
a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.  The motion for reconsideration
filed by the private prosecutor was disregarded because of the latter’s lack of
legal standing.  Another reason given by
the Court for its decision is the following:

. . . The Rules of Court is explicit that
an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense [Secs. 2 (f) and 8,
Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court.] Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that “prescription of the
crime” is one of the grounds for “total extinction of criminal
liability.” Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under
Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which
carries an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than P5,000.00.  This
crime prescribes in ten (10) years [Article 90, Revised Penal Code.] Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August
26, 1948.

*           *           *

[Cabral v. Puno, supra, at p. 609.]

Although the prescription of the crime was not squarely in issue
in Cabral, it is apparent that the statement of
the Court on prescription and constructive notice was not totally irrelevant to
the disposition of the case.  Moreover,
it is not without any legal basis.

The rule is well-established that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. 
The record is constructive notice
of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein.  All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains [Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590
(1915):  Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22,
1980, 95 SCRA 380:  Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., G.R. No. L-38303, May 30, 1988, 161 SCRA 634; See also Sec. 52, Pres. Decree No.
1529 (1978).]

Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that a purchaser of
registered land is presumed to be charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record.  The Court, in explaining the
nature of the rule on constructive notice and the presumption arising therefrom stated in Gatioan
v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, that:

*           *           *

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein . . .

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title.  Such presumption is irrebutable.  He is charged with notice of every fact shown
by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed.  This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith.  Otherwise the very purpose and object of the
law requiring a record would be destroyed. 
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of
what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law.  The rule that all
persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a
rule of law.  The rule must be
absolute.  Any variation would lead to
endless conclusion and useless litigation.

*           *           *

It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of
the property of the deceased was executed by some of his heirs, the
registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of Deeds is
constructive notice that said heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship
between them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the
property in question.  The heirs who were
not included in the deed of partition are
deemed to have notice of its existence from
the time it was registered with the Register of Deeds [De la Cerna v. De la Cerna, G.R. No.
L-28838, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 514.] Likewise, the rule on
constructive notice has been applied in the interpretation of a provision in
the Civil Code on the prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which
is parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code.  The Civil Code provision states:

Art. 391.  The action for
annulment shall be brought within four years.

This period shall begin:

*           *           *

In case of mistake or fraud, from the
time of the discovery
of the same [Underscoring supplied.]

In Armentia v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 1253, where a notarial document recorded with
the Registry of Deeds was sought to be annulled, the Court, interpreting the
phrase “from the time of the discovery” found in the aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled that
“in legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place
from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the
familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world. . .” [See
also Avecilla v. Yatco,
103 Phil. 666 (1958):  Gerona
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-19060, May
29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153:  Carantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33360, April 25, 1977, 76 SCRA 514:  Cultura v. Tupacar, G.R. No. L-48430, December 3, 1985, 140 SCRA 311:  Cimafranco v. IAC. G.R.
No. L-68687, January 31, 1987,
147 SCRA 611:  Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., supra.] However, petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised
Penal Code which states that “the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents . . .” cannot be construed in the same manner
because the rule on constructive notice is limited in application to land
registration cases.  It is argued that
haste should be avoided in applying civil law presumptions to criminal suits.

Although caution should be observed in applying the rules of
construction in civil cases in the
interpretation of criminal statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so if
the factual and legal circumstances so warrant. 
Hence, in Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938), the Court applied the presumption arising from the
allowance of will to bar a
criminal action.  In that particular
case, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of his
deceased wife.  The will was duly
probated.  Sixteen (16) months
thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for
falsification or forgery of the will.  Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the case claiming that the order probation the will is conclusive as to its
authenticity and due execution.  The
motion having been denied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA) which ruled that “the judgment admitting
the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the due execution and
genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned,
but not for the purpose of punishment of a crime.” But the Supreme Court
reversed the CA decision by ruling that, in accordance with Sec. 625 of the
then Code of Civil Procedure which provides that “the allowance by the
court of a will of real and
personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution,”** a
criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will
which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.

It is, however, insisted in this case that the rule on
constructive notice applies only in civil cases.  It is argued that the law on prescription of
crimes is founded on a principle different from that of the law on prescription
in civil actions.  The difference it is claimed, precludes the
application of the rule on constructive notice in criminal actions.

The statute of
limitations of civil actions was explained in Penales
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73611,
October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 223, 228 in the following manner:

Prescription is rightly
regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent and
stale claims from springing up at great
distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or death or removal of witness
.  . 
.

On the other hand, the Court in People v. Moran,
44 Phil. 389, 405-406 (1923) discussed the nature of the statute of limitations
in criminal cases as follows:

*           *           *

. .
. The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that
after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence:  that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume
his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve
the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.  Hence it is that statutes of limitation are
to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such
liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by
the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of
innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.  Independently of these views, it must be
remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of
memory, of testimony.  It is the policy
of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes enforcing such
promptitude should be vigorously maintained. 
They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon
itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure
for criminal trials the best evidence
that can be obtained.

*           *           *

It is evident that there is merit in petitioner’s claim that the
law on prescription of civil suits is founded on different policy
considerations from that of the law on prescription of criminal actions.  However, the Court does not subscribe to the
conclusion that the presumptions and rules of interpretation used in the law on
prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, can not
be applied in criminal actions.

The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits
are based mainly on practical and equitable grounds.  The lapse of a considerably long period of
time obscures the surrounding circumstances of a particular claim or right and
erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be presented in support of an
action to enforce or contest such claim or right.  Moreover, where a particular right has
accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left
on a precarious balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party. 
After a certain period of time fixed by law, the right enjoyed by a
party must be accorded respect by prohibiting adverse claims the factual basis
of which can no longer be verified with certainty.  Hence, the law on
prescription of civil suits is properly called a statute of repose.

The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best
evidence that can be obtained is also a major consideration in criminal
trials.  However, the law on prescription
of crimes rests on a more fundamental principle.  Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act
of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a certain period of time,
surrenders its
sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act.  While the law on prescription of civil suits
is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending
parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality
on the part of the state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405.] Hence, in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be
adopted [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parcel, 44 Phil. 437
(1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956).] The
application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91
of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused
since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with
earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the
Registry of Deeds.  In the instant case,
the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961.  The
criminal informations for falsification of a public
document having been filed only on October
18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was
charged has prescribed.  The Court of
Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial
court’s order quashing the two informations on the
ground of prescription.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr.,
Feliciano, and Bidin,
JJ., concur.

*
Penned by Justice Manuel T. Reyes and concurred in by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Justice
Lorna S. Lombos-De la Fuente
of the First Criminal Case Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court.

**
This provision is now found in the last
paragraph of Art. 838 of the Civil Code which provides:

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall
be conclusive as to its due execution.