PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION AND HEE ACUSAR, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MAYOR CELESTINO E. MARTINEZ, JR., THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BOGO (CEBU), AND SA…

Philippine Gamefowl Commission versus Intermediate Appellate Court

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and Hee Acusar against the Intermediate Appellate Court, the municipal mayor of Bogo, Cebu, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo, and Santiago Sevilla. At bottom, the case resolves a conflict of jurisdiction: the Philippine Gamefowl Commission claims the power to license the operation of cockpits, while the municipal government of Bogo insists that this power belongs to the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan. The case matters because it draws the boundary between national supervision and local autonomy, and because it fixes the meaning of the power of supervision as distinct from the power of control.

Procedural History

Hee Acusar first sought to revoke the license granted to Santiago Sevilla, but he failed before the Philippine Constabulary Regional Command 7 and later before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. His petition for certiorari challenging the decision of the lower court was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Acusar then went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, which issued an interlocutory order allowing him to operate temporarily, and later issued a resolution on the merits ordering the municipal officials to issue him a mayor's permit and to cancel the permit of Sevilla. Sevilla and the municipal government of Bogo filed separate actions in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which were temporarily restrained by the Intermediate Appellate Court. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court declared the resolution of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission null and void. The case then reached the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

Hee Acusar operated the lone cockpit in Bogo, Cebu. He was ordered to relocate it under the Cockfighting Law of 1974 because it stood in a tertiary commercial zone, a prohibited area. Although the period of grace for relocation was extended, Acusar failed to comply, and the Philippine Constabulary considered his cockpit phased out. The Court of First Instance of Cebu later declared that he had waived his right to a renewal of his permit because of his failure to relocate.

On July 24, 1980, Santiago Sevilla was granted a license to operate a cockpit by Mayor Celestino Martinez, by authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with the approval of the Philippine Constabulary Regional Command 7. Since only one cockpit is allowed by law in municipalities with a population of not more than one hundred thousand, Acusar sued to revoke this license, but he failed before the Constabulary Regional Command 7 and before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and his petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Acusar then went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, which initially allowed him to operate temporarily and later, on December 6, 1984, issued a resolution ordering Mayor Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan to issue him the necessary mayor's permit and to cancel the permit of Sevilla, and revoking Sevilla's registration certificate. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court declared that resolution null and void.

Issues

• Whether or not the Philippine Gamefowl Commission has the power to license the operation of ordinary cockpits, as against the municipal mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan.
• Whether or not the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, in ordering the cancellation of Sevilla's permit and the issuance of a permit to Acusar, acted within its powers of supervision and review.
• Whether or not Acusar's cockpit was properly considered phased out and disqualified under the prior-operator rule.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Presidential Decree Number 1802, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 1802-A, provides:

City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision.

This provision is the core of the case, because it locates the power to license regular cockfighting in the municipal mayor and the Sanggunian, subject only to the review and supervision of the Commission.

Section 141, paragraph 2(k) of the Local Government Code provides:

The municipal mayor has the power to grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which they have been granted.

This confirms that the mayor holds the licensing power over cockpits.

Section 149, paragraph 1(oo) of the Local Government Code provides:

The Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to regulate cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission.

This shows that even regulation is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines of the Commission.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that it is the municipal mayor, with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan, that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. The power of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission to license is limited to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over ordinary cockpits, the Commission has not the power of control but only of review and supervision.

On the second issue, the Court defined supervision as overseeing, or the power of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, connotes the power to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate has done and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Review is a reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction. The Court held that supervision does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. The Commission did not limit itself to vetoing the choice of Sevilla but directly exercised the authority of replacing him with its own choice. In doing so, it exercised control, which had not been conferred upon it. The Court stressed that in the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the choice of the municipal authorities should be respected.

On the third issue, the Court accepted the factual findings of the respondent court that Acusar's cockpit was within the prohibited area and was correctly considered phased out when he failed to relocate it. The Court noted that the cockpit was near a Roman Catholic church, near a college, near residential dwellings, and near a public market. These circumstances disqualified Acusar even under the prior-operator rule he invoked, since he was not actually holding the permit at the time it was given to Sevilla.

Doctrine

The power to license and regulate ordinary cockpits belongs primarily to the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan, subject only to the review and supervision of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. The Commission's licensing power extends only to international derbies.

Supervision is a lesser power than control. It is the power to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, but it does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate. Control is the power to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate has done and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Review is a reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction.

The power to review includes the power to disapprove, but it does not carry the authority to substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion. The choice of the municipal authorities, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, must be respected.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court was affirmed in toto, with costs against petitioner Hee Acusar.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that supervision does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between supervision, control, and review, and to illustrate the constitutional policy of local autonomy.