PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. PABLO GALLO Y CATANOY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Gallo

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Pablo Gallo y Catanoy, a criminal appeal from a conviction for homicide in the killing of Erlinio Dacio in Manila in October 1979. The case matters because the Supreme Court acquits the appellant on the strength of three enduring evidence rules: a co-accused's extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant, an identification made without any opportunity to confront and cross-examine the identifier is inadmissible, and the prosecution's failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be cured by the weakness of the defense's alibi. It is a compact lecture on the constitutional right of confrontation and on the burden of proof.

Procedural History

Seven accused were charged with murder under separate informations. One pleaded guilty to the lesser crime of homicide and was sentenced accordingly; two were acquitted by the trial court. The remaining four, including Pablo Gallo, were convicted after a joint trial of the lesser crime of homicide, with the trial court imposing an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Three of the convicted accused appealed, but only Gallo filed an appellant's brief, so the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals of the other two. The Court of Appeals was of the view that the crime committed was murder, as originally charged, and not homicide, so that the penalty should be raised to reclusion perpetua. Because the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, places in the Supreme Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals did not enter judgment but referred the case to the Supreme Court, which decided it in January 1988.

Facts

On the night of October 8, 1979, between ten and ten-thirty in the evening, Antonio Dacio, Senior and his son Erlinio were approached at the corner of Dagonoy and Oro-B Streets in Santa Ana, Manila by a group that included the appellant Gallo, Argales, Soriano, Bermudez and Villanueva. Argales poked a homemade gun, a sumpak, at the father while Erlinio was taken away; the victim was then boxed, clubbed and stabbed to death. The prosecution's evidence against Gallo consisted of the extrajudicial confessions of his co-accused Argales and Soriano, the identification of Gallo by Antonio Dacio, Senior during a police investigation while Gallo was in police custody, and the testimony in court of Antonio Dacio, Junior, the victim's brother.

Antonio Dacio, Senior died before he could take the witness stand, so his identification was never tested by cross-examination. Antonio Dacio, Junior, a sixteen-year-old high school student, claimed he witnessed the killing from a hiding place about fifteen meters away, but he gave no statement to the police after the killing, did not join the police line-ups, and surfaced as a witness only in December 1981, after his father died. His testimony also contained inconsistencies, and the Court found it unusual that eleven armed assailants would restrain the father but let the son run free.

Argales and Soriano, in their confessions, admitted that their group killed the victim to avenge a member of their gang, the Bahala na Gang, who had been killed by a member of the Commando Gang, believing the victim to belong to the latter. Gallo alleged, and the prosecution did not dispute, that he was not a member of the Bahala na Gang. Gallo interposed alibi, claiming he was at home that night, corroborated by an ambulant vendor who turned over her earnings to him at about ten to ten-thirty.

Issues

• Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of the co-accused Argales and Soriano are admissible against the appellant Gallo.
• Whether or not the identification of Gallo by Antonio Dacio, Senior, who died before trial, is admissible against Gallo.
• Whether or not the testimony of Antonio Dacio, Junior deserves the weight given by the trial court.
• Whether or not the absence of motive on Gallo's part supports his acquittal.
• Whether or not the weakness of the defense of alibi justifies conviction despite the prosecution's failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, paragraph f of Rule 115 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the rule in force at the trial, provides:

Section 1. Rights of defendant at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall entitled: (f) to be confronted at the trial by, and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Where the testimony of a witness for the prosecution has previously been taken down by question and answer in the presence of the defendant or his attorney, the defense having had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the testimony or deposition of the latter may be read, upon satisfactory proof to the court that he is dead or incapacitated to testify, or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines.

This provision governs the second issue: the prior identification of Gallo was made without any opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and the exception for a deceased witness requires that the testimony have been taken with the defense's opportunity to cross-examine, which was absent here.

The Court also cites Rule 131, Section 2 on the burden of proof, which provides:

Section 2. Burden of proof. — In a criminal case, the burden of proof is on the prosecution and does not shift to the defendant, who is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

This provision anchors the fifth issue: the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to secure a conviction.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the extrajudicial confessions of Argales and Soriano inadmissible against Gallo. A confession made by a defendant is admissible only against him and is hearsay as to his co-defendants, and here the confessions were repudiated by their makers on the witness stand and were properly objected to upon formal offer.

On the second issue, the Court held the identification by Antonio Dacio, Senior inadmissible. Even as Gallo candidly admitted he was positively identified by the father as one of the killers, the condition of the rule was not satisfied, because at the time it was made Gallo had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine the identifier.

On the third issue, the Court declined to accord Antonio Dacio, Junior's testimony the same weight the trial court gave it, citing the rule that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of credibility unless some fact or circumstance of weight has been overlooked. The Court found such circumstances: the son's long silence, his absence from the police line-ups, his inconsistencies, and the improbability that armed assailants would restrain the father but not the son.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the lack of motive on Gallo's part supported acquittal, since the killing was shown to be gang vengeance and Gallo was undisputedly not a member of the avenging gang.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that even granting the alibi was weak, that alone does not justify conviction, because the burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution, and failing to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it cannot rely on the weakness of the defense.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the extrajudicial confession of a co-accused is admissible only against the confessant and is hearsay as to the others, especially when repudiated and objected to. Second, under the confrontation right in Rule 115, an out-of-court identification made without any opportunity for the accused to confront and cross-examine the identifier is inadmissible, and the exception for a deceased witness applies only to testimony previously taken with the defense's opportunity to cross-examine. Third, the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the weakness of the defense of alibi cannot supply what the prosecution failed to prove. Fourth, the absence of motive, where identity is doubtful, is circumstantial evidence that the accused is not the author of the act.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted Pablo Gallo y Catanoy of the crime charged.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the weakness of the defense does not cure the weakness of the prosecution, for the burden of proof never shifts from the People. Examiners use this case on the confrontation right, on the limited reach of a co-accused's confession, and on why alibi need not be strong when the prosecution's evidence is not.