LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS, VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, …

This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of
petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City
Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating charges of
“Inciting to Sedition” against petitioners Lino
Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme
Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et
al.).  On learning that the corresponding
informations for this offense had been filed by the
City Fiscal against them on February
11, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo)
to implead the Presiding Judge,^[1]
and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-­38023, Q-38024 and
Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants
for their arrests, including their arraignment. 
Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered the provisional
release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas
corpus has become moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo).  We shall thus focus on the question of
whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition
may lawfully be enjoined.

Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police
District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held
in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the
Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO).  Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal
Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon
City.^[2]

Except for Brocka, et al. who were
charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was
recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00
each.  Brocka,
et al.’s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail
for which daily hearings from February
1-7, 1985 were held.

However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka,
et al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention
Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo).  Neither the original, duplicate original nor
certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).

Brocka, et al. were subsequently
charged on February 11, 1985
with Inciting to Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and
Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo), without prior notice to
their counsel (p. 7, Rollo).  The original informations
filed recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo).  The circumstances surrounding the hasty
filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka, et
al. (quoting from a separate petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos.
69848-50 entitled “Sedfrey A. Ordonez vs. Col.
Julian Arzaga, et al.”), as follows:

“x x x.

“6.     The ‘sham’
character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is starkly
bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11, 1985,
Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone
informing counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are
the subjects of this petition will be brought before the Quezon
City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed reasons: 
subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning counsel
informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al was to be at 2:00
P.M.  When petitioning counsel arrived in
the office of Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon,
the complainants’ affidavits had not yet been received by any of the panel of
three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under detention were
already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M.  It was
only at 3:00 when a representative of the military arrived bringing with him
alleged statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al for alleged inciting to sedition,
whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito
Abad ‘who ordered the detained persons to be brought
to the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon
since there were no charges on file;’ and said Colonel Agapito
Abad said aloud: 
‘I only received a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga
about 11:00 A.M. to bring the detained persons today – I am only the
custodian.’ At 3:15, petitioning
counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the charges against Lino Broka (sic) had been
officially received and he was informed that the said charges were never coursed
through the Records Office.

“7.     Under the facts
narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong arm of the law and
hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al the right to bail because the utterances
allegedly constituting inciting to sedition under Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the same utterances
which are the subject of Criminal Cases No. 37783, 37787 and 37788 and for
which said detained persons are entitled to be released on bail as a matter of
constitutional right.  Among the
utterances allegedly made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to
be violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
are:  ‘Makiisa sa mga drivers,’ ‘Makiisa sa aming
layunin,’ ‘Digmaang bayan ang sagot
sa kahirapan,’ Itigil ang pakikialam
ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,’ ‘Rollback ng presyo ng
langis sa 95 Centavos.’
(See Annex B)

“8.     That when
petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel requested that they
be given 7 days within which said counsel may confer with their clients – the
detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals demanded that said
detained persons should sign a ‘waiver’ of their rights under Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request, which is a
harrassing requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al were
already under the detention, albeit illegally, and they could not have waived
the right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was
made by the panel of assistant city fiscaIs.”
(p. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50))

They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E.
Marcos.  The circumstances of their
release are narrated in Our resolution dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General’s
Manifestation as follows:

“G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordonez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al., Respondents).  – Petitioner Sedfrey
A. Ordonez filed this petition for habeas corpus in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander Luzano,
and Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained under a Preventive Detention Action
(PDA) issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985. 
They were charged in three separate informations
of the crime of illegal assembly under Art. 146, paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834.  On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution
in the above criminal cases, directing the release of the five accused on bail
of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which resolution the respondent fiscals
took no appeal.  Immediately thereafter,
the accused filed their respective bail bonds.  This notwithstanding, they continued to be
held in detention by order of the respondent colonels; and on February 11,
1985, these same accused were ‘reinvestigated,’ this time on charges of
‘inciting to sedition’* under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal
Code, following which corresponding cases were filed.  The respondents complied with Our resolution
requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the
writ of habeas corpus.  In their RETURN,
it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985.  The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the
petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in
the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition.”
(p. 395, Rollo)

Hence, this petition.

Brocka, et al. contend that
respondents’ manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for
enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second
offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the
same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney
strike.  They maintain that while there
may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow
the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further,
that they will be placed in double jeopardy.

The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal
prosecution of a case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka,
et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.

We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and
enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to
sedition.

Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.  There are however so exceptions, among which
are:

“a.     To afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

“b.     When necessary
for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs.
Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra;
Fortun vs. Labang, et al.,
L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

“c.     When there is a
pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon
vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

“d.     When the acts of
the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas
vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);

“e.     Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty,
33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385,
389);

“f.      When double
jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People
and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);

“g.     Where the court
has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);

“h.     Where it is a
case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia
vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);

“i.       Where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto
vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rãnoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No.
30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al, vs.
City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and

“j.       When there is
clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).

“7.     Preliminary
injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo,
L-6374, August 1, 1953).” (cited in Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)

In the petition before Us, Brocka, et
al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had
become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad
faith.

Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.’s release from detention (before their
release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). 
This PDA was, however, issued on January
28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court’s order
of release).  Under the guidelines
issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in
Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila) (Ilagan
v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA
349).  Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.’s claim that, despite subpoenas for its
production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox
copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).

The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor
General’s office.  In fact they found
petitioner’s plight “deplorable” (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).

The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious
and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent’s
bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.

We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan
case that “individuals against whom PDAs have
been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original,
and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the
PDA, at the time of the apprehension” (supra, p. 369).

We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public
official’s prosecution of criminal offenders.  We, however, believe that this should not be a
license to run roughshod over a citizen’s basic constitutional rights, such as
due process, or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.

We are impelled to point out a citizen’s helplessness against the
awesome powers of a dictatorship.  Thus,
while We agree with the Solicitor General’s observation and/or manifestation
that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to
quash the information, We however, believe that such a course of action would
have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing.  Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious
and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty
preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to
keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second
offense of “Inciting to Sedition” could be facilitated and justified
without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew.  As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.’s release from detention was ordered by the
trial judge on February 9, 1985.

Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this
gesture is the true sign of democracy. 
These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of
national grandeur.

In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We pointed out:

“Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to
general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen’s right to be
free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted
and vexatious prosecution.  x x x.” (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p.
448)

We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that
accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional
release until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary
investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should
lawfully be enjoined.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Judge Ricardo Tensuan, Branch 83, RTC, National
Capital Judicial Region, Quezon
City.

^[2]
Judge Miriam D. Santiago, Presiding Judge

*
Criminal Cases Nos. 38023, 38024 and 38025, subject of the instant cases.