TEODULO RURA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. GERVACIO A. LOPENA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE 2ND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF TUBIGON-CLARIN, TUBIGON, BOHOL AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPIN…

Rura versus Lopena

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Teodulo Rura against Judge Gervacio A. Lopena, Presiding Judge of the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, and the People of the Philippines. Rura had been convicted of five counts of estafa and applied for probation, but the trial court denied his application on the ground that he was disqualified under Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law. The case matters because it fixes the meaning of the phrase "previously been convicted by final judgment" in the Probation Law, and settles that the reckoning point is the date of conviction, not the date of the commission of the crime.

Procedural History

Rura was accused, tried, and convicted of five counts of estafa in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol. The five cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on August 18, 1983, sentencing him in each case to three months and fifteen days of imprisonment, for a total prison term of seventeen months and twenty-five days. Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, which affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. A probation officer of Bohol opposed the application, invoking Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law. The trial court denied the application, and a motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Rura then filed the present petition with the Supreme Court.

Facts

Teodulo Rura was charged with five counts of estafa committed on different dates. The five cases were jointly tried before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol. On August 18, 1983, a single decision was rendered convicting him in all five cases. In each case, the sentence imposed was three months and fifteen days of imprisonment, for a total prison term of seventeen months and twenty-five days.

Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, which affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The probation officer of Bohol opposed the application, contending that Rura was disqualified under Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law because he had previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.

The trial court denied the application for probation, reasoning that although the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided, the dates of commission were different, and upon conviction, Rura was guilty of the offenses as of the dates of their commission. A motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting Rura to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for probation under Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law, Presidential Decree Number 968, as amended, provides:

(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.

This provision is the disqualification rule on which the trial court relied in denying Rura's application for probation, and its interpretation is the central issue in this case.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner. It ruled that when Rura applied for probation, he had no previous conviction by final judgment. The only conviction against him at the time of his application was the judgment which was the very subject of that application. The Court emphasized that the statute relates the word "previous" to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. The trial court's reasoning, that the effects of conviction retroact to the date of the commission of the offense, was rejected. The Court thus resolved the sole issue by declaring that Rura was not disqualified for probation under Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law.

Doctrine

The principle a Bar candidate must retain is that the disqualification for probation under Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law requires a previous conviction by final judgment. The word "previous" refers to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. A conviction rendered in a single joint decision for multiple offenses, all promulgated on the same date, does not constitute a previous conviction for purposes of disqualification from probation. The reckoning point is the date the conviction became final, and a conviction that is the very subject of the probation application cannot be counted as a previous conviction.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the respondent judge was directed to give due course to the petitioner's application for probation, with no costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. Examiners like to use this case to test whether a student understands that a joint conviction on the same date does not amount to a previous conviction by final judgment for purposes of disqualification from probation under Section 9, paragraph (c) of the Probation Law.