HABIB ALI, ET AL. PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Habib Ali versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is Habib Ali versus the Commission on Elections, a resolution of the Supreme Court promulgated in August 1986 upon the motions for reconsideration of an earlier decision rendered in November 1985. The petitioners were candidates who had lost before the Commission on Elections in a hotly contested local election in Marawi City, and who came to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The case matters for two reasons. First, it shows how the Court treats a case that events have overtaken, when a change of government installs officers in charge in the very positions being fought over. Second, it preserves, in a sharply worded dissent, the classic doctrine on election protests: that the Commission on Elections may not decide a protest grounded on widespread fraud without actually revising, recounting, and appreciating the ballots.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court against the Commission on Elections and the private respondents. In a majority decision promulgated in November 1985, the Court dismissed all the petitions for lack of merit. The petitioners then filed joint motions for reconsideration, and the respondent Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss those motions as pro forma and raising no new and substantial argument. After the change in administration in February 1986, the Court directed the new Solicitor General to submit his comment and to state whether he maintained the position of his predecessor. The new Solicitor General manifested that the Commission maintained the validity of its decision, but informed the Court that officers in charge had been designated for the offices of Mayor and Vice Mayor of Marawi City. The Court then resolved the pending motions for reconsideration.

Facts

The petitioners, among them Habib Ali, Mahadi Pimping, and Rashid Sampaco, were protestants in election cases before the Commission on Elections concerning local positions in Marawi City. They alleged widespread election frauds and irregularities committed by the contending parties. Resolving such a protest essentially required the revision, recount, and appreciation of the ballots cast. The Commission, however, did not conduct that revision and recount, even though the case had been pending for about four years and the Commission's own rules required it.

The Commission issued its resolution in favor of the private respondents and declared it final and executory. The petitioners received no notice of the promulgation; they learned of the adverse action only from the newspapers, while the protestants were served copies on the very day the resolution and order were dated. The private respondents then assumed the contested offices.

The petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which initially dismissed their petitions in November 1985. On reconsideration, the new Solicitor General informed the Court that officers in charge had been appointed to the contested positions following the change of administration. The petitioners argued the cases had not become moot because a ruling on the validity of the elections would affect their right to claim damages, while one respondent maintained the case had become moot and academic.

Issues

• Whether or not the motions for reconsideration should be denied for lack of merit.
• Whether or not the cases had been rendered moot and academic by the change of administration and the designation of officers in charge to the contested positions.
• Whether or not the Commission on Elections may decide an election protest based on alleged widespread fraud without conducting the revision, recount, and appreciation of the ballots.
• Whether or not the Commission on Elections denied the petitioners due process by promulgating its resolution without notice to them and by applying its rule making its decision final and executory after ten days.

Applicable Provisions

Section 18 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

When in the judgment of the court, the interest of the party in whose favor the judgment has been rendered has ceased, the court may order the substitution of the party or his legal representative.

This provision supplied the procedural basis for directing the new Solicitor General to state whether he maintained the action and position of his predecessor after the change in administration.

Article Twelve, Section 11 of the Constitution, as quoted in the dissent, provides:

Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

The dissent invoked this thirty-day period to argue that the Commission's rule making its decisions final and executory after ten days is void and unconstitutional.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. It found nothing in the manifestation of the new Solicitor General calling for any modification, much less reversal, of the November 1985 decision.

On the second issue, the Court likewise denied the motions on the further consideration that they had been rendered moot and academic. The designation of officers in charge to the contested positions, following the change of administration, had overtaken the relief the petitioners sought.

On the third and fourth issues, the majority did not rule anew, having dismissed the petitions and the motions. It was the dissent of Chief Justice Teehankee, concurred in by Justices Feria, Yap, Fernan, Cruz, and Paras, that addressed them. The dissent maintained that the Commission may not arbitrarily decide an election protest based on alleged widespread election frauds and irregularities, which essentially requires the revision, recount, and appreciation of the ballots cast, without conducting such revision, recount, and appreciation. It stressed that the Commission's own rules mandatorily required the revision and recount, that both protagonists prayed for it, and that the Commission was remiss in not appointing the committees on revision. It reminded that in election cases the private interest of the candidates is merely incidental; what matters is the public interest in free and honest suffrage and the determination of the true verdict of the electorate. On due process, the dissent held that the Commission disregarded its own rules requiring promulgation on a previously fixed date with advance notice, and that its rule making decisions final and executory after ten days is manifestly void and unconstitutional against the constitutional thirty-day period for certiorari.

Doctrine

First, a case may be denied as moot and academic where supervening events, such as a change of administration and the designation of officers in charge, have overtaken the relief sought. Second, the rule a Bar candidate must retain comes from the dissent: an election protest grounded on widespread fraud, which essentially requires the revision, recount, and appreciation of the ballots, cannot be decided without that revision and recount. The Commission on Elections is bound by its own rules mandatorily requiring revision and recount, and it may not short-circuit those proceedings without violating due process. Third, in election cases the private interest of the candidates is merely incidental; the paramount interest is the public interest in free and honest suffrage and in the true verdict of the electorate. Fourth, a rule making the Commission's decision final and executory after ten days cannot stand against the constitutional thirty-day period to bring any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Disposition

The Court denied the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and on the ground that they had become moot and academic, with the Chief Justice and five other Justices maintaining their dissent.

Remember This

Memorize the line that an election protest requiring revision and recount cannot be decided without revision and recount, for the public interest in honest suffrage outweighs the candidates' private interest. Examiners use this case to test mootness after supervening events and the constitutional thirty-day period for certiorari against the Commission on Elections.