EVELIO B. JAVIER, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, RESPONDENTS.

Javier versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Evelio B. Javier against the Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, arising from the May 1984 elections for the Batasang Pambansa in the province of Antique. Javier asks the Supreme Court to annul the decision of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections proclaiming Pacificador the winning assemblyman. The case matters far beyond the parties: it fixes who within the Commission may hear and decide election matters involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, and it stands as the Court's firm statement that it will not dismiss a case as moot where the purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned.

Procedural History

Javier went first to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns and to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival. The Second Division of the Commission dismissed his complaints and proclaimed Pacificador the winner. Earlier, on certiorari to the Supreme Court, a proclamation made by the provincial board of canvassers had been set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the five-day period of appeal, which Javier had seasonably made. Javier then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, asking that the decision of the Second Division be annulled. While the case was pending, Javier was killed, Pacificador disappeared, and the Batasang Pambansa was abolished. The new Solicitor General moved to dismiss the petition as moot and academic. The Court denied the motion and resolved the case on the merits.

Facts

Javier and Pacificador were candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in Antique in the May 1984 elections. Javier appeared to enjoy more popular support, but Pacificador had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, several followers of Javier were ambushed and killed, allegedly by Pacificador's men. Seven suspects, including Pacificador, faced trial for these murders. The incident heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate.

Javier went to the Commission on Elections, charging that the elections were marred by massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns, and the snatching of ballot boxes by armed men of Pacificador. He complained that in several municipalities the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or manila paper. The Second Division of the Commission dismissed his complaints and proclaimed Pacificador the winner. Pacificador then took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

While the case was still being considered by the Supreme Court, Javier was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The killing outraged a nation already indignant over the manipulation of the presidential elections. Later, the Batasang Pambansa was abolished and the office in dispute disappeared, with both parties having gone their separate ways.

Issues

• Whether or not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election, or whether contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa must be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
• Whether or not the refusal of Commissioner Opinion to inhibit himself, on the ground that he was a former law partner of the private respondent, violated due process of law and rendered the proceedings null and void.
• Whether or not the petition should be dismissed as moot and academic because of supervening events.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution confers on the Commission on Elections the power to be the sole judge of election contests:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

This provision defines the scope of the Commission's authority as sole judge, which the Court reads to cover all matters affecting the validity of a candidate's title.

Section 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.

This is the core provision: it requires that contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided en banc, and the question is whether a pre-proclamation controversy falls within that requirement.

Section 175 of the 1978 Election Code provides:

Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation. - The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.

The Court notes that in referring to the Commission as sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies, the law meant the body sitting en banc.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Second Division was not authorized to promulgate the decision. The respondents argued that only contests need be heard en banc, and that a pre-proclamation controversy is not yet a contest because no proclamation had been made and neither party had assumed office. The Court rejected this, because it would divide the jurisdiction of the Commission into two and give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while denying to the banc. The Court held that the term contest should not be given a restrictive meaning but the widest possible scope, referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. The phrase election, returns and qualifications refers in its totality to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections and could be heard and decided by it only en banc. The Court stressed that the purpose of the en banc requirement was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases, an objective that could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after proclamation, for it might then be too late.

On the second issue, the Court held that Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself violated due process. The Court demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial. Where the relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law, due process demands that he inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. His refusal divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision and rendered the proceedings null and void.

On the third issue, the Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. Although the Batasang Pambansa had been abolished and the office in dispute had disappeared, the Court held that there were larger issues that must be resolved once and for all, and that the more important purpose was to manifest in the clearest possible terms that the Court will not condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government.

Doctrine

A contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of a member of the Batasang Pambansa is not limited to a post-proclamation dispute. It covers any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation, whether or not the contestant claims the office. Under Section 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution, such contests must be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections en banc, and a decision by a mere division is void. The term election, returns and qualifications refers in its totality to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. Due process requires not only an impartial judge but one who appears impartial; where a relationship with a party may color the judgment, the judge must inhibit himself. Finally, the Supreme Court may resolve a case on the merits despite supervening events that render it moot, where larger issues of public interest and the integrity of elections demand resolution.

Disposition

The Court denied the motion to dismiss, granted the petition, and annulled the decision of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections proclaiming the private respondent the winner.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a contest involving a member of the Batasang Pambansa includes pre-proclamation controversies and must be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections en banc, not by a division. Examiners use this case to test the en banc requirement in election contests, the appearance-of-impartiality branch of due process, and the moot-and-academic exception.