G.R. Nos. 66102-04. August 30, 1990
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos.
CV-65885, CV-65886 and CV-65887 which reversed the decision of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan
dated December 27, 1978;
and its resolution dated November 28,
1983 denying the motion for reconsideration.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court on
appeal. However, this principle is
subject to certain exceptions. One of
these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court (see Sabinosa v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47981, July
24, 1989) in which case, a re?examination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. This is Our task now.
The antecedent facts are
as follows:
About 11:00 o’clock in the morning on December
24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune
and Guillerma Carreon and
driven by Tranquilino Manalo
at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
to spend Christmas at their respective homes.
Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo
was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip.
The private respondents’ testimonial evidence on this contractual
relationship was not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney,
with contrary evidence. Purportedly
riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes
Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat
were Caridad Pascua,
Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at Moncada,
Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney
proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San
Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced
position. Manalo
stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney
which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn,
invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a
manner that the jeepney’s front faced the south (from
where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The jeepney
practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which
is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No.
753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost
at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western
lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos
Reyes, or after stopping for a couple of
minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon
and Manalo, the
bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three
passengers of the jeepney
(Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney
passengers sustained physical injuries.
What could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic.
The causes of the death of the three jeepney
passengers were as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
“The deceased Catalina Pascua
suffered the following injuries, to wit:
fracture of the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull;
fracture of the left mandible; fracture of the right humenous;
compound fracture of the left radious and ullma, middle third and lower third; fracture of the upper
third of the right tibia and fillnea; avulsion of the
head, left internal; and multiple abrasions.
The cause of her death was shock, secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage. The fractures were produced as a result of
the hitting of the victim by a strong force.
The abrasions could be produced when a person falls from a moving
vehicles (sic) and rubs parts of her body against a cement road pavement. x x x.
“Erlinda Mariles
(sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on the left parietal region of the skull; hematoma
on the right upper lid; and barasions (sic) on the
left knee. Her internal lesions
were: hematoma
on the left thorax; multiple lacerations of the left lower lobe of the lungs;
contusions on the left lower lobe of the lungs; and simple fractures of the
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th ribs, left. The forcible impact of the jeep caused the
above injuries which resulted in her death.
x x x.
“The cause of death of Erlinda or
Florida Estomo (also called Adelaida)
as per autopsy of Dr. Panlasiqui was due to shock due
to internal hemorrhage, ruptured spleen and trauma. x x x.”
Caridad Pascua suffered
physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
“x x x
lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma
on the forehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm, back and
right leg. x x
x.”
The police investigators
of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel, Tarlac, Tarlac, upon arrival at
the scene of the mishap, prepared a sketch (common exhibit “K” for
private respondents and “19” for Rabbit) showing the relative positions of
the two vehicles as well as the alleged point of impact (p. 100, Record on
Appeal):
“x x x. The point of collision was a cement
pave-portion of the Highway, about six (6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders
with grasses beyond which are canals on both sides. The road was straight and points 200 meters
north and south of the point of collision are visible and unobstructed. Purportedly, the point of impact or collision
(Exh. ‘K-4’-Pascua, on the sketch Exh.
‘K’-Pascua) was on the western lane of the highway
about 3 feet (or one yard) from the center line as shown by the bedris (sic), dirt and soil (obviously from the undercarriage of both vehicles) as well
as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus and
greenish from the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked with
the letter ‘X’ in Exh. ‘K’-4, Pascua, had a
diameter of two meters, the center of which was about two meters from the
western edge of cement pavement of the roadway.
Pictures taken by witness Bisquera in the course
of the investigation showed the relative positions of the point of impact and
center line (Exh. ‘P’-Pascua)
the back of the Rabbit bus (Exh. ‘P-1-Pascua), the
lifeless body of Catalina Pascua (Exh
‘P-2-Pascua’), and the damaged front part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. ‘P-3-Pascua’).
No skid marks of the Rabbit bus was found in the vicinity of the
collision, before or after the point of impact.
On the other hand, there was a skid mark about 45 meters long
purportedly of the jeepney from the eastern shoulder
of the road south of, and extending up to the point of impact.”
At the time and in the
vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the
bus. The weather condition of that day
was fair.
After conducting the
investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for
Multiple Homicide. At the preliminary
investigation, a probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance. However, finding no
sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of delos
Reyes, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment. Not having appealed, he
served his sentence.
Complaints for recovery
of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. In Civil
Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua
and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua
while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil Case No.
1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia
Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda
Meriales. In
Civil Case No. 1140, spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as
heirs of Adelaida Estomo.
In all three cases,
spouses Mangune and Carreon,
Manalo, Rabbit and delos
Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against
spouses Mangune and Carreon
and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos
Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1136
only.
For the death of Catalina
Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to
collect the aggregate amount of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as
follows: P500.00 for burial expenses;
P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney’s fees. In the same case, plaintiff Caridad Pascua claimed P550.00
for medical expenses; P240.00 for loss of wages for two months; P2,000.00 for
disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00
for physical pain and suffering;
P2,500.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00
for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
In Civil Case No. 1139,
plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income P10,000.00 for moral
damages and P3,000.00 for attorney’s fees or total of P80,000.00.
In Civil Case No.
1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial
expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Adelaida, P56,160.00
for loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and
P3,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
Rabbit filed a
cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation. On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a
cross-claim in the amount of P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for
its non-use during the period of repairs.
On December
27, 1978, the trial
court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent,
the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 113-114,
Record on Appeal):
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so
holds:
“1) That
defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma
Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence, breached contract of carriage
with their passengers the plaintiffs’ and/or their heirs, and this Court
renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs –
‘a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of
Catalina Pascua, to pay her heirs the amounts of
P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life; P41,760.00 for loss of earnings;
P324.40 for actual expenses and P2,000.00 for moral damages;
‘b) In the same Civil Case No. 1136 for the
injuries of Caridad Pascua,
to pay her the amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages, P328.20 for actual
expenses and P500.00 for moral damages;
‘c) In Civil Case No. 1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay her
heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 – for indemnity for loss of her
life; P622.00 for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of wages or income and
P2,000.00 for moral damages;
‘d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida or Adelaida
Estomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount
of P12,000.00 for indemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual
expenses; P53,160.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral
damages.’
“2) The
defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having
contracted to ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and Carreon for damages
due their passengers, this Court renders judgment against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and severally
with said defendants (Mangune and Carreon)
to pay the plaintiffs the amount herein above adjudicated in their favor in
Civil Case No. 1136 only. All the
amounts awarded said plaintiffs as set forth in paragraph one (1) hereinabove;
“3) On the
cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil.
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No.
753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.
“All of the above amounts shall bear legal interest from the
filing of the complaints.
“Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune,
Carreon and Manalo and Filriters Guaranty.
“SO ORDERED.”
On appeal, the
Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes negligent, the dispositive
portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court’s decision is
hereby REVERSED as to item No. 3 of the decision which reads:
‘(3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. ordering the defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay
jointly and severally, the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No.
753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earnings.’
and another judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Casiana
Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad
Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabit
Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to
pay the former jointly and severally damages in amounts awarded as follows:
“For the death of Catalina Pascua,
the parents and/or heirs are awarded:
“Civil Case No. 1136 –
|
a) Indemnity |
– P12,000.00 |
|
b) Loss |
– 14,000.00 |
|
c) Actual |
– 800.00 |
|
d) For |
– 10,000.00 |
|
e) Exemplary |
– 3,000.00 |
|
f) For |
– 3,000.00 |
|
Total |
P38,200.00 (sic) |
“For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad
Pascua:
“Civil Case No. 1136
|
a) Actual |
– P 550.00 |
|
b) Moral damages (disfigurement of the face |
– 8,000.00 |
|
c) Exemplary damages |
– 2,000.00 |
|
Total |
– P10,550.00 |
“For the death of Erlinda Arcega Meriales, the parents and/or heirs:
“Civil Case No. 1139
|
a) Indemnity |
– P12,000.00 |
|
b) Loss |
– 20,000.00 |
|
c) Actual |
– 500.00 |
|
d) Moral |
– 15 000.00 |
|
e) Exemplary |
– 15,000.00 |
|
f) Attorney’s |
– 3,000.00 |
|
Total |
– P45,500 00 |
“For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo:
“Civil Case No. 1140.
|
a) Indemnity |
– P12,000.00 |
|
b) Loss |
– 20,000.00 |
|
c) Actual |
– 500.00 |
|
d) Moral |
– 3,000.00 |
|
e) Exemplary |
– 3,000.00 |
|
f) Attorney’s |
– 3,000.00 |
|
Total |
– P41,500.00 |
“With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
“SO ORDERED.”
The motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, the present petition.
The issue is who is
liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
The trial court, in
declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the
following (p. 106, Record on Appeal):
“(1) That the unrebutted
testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad Pascua that a long ways (sic) before reaching the point of
collision, the Mangune jeepney
was ‘running fast’ that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo
to slow down but did not heed the warning:
that the right rear wheel was detached causing the jeepney
to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back to the concrete pavement;
that driver Manalo applied the brakes after which the
jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in such a manner
that it inverted its direction making it face South instead of north; that the jeepney stopped on the western lane of the road on the
right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it was bumped by the latter;
“(2) The likewise unrebutted
testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San
Manuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to the
reported collision, found the real evidence thereat indicating in his sketch (Exh. K, Pascua), the tracks of
the jeepney of defendant Mangune
and Carreon running on the Eastern shoulder (outside
the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp
angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and
encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as
evidenced by the point of impact;
“(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road (and indicated in the sketch
(Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by
skid marks which he described as ‘scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its
wheel was removed;’
“(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru
Reckless Imprudence by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
(Exh. 24-Rabbit) upon the criminal Information by the
Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh.
23-Rabbit), as a result of the collision, and his commitment to prison and
service of his sentence (Exh. 25-Rabbit) upon the
finality of the decision and his failure to appeal therefrom;
and
“(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar (sic) attesting to the circumstance
that the collision occurred (sic) on the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit
Bus.”
The respondent court had
a contrary opinion. Applying primarily
(1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who
bump the rear of another vehicle
guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other
evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test, concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.
The misappreciation
of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by the respondent
court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.
We reiterate that
“[t]he principle about the ‘last clear chance’ would call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver
was likewise guilty of negligence.” This was Our ruling in Anuran, et al.
v. Buño, et
al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224.[1] Thus, the respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.
On the presumption that
drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49, Rollo):
“x x x,
the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout
and at the time of impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney
assumed a new frontal position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive
driving. The spirit behind the
presumption of guilt on one who
bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to
be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front
suddenly come to a full stop, or change its course either through change of
mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front
vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the situation as it
is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it.”
The above discussion
would have been correct were it
not for the undisputed fact that
the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit “K,” Pascua). The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder,
making a straight skid mark of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern
lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the
eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit “K,” Pascua). Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn
executed by Manalo.
The respondent court did not realize that the presumption was rebutted
by this piece of evidence.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of
the respondent court that (p. 52, Rollo):
“x x x. It is the rule under the substantial factor
test that if the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor it bringing about harm
to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen
the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d).
Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident
occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, x x x. The bus driver’s conduct is thus a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not
even attempt to avoid the mishap, but also because it was the bus which was the
physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of
the jeepney.”
The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as
follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):
“According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, at 4:00 o’clock A.M. and the accident took place at
approximately around 12:30 P.M.,
after travelling roughly for 8 hours and 30
minutes. Deduct from this the actual
stopover time of two Hours (computed from the testimony of the driver that he
made three 40-minute stopovers), We will have an actual travelling
time of 6 hours and 30 minutes.
“Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.)
driving at an average of 56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30
minutes. Therefore, the average speed of
the bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with
excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms.
per hour, as this is the place where buses would make up for lost time in
traversing busy city streets.”
Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said
that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the
accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming
such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the
jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured
from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed
the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that
the road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of
collision, visible and unobstructed.
Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per
hour at the time of the accident. Using
this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45
meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the
speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would
have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the
situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from
him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options
available to him. As the trial court
remarked (pp. 107-108, Record on Appeal):
“x x x. They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court
that defendant de los Reyes, could have taken either
of two options: (1) to swerve to its
right (western shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus
steer clear of the Mangune jeepney. This Court does not so believe, considering
the existing exigencies of space and time.
“As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit’s evidence is convincing
and unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road
was narrow and had tall grasses which would indicate that it was not
passable. Even plaintiff’s own evidence,
the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua)
are mute confirmation of such fact.
Indeed, it can be noticed in the picture (Exh.
P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full
stop, it was tilted to right front side, its front wheels resting most probably
on a canal on a much lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It too shows that all of the wheels of the
Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except the outer left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) clearly shows
coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters
from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show that driver de los
Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempting to avoid hitting the Mangune’s jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing
the Mangune jeepney as its
(Rabbit’s) left front hit said jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have been due to limitations of
space and time.
“Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to
its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane. Such a claim is premised on the hypthesis (sic) that the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear to be good copy of it
were based alone on the sketch made after the collision. Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to
consider the time element involved, for moments before that, the Mangune jeepney was crossing that
very eastern lane at a sharp angle.
Under such a situation then, for driver delos
Reyes to swerve to the eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running
smack in the Mangune jeepney
either head on or
broadside.”
After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and
duly proven evidence, We find that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune
and Carreon.
They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro
hac vice.
In culpa contractual,
the moment a passenger dies or is injured,
the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and
this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had
observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755
and 1756 of the New Civil Code[2] or that the death or injury of the passenger
was due to a fortuitous event[3] (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad
Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal,
Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo’s)
conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries
with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, supra. The negligence of spouses Mangune
and Carreon was likewise proven
during the trial (p. 110, Record on Appeal):
“To escape liability, defendants, Mangune
and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically
checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the
tightening of the bolts. This
notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in
transit. As to the cause thereof no
evidence was offered. Said defendant did
not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. x x x.”
In any
event, “[i]n an action for damages against the
carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an
accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence
of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carrier’s
liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al.,
104 Phil. 75).
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo
and spouses Mangune and Carreon
were negligent. However, its ruling that
spouses Mangune and Carreon
are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous.
The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily
discernible. Firstly, the contract of
carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefor to the passenger, even if such breach be due to
the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81,
April 29, 1966, 16
SCRA 742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver’s
negligence is his.[4] Secondly, if We make the driver jointly
and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier’s liability
personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds
to the driver,[5] contradictory to the explicit provision of
Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.[6]
We affirm the amount of
damages adjudged by the trial court, except with respect to the indemnity
for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in
relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code, the amount of damages for the
death of a passenger is at least three thousand pesos (P3,000.00). The prevailing jurisprudence has increased
the amount of P3,000.00 to P30,000.00
(see Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 51165, June, 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas
Co., G.R. Nos.L-35697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
dated July 29, 1983 and its
resolution dated November 28, 1983
are SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court
of First Instance dated December 27,
1978 is REINSTATED
WITH MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to
the victims or their heirs and that the amount of indemnity for loss of life is
increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
* as it appears in the petition
[1]
In this case, an improperly parked passenger jeepney was bumped from behind by a speeding truck with such violence that three of its
passengers died whereas two other passengers suffered injuries. The representatives of the dead and of the
injured passengers filed suits to recover damages against the driver and the
owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. The trial
court rendered judgment absolving the driver and the owners of the jeepney but required driver and the owners of the truck to
compensate the victims. The plaintiffs
appealed insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made
liable. The appellate court, relying on
the doctrine of last clear chance, affirmed
the trial court’s decision. The
plaintiffs then filed a petition
for review on certiorari before this
Court. We modified the questioned
decision by making all the defendants solidarily
liable.
[2]
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code, respectively provides:
“ART.
1733. Common carriers, from the nature
of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
“Such
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746. Nos. 5,
6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is
further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.”
“ART.
1755. A common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.”
“ART.
1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.”
[3]
Article 1174 of the New Civil Code provides:
“ART.
1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when
it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.”
[4]
Article 1759 of the New Civil Code provides:
“ART.
1759. Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.”
“This
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees.”
[5]
Article 1217 of the New Civil Code provides:
“ART.
1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary
debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
“He who
made the payment may claim from his codebtors only
the share which corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already
made. If the payment is made before the
debt is due, no interest for the
intervening period may be demanded.
“When one
of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his
insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share
shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each.”
[6]
Article 2181 of the New Civil Code provides:
“ART.
2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused
by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim.”