NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH 39, AND DANIEL R. ROXAS, DOING BUSINESS AS UNITED VETERANS SECURI…

This is a petition to set aside the Order, dated September 22,
1982, of the respondent judge. The
prayer is premised on the allega­tion that the questioned Order was issued with
grave abuse of dis­cretion.

In Civil Case No. 133528 of the defunct Court of First Instance
of Manila, DANIEL E. ROXAS, doing business under the name and style of United
Veterans Security Agency and Foreign Boats Watchmen, sued the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC) and two of its officers in Iligan City. The purpose of the suit was to compel the
NPC to restore the contract of Roxas for security services which the former had
terminated.

After several incidents, the litigants entered into a Compro­mise
Agreement on October 14, 1981, and they asked the Court to approve it. Accordingly, a Decision was rendered on
October 30, 1981, which reads as follows:

“In order to abbreviate the proceedings in this case, the
parties, instead of going into trial, submit­ted a compromise agreement, as
follows:

‘The parties, DANIEL E. ROXAS, etc. and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
ET AL., represented by its President Mr. Gabriel Y. Itchon with due and proper
autho­rity under NP Board Resolution No. 81-224, assisted by their respective
counsel, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the follow­ing compromise
agreement:

1.     The
defendant National Power Cor­poration shall pay to plaintiff the sum of
P7,277.45, representing the amount due to plaintiff for the services of one of
plaintiff’s supervisors;

2.     The
defendant shall pay plaintiff the value of the line materials which were stolen
but recovered, by plaintiff’s agency which value is to be determined after a
joint inventory by the representatives of both parties;

3.     The
parties shall continue with the contract of security services under the same
terms and conditions as the previous contract effective upon the signing
thereof;

4.     The
parties waive all their res­pective claims and counterclaims in favor of each
other;

5.     The
parties agree to faithfully comply with the foregoing agreement.

P R A Y E R

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Hon. Court approve
the following com­promise agreement.’

“Examining the foregoing agreement, the Court finds that the
same is in accordance with law and not against morals and public policy.

“CONFORMABLY, the Court hereby renders judgment in accordance
with the terms and conditions thereof, enjoining the parties to strictly comply
with the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement, without
pronouncement as to cost.” (Rollo, pp. 33-34.)

The judgment was not implemented for reasons which have no
relevance here.

On May 14, 1982, the NPC executed another contract for security
services with Josette L. Roxas whose relationship to Daniel is not shown. At any rate Daniel has owned the
contract. The NPC refused to im­plement
the new contract for which reason Daniel filed a Motion for Execution in the
aforesaid civil case which had been re-numbered R-82-10787. The Motion reads:

“PLAINTIFF, by counsel, respectfully shows:

‘”1.   On October 30, 1981, this Honorable Court
rendered its decision based on compromise agreement submitted by the parties,
under which it was provided, among others, that –

‘3. The parties
shall continue with the contract of security services under the same terms and
conditions as the previous contract effective upon the signing thereof;’

“2. To date, after
more than about eight (8) months since the decision of this Honorable Court,
defendant National Power Corporation, through bad faith by reason of excuses
made one after another, has yet to comply with the aforesaid terms of the
decision. It has not reinstated the
contract with the plaintiff in gross violation of the terms of the said
compromise agreement which this Honorable Court approved, ‘enjoining the
parties to strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the com­promise
agreement’;

“3.  Hence, plaintiff is compelled to seek the
assistance of this Honorable Court for the execution of its decision.

P R A Y E R

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable
Court order the issuance of the writ of execution for the enforcement of the
aforesaid portion of its decision.” (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)

Acting on the Motion, the respondent judge issued the following
Order:

“Acting on the motion for execution dated July 14, 1982,
visibly over the objection and/or opposition to the motion for execution dated
July 19, 1982, the Court, considering that the decision of October 30, 1981 was
based on a Compromise Agree­ment entered into by and between the parties which
decidedly, become final and executory, is inclined to grant said action.

“CONFORMABLY, let the corresponding writ of execution be
issued to be served by the Deputy Sheriff assigned to this branch.”
(Rollo, p. 54.)

The NPC assails the Order on the ground that it directs execu­tion
of a contract which had been novated by that of May 14, 1982. Upon the other hand, Roxas claims that said
contract was executed precisely to implement the compromise agreement for which
reason there was no novation.

We sustain the private respondent. Article I of the May 14, 1982, agreement supports his contention. Said article reads:

“ARTICLE I

DOCUMENTS COMPRISING THE CONTRACT

The letter proposal dated September 5, 1981; CORPORA­TION’S
counter-proposal dated September 11, 1981; Board Reso­lution No. 81-244 dated
September 28, 1981; the Compromise Agreement and Court Decision dated October
30, 1981 in Civil Case No. 133528 CFI-Manila; other subsequent letters and the
performance bond of AGENCY to be filed in favor of COR­PORATION in the manner
hereinafter provided, are hereby expressly made integral parts of this contract
by reference.” (Rollo, pp. 59-60.)

It is elementary that novation is never presumed; it must be
expli­citly stated or there must be manifest incompatibility between the old
and the new obligations in every aspect. Thus the Civil Code provides:

“Art. 1292. In order
that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same,
it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old
and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.”

In the case at bar there is nothing in the May 14, 1982,
agreement which supports the petitioner’s contention. There is neither explicit novation nor incompatibility on every
point between the “old” and the “new” agreements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit with
costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero,
De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., no part.