HEIRS OF INOCENCIO SANTIAGO, REPRESENTED BY JOSE CUNANAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, JUDGE, CFI, RIZAL, BRANCH IX, QUEZON CITY; HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, JUDGE, CFI, RI…

Petition for certiorari (1) to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IX in Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-32452, entitled:
“Francisco Edades, et al. vs. Tan Cheng Leng, et al.”,
directing “the demolition of the illegally constructed houses, shanties
and other structures of the plaintiffs as contained in the order of this
court dated July 2, 1982, in accordance with existing laws and
procedures on the matter”; (2) to set aside the order of respondent
Judge Antonio P. Solano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVI in Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-35920, entitled: “Heirs
of Inocencio Santiago, represented by Jose Cunanan vs. The
General Manager, National Housing Authority, et al.”, dismissing the
petition for a writ of prohibition, quieting of title with preliminary
injunction and denying the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction as the same has “become moot and academic”; and, (3) to annul
and set aside the demolition notices issued in September 1982 by the
City Engineer of Quezon City. Petitioners claim that the aforementioned
orders of respondent Judges were issued with grave abuse of discretion
and beyond their jurisdiction.

On October 19, 1982, upon Urgent Motion, filed by petitioners, through
counsel, the Court issued a restraining order “enjoining the respondents
or their agents and representatives from demolishing the petitioners’
houses pending resolution of the prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise
ordered by this Court.” (p. 46, Rollo)

The established background facts insofar as pertinent to this petition, follow:

On July 3, 1972, Mabuhay Real Estate Investment and Financing
Corporation, owned by Bernabe Ang, filed Civil Cases Nos. Q-16689,
Q-16691 and Q-16693 (CFI, Rizal) against Elisa Gonzales, Igmidio
Tolentino and Emmanuel Gonzales, respectively. The complaints commonly
alleged that the plaintiff is the registered owner of the parcels of
land in question, having purchased them from J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. and for which corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title were
duly issued in its name; that the above-named defendants were unlawfully
occupying the said parcels of land to the extent that it could not use
the same.

Defendants Eliza Gonzales, Igmidio Tolentino and Emmanuel Gonzales
resisted the complaints, claiming that they are the rightful owners of
their respective lots based on the Spanish title or grant to their
predecessor-in-interest, Inocencio Santiago, which was registered under
Act No. 496, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 892 (LRC No. Q-341 in
Quezon City and LRC No. 80, LRC Record No. 49124 in Manila).

On November 19, 1974, the lower court rendered its decision on the three
cases, the trial of which, by agreement of the parties was
consolidated. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

“‘x x x. It follows that the defendants’ claim must fall since
the basis of their claim was the invalidity of OCT No. 735. By invoking
the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cases which
was reiterated by the same tribunal in the case of J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Judge Felix V. Makasiar, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants as follows:

“1. The defendant Elisa Gonzales, her heirs and all parties
claiming any right or title under her are hereby ordered to vacate the
premises and turn over possession of the same to the plaintiff; to pay
the sum of P60.00 a month by way of rental from July 1960 until she
actually vacates the premises; and to pay the sum of P500.00 for
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit;

“2. Defendant Igmidio Tolentino, his heirs and all parties
claiming rights or title under him are ordered to vacate the premises
and turn over possession of the same to the plaintiff; to pay the sum of
P240.00 a month by way of rent from June 1960 until he actually vacates
the premises; to pay the sum of P600.00 for attorney’s fees and costs
of suit;

“3. Defendant Emmanuel Gonzales, his heirs and all parties
claiming rights or title under him to vacate the premises and turn over
possession of the same to the plaintiff; to pay the sum of P300.00 a
month by way of rental from April 1966 until he actually vacates the
premises; to pay the sum of P500.00 for attorney’s fees, and costs of
suit.'” (pp. 142-143, Rollo)

The foregoing judgment became final and executory when the defendants
did not appeal. However, when they refused to leave the premises,
plaintiff filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted.
The matter was brought to the then Court of Appeals which rendered a
decision on December 29, 1980 in CA-G.R. Nos. 08367-69-SP, entitled:
“Jose Cunanan, et al. vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Tensuan”, pertinent portion of which states:

“With respect to petitioners Elisa Gonzales, Igmidio Tolentino and
Emmanuel Gonzales, it is plain that they have failed to make out a case
for the issuance of the extra-ordinary writs prayed for. The decision
in Civil Cases Nos. Q-16689, Q-16691 and “Q-16693, ordering them to
vacate the premises in question, has long become final and executory for
failure on their part to appeal therefrom. As such, its execution is a
matter of right. Contrary to their assertion, we are unable to find
supervening facts and circumstances which would render execution of
judgment impossible or which justify the postponement of implementation
of the writs of execution (Magdangal vs. Hawaiian-Philippine
Co., 65 SCRA 101). Not only were they classified by the National
Housing Authority as ‘disqualified’ for purposes of government
assistance by way of relocation and resettlement, but they were also
declared, in effect, not to be owners of the land they are occupying
when the Supreme Court in the case of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Hon. Makasiar, et al. (G.R. No. L-12674) upheld the validity of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the root of the title of Mabuhay
Real Estate Investment and Financing Corporation, plaintiff in said
ejectment cases.

“Neither could the above-named petitioners validly avail in this
Court the remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court under their alternative prayer. Suffice it to say that, if at
all, it should have been sought from the Court of First Instance of
Rizal by means of a verified petition specifically grounded on fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, (Sec. 2) within sixty days
after they have learned of the decision and not more than six months
after the judgment or order was entered (Sec. 3).

“With respect to the other petitioners, namely, Jose Cunanan,
Paulina Cunanan, Domingo Cunanan, Antonio Soriano, Emilia Cunanan,
Constantino Tolentino, Felix Tolentino and Papa Ignacio, the present
petition is not proper for want of jurisdiction by this Court. It
appears that they were being evicted by the respondent City Engineer of
Quezon City by virtue of a clearance from the National Housing Authority
under Letters of Instruction No. 19 and 19-A after due investigation
wherein they were required to appear and present their side. Their
remedy, if any lies elsewhere. In fact, except for Jose Cunanan and
Domingo Cunanan, the other petitioners had already filed a similar case
with this Court, docketed as CA-G. R. No. 07610-SP, but this was
dismissed outright in a resolution promulgated on March 20, 1978, it
reads:

“Herein petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and prohibition to enjoin respondent City Engineer from
executing his Orders of demolition of the houses of the petitioners
allegedly ‘constructed within a government or private lot in violation
of LOI 19’.

“This petition should be dismissed outright on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the writs prayed for.

“The petitioners had prematurely instituted this action before Us.
They should had brought first this action in the City Court which has
original jurisdiction on ejectment cases and which may grant the
preliminary injunction prayed for (I Moran, Rules of Court, 69; Padilla vs.
De Jesus, 95 Phil. 688). As it is, there is no judgment or order of
the lower court which is subject for review, either by appeal or writ of
error, by this Court. This Court has original jurisdiction to issue
writ of mandamus, prohibitions, injunction, certiorari and all other auxiliary writs only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (R.A. 296, Sec. 30).

“WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby summarily dismissed.

“SO ORDERED.”

“WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
dismissed and the restraining order heretofore issued by this Court
immediately lifted. Costs against the petitioners.” (pp. 145-146,
Rollo)

Herein petitioners submit that instead of demolishing only the house of
Elisa Gonzales and Emmanuel Gonzales, who were defendants in Civil Cases
Nos. Q-16689; Q-16691 and Q-16693, “the Sheriff demolished 24 houses
including that of the two defendants, that is, the 22 houses demolished
belong to persons not parties to the case and therefore cannot be
reached by any judgment or order in the said cases, or in any other
case. x x x The thing most intriguing and beyond the understanding of
the 22 families whose houses were demolished without due process of law
in these cases (Q-16689; Q-16691 and Q-16693) is that they have
presented to the Court evidence that the area from where they were
unduly ejected is part of the titled land of their forebear, Inocencio
Santiago. They presented the Spanish title; the approved plan, the tax
declaration all in the name of Inocencio Santiago and their registration
of the whole area covered by the Spanish title yet the court did not
give an iota of consideration on these documented facts but gave credit
to the unsupported claims of the City Engineer that they (petitioners)
are squatters. x x x After the illegal demolition, the respondents were
not satisfied but moved for redemolition, of the houses which the 22
petitioners (in the three cases) hurriedly salvaged and formed into
barong-barong if only to shelter their family members, mostly babies,
children (and) ailing adults.” (pp. 16-17, Rollo)

On the other hand, Tan Cheng Leng sued the families who are occupying
his property located in Palanca Street, Brixton Hill, Barangay Doña
Imelda, Quezon City before the Barangay Court of Barangay Doña Imelda,
Quezon City. After a conference, 11-squatter families promised to
voluntarily vacate the premises; the others refused. Thus, Tan Cheng
Leng sought the assistance of the National Housing Authority to relocate
the families who refused to vacate his property. In response, the
Manager of the National Housing Authority issued a clearance for the
demolition of the houses and structures of the petitioners but the same
was not implemented because the area is covered by the Zonal Improvement
Program (ZIP) of Quezon City.

On May 20, 1981, without having received a Notice of Demolition,
petitioners filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IX in Quezon City, a petition for a writ of prohibition and
preliminary injunction, entitled: “Francisco Edades, et al., vs.
Tan Cheng Leng, et al.” docketed therein as Civil Case No. Q-32452.
However, in an order, dated June 13, 1981, the petition was dismissed on
the ground that it states no cause of action and that petitioners had
not exhausted all available administrative remedies.

On July 2, 1982, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, the Presiding Judge of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX in Quezon City,
issued an order allowing the implementation of the demolition of the
houses of petitioners in the subject property. Upon motion of
respondent Tan Cheng Leng, respondent Judge Castro issued the questioned
Order of September 23, 1982, directing the authorities concerned,
particularly the National Housing Authority and the Quezon City
Engineer’s Office, to cause the demolition of the illegally constructed
houses, shanties and other structures of petitioners.

Similarly, spouses Ramon Albert and Maria Puno seek the assistance of
the Mayor of Quezon City for the ejectment of herein petitioners on
their land. After several representations and requests of the said
spouses, the City Mayor recommended to the National Housing Authority
the issuance of a clearance to demolish and/or relocate the families
occupying the same. Acting upon the recommendation of the City Mayor,
respondent National Housing Authority issued a clearance authorizing the
Mayor to dismantle and/or remove all illegal structures on subject
property pursuant to LOI 19 and its implementing directives from the
Office of the President. Prior to its implementation, a conference was
held between the parties therein, wherein 22 of the 28 families executed
a KASUNDUAN, dated August 1, 1982, to vacate the premises voluntarily.

However, on August 6, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition
and Quieting of Title with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI in Quezon City,
entitled: “Heirs of Inocencio Santiago, represented by Jose Cunanan vs.
The National Housing Authority, et al.”, which was docketed therein as
Civil Case No. Q-35920, alleging that public respondents acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction by ordering the demolition of
their structures. However, no copy of the order of demolition was
attached. Thus, on August 27, 1982, respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano
of Branch XVI, dismissed the petition for not being sufficient in form
and substance.

Hence, this petition filed on October 7, 1982.

We cannot sustain the petition.

1. The properties in question are registered and titled in the
respective names of private respondents, namely: (a) Tan Cheng Leng,
under TCT Nos. 196095 and 90307; (b) Ramon Araneta Albert and Maria
Lourdes Puno, under TCT No. 268627; and (3) the Mabuhay Real Estate
Investment and Financing Corporation under TCT No. 25859, which
originated from OCT No. 735 in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
all in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. This Court, in the case
of Benin vs. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531, 595, held that the “the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado,
and it did not establish the right of ownership of their
predecessor-in-interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her
co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex
A). This Court held in that previous case that the document was
unavailing against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.”
Thus, herein petitioners, claiming as heirs of Inocencio Santiago,
cannot derogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate
Of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from
said original certificate of title; and, if the late Inocencio Santiago
did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the
document, Annex A, then herein petitioners, as his alleged heirs, have
not acquired said ownership either, much less the right of possession.

2. The petition has become moot and academic inasmuch as the
houses and shanties of petitioners which were constructed in the
property of the Mabuhay Real Estate Investment & Financing
Corporation had already been demolished on October 8 and 9, 1982, as
shown in the accomplishment Report of the City Engineer of Quezon City
(p. 213, Rollo).

3. In Civil Case No. Q-32452, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, on June 13, 1981,
issued an Order dismissing the petition for prohibition filed by
Francisco Edades, et al. versus Tan Cheng Leng, et al. for the reason
that-

“x x x on February 2, 1981, the General Manager of the NHA
issued a clearance to dismantle and remove from the Tan property (the
property involved in this petition) all structures illegally introduced
by the persons enumerated therein. Said clearance shall be impIemented
within three (3) months from receipt.

“The motion to dismiss alleges that the petition states no
cause of action and that the petitioner has not exhausted all available
administrative remedies.

“Indeed, there is no cause of action, while there was
clearance to dismantle, the implementing arm has not made any effort to
enforce the demolition, and the best evidence is that the local
government did not notify the petitioners to vacate and as a matter of
fact, the local government allowed the expiration of the clearance
without utilizing it.

“As to the second ground, granting that the local government
is ready to implement the clearance, the remedy of the petitioners is to
avail of administrative remedies before resorting to the Courts. In
the instant case, the petitioners came immediately to the Court which
should not be the case.” (p. 406, Rollo)

4. In Civil Case No. Q-35920, entitled: “Heirs of Inocencio Santiago, represented by Jose Cunanan vs. The General Manager, National Housing Authority, et al.” respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano, on August 27, 1982, issued the other questioned Order, as follows:

“The petition for a Writ of prohibition and quieting of title,
filed by petitioners thru counsel, not being sufficient in form and
substance, is hereby DISMISSED.

“Accordingly, the application for writ of preliminary
injunction, dated August 12, 1982, having become moot and academic, is
hereby DENIED.” (p. 409, Rollo)

The order dismissing the petition for prohibition, in Civil Case No.
Q-32452 is dated June 13, 1981, and the order denying the petition in
Civil Case No. Q-35920 is dated August 27, 1982. Instant petition was
filed on October 7, 1982. As pointed out by respondent National Housing
Authority, in its Memorandum dated September 27, 1983, the aforesaid
orders have become final and executory. Herein petitioners did not
refute this contention.

“The petitioner is seeking to avail of the remedy of certiorari as
a substitute for appeal. The questioned order of dismissal is
appealable and the proper remedy should have been to appeal the same.
No circumstance had been shown to explain why such procedure was not
observed, nor to justify a deviation from the same as to make available a
petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an appropriate appeal.” (Velasco Vda. de Caldito vs. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573)

“Plaintiffs cannot resort to the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus
because these remedies are not available when, as in this case, there
was a remedy by appeal and the period for appealing had already
expired.” (G.L. Enterprises, Inc. vs. Señeris, 111 SCRA 735)

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, instant petition is DISMISSED and the
temporary restraining order issued on October 19, 1982 is hereby
DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Acting C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., in the result.

Fernando, C.J., and Teehankee, J., on leave.

De la Fuente, J., no part.