TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RICARDO C. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF JUSTICE; AND JORGE CENTENERA, TEODORO ALARCON, PABLO PAQUEO, JR., AMELIA LAMIT, ALFRED…

The question raised in the petition is whether respondent Minister of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the Provincial
Fiscal of Camarines Sur “to desist from filing in court the
corresponding informations against respondents based on your resolution,
or to move for their dismissal if they have already been filed, and to
thereafter dismiss the twin complaints filed in your office under I.S.
Nos. 1162 and 1163, reporting the action you have taken on this
directive within ten days from receipt hereof.” (p. 35, Rollo)

The facts of this case are as follows:

Herein petitioner, Tomasa Vda. de Jacob, filed with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur two (2) criminal complaints for
falsification of public documents which purport to have been executed by
her deceased husband, Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob, to wit:

“(1) A Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1977 over a
parcel of residential land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of
Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, in favor of Jorge M. Centenera. This
deed was ratified on the same date before Notary Public Teodoro Alarcon
and had for instrumental witnesses Pablo Paqueo, Jr. and Amelia Lamit.
This is the subject of I.S. No. 1162.

“(2) A Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 20, 1976 conveying
ownership of 454,987 square meters of agricultural land situated at
Barrio Mabalodbalod, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur
to Dr, Daniel Mercado and Dr. Alfredo V. Silva. This deed was ratified
on October 25, 1976 before Notary Public Jose Cea and had as
instrumental witnesses, Miguel Moll and Olympio Clapis. While this deed
is the only one involved in I.S. No. 1163, records show that sometime
there­after, on January 24, 1977, Dr. Jacob appears to have executed
another deed of sale covering the same parcel of land to Daniel Mercado
only. This deed was ratified on the same date before the same Notary
Public, Jose Cea.” (pp. 32-33, Rollo)

In charging herein private respondents, namely: Jorge Centenera,
Teodoro Alarcon, Pablo Paqueo, Jr., Amelia Lamit, Alfredo Silva, Jose
Cea, Miguel Moll and Olympio Clapis, with falsification of public
documents, petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who, since January 16, 1979,
had been the court-appointed guardian of the then incompetent Dr.
Alfredo Jacob, claims that respondents connived and confederated with
each other in falsifying the two deeds of absolute sale afore­mentioned
by making it appear therein that her husband participated in the
execution thereof as seller when in truth and in fact he never did so
participate in any manner as he was already seriously ill and
practically bed ridden on October 20, 1976 and December 2, 1977 when the
said documents appeared to have been executed.

After preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ceferino P.
Goce, on May 15, 1979, issued separate resolutions in I.S. Nos. 1162
and 1163 recommending the filing in court of the corresponding
informations “for falsification of public documents by private
individuals as defined and punished under Article 171, par. 2 in
relation to Article 172, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code x x x.” (p.
46, Rollo)

The private respondents appealed the aforementioned resolutions to the
respondent Minister of Justice, who, on April 15, 1981, directed the
Provincial Fiscal to desist from filing in court the corresponding
informa­tions against the respondents. Reasons for this directive are –

“While the three medical cer­tificates submitted in evidence tend
to indicate that Dr. Alfredo Jacob underwent medical treatment since
1975 for arteriosclerosis and Parkin­son’s disease, these could not be
considered weighty enough to give credence to the claim that Dr. Jacob
could not have been at Camarines Sur on December 2, 1977 to execute the
Deed of Absolute Sale involved in I.S. No. 1162. There is no showing
that he was no longer ambulatory and mobile while undergoing treatment.

“In this regard, it will be noted that the descriptive portion of
the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Rodolfo Talag indicating the weak
physical condition of the patient and the uncoordinated movements of his
legs has reference to the physi­cal condition of Dr. Jacob at the time
of examination immediately prior to the issuance of the medical
certi­ficate on March 18, 1978. This observation is amply fortified by
the suggestion in the medical certificate that the patient undergo
immediate hospitalization. It in no way reflects the patient’s state of
health on December 2, 1977 when he executed one of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale in question.

“Also, there is nothing in the medical certificates issued by
three different doctors that would suggest that Dr. Alfredo Jacob could
not have been in Camarines Sur on October 20 when he executed the Deed
of Absolute Sale subject matter of I.S. No. 1163. The medical
certificates do not indicate that he was confined or was under
treat­ment from May 31, 1976 when he was dis­charged from the hospital
after a cardio-vascular clearance to the date when the deed of October
20, 1976 was executed.

“Moreover, the categorical declara­tions of the instrumental
witnesses and Notary Public Teodoro Alarcon who re­spectively
participated in the execution of the deeds in question, to the effect
that Dr. Jacob actually and personally executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale referred to cannot simply be overcome by the aforementioned medical
certifi­cates, most especially in the absence of corroborating evidence
tending to show in definite and precise terms that Dr. Jacob was
actually not in Camarines Sur on the dates of the execution of the deeds
in question. Complainant herself could not qualify to assert this fact
considering that on the dates of the execution of the said documents
she was not yet married to Dr. Jacob.

“Besides, even without the afore­mentioned declarations of the
instrumental witnesses and notary public, the medical certificates,
standing alone, which raise merely assumptions cannot destroy the
presumption of regularity in the execu­tion of documents.

“In their totality, we are of the opinion that the evidence on hand cannot sustain a prima facie case of falsifica­tion of public documents against respondents in both cases.” (pp. 33-34, Rollo)

The first and second motions for reconsideration of the aforementioned
order of respondent Minister of Justice were denied. Hence, this appeal
by certiorari, petitioner arguing that respondent Minister “has
transcended his authority to merely determine the existence of a prima facie
case in pursuance of P.D. No. 911 and in so doing arrogated to himself
the prerogatives or power vested in the courts.” (pp. 28-29, Rollo)

It is apparent from the facts above-stated that certiorari does not lie.

The power of supervision and control by the Minister of Justice over the
fiscals cannot be denied. As stated in Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47,
“Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code defines the extent of
a department secretary’s power. The power of control therein
contemplated ‘means (the power of the department head) to alter, modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.’ ‘The power of control … implies the right of
the President (and, naturally, of his alter ego) to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.'”
For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who,
according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be
guilty of a crime, the Minister of Justice is likewise bound by his oath
of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or serious
prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if
he orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a
complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence would warrant the
filing of the action in court. As he has the power of supervision and
control over prosecuting officers, the Minister of Justice has the
ultimate power to decide which as between conflicting theories of the
complainant and the respondents should be believed. “It should be
realized that when a man is haled to court on a criminal charge, it
brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family
as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence
carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of prima facie
case before filing the information in Court. Anything less would be a
dereliction of duty (Bernardo vs. Mendoza, 90 SCRA 214).”

The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of Justice would
not allow the filing of a criminal complaint against an accused because
it is his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain an
information for the complaint with which the respondents are charged of,
is to file a civil action as indicated in Article 35 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

“Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil
action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of
the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute
criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

“If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should
be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the ter­mination of the criminal proceedings.”

Further, Presidential Decree No. 911 specifically provides:

” x x x Provided, Finally, That whore the resolution of the
Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review,
reversed by the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice, the latter may,
where he finds that no prima facie case exists, authorize and
direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state
prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he
finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information
in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statement or
evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another
preliminary investigation.”

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De La Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

Makasiar, J., in the result.