ROLANDO MANGUBAT, ANTONIO CENIZA, ULDARICO ENCENZO, RUFINO NUNEZ, ANGELINA ESCANO, MANUEL DE VEYRA, BASILISA GALVAN, MATILDE JABALDE, JOSEFINA LUNA, JOSE SAYSON, LEONILA DEL ROS…

Mangubat versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a petition by several accused, led by Rolando Mangubat, asking the Supreme Court to nullify a resolution of the Sandiganbayan that discharged their co-accused Delia Preagido so that she could testify as a state witness against them. The petitioners insist that Preagido was disqualified because she had earlier been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The case matters because it settles, as a rule a reviewee can carry into the examination room, that the propriety of discharging an accused as a state witness affects only that accused's criminal liability, and never the competency of that person as a witness or the admissibility of the testimony given.

Procedural History

Several criminal cases were pending before the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to discharge three of the accused so that they could be used as state witnesses under Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Some of the other defendants opposed the motion, but only as regards Delia Preagido, on the ground that she had previously been convicted by the Sandiganbayan of many counts of estafa through falsification of public or commercial documents, although she had seasonably appealed that conviction to the Supreme Court. In an order dated March 5, 1982, the Sandiganbayan overruled the opposition and directed the discharge of Preagido and the two others. It then received her direct testimony over the objection of the defense, deferring cross-examination so that the objectors could first question the Sandiganbayan's acts before the Supreme Court. The objectors did so, and the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, rendered a decision on April 20, 1985 declining to nullify the Sandiganbayan's resolution on certiorari. The petitioners then filed the present motion for reconsideration of that decision, which the Court now resolves.

Facts

In the Sandiganbayan cases, the prosecution asked that three of the several accused be discharged and utilized as state witnesses under Section 9 of Rule 119. The other defendants opposed the motion only as to Delia Preagido, pointing to her prior conviction by the Sandiganbayan of one hundred twenty-six counts of estafa through falsification of public or commercial documents. She had timely appealed that conviction to the Supreme Court by filing the requisite petition for review.

On March 5, 1982, the Sandiganbayan overruled the opposition and ordered the discharge of Preagido and the two others. It reasoned that her cases were still on appeal, so she still enjoyed in her favor the constitutional presumption of innocence, and that until a final conviction was promulgated, that constitutional mandate prevailed. The Sandiganbayan then received her direct testimony as a state witness over the defense's objection, but deferred cross-examination to allow the objectors to bring the matter to the Supreme Court.

It later turned out that neither the Sandiganbayan nor the defense lawyers knew the precise status of Preagido's appeal. Her appeal was not finally adjudged until November 12, 1985, when the Supreme Court denied with finality her third motion for reconsideration of a resolution that had denied her petition for review, and entry of judgment was made on November 21, 1985. In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners argued that Preagido had become disqualified from turning state witness by reason of her conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude, and that the requirement of non-conviction of such an offense is as important as, if not more important than, the requirement of absolute necessity of the testimony, because a witness tainted by moral turpitude is untrustworthy.

Issues

• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, in discharging Delia Preagido as a state witness despite her prior conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude, when that conviction was still on appeal and not yet final.
• Whether or not Preagido's discharge as a state witness may afterwards be undone, and she reverted to the status of an accused, upon the later final resolution of her appeal from her conviction.
• Whether or not an erroneous discharge of an accused as a state witness renders that person incompetent as a witness or makes her testimony inadmissible against her co-accused.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, as referred to in the decision, governs the discharge of one or some of several accused so that they may be utilized as state witnesses:

When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

This provision supplies the grounds for discharge, and the Court examines whether the Sandiganbayan's finding on the ground of non-conviction was tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

Section 11 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court of 1964, cited by the Court, fixes the effect of a discharge:

A person discharged under the preceding section shall not again be prosecuted for the same offense, nor for any offense necessarily included therein or necessarily including the same, and the order of discharge shall be a bar to any further prosecution for the offense charged or for any offense necessarily included therein or necessarily including the same.

This provision is the basis for the Court's holding that Preagido's discharge operated as an acquittal that can no longer be recalled.

Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f), of Rule 115, also mentioned by the Court, preserves the accused's right to testify or to refuse to take the stand:

To testify in his own behalf, or to refuse to do so, but if he does testify, he may be cross-examined on matters covered by his direct examination and on other matters reasonably connected therewith; and to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

This provision shows that, apart from any discharge, Preagido was never incompetent to testify, and could have chosen to testify for the prosecution, for the defense, or not at all.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion. When it ordered the discharge on March 5, 1982, Preagido's appeal from her conviction was still pending before the Supreme Court and had not been finally decided. The Sandiganbayan's ruling that, despite her convictions, she still had in her favor the constitutional presumption of innocence, and that until a final conviction was promulgated that mandate prevailed, was not bereft of legal or logical foundation. It could not be characterized as a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment.

On the second issue, the Court held that the act can no longer be undone. Having been discharged from the information to turn state's evidence under Section 9 of Rule 119, Preagido could no longer be un-discharged, or reverted to the status of an accused, upon the adverse resolution years later of her appeal. Her discharge, coupled with her act of testifying for the People in accordance with her prior representations to the public prosecutor, operated as an acquittal that forever precludes her reinclusion as a defendant in the cases from which she was discharged, or being charged anew for the same offenses, for an attempt or frustration thereof, or for crimes necessarily included in or necessarily including those offenses.

On the third issue, the Court held that the error of the Sandiganbayan, assuming it to be one, was not reversible, and did not make Preagido incompetent as a witness or render her testimony totally untrustworthy, although it may indicate a need for caution in its assessment. The Court explained that before her discharge, or even without being discharged, Preagido was not incompetent to testify in the cases in which she was one of the accused; theoretically she had the option to testify for the prosecution or the defense, or to refuse to take the stand. Had her discharge been denied, the failure of the motion would not have rendered her incompetent as a witness. And where the discharge was granted but afterwards shown to be erroneous, this would not ordinarily constitute ground for reversal of the conviction of her co-accused, or render her incompetent as a witness or her testimony inadmissible. The Court summed up the rule:

In fine, the correctness of a trial court's determination of the existence or non-existence of the grounds prescribed by the Rules for discharge of one or some of several defendants, or the propriety of the order issued on the basis thereof, affects only the criminal liability of the persons proposed for discharge or actually discharged, but not in any sense their competency as witness or the admissibility of their testimony.

Finally, the Court stressed that the rule does not make the testimony of the state witness conclusive, any more than an error in its application makes the testimony essentially worthless. The state witness's testimony is subject to the same objections, and the same standards of assessment, as that of any other witness. All that was done was to make available to the prosecution, and to put on record, Preagido's knowledge of the relevant facts; the defense's prerogative to expose her testimony as incredible, or to contradict her declarations by other proof, was in no sense diminished.

Doctrine

First, the propriety of an order discharging an accused as a state witness under Section 9 of Rule 119 affects only the criminal liability of the person discharged, and not in any sense that person's competency as a witness or the admissibility of the testimony given. Second, a discharge validly made, coupled with the witness's testimony for the People in accordance with prior representations to the public prosecutor, operates as an acquittal that forever precludes reinclusion of that person as a defendant in the same cases, or prosecution anew for the same offense, for an attempt or frustration thereof, or for crimes necessarily included in or necessarily including those offenses, consistent with Section 11 of Rule 119. Third, an erroneous discharge does not render the state witness incompetent or the testimony inadmissible, though it may call for caution in assessing the testimony, which remains subject to the same objections and standards as that of any other witness. Fourth, the pendency of an appeal from a prior conviction means no final conviction yet exists, so the constitutional presumption of innocence still prevails and the ground of non-conviction under Section 9 is not shown to be absent.

Disposition

The Court denied the motion for reconsideration and declared the denial final, leaving undisturbed the discharge of Delia Preagido as a state witness and the denial of the petition against the Sandiganbayan's resolution.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that the correctness of a discharge of a state witness affects only the criminal liability of the person discharged, never that person's competency as a witness or the admissibility of the testimony. Examiners like to use this case on the requisites for discharge under Section 9 of Rule 119, on the effect of a pending appeal on the ground of non-conviction, and on the acquittal-like effect of a discharge under Section 11 of Rule 119.