CECILIA C. BARRETTO AND ROBERT SORIANO, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, RESPONDENT.

Barretto versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a criminal case that began as five separate charges of estafa through falsification of public documents filed against Cecilia Barretto, the Chief of the Project Compassion Office in the Province of Batangas, together with Esperanza Magadia and Robert Soriano, who were casual employees in the same office. The prosecution alleged that they conspired to falsify time books and payrolls in the name of a separated casual employee, Leticia Austria, and to collect wages for services she never rendered. The amounts involved were small, but the case matters greatly for the law on evidence: it is the Supreme Court's reminder that the testimony of a discharged accused who turns state witness is testimony from a polluted source, and it cannot convict anyone unless it is substantially corroborated in its material points.

Procedural History

The five informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan, First Division, and the cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties. After the prosecution had presented only two witnesses, the complainant and the paymaster, it moved to discharge Esperanza Magadia so that she could be utilized as a state witness. Over the objection of the petitioners, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. The prosecution then presented Magadia as its state witness and rested its case. The petitioners took the witness stand, and the defense rested.

The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision convicting Barretto and Soriano in all five cases and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty and a fine for each case, and ordering them to pay the Province of Batangas the total amount defrauded. The case reached the Supreme Court on review on appeal by certiorari. The Court first affirmed the conviction but modified the penalties, then, on motion for reconsideration to which the Solicitor General interposed no objection, it reconsidered that resolution, gave due course to the petition, and reviewed the evidence anew.

Facts

Cecilia Barretto was the Chief of the Project Compassion Office in Batangas. Esperanza Magadia and Robert Soriano were casual employees in that office. Leticia Austria was also a casual employee, but she had already been separated from the service. According to the informations, Magadia, upon the direction of Barretto, prepared time books and payrolls for periods covering the supposed services of Austria, even though Austria no longer worked there. Magadia then signed Austria's name on those documents without authority. Barretto, knowing the payrolls were falsified, signed them anyway, and Soriano signed as a witness to the authenticity of the signature.

The falsified payrolls were presented to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, which released the corresponding amounts to Soriano. The prosecution alleged that Soriano delivered the money to Barretto, who converted it to her personal use, to the prejudice of the national government. The five cases involved the amounts of 130 pesos, 100 pesos, 90 pesos, 100 pesos, and 100 pesos, a total of only 520 pesos.

At the trial, the prosecution discharged Magadia and used her as its state witness. She admitted falsifying the payrolls but shifted the blame to Barretto, claiming she merely followed the orders of her superior for fear that her appointment would not be renewed. She also claimed that Soriano received Austria's salary and delivered it to Barretto. The Sandiganbayan believed her and convicted the petitioners, relying on her testimony alone.

Issues

• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioners on the sole and uncorroborated testimony of Esperanza Magadia, an accused discharged to become a state witness.
• Whether or not the testimony of a discharged accused, who is the most guilty and who has the strongest motive to implicate others in exchange for her own acquittal, can be the basis of a judgment of conviction without substantial corroboration in its material points.
• Whether or not the rule according great respect to the findings of fact of the trial court yields when the trial court overlooked material facts and circumstances that would affect the result of the case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9, paragraph c, of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, as cited in the decision, provides:

Section 9. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused, that the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points, and that said accused does not appear to be the most guilty.

This provision bears directly on the case because the Court found that Magadia's testimony failed to meet the condition that it be substantially corroborated in its material points, and that she appeared to be the most guilty.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the conviction cannot stand. The Sandiganbayan relied on the uncorroborated testimony of the accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza Magadia, and Section 9, paragraph c, of Rule 119 requires, as an essential condition for the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness, that his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points. Magadia's testimony failed to meet this condition, and yet the trial court believed her and used her testimony to convict the petitioners.

On the second issue, the Court held that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing blame to his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the crime. The Court noted that Magadia admitted falsifying the payrolls but tried to exculpate herself by shifting responsibility to Barretto, and that her claim was uncorroborated. There was even evidence that Barretto did not have the appointing power. Her statement that Soriano delivered the money to Barretto was pure speculation, based only on her observation that Austria used to enter Barretto's office. The Court also found that Magadia had given two statements to the National Bureau of Investigation: an earlier one in which she admitted falsifying Austria's signatures but did not implicate Barretto, and a later one pointing to Barretto, which the Court saw as an effort to exculpate herself. Judging from her acts, Magadia appeared to be the most guilty, and as such she had the strongest motive to point to the petitioners in exchange for her discharge and eventual acquittal. The Court added that it was hard to believe Barretto would jeopardize her position for the paltry total of 520 pesos.

On the third issue, the Court acknowledged the general rule that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. It held, however, that the trial court had overlooked material facts and circumstances in the appreciation of the evidence which, properly considered, would affect the result of the case. Without Magadia's testimony, the petitioners would certainly have been acquitted, as there would have been no evidence to link them to the offense. Such testimony, coming from a polluted source, cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction without being corroborated in its material points by other evidence.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the testimony of a discharged accused used as a state witness must be substantially corroborated in its material points, as required by Section 9, paragraph c, of Rule 119; absent such corroboration, it cannot support a conviction. Second, the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator that implicates his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the crime. Third, the testimony of an accused who appears to be the most guilty is testimony from a polluted source, because such a witness has the strongest motive to implicate others in exchange for discharge and acquittal. Fourth, the rule according great respect to the trial court's findings of fact yields when the trial court overlooked material facts and circumstances that would affect the result of the case.

Disposition

The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan, acquitted the petitioners, and declared them without liability of whatever nature arising from the incidents of the case.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the testimony of a discharged accused, coming from a polluted source, cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction without being corroborated in its material points by other evidence. Examiners like to use this case on the requisites for discharging a state witness under Rule 119, on the need for corroboration of an accomplice's testimony, and on the exception to the respect accorded to the trial court's findings of fact.