PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLO…

The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated,^[1] to
order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the
procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to bail^[2]
are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of
the nature of a certiorari.  It
must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu,^[3]
no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have
led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain
fundamentals.  They ignored the principle
that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public
officials concerned.  Nonetheless, the
importance of the questions raised, the need for a change of venue and the
cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken.  Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the
filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General
as well as of the private respondents,^[4]
the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental.

On March 4, 1981,
the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza.^[5]
It opened with this preliminary statement: “The present petition was filed
by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.  Rightly, any petition before this Honorable
Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines
can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General.  The assertion of the petitioner private
prosecutors that they are instituting the action ‘subject to the control and
supervision of the Fiscal’ will not, therefore, improve their legal
standing.”^[6]
None­theless, it did not press the legal point but instead adopted “the
two-pronged thrusts of the petition: 
1.  the setting aside, by certiorari,
of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan,
presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail
to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2.  the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to
avoid a miscarriage of justice.”^[7]

The facts were therein narrated thus: “On September 15,
1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constab­ulary
commander at Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search
warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons
believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Solo in his hacienda at Sta.
Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980, armed with the above warrant, elements
of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola.  Diggings made in a canefield
yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Collet and Bienvenido Emperado.  On
September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for
murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco
Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and four­teen
(14) other persons of unknown names.  The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139
and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan.  After due preliminary examination of the
complainant’s witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found
probable cause against the accused.  It
thus issued an order for their arrest. 
However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the
right to post bail for their temporary release. 
The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and
Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right
and have since been released from detention. 
In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed
the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance
branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized.  At least two of the accused are officials
with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have
been released on bail.  In addition, most
of the accused remained at large, Indeed, there hove been reports made to
police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses.”^[8]
The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of
venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.

On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the
following resolution: “The Court Resolved to  (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for
change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the
petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of
the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by
Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused
in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all
entitled ‘People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola, et al.’; (2) the
petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to
avoid a miscarriage of justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid
criminal cases to Branch V of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo
Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan
has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March
12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V
is the nearest court station to Himamaylan; and (c)
[Await] the comment of
respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public
officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the
witnesses of the prosecution.”^[9]
Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic.  The comments respectively submitted by
respondent Florendo Baliscao
on March 5, 1981, respondent
Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981
and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of
the cancellation of the bail bonds.  Such
comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted
for decision.

The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents,
there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be
heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to
bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner.  The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case
remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. 
So we rule.

1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of  transferring the place of trial, in this
case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City.  The Constitution is quite explicit.  The Supreme Court could order “a change
of venue or place of trial to avoid a mis­carriage of justice.”^[10]
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the
landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez,^[11]
where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente
vigorously and categorically affirmed: “In the particular case before Us,
to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses
will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the
judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established.”^[12]
Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the
Solicitor General.  Thus: “The
exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case
will be appropriate.  The witnesses in
the case are fearful for their lives. 
They are afraid they
would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan
during any of the days of trial.  Because
of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save
their lives.”^[13]
Respondent Florendo Baliscao
was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in
Metro Manila.^[14]
Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds.  Respondent Pablo Sola
made clear that he had “no objection to the transfer.”^[15] It may be added that there may be cases where
the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than
terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses
who will testify.  The primordial aim and
intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind.  In case of doubt, it should be resolved in
favor of a change of venue.  As a matter
of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this
Court.  Such a plea could have been done
administratively.  In this particular
case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the
fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds
was also sought.

2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than
justified.  Bail was granted to the
accused in the Order of the Mun­icipal Court without hearing the
prosecution.  That is to disregard the
authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego.^[16]
As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: “The
question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of
procedural due process.  The answer is in
the affirmative.  We are of the
considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prose­cution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.  If, as in the criminal case involved in the
instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of pro­cedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground.”^[17]
These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: “The law, as we have
seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever
forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend.  Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent
in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of
reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be
the pressure of incriminating proof.  But
justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.  The concept of fairness must not be strained
till it is narrowed to a filament.  We
are to keep the balance true.”^[18] This norm which is of the very
essence of due process as the embodiment of
justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove
that there is strong evidence of guilt. 
It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the
municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as
searching.  That fact did not cure an
infirmity of a jurisdictional character.^[19]

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified,
set aside, and declared to be with­out force and effect.  Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the
cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March
5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private
respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the respondents is strong.  This
decision is immediately executory.  No costs.

Teehankee, Makasiar,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Barredo and
Abad Santos, JJ., on
official leave.

^[1] According to Article X, Section 5(4) of the
Constitution: “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (4)
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a mis­carriage of
justice.”

^[2] According to Article IV, Section 18 of the
Constitution: “All persons, except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not
be required.”

^[3] The name of the highly-experienced
counsel.  Juan Hagad
was included in the list of private prosecutors, but he did not sign the
petition.

^[4] The private respondents are Francisco (Ecot) Garcia and Ricardo (Cadoy)
Garcia.

^[5] He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor
General Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.

^[6] Comment, 1-2.

^[7] Ibid, 2.

^[8] Ibid,
2-4.

^[9] Resolution of the Court dated March 5,
1981.

^[10] Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.

^[11] L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172.

^[12] Ibid, 180.

^[13] Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 9.

^[14] Comment of respondent Florendo
Baliscao, erroneously entitled Rejoinder to the
Petition, 1.

^[15] Comment of respondent Pablo Sola, erroneously
entitled Opposition of respondent
Mayor Pablo Sola, 1.

^[16]
L-29676, December 24, 1968,
26 SCRA 522.

^[17] Ibid,
524.

^[18] Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 122 (1933).

^[19] Cf. Inocencio
v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 55658, February 5, 1981.