G.R. Nos. 54558 & 69882. May 22, 1987
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V. JIMENEZ, ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ, CARLOS LAZARO, REYNALDO MACLANG, MAGDALENA DE LOS SANTOS-MACLANG, TEODORICO N. DIESMOS, RENE J. MARCIANO, DANILO R. …
GANCAYCO, J.:
Filed with this Court are two Petitions wherein the fundamental
question is whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try
civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. The two
Petitions have been consolidated inasmuch as the issues raised therein are
interrelated.
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez,
Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos Lazaro,
Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos-Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C. Amado were arrested
by the military authorities. They were
all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. They were subsequently transferred to the
detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa
in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer
who remained in detention at Camp Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities sometime in June, 1980 and was,
thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All of the
petitioners are civilians.
On May 30, 1980,
the petitioners were charged for subversion[1] upon
the recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of
the respondent Minister of National
Defense.[2] The case was designated as Criminal Case No.
MC-34-1.
On June 13, 1980,
the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines[3]
created the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against the petitioners.[4]
On July 30, 1980, an amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses,
namely: (1) unlawful possession of
explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and
Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and
Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate
Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño
and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
and inciting to rebellion.[5]
Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19, 1980, the petitioners went
to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.[6]
They sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding
with the trial of their case. They
likewise sought their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that
military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses
alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. They also maintain that the proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross
violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.
On September 23, 1980,
the respondents filed their Answer to the Petition.[7]
On November 20, 1980, the
petitioners submitted their Reply to the Answer.[8]
In a Motion filed with this Court on July
25, 1981, petitioner Olaguer requested
that the Petition be considered withdrawn as
far as he is concerned.[9] In the Resolution of this Court dated July 30,
1981, the said
prayer was granted.[10] On
August 31, 1984,
the respondents filed a Rejoinder to the Reply submitted by the petitioners.[11]
On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the
Petition, the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 passed sentence convicting
the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution. Thus, on February 14, 1985, petitioners Olaguer,
Maclang and Othoniel
and Ester Jimenez went to this Court
and filed the other instant Petition,
this time for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. They also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[12]
The respondents named in the Petition
are the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Military Commission No. 34, the Judge Advocate General, the Minister
of National Defense and the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons.
In sum, the second
Petition seeks to enjoin the said respondents from taking any further action on the case against the
petitioners, and from implementing the judgment of conviction rendered by the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 for the reason that
the same is null and void. The
petitioners also seek the return
of all property taken from them by the respondents concerned. Their other arguments in the earlier Petition
are stressed anew.
On August 9,
1985, the respondents
filed their Answer to the Petition.[13] On September 12, 1985,
this Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondents from executing the Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34.[14] On February 18, 1986 the petitioners submitted an extensive
Brief.[15] Thereafter, and in due time, the cases were
submitted for decision.
In resolving these two
Petitions, We have taken into account several supervening events which have
occurred hitherto, to wit —
(1) On January
17, 1981, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2045 officially lifting martial law in the Philippines. The same Proclamation revoked General Order
No. 8 (creating military tribunals) and directed that “the military
tribunals created pursuant thereto are
hereby dissolved upon final determination of cases pending therein which may
not be transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the
state in view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which
render prosecution of the cases
difficult, if not
impossible.” ; and
(2) Petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez
was granted provisional liberty in January, 1981. On the other hand, petitioners Eduardo Olaguer and Othoniel Jimenez
obtained provisional liberty on January
23, 1986.[16]
The rest of the petitioners have been released
sometime before or after President Corazon C. Aquino
assumed office in February, 1986.
The sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is detention.[17]
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus
was filed is effected, the
Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic.[18] Inasmuch as the herein petitioners hav been released from their confinement in military
detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
We come now to the other matters raised in the two
Petitions. The main issue raised by the
petitioners is whether or not military commissions or tribunals have the
jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed during martial
law when civil courts are open and functioning.
The petitioners maintain that military commissions or tribunals
do not have such jurisdiction and that the proceedings before the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right
to due process of law. The respondents,
however, contend otherwise.
The issue on the jurisdiction of military commissions or
tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed before, and more
particularly during a period of martial law, as well as the other issues raised
by the petitioners, have been ruled upon by a divided Supreme Court in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2.[19]
The pertinent portions of the main opinion of the Court are as follows -?
“We hold that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has
been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the
cases against civilians, including the petitioner.
“1. The Court has previously declared that the
proclamation of Martial Law xxx on September
21, 1972, xxx is valid and constitutional and that its continuance
is justified by the danger posed to the public safety.[20]
“2. To preserve the safety of the nation in times
of national peril, the President of the Philippines
necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized in
General Order No. 8 xxx the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
create military tribunals to try and decide cases ‘of military personnel and
such other cases as may be referred to them.’ In General Order No. 12 xxx, the
military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction ‘exclusive of the civil
courts’, among others, over crimes against public order, violations of the
Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes
which, in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the quelling of
the rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the
Republic. xxx. These measures he had the authority to
promulgate, since this Court recognized that the incumbent President (President
Marcos), under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3 of Article XVII of the new
(1973) Constitution, had the authority to ‘promulgate proclamations, orders
and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and
preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social
liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the
resurgence of the rebellion or insurrection
or secession or the threat thereof xxx’.[21] xxx.
“3. Petitioner nevertheless insists that he being
a civilian, his trial by military commission deprives him of his right to due
process, since in his view the due process guaranteed by the Constitution to
persons accused of ‘ordinary’ crimes means judicial process. This argument ignores the reality of the rebellion
and the existence of martial law. It
is, of course, essential that in a martial law situation, the martial law administrator must have ample and
sufficient means to quell the rebellion and restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial and punishment of
offenders have been considered as necessary in a state of martial law, as a
mere power of detention may be wholly inadequate for the exigency.[22] ‘xxx martial law xxx creates an exception to
the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders
offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable, xxx by military tribunals.’[23] ‘Public danger warrants the substitution of
executive process for judicial process.’[24] xxx.
‘The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however,
give way in areas governed by martial law.
When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes can
be superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction
normally vested in courts.’[25] xxx.”
“xxx.
“5. xxx.
The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form
of tribunal in criminal cases. A
military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice
and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately
meet the due process requirement. Due
process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the regular
courts.[26]
xxx.”
This ruling has been affirmed, although not unanimously, in at
least six other cases, to wit: Gumaua v. Espino,[27] Buscayno v. Enrile,[28] Sison v. Enrile,[29] Luneta v. Special Military Commission No. 1,[30] Ocampo v. Military Commission No. 25,[31] and Buscayno
v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25.[32]
These rulings notwithstanding, the petitioners anchor their
argument on their prayer that the ruling in Aquino,
Jr. be appraised anew and abandoned or modified accordingly. After a thorough deliberation on the matter,
We find cogent basis for re-examining the same.
Some recent pronouncements of this Court could be considered as
attempts to either abandon or modify the ruling in Aquino,
Jr.
In De Guzman v. Hon. Leopando, et
al.,[33]
an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and several other persons were charged with Serious Illegal Detention before the
Court of First Instance of Maguindanao sometime in
October, 1982. The military officer
sought to effect the transfer of the case against him to the General Court Martial for trial pursuant to the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1850.
The trial court disallowed such transfer for the reason that the said
Decree is unconstitutional inasmuch as it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional
provisions on social justice, the speedy disposition of cases, the republican
form of government, the integrity and independence of the judiciary, and the
supremacy of civilian authority over the military.
When the matter was elevated to this Court by way of a Petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the Court
decided that a ruling on the constitutional issues raised was not
necessary. With the view that practical
and procedural difficulties will result from the transfer sought, this Court resolved to dismiss the Petition for
lack of merit.
In Animas v. The Minister of National Defense,[34]
a military officer and several civilians were charged with murder alleged to
have been committed sometime in November, 1971.
All of the said accused were recommended for prosecution before a
military tribunal. In the course of the
proceedings, the said accused went to this Court on a Petition for certiorari
and challenged the jurisdiction of the military tribunal over their case. The petitioners contended that General Order No.
59 upon which the jurisdiction of the military tribunal is anchored refers
only to the crime of illegal possession of firearms and explosives in relation
to other crimes committed with a political complexion. They stressed that the alleged murder was
devoid of any political complexion.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
ordered the transfer of the criminal proceedings to the civil courts after
noting that with martial law having been lifted in the country in 1981, all cases
pending before the military tribunals should, as a general rule, be transferred
to the civil courts. The Court was also
of the view that the crime alleged to have been committed did not have any
political complexion. We quote the
pertinent portions of the Decision of the Court, to wit —
“Inspite or because of the ambiguous
nature of xxx civilian takeover of jurisdiction was concerned and
notwithstanding the shilly-shallying and
vacillation characteristic of its implementation, this Court relied on the
enunciated policy of normalization in upholding the primacy of civil
courts. This policy meant that as many
cases as possible involving civilians being tried by military tribunals as
could be transferred to civil courts should be turned over immediately. In case of doubt, the presumption was in
favor of civil courts always trying civilian accused.
“xxx.
“The crime for which the petitioners were charged was
committed xxx long before the proclamation of martial law. xxx. Now
that it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully
never more to return, there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained,
at this time, by a military tribunal.
xxx.”
We agree with the dissenting views of then Justice, now
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee[35]
and Madame
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma[36]
in Aquino, Jr. in so far as they hold that military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction
to try civilians for alleged offenses
when the civil courts are open
and functioning.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the
accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be
entitled to, among others, a trial.[37] The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter
as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military
process. Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the
Philippine judicial system. As explained
by Justice Teehankee in his separate dissenting opinion —
“xxx Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil
offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process.
“Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in
the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by
law. Judicial power exists only in the
courts, which have ‘exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which
affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.’[38]
“Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a
military government and even on the premise that martial law continues in
force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for civil offenses committed
by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained
open and have been regularly functioning.[39] xxx.
“And in Toth v. Quarles,[40] the U.S. Supreme Court further stressed that
‘the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the
President’s power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.’
“xxx.
“The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed out xxx, in ruling that discharged army
veterans (estimated to number more than 22.5 million) could not be rendered
‘helpless before some latter-day revival of old military charges’ and subjected
to military trials for offenses committed while they were in the military
service prior to their discharge, that
‘the presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and
independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and nurtured by
the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and
procedure apply in military trials.
Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of
influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it,
selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct
command authority over its members is a pervasive one in military law, despite
strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.’
“The late Justice
Black xxx added that ‘(A) Court-Martial is not yet an independent
instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of
the over-all mechanism by which military discipline is preserved,’ and that exservicemen should be given ‘the benefits of a civilian
court trial when they are actually civilians xxx. Free countries of the world have tried to
restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely
essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service.’ “
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department
of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power,
provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him
in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.[41]
Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines,
the power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual should
be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the
judiciary.[42]
It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are
regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of
martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts.[43]
To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due
process of the civilian concerned.
In addition to this pronouncement, We take note of the
observation made by the Solicitor General to the effect that the death penalty
imposed upon the petitioners by the respondent Military Commission No. 34
appears to have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice of the petitioners,
and in complete disregard of their constitutional right to adduce evidence on
their behalf. We quote the pertinent
portions of the Manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General, to wit –
“Prior to the session of December 4, 1984, when the respondent
Commission rendered its sentence, petitioners have requested the prosecution to
provide them with copies of the complete record of trial, including the evidences
presented against them, but the prosecution dillydallied and failed to provide
them with the documents requested.
According to petitioners, they needed the documents to adequately
prepare for their defense.
“But a few days before December
4, 1984 the prosecution suddenly furnished them with certain
transcripts of the proceedings which were not complete. Petitioner Othoniel
Jimenez was scheduled to start with the presentation of his evidence on said
date and he requested that his first witness be served with subpoena. The other petitioners, as agreed upon, were
to present their evidence after the
first one, Othoniel Jimenez, has finished presenting
his evidence. But on that fateful day, December
4, 1984, the witness
requested to be served with subpoena was not around, because as shown by the
records, he was not even served with the requested subpoena. But in spite of that, respondent Military
Commission proceeded to ask each one of the petitioners if they are ready to
present their evidence. Despite their
explanation that Othoniel Jimenez cannot proceed
because the prosecution, which performs the duties and functions of clerk of
court, failed to subpoena his witness, and that the other petitioners were not
ready because it was not yet their turn to do so, the Commission abruptly
decided that petitioners are deemed to have waived the presentation of
evidence in their behalf, and considered the case submitted for resolution.
“After a recess of only twenty-five (25) minutes, the session
was resumed and the Commission rendered its sentence finding petitioners guilty
of all the charges against them and imposing upon them the penalty of death by
electrocution.”[44]
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the
Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as observed by the
Solicitor General, the said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal
that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.[45]
Moreover, We find that Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17,
1981) officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and abolishing all
military tribunals created pursuant to
the national emergency effectively divests the respondent Military Commission
No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that matter) of its supposed authority
to try civilians, including the herein petitioners.
The main opinion in Aquino,
Jr. is premised on the theory that military tribunals have the jurisdiction
to try civilians as long as the period of national emergency (brought about by
public disorder and similar causes) lasts.
Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 2045 is an acknowledgment on the part of the Executive
Department of the Government that the national emergency no longer exists. Thereafter, following the theory relied upon
in the main opinion, all military tribunals should henceforth be considered functus officio in their relationship with
civilians.
By virtue of the proclamation itself, all cases against civilians
pending therein should eventually be transferred to the civil courts for proper
disposition. The principle of double
jeopardy would not be an obstacle to such transfer because an indispensable
element of double jeopardy is that the first tribunal which tried the case must
be of competent jurisdiction.[46]
As discussed earlier, the military tribunals are devoid of the required
jurisdiction.
We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as the civil
courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or not martial law has been
proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this observation is
found in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit -?
“A state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision in the fundamental law is just one of the many
steps taken by the Filipino people towards the restoration of the vital role of
the judiciary in a free country — that of the guardian of the Constitution and
the dispenser of justice without fear
or favor.
No longer should military tribunals or commissions exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them when the
civil courts are open and functioning.
No longer may the exclusive judicial power of the civil courts,
beginning with the Supreme Court down to the lower courts[47]
be appropriated by any military body or tribunal, or even diluted under the
guise of a state of martial law, national security and other similar labels.
At this juncture, We find
it appropriate to quote a few paragraphs from the ponencia
of Mr. Justice Gutierrez in Animas v. The Minister of National Defense,[48] viz —
“The jurisdiction
given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian(s) accused
at a time when all civil courts
were fully operational and freely functioning
constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine judiciary.
“The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the glorification of military tribunals, the instability and
insecurity felt by many members of the judiciary due to various causes both
real and imagined, and the many
judicial problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which
effectively eroded judicial independence
and self-respect will require plenty of time and determined efforts to cure.
“The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which
properly belong to them is only a beginning.”
And in his separate concurring opinion in
Animas, Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee had this
to say —
“I only wish to add that the great significance of our
judgment in this case is that we reestablish and reinstate the fundamental
principle based on civilian supremacy
over the military as urged in vain
in my dissent in the case of Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, et al. that ‘Civilians
placed on trial for offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process. Judicial power is
vested by the Constitution exclusively
in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as are duly established
by law. Military commissions, or
tribunals, are not courts and do not form part of the judicial system. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor
are we under a military government and even on the premise that martial law
continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction
over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly
functioning.’
“xxx.
“The terrible consequences of subjecting civilians to trial by
military process is best exemplified in the sham military trial of the martyred
former Senator Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr., whereby he was deprived (1) by the summary ex parte investigation by the chief
prosecution staff of the JAGO, of his right to be informed of the charges
against him and of his right to counsel as expressly recognized by Section 20
of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution; (2) of his vested statutory right
to a preliminary investigation of the subversion charges against him before the
proper court of first instance as required under Section 5 of the
Anti-Subversion Act, R.A. 1700 and of the other charges against him before the
proper civilian officials and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him under R.A. 5180; (3) of the right to be tried by judicial process,
by the regular independent courts of justice, with all the specific
constitutional, statutory and procedural safeguards embodied in the judicial
process and presided over not by military officers; and (4) of the right to
appeal to the regular appellate courts and to judicial review by this Court in
the event of conviction and imposition
of a sentence of death or life imprisonment which the charges carry and wherein
a qualified majority of ten (10) votes for affirmance
of the death penalty is required. In
fine, he was denied due process of law as guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
which further ordains that ‘No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of
law.’ Worse, his trial by a military tribunal created by the then President and
composed of the said President’s own military
subordinates without tenure and of non?lawyers (except the law member) and
of whose decision the President is the final reviewing authority as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces deprived him of a basic constitutional
right to be heard by a fair and impartial tribunal, considering
that the said President had publicly declared the evidence against
petitioner ‘not only strong (but) overwhelming’ and thereby prejudged and
predetermined his guilt, and none of his military subordinates could be
expected to go against their Commander-in-Chief’s declaration.
“Hopefully, all these
aberrations now belong to the dead and nightmarish past, when time-tested
doctrines, to borrow a phrase from the then Chief Justice,
‘shrivelled in the effulgence of the overpowering
rays of martial rule.’ “[49]
As stated earlier, We have been
asked to re-examine a previous
ruling of the Court with a view towards abandoning or modifying the same. We do so now but not without careful
reflection and deliberation on Our part.
Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect because stability in
jurisprudence is desirable. Nonetheless,
reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when
constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or
modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more important than anything else
is that this Court should be right.[50]
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a
military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and
that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.[51]
For the same reasons, Our pronouncement in Aquino,
Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2[52]
and all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent
with this pronouncement, should be deemed abandoned.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petitions for habeas
corpus are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic. The Petitions for certiorari
and prohibition are hereby GRANTED. The
creation of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try civilians like the
petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings are
deemed null and void. The temporary
restraining order issued against the respondents enjoining them from executing
the Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is hereby made
permanent and the said respondents are permanently prohibited from further
pursuing Criminal Case No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence rendered by the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 imposing the death penalty on the petitioners is
hereby vacated for being null and void, and all the items or properties taken
from the petitioners in relation to the said criminal case should be returned
to them immediately. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee,
C.J., separate concurring opinion.
Padilla, J., no part; counsel for petitioner, O. Jimenez is my
brother.
[1]
For violation of Presidential Decree No. 885 (The Revised Anti-Subversion Law),
as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
31.
[2] At that time, the Judge Advocate General was
General Hamilton Dimaya while the Minister of
National Defense was Juan Ponce Enrile.
[3] At the time Military Commission No. 34 was
created, General Romeo Espino was the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
[4] Military Commission No. 34 is composed of
Brigadier General Emilio P. Melendres as President,
Colonel Marciano I. Bacalla
as Law Member, and Colonels Roberto F. Ang, Higino E. Dacanay, Norberto Furagganan, Mayo Domingo and Soliman
Gutierrez as Members; Page 95, Rollo.
[5] Page 19, Rollo.
[6] G.R. No. 54558, pages 2 to 44, Rollo.
[7]
The respondents were represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
[8] Pages 255 to 268, Rollo.
[9] Pages 287 to 291, Rollo.
[10] Page 296, Rollo.
[11]
Pages 333 to 352, Rollo.
[12] G.R. No. 69882, pages 2 to 64, Rollo.
[13] Pages 243 to 267, Rollo.
[14] Page 346, Rollo.
[15] Pages 299 to 415, Rollo.
[16] Page 308, Rollo,
Vol. II, G.R. No. 69882.
[17] Herrera v. Enrile,
L-40181, 62 SCRA 547 (1975).
[18] Cagaya v. Tangonan,
L-40970, 66 SCRA 216, 219 (1975).
[19] 63 SCRA 546 (1975). Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio wrote the main
opinion. The Decision of the Court was
not unanimous inasmuch as some Justices had dissenting views.
[20] Citing Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., et al. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, L-35546, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), and companion cases.
[21] Citing Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections,
L-40004, 62 SCRA 275 (1975).
[22] Citing Fairman, The
Law of Martial Rule, 1943 Ed., p. 262.
[23] Citing Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1
and 2, p. 830.
[24] Citing Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78.
[25] Citing Schwartz, Constitutional Law,
p. 160.
[26] Citing Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S.
427 (1901) and Ballard v.
Hunter, 204 U.S.
241 (1907).
[27]
96 SCRA 402, February 29, 1980.
[28]
102 SCRA 7, January 15, 1981.
[29]
102 SCRA 33, January 15, 1981.
[30]
102 SCRA 56, January
16, 1981.
[31]
109 SCRA 22, November 6, 1981.
[32]
109 SCRA 273, November 19, 1981.
[33] G.R. No. 62798, December 22, 1983 and March 13, 1984; cited in Rodolfo Animas v. The
Minister of National Defense, G.R. No. 51747, December 29, 1986. See
also Sardinia-Linco v. Pineda (104 SCRA 757)
where this Court did not implement the Executive Order to transfer the criminal
case from the civil court to the Sandiganbayan, and
Evangelista v. Judge Luis Peña, et al. (G.R.
No. 62640, July 22, 1983) where a Petition of a member of the Philippine
Constabulary seeking the transfer of the case to a military tribunal was
dismissed for lack of merit.
[34] G.R. No. 51747, December 29, 1986.
[35] 63 SCRA 611 to 648.
[36] 63 SCRA 665 to 666.
[37] In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Sections 1 and 14 (2), Article
III, 1987 Constitution. There appears to be no substantial change from the
corresponding provisions of the 1973 Constitution.
[38] Citing Lopez v. Roxas,
17 SCRA 756 (1966) and Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller,
99 Phil. 762 (1956).
[39] Citing Ex-parte
Milligan, 4 Wallace (U.S.) 127, 18 L. Ed. 297.
[40] 350 U.S. 5, 14 (1955).
[41] Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 (1946).
[42] Koppel (Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496, 515 (1946).
[43] Ex-parte Milligan, supra.
[44] Manifestation dated February
11, 1987.
[45] Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420, 427 (1971), reiterated in Dacuyan
v. Ramos, 85 SCRA 487, 491 (1978).
[46] People v. Ylagan,
58 Phil. 851 (1933).
[47] Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
[48] Supra.
[49] Citations omitted.
[50] Phil. Trust Company and Smith, Bell & Co.
v. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, 36 (1933), cited with approval in Koppel
(Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, supra, at 515.
[51] People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 274
(1975).
[52] L-37364, 63 SCRA 546.
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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
I hail the Court’s unanimous judgment[1]
vacating and setting aside the penalty of death by electrocution summarily
imposed by respondent military commission on December 4, 1984 upon the principal
petitioners Eduardo Olaguer, Othoniel
Jimenez, Reynaldo Maclang and Ester Misa Jimenez for lack of jurisdiction of military commissions
over civilians, and expressly overturning and rejecting the contrary 1975
ruling in Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2[2]
and subsequent cases, issued during the darkest chapter of our history when
time-tested doctrines guaranteeing a person’s right to due process in
preservation of his life and liberty “shrivelled
in the effulgence of the overpowering rays of martial rule.” We uphold
once again the supremacy of the Constitution and of the Rule of Law and of
civilian authority over the military.
1. As petitioners submitted
in apparent futility at the time in view of the Aquino
ruling, they were denied from the very beginning elementary due process which
guarantees their constitutional right to an impartial trial because, prescinding from civilians’ right to trial by judicial, not
military, process, the President (Commander-in-Chief) and the Defense Minister
who were the supposed targets of petitioners’
conspiracy, were also the very authorities who personally approved the filing
of the charges against them and referred them to the respondent commission for
trial, and as reviewing authorities, had the power to reverse or modify every
judgment of respondent commission, even a judgment of acquittal; furthermore,
the President and the Defense Minister had the power directly or indirectly to
substitute at pleasure the members of respondent
commission, assign them as subordinates to more hazardous or difficult duties and to promote or prevent their
promotion to higher rank. They could
hardly be expected to go against their superiors’ declaration of the
“overwhelming” evidence against the accused. As stressed in my dissent in Aquino:
“Petitioner’s plea that his trial by a military tribunal
created by the President and composed of the President’s own military
subordinates without tenure and of non-lawyers (except the law member) and of
whose decision the President is the final reviewing authority as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces deprives him of a basic constitutional
right to be heard by a fair and impartial tribunal, considering that the
President has publicly declared the evidence against petitioner ‘not only
strong (but) overwhelming’ and in petitioner’s view thereby prejudged and
predetermined his guilt merits consideration.
“In petitioner’s view, he has been publicly indicted and his
guilt prejudged by the President when in a nation-wide press conference on
August 24, 1971 following the Plaza Miranda bombing three days earlier of the
Liberal Party proclamation meeting, the President charged him and disclosed
evidence in the possession of the government linking petitioner to some illegal
and subversive activities, in 1965 – 1971, which are virtually the same charges
now filed against him before respondent military commission, and declared the
evidence against petitioner ‘not only strong (but) overwhelming.’ The President
explained on the same occasion that in not acting against petitioner, he had
‘erred on the side of generosity as well as of liberality hoping that good
sense may someday catch up with him’ since petitioner was ‘the only opposition
senator left in the Senate’ after the [Plaza Miranda] bombing, but that he did
not know ‘what will happen later on, because, of course, the military insist
that we must not make any exceptions to the general rule.’
“While one may agree that the President as Commander-in-Chief
would discharge his duty as the final reviewing authority with fealty to his
oath ‘to do justice to every man’, particularly because of his renowned legal
sagacity and experience, still under the environmental facts where the
military appears to have been impressed by the President’s appraisal of the evidence
and without casting any reflection on the integrity
of the members of respondent military commission which petitioner himself acknowledges, the doctrine
consistently held by the Court that ‘elementary due process requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal’ and that ‘All suitors . . . are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an
independent, wholly free, disinterested and impartial tribunal’ calls for
application in the present case.”[3]
The then President had himself acknowledged the indispensability
of the judicial process, stating in the same nationwide press conference of
August 24, 1971 that:
“I am a lawyer, my training is oriented towards the protection
of the Bill of Rights, because if you will remember, I have repeatedly said,
that if it were not for the Bill of Rights I would not be here now. If it were not for the judicial process, I
would not be President of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.”[4]
Yet, he denied to Aquino
the very self-same rights to due process and judicial process.
2. The total unacceptability of military trials for civilians may
be appreciated from the fate and ordeal of petitioners. Since their arrest on December 24, 1979,
they had been continuously confined for over five years (without physical
access to lawyers, witnesses and court records in the case of Eduardo Olaguer[5])
and spent seven Christmases in confinement, before their provisional release on
January 23, 1986 (save petitioner Ester Misa Jimenez
whose provisional release was earlier granted in January, 1981). The extreme difficulties encountered by
civilian counsels in defending them before respondent military commission can
best be seen from their written motions/manifestations of withdrawal as such
counsel. Former Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Atty. Wigberto Tañada had previously withdrawn as civilian counsel for
petitioner Eduardo Olaguer.
Civilian counsel Sabino Padilla, Jr.
for petitioner Othoniel Jimenez was likewise
constrained to file on January 10, 1983 his Motion to Withdraw Appearance,
stating the following:
“1. In the hearing of March 2, 1982, the
prosecution moved for the discharge of the accused Carlos Lazaro
and Teodorico Diesmos. The prosecution alleged that the requirements
of sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had been complied with. Considering
that trial had commenced one year and a half before the prosecution made this
move, the defense vehemently objected.
This Military Commission ruled:
LAW MEMBER:
Please, just listen. We are
of the view that this Commission has no authority to discharge the accused
Carlos Lazaro and accused Teodorico
Diesmos from the Charge Sheet to be utilized as state
witnesses. In the same manner that the
herein accused have been included in the Charge Sheet upon the approval of the
appointing authority, the exclusion or discharge of any of them should likewise
carry the approval of the appointing authority.
Therefore, the matter of the discharge of the said two (2) accused
should be addressed to the appointing authority for his consideration. (Tsn, March 2,
1982, pp. 42-43)
xxx xxx xxx
“3. At the start of the hearing last December 13, 1982, the
prosecution informed this Military Commission and the defense that on December
11, 1982 (a Saturday), the Minister of National Defense had ordered the
discharge of the accused Lazaro and Diesmos, and that the prosecution would be presenting
these accused in that hearing.
“In view of the vital implications of such a discharge on the
conduct of the defense of the other accused, all three counsel of choice
immediately moved that the hearing be postponed or that witnesses other than Lazaro and Diesmos be presented
in that hearing, to allow counsel to take to the Supreme Court the ruling of
the Minister of National Defense as well as this Military Commission’s
abdication of a trial court’s jurisdiction to grant or deny a prosecution
motion to discharge an accused.
“To the complete surprise and dismay of defense counsel of
choice, the prosecution insisted on presenting Lazaro
and Diesmos before the other accused could take to the Supreme Court the legality and
propriety of their discharge as accused to be state witnesses. Counsel of choice had no alternative but to withdraw
from the proceedings that day.
“Subsequent events disclosed why Lazaro
and Diesmos had to be presented as witnesses on that
day, December 13, 1982. They were to
recite, as indeed they recited, a newly fabricated and fantastic story linking
(three years after the fact) the present accused with the accused in the We
Forum case, who were being arraigned that afternoon in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City. Pursuant to this scenario, all the newspapers the following day carried the same release that the accused
herein and those in the We Forum were members of one conspiracy.
“It has thus become abundantly clear to the undersigned
counsel that under the present circumstances any further participation on
his part in the proceedings before this Military Commission would not only be
futile but also bring disgrace and dishonor to himself and to the legal
profession.”[6]
Civilian counsel Joaquin L. Misa for his close kin, Ester Misa
Jimenez, after prefatory remarks that he “had never appeared before in a
military court [and] entertained a degree of confidence in the quality of
military justice [and] was reared with a healthy regard for military officers” stated in his written manifestation dated
January 10, 1983 that:
“x x x
many events in the course of these proceedings have eroded the confidence of
the undersigned in ultimately obtaining justice from this Honorable Commission.
“The last straws so to speak, were the events of December
13, 1982. Three hearings of this
case prior to the
December 13 hearing were cancelled or postponed upon motion of the Prosecution
on the shallow and never explained excuse that their next supposed witness,
Col. Beroya, was not available. On December 13, the Prosecution read into
the record an alleged resolution on the state witness question by the Minister
of National Defense (Note that up to this writing the undersigned has not been
served with a copy of that alleged resolution perhaps because it was written on
stationery marked CONFIDENTIAL). After
the supposed resolution by the Minister of National Defense was read into the
record, the undersigned moved for a postponement of even one week to afford
the undersigned the opportunity to either ask for a reconsideration by the
Minister or raise the matter to the Supreme Court on Certiorari. The Prosecution’s objection was so
vehement that it was incomprehensible to the undersigned why a simple motion
could evoke such a violent reaction from the Prosecution (Cols. Ridao and Disierto seemed to be
outdoing each other in the decibels of their objections). This was especially baffling to the
undersigned because theretofore in several instances when the undersigned
inquired if there had been a ruling by ‘the higher authorities’ on the question
of the state witnesses, the Prosecution always assured the undersigned and
the other civilian defense counsel that if a ruling is made, and it is adverse
to the defense we will be given enough time to deal with the problem.
“As the Commission well knows the defense motion for
postponement was denied and two (2) accused who were released from the case testified in the absence of all the civilian defense
counsel. Only upon reading the
newspaper the next day was the
indecent haste of the Prosecution to present the two (2) witnesses explained. The Prosecution, and the Commission by going
along with the Prosecution, apparently wanted to time the newly fabricated
testimony of Diesmos and Lazaro
linking this case with the We Forum case the arraignment of which was held on December 13, in the afternoon.
“The orchestration and synchronization of such
testimony in this case (at the expense of denying the accused recourse against
the resolution of the Minister) with the arraignment in the We Forum case taken
together with the identically worded newspaper stories appearing in all the
dailies now in publication, has made it clear to the undersigned that this
case will not be decided on its merits but on the convenience that it affords
to the pursuit of the government’s objectives.”[7]
Respondent military commission furthermore on December 4, 1984
summarily called all proceedings to a halt, denied any continuation of the
case and abruptly declared the case submitted without any evidence for the
defense, notwithstanding that it had not subpoenaed the first defense witness
for petitioner Othoniel Jimenez as duly requested,
while the other petitioners were not expected to be ready with their witnesses
until later hearings; and after a mere 25-minute recess, rendered its
“judgment” imposing the death penalty by electrocution on all
the above-named petitioners. No
objection to this bizarre procedure came from military counsels who were
assigned to represent petitioners after their civilian counsels’ withdrawal,
for as the Solicitor General now manifested, “the records show, they more
often than not practically acted for the prosecution rather than as defense
counsels.”7-a
3. I hail the Court’s
reinstatement of the settled ruling in this jurisdiction that deprivation and
disregard of the constitutional rights of
an accused ousts the court or tribunal of jurisdiction, which had been greatly
eroded. This reenforces
the 1987 Constitution’s reaffirmation of the role of the Supreme Court as the
guarantor of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its
jurisdiction with the function of seeing to it that these rights are respected
and enforced. As the Court stressed in Gumabon vs. Director of Bureau of Prisons[8]
“Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist,
the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
detention.”[9] So accused persons who are deprived of their
constitutional right of a speedy trial should be set at liberty.[10] Likewise persons detained indefinitely
without charges so much so that the detention becomes punitive and not merely
preventive in character are entitled to regain their freedom, for the spirit
and the letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any charges.
4. Indeed, Art. VII, section
18 of the 1987 Constitution, drawing upon the sad lessons of the excessive
concentration of powers in the Chief Executive in the previous Constitutions
which enabled him to exercise absolute power to the point of taking over the
entire government, has provided for measures to curtail such abuse of
executive power. The late former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, pillar and champion of
the Rule of Law, chairman of the 1986 Constitutional Commission’s Judiciary
Committee and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at the time of the imposition
of martial law in 1972, summarized these salutary changes, in his last public
address, as follows:
“1. Under the New Constitution, martial law does
not suspend the operation of the New Constitution or supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies.
Neither does it authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians when civil courts are able to function.
“2. Martial law does not supplant the civil courts
when the same are able to function.
“3. Martial law does not automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
“4. Martial law may not be declared upon the
ground of imminent danger of invasion or rebellion. In the event of such danger, the President
may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress the danger, without declaring
martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ.
“5. Within forty-eight (48) hours after the
proclamation of martial law, the President shall report the same to Congress in
person or in writing.
“6. Congress may, by a majority vote of all its
members, revoke the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, which action of Congress may not be set aside by the
President.
“7. The proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ by the President, may not exceed sixty (60) days
without the concurrence of Congress.
“8. The Supreme Court has been expressly
authorized to ‘review in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty (30)
days from its filing.’
“9. Under the ‘1973 Constitution’, as amended, at
least ten (10) votes of the members of the Supreme Court were necessary to
invalidate or declare a law unconstitutional, regardless of the number of
vacancies in the Supreme Court or the number of its members who participated in
the deliberations on the issues involved in the case, and voted thereon. Under the New Constitution a simple majority
of the members who took part in such deliberation and cast their votes thereon
is sufficient.
“10. In the case of suspension of the privilege of
the writ, the same does not apply to persons who have not been placed under the
custody of a court of justice.
“11. In case of suspension of the privilege of the
writ, the person detained must be released unless judicially charged within
three (3) days.”[11]
These substantial checks by the legislature as well as by the
judiciary on the Chief Executive’s power to proclaim martial law or to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were meant to forestall a recurrence
of the long and horrible nightmare of the past regime when one single clause,
the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution then in force that authorized
the President to declare martial law was held to have nullified the entire
Constitution and the Bill of Rights and justified the then President’s taking
over “absolute command” of the nation and that the people could
“only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost
patriotism, (he) will not fail them,” Thus, persons held under
Presidential Commitment or Detention Orders were detained indefinitely without
charges, yet had no recourse to the courts.
Even if they were acquitted in court, the military would not release
them until and unless the then President lifted the preventive detention
order.[12]
It was a long and horrible nightmare when our people’s rights, freedoms and
liberties were sacrificed at the altar of “national security” even
though it involved nothing more than the President-dictator’s perpetuation in
office and the security of his relatives and some officials in high positions
and their protection from public accountability of their acts of venality and
deception in government, many of which were of public knowledge.
Draconian decrees were issued whereby many were locked up
indefinitely for “rumor-mongering”, “unlawful use of means of
publication and unlawful utterances, and alarms and scandals.” While the
people for the most part suffered in silence and waited, others never gave up
the struggle for truth, freedom, justice and democracy, a common commitment
which is what makes a people a nation instead of a gathering of self-seeking individuals. The national will was systematically
undermined to the point of national mockery, that the day of imposition of
martial law was proclaimed as “National Thanksgiving Day.” As the
Court observed through Mr. Justice Gutierrez in Animas vs. Minister of
National Defense[13], the era of martial law when military
tribunals, against all tenets of due process, were conferred jurisdiction over
common crimes and civilians, their glorification with the downgrading of
judicial prestige and ‘”the many judicial problems spawned by extended
authoritarian rule which effectively eroded judicial independence and
self-respect will require plenty of time and determined efforts to cure.”
5. The treacherous assassination on August 21, 1983 of the
martyred Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr., within minutes of his arrival at the Manila International Airport,
although ringed with 2,000 soldiers, shocked and outraged the conscience of the
nation. After three years of exile
following almost eight years of detention since martial law, Aquino, although facing the military commission’s
predetermined death sentence, supra, yet refused proper travel
documents, was returning home “to strive for genuine national reconciliation
founded on justice.” The late Senator Jose W. Diokno
who passed away this year was among the first victims of the martial law coup
d’ etat to be locked up with Senator Aquino. In March,
1973, all of their personal effects, including their eyeglasses were ominously
returned to their homes. Their wives’
visitation privileges were suspended and they lost all contact for over a
month. It turned out that Aquino had smuggled out of his cell a written statement
critical of the martial law regime. In
swift retribution, both of them were flown out blindfolded to the army camp at
Fort Laur in Nueva Ecija and kept in solitary confinement in dark boarded
cells with hardly any ventilation. When
their persons were produced before the Court on habeas corpus proceedings, they
were a pitiable sight having lost about 30 to 40 lbs. in weight. Senator Diokno was
to be released in September, 1974 after almost two years of detention. No charges of any kind were ever filed
against him. His only fault was that he
was a possible rival for the presidency.
Horacio Morales, Jr., 1977 TOYM awardee for government service and then executive
vice-president of the Development Academy of the Philippines, was among the
hard-working government functionaries who had been radicalized and gave up
their government positions. Morales went
underground on the night he was supposed to receive his TOYM award, declaring
that “(F)or almost ten years, I have been an official in the reactionary
government, serviced the Marcos dictatorship and all that it stands for,
serving a ruling system that has brought so much suffering and misery to the
broad masses of the Filipino people. (I)
refuse to take any more part of this. I
have had enough of this regime’s tyranny and treachery, greed and brutality,
exploitation and oppression of the people,” and “(I)n rejecting my
position and part in the reactionary government,
I am glad to be finally free of being a servant of foreign and local vested
interests. I am happy to be fighting
side by side with the people.” He was apprehended in 1982 and was charged
with the capital crime of subversion, until he was freed in March, 1986 after
President Corazon C. Aquino’s assumption of office,
together with other political prisoners and detainees and prisoners of
conscience in fulfillment of her campaign pledge.
Countless others forfeited their lives and stand as witnesses to
the tyranny and repression of the past regime.
Driven by their dreams to free our motherland from poverty, oppression,
iniquity and injustice, many of our youthful leaders were to make the supreme
sacrifice. To mention a few: U.P. Collegian editor Abraham Sarmiento, Jr. worthy son of an illustrious member of the
Court pricked the conscience of many as he asked on the front page of the
college paper: Sino ang kikibo kung hindi tayo kikibo? Sino ang kikilos kung hindi tayo kikilos? Kung hindi ngayon, kailan pa?13-a
He was locked up in the military camp and
released only when he was near death from a severe attack of asthma, to which
he succumbed. Another TOYM awardee, Edgar Jopson, an
outstanding honor student at the Ateneo University,
instinctively pinpointed the gut issue in 1971 – he pressed for a
“non-partisan Constitutional Convention;” and demanded that the then
president-soon-to-turn-dictator “put down in writing” that he was not
going to manipulate the Constitution to remove his disqualification to run for
a third term or perpetuate himself in office and was called down as “son
of a grocer.” When as he feared, martial law was declared, Jopson went underground to continue the struggle and was
to be waylaid and killed at the age of 34 by 21 military troops as the reported
head of the rebel movement in Mindanao.[14] Another activist honor student leader,
Emmanuel Yap, son of another eminent member of the Court, was to disappear on Valentine’s Day in 1976 at
the young age of 24, reportedly picked up by military agents in front of
Channel 7 in Quezon City, and never to be seen again.
One of our most promising young leaders, Evelio
B. Javier, 43, unarmed, governor of the province of Antique at 28, a Harvard-trained
lawyer, was mercilessly gunned down with impunity in broad daylight at 10 a.m.
in front of the provincial capitol building by six mad-dog killers who riddled
his body with 24 bullets fired from M-16 armalite
rifles (the standard heavy automatic weapon of our military). He was just taking a breather and stretching
his legs from the tedious but tense proceedings of the canvassing of the
returns of the presidential snap election in the capitol building. This was to be the last straw and the bloodless
EDSA revolt was soon to unfold. The
Court in Javier vs. Comelec[15],
through Mr. Justice Cruz, “said these meager words in tribute to a fallen
hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak
against tyranny. Where many kept a
meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in
hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting
obsession: the return of freedom to his
country. And though he fought not in the
barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the
liberties of his people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his
race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark
enslavement. He did not see the breaking
of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio
B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan,
‘swifter than eagles and stronger than lions.'”
6. The greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human
memory. We must note here the
unforgettable and noble sacrifices of the countless brave and patriotic men and
women who fell as martyrs and victims
during the long dark years of the deposed regime. In vacating the death sentence imposed on the
petitioners who survived the holocaust, we render them simple justice and we
redeem and honor the memory of those who selflessly offered their lives for the
restoration of truth, decency, justice and freedom in our beloved land. Due recognition must be given also that 85%
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines readily joined the EDSA revolt and redeemed
the honor of the military by recognizing civilian supremacy and the supreme
mandate given by the people to the true winners of the elections. Witness the testimony of Gen. Fidel V. Ramos,
now chief of the new Armed Forces of the Philippines, as he recounted early
last year his breakaway from the past regime:
“The Armed Forces of the Philippines had ceased to be the real
armed forces supposed to be the defender of the people. There had developed an elite group within the
AFP x x x and the AFP no
longer represented its rank and file and officers corps.
“Mr. Marcos was no longer the same President that we used to
know, to whom we pledged our loyalty and dedicated our services. He was no longer the able and capable commander-in-chief
whom we used to count on. He had already
put his personal interest, his family
interest, above the interest of the people.
“The small people in the AFP and the Integrated National
Police were now being pushed around by powerful military officers motivated by
very selfish desires and intentions.
Many of those officers were now practically the servants of powerful
politicians.”[16]
The present PC/INP Chief, Major General Renato
de Villa, on the 85th anniversary of the Philippine Constabulary last August
8th publicly stated that “for the perfidy of a few, we owe the whole
nation a sincere apology and a commitment to intensively pursue our new program
of reforms, to weed out the misfits who bring discredit to our organization,”
and solemnly pledged that “now and forever, your PC/INP stands ready and
committed to fight lawlessness, injustice and oppression, as well as the
sinister forces that continue to threaten our stability and progress as a free
country. We make this solemn pledge here
and now, before our entire nation, before our Commander-in-Chief who is the personification
of our national honor and unity, before God who has always blessed our people
x x x – to consecrate our
lives to the protection and preservation of our national ideals – of unity,
peace, justice and democracy.”
7. The people by their
overwhelming ratification of the 1987 Constitution at the plebiscite held last
February 2nd unequivocally reaffirmed their collective act of installing our
new government following the bloodless EDSA revolt. They refused to be deterred by the last-ditch
efforts of the forces of the Right and of the Left to derail our return to full
normalcy and the restoration of our democratic institutions. They proclaimed a renewed and vigorous faith
in the democratic process. Among the
great changes introduced in the 1987 Constitution to harness the Presidential
power to impose martial law and strengthen the system of checks and balances in
our government were those made by the venerable late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and his fellow members of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, hereinabove enumerated.[17]
With their work completed, and the 1987 Constitution decisively approved and
ratified by the people, Chief Justice Concepcion
could then claim his eternal rest on last May 3rd and leave us this legacy and caveat: “One thing,” he said, “I have
learned during the martial law regime, and that is – that a Constitution is as
good only as it is enforced. x x x the Primacy of the Law
depends ultimately upon the people; upon their awareness of this fact and their
willingness and readiness to assume the corresponding responsibility, in
short, upon their political maturity.”[18]
[1] Save for Mr. Justice Padilla who inhibited
from the case, as his brother was counsel for petitioner Othoniel
Jimenez.
[2] 63 SCRA 546.
[3] Idem at pp. 625-627.
[4] Idem at p. 628.
[5] Record, Vol. I, G.R. No. 69882, p. 84.
[6]
Record, Idem, Annex “E”, pp. 71-73; emphasis supplied.
[7] Record, idem, Annex “F”, pp. 75-76;
emphasis supplied.
7-a
Solicitor General’s Manifestation in
lieu of Brief dated February 11, 1987, Record, Vol. II, p. 528.
[8] 37 SCRA 420, 427.
[9] Cf. Conde v.
Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924); Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741
(1948); Abriol v. Homeres,
84 Phil. 525 (1949); Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 (1968);
Celeste v. People, 31 SCRA 391 (1970).
[10] Conde v. Diaz, 45 Phil. 173 (1923).
[11] Address of Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion on February 10, 1987 on the eve of the first death anniversary of
the Antique martyr Evelio Javier at the Ateneo Law School.
[12] In re:
habeas corpus petition for Dr. Aurora Parong,
et al., 121 SCRA 472 (1983); see Toyoto vs.
Ramos, 139 SCRA 316 (1985); Habeas Corpus cases of Renato
Cañete (G.R. No. 63776, August 16, 1984) and Aristedes Sarmiento (131 SCRA
405, August 27, 1984).
[13] G.R. No. 51747, Dec. 29, 1986.
13-a If we
don’t protest, who will protest? If we
don’t move, who will move? If not now,
when else?
[14] Olivares; Babst: Bulletin Today issue of Sept. 29, 1982; Soliven: Mr. &
Ms. issue of Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 1984.
[15]
144 SCRA 194 208 (Sept. 22, 1986)
[16] Manila Times issue of March 11, 1986.
[17] Supra, par. 4 hereof.
[18] Supra, see fn. 11.